JUDGMENT - M.S. DESHPANDE, J.:---These 9 petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are directed against the acquisition by the respondents of the several lands owned by the petitioners under the provisions of sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and they may conveniently by taken up for decision together. 2. In Writ Petition No. 1006 to 1009 a notification dated 11-3-1977 under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act came to be published on 17-7-1977. The notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 30-11-1979, but earlier a declaration under section 11 of the Maharashtra Resettlement of Project Displaced Persons Act, 1976 ('Resettlement Act' for short) came to be made on 14-2-1978. In Writ Petition No. 1677, 1836, 1860 and 1877 of 1980 the notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act which was dated 19-5-1977 was published on 30-6-1977 while declaration under section 11 of the Resettlement Act was issued on 24-11-1978 and the notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 23-6-1980. Since only two questions have been canvassed before us, it is not necessary to give the detailed description of the lands involved and the details of contentions raised in the petitions and the answers thereto in the return. 3. The first contention on behalf of the petitioners is that since after the publication of the notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act the declaration under section 11(1) of the Resettlement Act, came to be made, it was necessary for the respondents to follow the procedure prescribed by Chapter III of the Resettlement Act and it was not open to acquire the land in pursuance of section 16 of the Resettlement Act, unless the final notification under section 15 of the Act was made. On the other hand the contention on behalf of the respondents was that since the legal proceedings came to be initiated for acquisition by resorting to section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, merely because the notification under section 11(1) was issued, it was not necessary to follow the procedure prescribed by the Resettlement Act and the modalities prescribed under the Land Acquisition Act could be followed and it was not necessary to follow the procedure prescribed by Chapter III of the Resettlement Act. Further the contention on behalf of the respondents was that even if it were necessary to follow that procedure, the requirements of sections 13 to 15 of the Resettlement Act had been followed and the acquisition cannot be questioned. 4. It is not necessary for us to dwell in detail upon the different provisions of the Resettlement Act as they came to be considered in the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in (Ganpat Balwant Pawar v. Special Land Acquisition Officer)1, 1984 Mh.L.J. 752 . The Full Bench took the view that it was not correct to say that after 11th March, 1977 when the Maharashtra Resettlement of Project Displaced Persons Act, 1976 came in to force that resettlement of persons displaced as a result of any project cannot be done except in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. The procedure prescribed under the Resettlement Act becomes applicable only when a declaration is made under section 11(1) of that Act, that the provisions of the said Act shall be applicable to a project. Such a declaration will follow only after the formation of the opinion by the State Government that it is necessary or expedient in the public interest to make such a declaration. When such a notification is not issued or has not been issued, the Government is free to take recourse to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to resettle the persons who are displaced as a result of any project. When there is no notification under section 11(1) of the Resettlement Act, there is naturally no obligation upon the State Government to resettle persons because the provisions of that Act are not followed and payment of compensation to the affected persons may be enough for the land acquired from them under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. When there is a notification, the obligation is only to follow the procedure for resettling "as many persons as possible." The obligation is relating to the procedure to be followed. Hence where a project has already been completed and no notification under section 11(1) of the Resettlement Act is issued, the resettlement of project affected persons can be done by taking recourse to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Hence where a project has already been completed and no notification under section 11(1) of the Resettlement Act is issued, the resettlement of project affected persons can be done by taking recourse to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. In taking this view the Full Bench dissented from the view taken in (Pandurang Akaji Dawla v. State of Maharashtra)2, Special Civil Application No. 915 of 1977 decided on 17/18th October, 1977, by the Division Bench of this Court. 5. The submission of Shri G.D. Patil, the learned Assistant Government Pleader was that in the case decided by the Full Bench, there was no notification under section 11(1) of the Resettlement Act and what it was called upon to consider was what was to happen to the notification issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in the absence of a notification under section 11(1) of the Resettlement Act. Reference was also made on behalf of the respondents to the observations of the Division Bench in Pandurang's case in relation to the applicability of section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act as to whether the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were "legal proceedings". The conclusion reached ultimately by the Division Bench was that upon issuance of section 4 notification, the private property concerned is subjected to a liability of firstly to survey, inspection and eventual declaration for the purpose of taking it away, and secondly a right accrued in favour of the landholder to get damages under section 5 and the compensation in the manner provided for by the Act upon the principles available under sections 23 and 24 having all reference to the date of making notification under section 4. It held that the entire scheme right from the stage of section 4 notification leading to the declaration under section 6 followed by an award under section 11 and the vesting indicated by section 16, thus constitutes a legal proceeding within the meaning of Clause (c) of section 7 of the General Clauses Act concerning the liability of the property which is the subject of acquisition and the right that accrues to the owner of the property within the meaning of Clause (c) of section 7 ibid. It held that there being no contrary intention available in the provisions of the Displaced Persons Act, these proceedings which were pending cannot be affected and will have to be continued as if the Displaced Persons Act had not come into force. 6. If further went on to observe that the same would not be the position with regard to the notifications under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act after the Displaced Persons Act was made applicable i.e. after 11-3-1977. 7. The Full Bench, however, pointed out that it cannot be said that the provisions of Resettlement Act prohibit the State Government from having recourse to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the contrary view to be found in the judgment of the Division Bench is inconsistent with the clear language in Chapter III of the Resettlement Act, and that it is only when in anticipation of a project or starting of a project, the State Government issues a notification under section 11(1) of the Act that the other provisions of the act come into play, and it is only in such cases that the State Government is under an obligation to follow the procedure prescribed under the Act to achieve the stated object of resettling "as many displaced persons as possible". The full Bench had to resolve the situation created by the differing view in Pandurang's case and in (Gulab Shankar Walke v. Special Land Acquisition Officer)3, 1981 Mh.L.J. 881. In Gulab's case, it was pointed out that reference to Land Acquisition Act in sub-section (2) of section 16 of the Resettlement Act was intended to adopt the mechanism of acquisition evolved there under and recourse thereto for this compulsory acquisition; does not make the acquisition otherwise than under the Act and cannot relieve the authorities of their obligation to comply with sections 13 to 15 of the Act. It was also pointed out that it is fallacious to assume that section 16 contemplates two different modes of compulsory acquisition i.e. one under the Act and the other under the Land Acquisition Act, Sub-section (2) of the section 16 of the Resettlement Act merely adopts the Land Acquisition Act for the requirement of the land under this Act, Creating fiction of the purposes of the Act being a public purposes is intended to remove any possible doubts as to the validity of the contemplated acquisitions. In the view of the Full Bench, the Act does not provide for any other mechanism or the fiction of the acquisition being for a public purpose, would also be inapplicable in that case. The view taken in Gulab Shankar's case found favour with the Full Bench and it pointed out in para 15 that section 16 of the Act cannot come into operation unless all the steps that have to be taken under section 13 to 15 have been taken. In the words of the Full Bench, it is only after this that the State Government gets a picture of the land necessary to be acquired for the purpose of resettling the project affected persons, and it is by invoking the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act that the resettlement is to be made because sub-section (5) of section 16 mentions that all lands acquired shall form part of the land pool. 8. We have referred in detail to the observations of the two Division Benches and the Full Bench only in order to point out that the submission of the learned Assistant Government Pleader that the provisions of the Resettlement Act brought about, as held in Pandurang's case, implied repeal of sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and that, therefore, section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act would become available, would be untenable. In fact, for the application of section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, it is necessary that either that Act or any Bombay Act or Maharashtra Act made after the commencement of the Bombay General Clauses Act, repeals any enactment hither to made or hereafter to be made, then unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not have the consequence of bringing about the effect enumerated in Clauses (a) to (e) of that section. There is nothing in the Resettlement Act which would show that after a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act is issued earlier, the notification under section 11 of the Resettlement Act cannot be issued. Section 11(1) of the Resettlement Act is an enabling provisions. If the State Government is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do, for the resettlement of displaced persons, it may declare that the provisions of the Act shall apply to such project. Section 11(1) of the Resettlement Act is an enabling provisions. If the State Government is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do, for the resettlement of displaced persons, it may declare that the provisions of the Act shall apply to such project. There is nothing in any of provisions of the Resettlement Act which would run counter to the requirements of section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and having regard to the general scheme of Chapter III and particularly to the provision of section 16, which vests in the Government the power to acquire land for the purposes of that Act, it is apparent that the provisions of section 11 of the Resettlement Act are in addition to and supplement those of section 4 of the Act. Nonetheless the modalities of the Land Acquisition Act have to be followed should an opinion be formed as contemplated by section 11 of the Resettlement Act. Considering these factors, we find it impossible to agree with the learned Assistant Government Pleader that two irreconcilable and separate modalities are contemplated for the acquisition of the land, one by initiating action under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, and the other by resort to the provisions of Chapter III of the Resettlement Act. Once this position is understood, it would be clear that all the requirements of Chapter III would have to be ful-filled upon a notification being issued under section 11(1) of the Resettlement Act and unless that is done, as pointed out by the Full Bench, action for acquisition in the teeth of non compliance of the provisions of sections 13 to 15 of the Resettlement Act, would become unsupportable. We are clear that merely because a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act has been issued, it would not do away with the compliance of the provisions of Chapter III, if a notification under section 11 of the Resettlement Act has been issued. 9. In view of this position, it was necessary for the respondents to show that the procedure prescribed by Chapter III had been followed. 9. In view of this position, it was necessary for the respondents to show that the procedure prescribed by Chapter III had been followed. We are referred to the averments in para 3 of the return in which it was pointed out that there was compliance of section 13 after the notification under section 11(1) of the Resettlement Act came to be issued and the requisite information was collected and public notices came to be issued as required under section 19(1) and the provisional declaration as required under section 14(1) was published in the Gazette dated 26-4-1979 inviting objections and suggestions and because no objections were received, proposal for issued of notification under section 15 of the Resettlement Act was submitted to the Collector, Buldana. There was no reference to the final notification being issued under section 15, but the learned Assistant Government Pleader stated before us that the final notification under section 15 was published on 16-7-1980. That was evidently after the notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 30-11-1979. As already pointed out, having regard to the ratio of the Full Bench decision in para 15 of the report at page 758, it is only after the steps have been taken under sections 13 to 15 that action can be taken by invoking the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act preceded the final notification under section 15 of the Resettlement Act on 10-7-1980 and so the notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, cannot stand in the present case. 10. In the Writ Petition Nos. 1005 to 1009 of 1980, 1677 of 1980, 1836 of 1980, 1860 of 1980 and 1877 of 1980 admittedly no action under sections 13 to 16 of the Resettlement Act was taken before issuing the notice under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act on 23-6-1980, a notification under section 11 of the Resettlement Act was issued on 24-11-1978. Since this action fell foul of the provisions of Chapter III of the Resettlement Act, the notification under section 6 issued in these cases also would have to be quashed. 11. In the result, we quash the notification issued by the respondent for acquisition of the land under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, and make the rule absolute. Since this action fell foul of the provisions of Chapter III of the Resettlement Act, the notification under section 6 issued in these cases also would have to be quashed. 11. In the result, we quash the notification issued by the respondent for acquisition of the land under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, and make the rule absolute. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. Order accordingly. -----