PRABIR KUMAR MAJUMDAR, J. ( 1 ) THE Court : The West Bengal State Electricity Board issued a notice inviting tender for fabrication and erection of structural steelwork for Kolaghat Thermal Power Project. The respondent Texmaco Ltd. submitted its tender quoting the prices with specific price variation terms, covering certain items, the said structural steelworks. A formal agreement was executed between the West Bengal State Electricity Board and the Texmaco Ltd. on 20th September, 1980. The said agreement contained an arbitration clause which, inter alia, provides that in the event of disputes and differences between the parties the same shall be referred to the arbitration of two persons, one to be nominated by the purchaser and the other by ande contractor. The arbitrators thereafter nominated an umpire who shall be appointed before they enter upon the reference. ( 2 ) DISPUTES and differences having arisen between the parties, the same was referred to the arbitration in terms of the said arbitration agreement.-The respondent nominated Shri R. K. Choudhury, a partner of Khaitan and Co. Advocates and the West Bengal State Electricity Board nominated one Shri S. K. Datta a retired District Judge, to act as Joint Arbitrators. The Joint Arbitrators thereupon nominated and appointed Shri Salil Kumar Roy Chowdhury, a retired Judge of this Court as the Umpire before the said Joint Arbitrators entered upon the reference. During the pendency of the arbitration before the said Joint Arbitrators the Government of West Bengal in or about November, 1986 directed the said State West Bengal State Electricity Board to make over the Kolaghat Thermal Power Project, stages I and II with all its assets and liabilities as on 1st April, 1986 to the West Bengal Power Development Corporation Ltd. subject to the terms and conditions contained in the notification dated 4th November, 1986 which, inter alia, provides that all suits, cases, applications or arbitration proceedings pending in any Court and any Arbitrator relating to the generating station against the Board shall, with effect from the date of the notification, be deemed to have been instituted against the West Bengal Power Development Corporation. On 5th February, 1987 the said West Bengal Power Development Corporation made a formal application for substituting the Corporation instead and in place of the West Bengal State Electricity Board. On 5th February, 1987 the said West Bengal Power Development Corporation made a formal application for substituting the Corporation instead and in place of the West Bengal State Electricity Board. ( 3 ) AFTER the execution of the formal contract on 20th September, 1980 the work of fabrication was completed in or about middle of September, 1985. It appears that the said work order which formed part of the formal agreement contains amongst others detailed provision for payment of wage escalation and a formula of wage escalation has been set out in the said work order. From time to time the respondent submitted bills in terms of the contract and diverse payments were made by the West Bengal State Electricity Board to the respondent against such bills. The West Bengal State Electricity Board, however, disputed its liability for payment on account of wage escalation and excise duty thereon and thus disputes and differences arose between the parties regarding wage escalation and excise duty and these were the subject matter of the arbitration proceedings before the said Joint Arbitrators. ( 4 ) THE West Bengal State Electricity Board contended amongst other that it was not liable for payment of any amount for wage escalation and excise duty and the formula for wage escalation as stipulated in the con- tract should_be suitably modified so that such escalation clause would have reasonable next with the upward variation of the actual wage structures. The West Bengal State Electricity Board also filed a counter claim against the respondent before the Joint Arbitrators. ( 5 ) AFTER hearing the submissions of the Counsel appearing for the respective parties on facts as also on law and also considering the various statement, submissions taking into the account the totally of evidence and circumstances and the nature of disputes and differences referred to them, the Joint Arbitrators on 28th December 1987 made the following award:"1. We hold direct and award that the wage escalation clause contained in the Works order/formal contract dated 20th September, 1980 is binding on the parties. 2. We hold direct and award that the corporation should pay Rs. 1,67,00,000 (Rupees one Crore and sixty seven lakhs to the company within three months from the date hereof. 3. We hold direct and award that the Corporation is liable for payment of interest @ 11% (eleven percent) per annum on Rs. 2. We hold direct and award that the corporation should pay Rs. 1,67,00,000 (Rupees one Crore and sixty seven lakhs to the company within three months from the date hereof. 3. We hold direct and award that the Corporation is liable for payment of interest @ 11% (eleven percent) per annum on Rs. 1,67,00,000 (Rupees one crore and sixty seven lakhs) to be computed from 1st day of July, 1985 till the date hereof and accordingly, we direct the Corporation to pay the same along with the sum of Rs. 1,67, (0,000 (Rupees one crore sixty seven lakhs ). 4. We hold that all other claims and contentions by one party against the other stand rejected. 5. We direct the parties to pay and bear their respective cost of arbitration proceedings. Dated this 28th day of December, 1987. Sd. S. K. Datta, Sd. R. K. Chowdhury joint Arbitrators". ( 6 ) THE petitioner West Bengal Power Development Corporation Ltd. has challenged the said award under Section 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act contending, inter alia, that the Joint Arbitrators proceeded on the basis of mistaken construction of the contract and accordingly misdirected themselves. The Joint Arbitrators arrived at a conclusion ignoring the material documents that is the documents pertaining to a similar contract in the work at Bandel and thereby misconducted themselves and the proceedings. The Joint Arbitrators have come to the findings that on the wordings of the contract as referred to as work order or formal award itself and have thereby impliedly incorporated the contract and clauses in it and the award as passed is bad in law and on facts on the face of it. The Joint Arbitrators have impliedly incorporated the contract and its clauses in the award and the Court is competent to look into the merits of the case. The Joint Arbitrators have indicated legal proposition in the award itself by holding that Clause 10 (ii) of the Contract is binding on the parties which is the basis of the award and such finding is erroneous and also there is an error of law on the face of the award. ( 7 ) MR. A. C. Bhabra, appearing for the petitioner West Bengal Power Development Corporation contents that the award is a reasoned award and the 5ndings of the Joint Arbitrators are dot compatible with the reasons contained in the award. ( 7 ) MR. A. C. Bhabra, appearing for the petitioner West Bengal Power Development Corporation contents that the award is a reasoned award and the 5ndings of the Joint Arbitrators are dot compatible with the reasons contained in the award. The learned Counsel has also submitted that the Joint Arbitrators have not considered certain facts although those facts were available to the arbitrators from the statements and counter statements and other documents placed before the Joint Arbitrators. ( 8 ) MR. Bhabra has also contended that in any event, if it be held that the Joint Arbitrators have not made a reasoned award, then in view of the large claim and also the large amount being awarded, the Joint Arbitrators should have indicated reasons to support their conclusions. It has also been submitted by the learned counsel that there were 12 issues referred to the Joint Arbitrators but the Joint Arbitrators have not decided all the issues referred to them. ( 9 ) LASTLY, as to the question of interests, it is the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the award as to interest is bad in view of the recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court. ( 10 ) MR. Bhabra has referred to the recital of the facts as also the contentions made by the West Bengal State Electricity Board, the petitioner and he has made an endeavour to suggest that each and every such recitals amounts to reason. The learned Counsel has drawn the attention of the Court to a recital "and WHEREAS in view of the aforesaid. . . . . . . the Joint Arbitrators make this award as follows. " ( 11 ) MR. Bhabra submits that as it will appear from the award itself that the Joint Arbitrators have observed that work order formed part of the formal agreement which contains amongst other detailed provision for payment of the wage escalation. It will also appear therefrom that the Joint Arbitrator's have recorded the contentions of the West Bengal State Electricity Board that the formula for wage escalation in the contract should be suitably modified so that such escalation clause would have reasonable nexus with the upward variation of the actual wage structures. It has also been contended by Mr. It will also appear therefrom that the Joint Arbitrator's have recorded the contentions of the West Bengal State Electricity Board that the formula for wage escalation in the contract should be suitably modified so that such escalation clause would have reasonable nexus with the upward variation of the actual wage structures. It has also been contended by Mr. Bhabra that in rejecting such contentions on behalf of the West Bengal State Electricity Board, the Joint Arbitrators have held that the wage escalation clause contained in the works order/formal contract dated 20th September, 1980 is binding on the parties. ( 12 ) MR. Bhabra has also contended that the Joint Arbitrators as to wage escalation contained in the works order or the formal contract dated 20th September, 1988 is inconsistent with the materials on record and the Joint Arbitrators by making a reference to the work order or formal contract in the award itself have impliedly incorporated the contract and clauses in it into the award. It is the contention of Mr. Bhabra that the Court is competent to look behind the award particularly the contract to test the finding of the Joint Arbitrators as to the binding nature of wage escalation clause. ( 13 ) THE learned Counsel Mr. Dilip Surana who is led by Mr. Anindya Mitra has submitted that whatever that have been stated by way of recitals are mere narration of facts and by way of recitals the contentions of the West Bengal State Electricity Board have also been recorded. Mr. Surana submitted that this cannot be taken as reasons in the award for the conclusion arrived at by the Joint Arbitrators. ( 14 ) MR. Surana submits that the law uptill is now that the Arbitrator is not required to indicate reasons in the award in support of the conclusions arrived at by the Arbitrator. If, however, there is a mandate by the parties contained in the arbitration clause itself that the Arbitrator while adjudicating the disputes and differences between the parties should indicate reasons for the conclusions reached by him then he should indicate reasons. It has also been submitted by Mr. Surana that even if there is any recent trend to indicate reasons in the award such trend has not resulted into a legal proposition that the Arbitrator should be always indicate reasons in the award. It has also been submitted by Mr. Surana that even if there is any recent trend to indicate reasons in the award such trend has not resulted into a legal proposition that the Arbitrator should be always indicate reasons in the award. ( 15 ) IT has been submitted by Mr. Surana referring to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa vs. Dandasi Sahu, reported in AIR 1988 S. C. 1791 that the law as it stands today is that award without reasons are not bad per se. The award can only be set aside on the ground of misconduct or on an error apparent on the face of the award. In the said decision, it has also been observed by the Supreme Court that it is well settled that when parties choose their own arbitrator to be the judge in dispute between them, they cannot, when the award is good on the face of it, object to the decision either upon law or on facts. The Supreme Court has also observed when arbitrator commits mistake either in law or in fact in determining the matter referred to him, where such mistake does not appear on the face af the award and the documents appended to or incorporated so as to form part of it, the award will neither be remitted not set aside. ( 16 ) MR. Surana has also referred to another Supreme Court decision in the case of Coimbatore District P. T. Samgam vs. Bala Subramania Foundry sported in AIR 1987 S. C. 2045 to contend that the mistake as to law not appearing on the face of the award as also the mistake of the fact are not amenable to correction by the court dealing with an application for setting aside the award. ( 17 ) MR. Surana has also referred to another Supreme Court decision in the case of Hindusthan Tea Co. vs. K. Sashikanta, AIR 1987 S. C. 1981 where the court held that under the law the Arbitrator is made the final arbiter of the dispute between the parties referred to him and the award is not open to challenge on the ground that the arbitrator has reached a wrong conclusion or has failed to appreciate facts. ( 18 ) MR. Surana has also submitted in answer to the contention of Mr. ( 18 ) MR. Surana has also submitted in answer to the contention of Mr. Bhabra that about 12 issues were referred to Arbitrator and the Joint Arbitrators have not decided all of them, that the Arbitrator is not bound to deal with all the issues separately. The Arbitrator may make a lump sum award. ( 19 ) I have already set out the material portions of the award and also have indicated the facts and contentions as recorded by the Joint Arbitrators in the impugned award. ( 20 ) MR. Bhabra firstly has argued that the Joint Arbitrators have given reasons and those are erroneous in law. As I have indicated above, Mr. Bhabra has referred to the facts recorded by the Joint Arbitrators that the respondent while submitting tender dated 3rd May, 1975 quoted their prices with specific price variation terms and the work order issued after the execution of the contract which contains amongst other detailed provision for payment of wage escalation and also the formula. Mr. Bhabra has also pointed out that the Joint Arbitrators rejecting the contentions of he said West Bengal State Electricity Board that the formula for wage escalation should be suitably modified so that the escalation clause would have reasonable nexus with the upward variation of the actual wage structure held that the wage escalation clause contained in the work order/formal contract dated 20th September, 1980 is binding on the parties. ( 21 ) MR. Bhabra's contention is that by holding that the said wage escalation clause is binding on the parties the Joint Arbitrators have made a legal proposition of law on the face of the award which is the basis of the impugned award and such legal proposition, according to Bhabra, is erroneous. It has also been contained by Mr. Bhabra that as there is a reference to the contract in the Award the Court can find an error of law on the face of the award or in the document being the contract incorporated thereto. ( 22 ) I am unable to accept this contention of Mr. Bhabra. The Judicial Committee of Privy Council in Champony Bhara and Co. vs. Jivraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Co. ( 22 ) I am unable to accept this contention of Mr. Bhabra. The Judicial Committee of Privy Council in Champony Bhara and Co. vs. Jivraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. , AIR 1923 Privy Council 66 held that the error of law on the face of the award means that the one can find in the award or in the document incorporated thereto as, for instance, a note appended by the Arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment, some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which is erroneous. ( 23 ) THE Supreme Court in various decisions had occasion to consider this question as to what an error of law on the face of the award means. ( 24 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of Allen Berry and Co. vs. Union of India AIR 1971, S. C. 696 has observed that mere reference to the contract in the award is not to be held as incorporated it. ( 25 ) THE Supreme Court has also observed that the test is, does the Arbitrator come to a finding on the wording of the contract, if he does he can be said to have impliedly incorporated the contract or a clause in it whichever be the case. But a mere general reference to the contract in the award is not to be held as incorporating it. The Supreme Court further observes that the principle of reading contracts or other documents into the award is not to be encouraged or extended. ( 26 ) FINALLY, the Supreme Court observes that even when an Arbitrator commits a mistake either in law or in fact in determining the matter referred to him, that such mistake does not appear on the face of the award or in a document appended to or incorporated in it so as to form part of it, the award will neither be remitted nor set aside notwithstanding the mistake. ( 27 ) THIS view has been reiterated in several decisions of the Supreme Court pronounced later ( 28 ) THIS view has also been reiterated in the latest Supreme Court decision in U. P. Hotels vs. U. S. Slate Electricity Board AIR 1989 S. C. 268. ( 27 ) THIS view has been reiterated in several decisions of the Supreme Court pronounced later ( 28 ) THIS view has also been reiterated in the latest Supreme Court decision in U. P. Hotels vs. U. S. Slate Electricity Board AIR 1989 S. C. 268. The Supreme Court in this case has observed that even assuming that there was an error of construction of the agreement or even that there was an error of law in arriving at a conclusion, such an error is not an error which is amenable to correction even in a reasoned award under the law. The Supreme Court observed that in order to set aside the award, there must be a wrong proportion of law laid down in the award as the basis of the award. ( 29 ) I have indicated the nature of the award and in my view, this is a non-speaking award. I cannot, however, accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that this is a reasoned award and quoting the Supreme Court in U. P. Hotels case (Supra) that even assuming that there is an error of construction of the agreement or even that there was an error of law contained in a reasoned award, such an error is not amenable to correction, unless of course, this is found to be a legal proposition of law on the face of the award which is erroneous. ( 30 ) I have already indicated that in my view, this impugned award is not a speaking award or a reasoned award. Again assuming it to be a reasoned award the reasonableness of the reasons given by the arbitrator in making his award cannot be challenged. This view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Delhi Municipal Corporation vs. M/s. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar AIR 1987, S. C. 2316. ( 31 ) IT is also the law that in a case of arbitration where the parties stated that the claims were based on an agreement and on nothing else, all that the arbitrator had to decide was as to the effect of an agreement, and the Arbitrator had really to decide a question of law i. e. , of interpreting the document, the agreement. Such a decision of his is not open to challenge. Such a decision of his is not open to challenge. See the decision in Kapoor Nilokheri Co-operative Dairy Farm Society Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1973 S. C. 1338. ( 32 ) IN the present case, the question, whether wage escalation clause in the contract is binding or not, is a question to he decided with reference to the contract entered by the parties, and in deciding such question the Joint Arbitrators have to decide the effect of the contract and that itself is a question of law before the Joint Arbitrator, As has been held in U. P. Hotels case, an error of construction of an agreement is not an error amenable to correction. ( 33 ) IT has also been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Joint Arbitrators have not dealt with each and every issues referred to him and also have not considered the counter claim put forward by the petitioner before the Joint Arbitrators. ( 34 ) I have already stated above, that the arbitrator need not deal with each and every issue. ( 35 ) IT will also appear from the impugned award itself that the Joint Arbitrators have held that all other claims and contentions by one party against the other stand rejected. Therefore, it is not correct to say that the Joint Arbitrators have not considered the respective claims and contentions by one party against the other. ( 36 ) REGARDING interest, as would appear from the Award, the Joint Arbitrators have made an award to the effect that the petitioner is liable for payment of interest at the rate of 11% per annum on the awarded some Rs. 1,67,00,000 (Rupees one crore sixty seven lakhs) to be computed from 1st day of July, 1985 till the date of the award. ( 37 ) THE recent decision of the Supreme Court, in Executive Engineer Balidanga vs. Abaduth Jana, reported in AIR 1988, S. C. 1520 is that Arbitrator is not competent to award interest prior to the date of reference if the claim was not made under the Interest Act 1978 or under any other statute. It has also been held by the Supreme Court in this decision that the Arbitrator is not competent to make an award for pendente lite interest that is from the date of the reference to the date of the award. It has also been held by the Supreme Court in this decision that the Arbitrator is not competent to make an award for pendente lite interest that is from the date of the reference to the date of the award. ( 38 ) IN view of the said decision of the Supreme Court I hold that this part of the award relating to the Award of interest against paragraph 3 is bad. This part should be deleted and is hereby deleted. This being severable from the rest of the award, the award for Rs. 1,67,00,000 (Rupees one crore sixtyseven lakhs) can be sustained and is hereby sustained. ( 39 ) THE award subject to the modification indicated above is, therefore, sustained and upheld. ( 40 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, this application challenging the impugned award except the said modification is dismissed. There will be no order as to cost. ( 41 ) THERE will be a stay of operation of this judgment and order for a period of fortnight from date. Application dismissed with some modifications.