JUDGMENT Roy. J. 1. The points for determination in both the appeals being the same, although the appellants are different, even though they are related, they are taken up for analogous hearing and consideration, by consent of parties. 2. Both the appeals were directed against the judgment and orders dated 19th May, 1987, passed in C.R. No. 7882 (W) of 1985 and C.R. No. 7883 (W) of 1987 respectively, by a learned Single Judge of this Court and by such judgment, the learned Single Judge was pleased to dismiss the Writ proceedings and discharge the Rules, with a further stipulation that such orders of discharge will not prevent the Writ petitioners of move appropriate Civil Court, for seeking redress and relief in accordance with law. It should be noted that at the time of hearing of the Rules and during the course of hearing, there were interim order issued and the learned Judge directed such interim order to continue for two months from the date of judgment. We feel that such extension of the interim order was granted to facilitate the Writ petitioners to move the appropriate forum and to obtain necessary orders, if so advised. 3. It was the case of the appellant in F.M.A. No. 855 of 1987, that the Respondent authorities viz., West Bengal Housing Board invited offers from the public, in order to enable them to have allotment of fiats proposed to be built at Golf Green Urban Complex, Tollygunge under Phase-IV, on certain terms and conditions, which were contained in a brochure and it was directed that the necessary allotments would be made on the basis of lottery. A Xerox copy of the brochure was produced by Mr. P.K. Das, the learned Advocate appearing for the appellants and the same contained, inter alia, amongst others that the Board shall have the right to allot portions of land included in the common areas and the facilities of the Estate on lease hold basis to organisation/institution approved by West Bengal Homing Board) Government (Central or State) with the concurrence of the Apartment Owners Association, apart from containing general conditions for the intending applicants for flats/houses/plots under different schemes of the West Bengal Housing Board. The portions of such guidelines which would be relevant for us, on the basis of the submissions as made, as hereunder : 1. ….. ……. …….. ……. …… 2. ….. The portions of such guidelines which would be relevant for us, on the basis of the submissions as made, as hereunder : 1. ….. ……. …….. ……. …… 2. ….. …… ……… …… 3. ……. …. …… ……. ……. 4. The applicant shall have to furnish documentary evidence such as latest Income-Tax assessment order or tax clearance certificate to salary certificate in proof of his/her income. For those who do not have regular salaried employment and who are below taxable-limit, a signed affidavit stating the source and amount of his/her income should be furnished. No application will be considered without those certificates. 5. …… …….. ……. ……… 6. …. ……….. ……. ……. 7. …… ……. ……. ….. 8. …. ….. …….. …….. . … 9. ….. …. …… …… …… …… …… ….. ….. ...and the terms and conditions for allotment of the flats were as under ; 1.A. ……. …… ……… …….. …… …….. . B. ….. …… …….. …….. ……… ………. C. …. …… …….. …….. ……… ……. D. Every applicant shall furnish with his/her application proof of his/her income (e.g. salary certificate or Income Tax Clearance certificate or those who are below taxable limit signed affidavit showing source and amount of their annual income). Annual income means gross annual income. No application will be considered without such certificate and the procedure for making the allotment was as under; (i) ….. …… ……. ….. ……. (ii) …… ……. ……… ……. (iii) Only one flat will be allotted to one person or to more than one person of the same family applying jointly. Family means husband, wife, dependant parents and children. (iv) …………. …. ……….. ……….. ………. (v) ……… ……… ……… ……… (iv) ……. ….. ……….. …… 4. Admittedly, on or about 4th June, 1980, the appellant in F.M.A. No. 855 of 1987, applied for allotment of flat at the concerned complex under the West Bengal Housing Board and she has claimed to have paid the requisite amount of Rs. 6,000/-, being 10 per cent of the price of the flat which was Rs. 60,000/- along with her application and she has also claimed to have submitted details or her annual income. 5. 6,000/-, being 10 per cent of the price of the flat which was Rs. 60,000/- along with her application and she has also claimed to have submitted details or her annual income. 5. Before proceeding with the facts of the appeal, we must also remember that the Housing Scheme and so also the West Bengal Housing Board is framed and formulated under the West Bengal Housing Board Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) which was enacted to provide for the constitution of a Housing Board for West Bengal and for matters connecting therewith or incidental thereto and since it was also felt to be expediented to provide for the constitution of such Board and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 6. It has been stated that the lottery as mentioned hereinbefore, was held on or about 29th October, 1980, wherein the appellant was selected for allotment of one flat under the concerned ownership flat scheme at the said complex and on 6th March, 1981, a letter from the concerned Board to her was issued intimating of allotment of flat No.22/8, on the 3rd floor and stating that balance 40 per cent of the price of her flat, amounting to Rs. 17,781.18P. should be paid by her to the Board through Canara Bank, Chowringhee Road Branch, Calcutta within 60 days from the date of issue of the letter and in default, the allotment will stand automatically cancelled. 7. It was the case of the appellant that thereafter, she duly deposited Rs. 18,197.21 D. as part payment of the price of her flat as allotted and such payment included interest and according to her, she also furnished all the requisite documents. In fact, she has pointed out that without those documents the part payment as made, would not be accepted by the answering Respondents. It was also the case of the appellant that on or about 16th April, 1983, she paid a further sum of Rs.15,022.27P. as part payment of price and such amount included maintenance charges of the flat as allotted to her and she has stated that she received a receipt, duly signed and granted. 8. It was also the case of the appellant that on or about 16th April, 1983, she paid a further sum of Rs.15,022.27P. as part payment of price and such amount included maintenance charges of the flat as allotted to her and she has stated that she received a receipt, duly signed and granted. 8. The appellant has stated that thereafter, on or about 12th September, 1983, a letter was sent to her by the Board, requesting her to submit Income-Tax Clearance certificate for 1981-82 and 1982-83 within 15 days and in default, it was intimated that the allotment of her flat will stand cancelled. The appellant, admittedly on 21st September, 1983, applied to the Board for extension of time to obtain and deposit such Income-Tax Clearance certificate and it was her further case that on 30th September, 1983, she obtained the necessary Clearance certificate from the authorities concerned for 1982-83 and on 10th October, 1983, she deposited the same with the concerned Board. 9. It has been stated that thereafter on 13th April, 1984, she received a letter from the said Board, intimating that the allotment of the flat as made in her favour, has been cancelled and the amount as deposited by her, will be refunded in due course. The said letter of cancellation has been disclosed as Annexure-F to the Writ petition. In reply to the above letter, on or about 19th April, 1984, the appellant communicated with the concerned Board and indicated that she has complied with the relevant formalities duly and such being the position, there was no reason as to why her allotment of the concerned flat, should be with held. In the said letter, which has been disclosed as Annexure-G to the petition of motion, she has also stated that there was no fault on her part, in complying with the necessary requirements and she has already applied for membership of Co-operative Society viz., Shyamalima Co-operative Housing Society Limited and such fact was also informed to the authorities of the concerned Board. In such circumstances and view of the matter, she pleaded that the cancellation order as indicated hereinbefore, should be recalled and must not be given effect to. 10. There was reply to the above letter of the appellant on 27th April, 1984, from the Assistant Housing Commissioner of the concerned Board. In such circumstances and view of the matter, she pleaded that the cancellation order as indicated hereinbefore, should be recalled and must not be given effect to. 10. There was reply to the above letter of the appellant on 27th April, 1984, from the Assistant Housing Commissioner of the concerned Board. stating that the appellant has committed breach of the terms and conditions as contained in Chapter II, Rule ID of the terms and conditions of the brochure (the relevant particulars whereof we have quoted hereinbefore) and she has also failed to furnish Income-Tax Clearance certificate for 1981-82, 1982-83 and for the current year as per requisition made by the Board, through their letter of 12th September, 1983. The abovementioned letter has been disclosed as Annexure-H to the petition of motion. 11. It would appear that even thereafter, on 27th April, 1984, a further instalment of Rs. 3,271.44P. was paid by the appellant, as part payment of the price of the flat in question, against receipt granted by and on behalf of the cashier of the concerned Housing Board. This receipt has been disclosed as Annexure-I to the petition of motion. It was the case of the appellant that taking into account all the payment as have been made by her, she has in fact, made a total part payment of Rs. 42,690.92P. out of Rs. 60,000/-, which was the aggregate price of the flat as allotted to her. 12. Since there was no compliance with the demand as made by the appellant, after serving a formal demand for justice dated 11th May, 1984, the Writ petition, which was dismissed in the manner as indicated hereinbefore and from which this appeal was presented on 10th July, 1987, was moved and order obtained along with the interim order as indicated earlier. 13. As pointed out earlier, the learned trial Judge had dismissed the Writ proceedings and that was not only on the basis of a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of (1) Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation v. Shyam Ganeriwala, 91 CWN 217, which amongst others has indicated that a contract which is held from the Government stands on no different footing from a contract held from a private party. The breach of the contract, if any, may entitle the person aggrieved to sue for damages, in appropriate cases even specific performance but he cannot complain that there has been a deprivation of the right to practise any profession or carryon any occupation, trade or business such as is contemplated by Article 19(1)(g). 14. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld and drawn to any subsequent decision of the Supreme Court where the said Court can be said to have expressed in its doubt or alter the principles so enunciated, in the case of (2) Radhakrishna Agarwal v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1496 , the Supreme Court further clarified the position and re-affirmed the same principles when it held "after the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines the rights and obligations of the parties inter se. No question where the State or its agents purporting to act within this field performs any Act. In this case the Supreme Court further laid down that no order can issue under Article 226 of the Constitution to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple and also the observations in the case of (3) Har Sankar v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner & Ors., AIR 1978 SC 1181 and those in the case of (4) Divisional Forest Officer v. Biswanath Tea Company Limited, AIR 1981 SC 1378, on the further observations that this Court would not be in a position to entertain the Writ proceedings even though in his view the allotments were cancelled arbitrarily. Such being the position, the learned Judge had relegated the parties to suit. It should be noted that in the case of Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation as mentioned hereinbefore, the Division Bench of this Court has also observed that a right derived from an agreement or a contract may be infringed by breach thereof. In all such cases the remedy available is the usual remedy under the laws, namely, specific performance or damages. Irrespective of whether the party committing the breach is a private individual or the State and/or its instrumentalities, in all such cases the parties to the agreement or contract having entered into a contractual relationship they would be governed exclusively by the laws relating to contract. Irrespective of whether the party committing the breach is a private individual or the State and/or its instrumentalities, in all such cases the parties to the agreement or contract having entered into a contractual relationship they would be governed exclusively by the laws relating to contract. But at the same time a right derived from an agreement with the State may as well be infringed by the State by way of breach thereof but by some administrative action taken in exercise of any statutory power or in exercise of its sovereign power. Simple illustration in our opinion would explain the position. A lease or interest derived under the lease obtained from the State may itself be the subject-matter of acquisition or requisition by the State and such acquisition or requisition by the State would certainly infringe the leaseholder's right under the lease. Similarly, with ever increasing statutory control over the economic processes it is often to be found that Statutory prescriptions are often so far imposed on the terms of an agreement or a contract between the parties particularly wherein' the Stale or its instrumentality is a party thereto and in such cases the right derived from an agreement may be infringed in exercise of powers under the agreement but subject to the statutory limitations. 15. Before we take up the case for further consideration and that too on the pleadings of the parties, it should be noted that in both the appeals, cross-objections were filed by the West Bengal Housing Board and its authorities under Order 41, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure and those cross-objections have been filed through separate supplementary Paper-books. 16. The Respondents in the Rule, who were also Respondents in these appeals claimed IInd contended that such cancellation of allotment as made in this case, would at best amount to a breach of agreement and as such, no Writ proceedings would be maintainable and so this Court would not bit justified in making any interference in such jurisdiction. In fact, such submissions were made before the learned Judge by the answering Respondents, on the basis of the determinations in the case of Har Sankar v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner & Ors. In fact, such submissions were made before the learned Judge by the answering Respondents, on the basis of the determinations in the case of Har Sankar v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner & Ors. (Supra), where, on the basis or the pleadings in that case it has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India that a Writ proceedings would not be an appropriate remedy for impeaching the validity of contractual obligations. Apart from the said determinations, the answering Respondents in the Writ proceedings, also referred to the case of M/s. Radhakrishna Agarwal & Ors. v. State of Bihar & ors (Supra), where, amongst others it has been observed that at the very threshold or at the time of entry into the field of consideration of persons with whom the Government could contract at all, the State, no doubt, acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations which dealings of the State with the individual citizens import into every transaction entered into in exercise of its constitutional powers. But after the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but they are governed by the legally valid contract which determines rights and obligations of the parties inter se and that being the position there would be no question of any violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India or any constitutional provisions when the State or its agents purportings to act within such field of contract. 17. In addition to the above, the answering Respondents also relied on the determinations in the case of (5) M/s. S. Pal & Co. v. State of Tripura & Ors., AIR 1984 Calcutta 379, wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court has observed in the facts of that case that the petitioner was not entitled to any remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution for threatened enforcement of the bank guarantee by the Government. Arbitrariness or illegality of action by the State in the field of contract not governed by any statute falls within the domain of private law which is outside the realm of public law, the remedy for which is to be pursued in the Civil Court and not in the Writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Arbitrariness or illegality of action by the State in the field of contract not governed by any statute falls within the domain of private law which is outside the realm of public law, the remedy for which is to be pursued in the Civil Court and not in the Writ jurisdiction of the High Court. In such a case, no grievance could be made that the Government have deliberately misread and misconstrued the clauses of the agreement between the parties as the dispute over interpretation of the terms of the contract cannot be resolved in the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. 18. Mr. Das appearing for the appellants, not only before the learned trial Judge but also before us and that too on the basis of the available pleadings, claimed and contended that the Housing Board in the instant case had no jurisdiction to violate the provisions of the said Act and the answering Respondents had also no authority to consider the Income Tax Clearance certificate of the appellant for the year 1981-82 and 1982-83, being the financial year and the certificate for the year 1983-84 being the assessment year, as was filed and produced, was sufficient. In any event, it was contended that the appellants were under no legal obligations to furnish their Income Tax Clearance certificates under the law and they, in the instant case, failed to consider that the appellants had paid all the required sums till 22nd April, 1984, together with maintenance charges even after the purported cancellation orders and the Respondents having accepted such payments, could not authorisedly take the plea of non-maintainability of the Writ proceedings and more particularly when, the answering Respondents being statutory authorities or organisations or limbs of the State were required to act fairly and not unfairly, as they have acted in the instant case. In any event, Mr. Das submitted that the Writ proceedings in the facts and circumstances of the case and his submissions, particulars whereof would be indicated hereafter, the learned trial Judge should have held to be maintainable and he should have granted the reliefs as asked for. In any event, Mr. Das submitted that the Writ proceedings in the facts and circumstances of the case and his submissions, particulars whereof would be indicated hereafter, the learned trial Judge should have held to be maintainable and he should have granted the reliefs as asked for. It was his further submission that without appropriately considering the facts of the present case and the law as involved in the instant case, the learned trial Judge made his order and he was wrong in not declaring that the authorities concerned had acted, while cancelling the allotment, arbitrarily and with mala fide intention and such acting on their behalf was not clothed with the authority, in terms of the Supreme Court decisions as indicated in this case. 19. In support of his submissions, Mr. Das also referred firstly, to section 17 of the said Act, which lays down and postulates the powers and duties of the said Board, to under take Housing Scheme. Then and secondly, he referred to section 17 of the said Act, which deals with the matters to be provided for by Housing Scheme and he placed heavy reliance on sub-section (c) of section 18, on the basis whereof, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being, enforce a Housing Scheme may provide amongst others for..................(c) the sale, letting out or exchange of any property included in the scheme and thirdly, to section 26 of the said Act, which enumerates the other duties of the concerned Board. 20. It was contended by Mr. Das that since, after the advertisement as made by the authorities concerned or on the basis thereof, the appellants had changed their position and acted prejudicially to their interest by such changing of position, they were estopped, because of their promise as indicated, in cancelling the allotments as made in their favour. In support of his submissions as above, Mr. Das that since, after the advertisement as made by the authorities concerned or on the basis thereof, the appellants had changed their position and acted prejudicially to their interest by such changing of position, they were estopped, because of their promise as indicated, in cancelling the allotments as made in their favour. In support of his submissions as above, Mr. Das referred to the case of (6) The Gujarat Stott Financial Corporation v. M/s. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd, AIR 1983 SC 848 where, in the facts of that case, it has been observed that it is too late in the day to contend that the instrumentality of the State which would be "other authority" under Article 12 of the Constitution can commit breach of a solemn undertaking on which other side has acted and then contend that the party suffering by the breach of contract may sue for damages but cannot compel specific performances of the contract. It was not disputed that the Gujarat State Financial Corporation which is set up under section 3 of the State Financial Corporation Act, is an instrumentality of the State and would be "other authority" under Article 12 of the Constitution. By its letter of offer and the subsequent agreement the appellant Corporation entered into a solemn agreement in performances of its statutory duly to advance the loan of Rs. 30 Lakhs to the respondent-company. Acting on the solemn undertaking the respondent proceeded to undertake and execute the project of setting up a 4 Star Hotel. The agreement to advance the loan was entered into in performance of the statutory duty cast on the Corporation by the statute under which it created and set up. On its solemn promise evidenced by the aforementioned two documents, the respondent incurred expenses suffered liabilities to set up a hotel. Presumably, if the loan was not forthcoming, the respondent may not have undertaken such a huge project. Acting on the promise of the appellant evidenced by documents, the respondent proceeded to suffer further liabilities to implement and execute the project. Presumably, if the loan was not forthcoming, the respondent may not have undertaken such a huge project. Acting on the promise of the appellant evidenced by documents, the respondent proceeded to suffer further liabilities to implement and execute the project. In the back drop of this incontrovertible fact situation, the principle of promissory estoppel would come into play and then, to the case of (7) Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2414 where, while dealing with promissory estoppel, the Supreme Court, amongst others has observed that in the formative period, it was generally said that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked by the promises unless he suffer 'detriment' or 'prejudice'. It was often said simply that the party asserting the estoppel must have been induced to act to detriment. All that is now required is that the party asserting the estoppel must have acted upon the assurance given to him. Must have relied upon the representation made to him. It means the party has changed or altered the position by relying on the assurance or the representation. The alteration of position by the party is the only indispensable requirement of the doctrine. It is not necessary to prove further any damage, detriment or prejudice to the party asserting the estoppel. The Court, however, would compel the opposite party to adhere to the representation acted upon or abstained from acting. The entire doctrine proceeds on the promise that it is reliance based and nothing more, apart from observing that the concept of detriment as it now stands is whether it appears unjust, unreasonable or inequitable that the promisor should be allowed to resile from him assurance or representation, having regard to what the promisee has done or refrained from doing in reliance on the assurance or representation and indicating that is, however, quite fundamental that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be used to compel the public bodies or the Government carry out the representation or promise which is contrary to law or which is outside their authority or power. Secondly, the estoppel stems from equitable doctrine. It, therefore, requires that he who seeks equity must do equity. The doctrine, therefore, cannot also be invoked if it is found to be inequitable or unjust in its enforcement. Secondly, the estoppel stems from equitable doctrine. It, therefore, requires that he who seeks equity must do equity. The doctrine, therefore, cannot also be invoked if it is found to be inequitable or unjust in its enforcement. In additional to the observations that for the purpose of finding whether an estoppel arises in favour of the person acting on the representation, it is necessary to look into the whole of the representation made. The representation, must be clear and unambiguous and not tentative or uncertain and where certain rate of freight for carriages of its Naptha was claimed by a fertilizer company on basis of certain assurance as to rate of freight given by the Railway Board before setting up of the factory of the Company but from the letter containing the assurance it was clear that the rate of freight stated therein was subject to review by the Railway, the assurance could not be said to be clear and unqualified. No question of estoppel would therefore arise in favour of the Company. On the basis of the determinations as indicated, it was Mr. Das's specific submissions that the authorities under the said Act, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, had a statutory duty and obligation cast on them and such being the position and more particularly when the appellants have complied with the part of their performances/obligations, they could not authoritatively or authorisedly cancel the allotment as made and that too in performance of their statutory duties. 21. While on the point, further reference was made by Mr. Das to the case of (8) M/s. Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy etc. v The State of Jammu & Kashmir & Anr., AIR 1980 SC 1992 , where it has that the discretion of Government in the facts of that case, which according to Mr. Das fit in with the facts of the present case, while granting largess under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, the discretion left with the Government would not be unlimited and their action must satisfy the test of reasonableness and public interest. In fact, Mr. Das referred to the observations of the Supreme Court to the effect that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or granting other forms of largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will. In fact, Mr. Das referred to the observations of the Supreme Court to the effect that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or granting other forms of largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will. There are two limitations imposed by law which structure and control the discretion of the Government in this behalf. The first is in regard to the terms on which largess may be granted and the other, in regard to the persons who may be recipients of such largess. Unlike a private individual the State cannot act as it pleases in the matter of giving largess and it cannot choose to deal with any person it pleases in its absolute and unfettered discretion and every activity of the Government has a public element in it and it must therefore, be informed with reason and guided by public interest. If the Government awards a contract or leases out or otherwise deals with its property or grants any other largess, It would be liable to be tested for its validity on the touch-stone of reasonableness and public interest and if is fails to satisfy either test, it would be unconstitutional and invalid, apart from indicating that it must follow as a necessary corollary that the Government cannot act in a manner which would benefit a private party at the cost of the State, such an action would be both unreasonable and contrary to public interest. The Government, therefore, cannot, for example, give a contract or sell or lease-out its property for a consideration less than the highest that can be obtained for it, unless of course there are other considerations which render it reasonable and in public interest to do so. The Government, therefore, cannot, for example, give a contract or sell or lease-out its property for a consideration less than the highest that can be obtained for it, unless of course there are other considerations which render it reasonable and in public interest to do so. Such considerations may be that some Directive Principle is sought to be advanced or implemented or that the contract or the property is given not with a view to earning revenue but for the purpose of carrying out a welfare scheme for the benefit of particular group or section of people deserving it or that the person who has offered a higher consideration is not otherwise fit to be given the contract or the property and also Indicating that there may be an infinite variety of considerations which may have to be taken into account by the Government in formulating its policies and it is on a total evaluation of various considerations which have weighed with the Government in taking a particular action, that the Court would have to decide whether the action of the Government is reasonable and in public interest. 22. One basic principle which must guide the Court in arriving at its determination on this question is that there is always a presumption that the Governmental action is reasonable and in public interest and it is for the party challenging its validity to show that it is wanting in reasonableness or is not informed with one and it has to be discharged to the satisfaction of the Court by proper and adequate material. The Court cannot lightly assume that the action taken by the Government is unreasonable or without public interest. But where it is so satisfied, it would be the plainest duty of the Court under the Constitution to invalidate the Governmental action. This is one of the most important functions of the Court and also one of the most essential for preservation of the rule of law. It may be pointed out that this ground of invalidity, namely, that the Governmental action is unreasonable or lacking in the quality of public interest, is different from that of public interest, is different from that of malafides though it may, in a given case, furnish evidence of malafides. 23. As indicated earlier, it was in fact. Mr. It may be pointed out that this ground of invalidity, namely, that the Governmental action is unreasonable or lacking in the quality of public interest, is different from that of public interest, is different from that of malafides though it may, in a given case, furnish evidence of malafides. 23. As indicated earlier, it was in fact. Mr. Das’s contentions that the contracts in the instant cases, were statutory contracts and to establish whether Courts have right to interfere in case of infraction of such statutory contracts, reference was made by him to the case of (9) Rohtas Industries Ltd. & Anr. v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 425 which was a case of statutory arbitration and while dealing with the powers of the High Court, It has been observed that the expansive and extra-ordinary power of the High Courts under Article 226 is as wide as the amplitude of the language used indicates and so can effect any person even a private individual and be available for any (other) purpose even one for which another remedy may exist. The amendment to Article 226 in 1963 interesting Article 226(1A) reiterates the targets of the writ power as inclusive of any person by the expressive reference to 'the residence of such person'. The Supreme Court has spelt out wise and clear restraints on the use of this extra-ordinary remedy and High Courts will not go beyond those whole some inhibitions except where the monstrosity' of the situation or other exceptional circumstances cry for timely judicial interdict or mandate. The mentor of law is justice and a potent drug should be judiciously administered. Speaking in critical retrospect and portentous prospect, the writ power has, by and large, been the people's sentinel on the qui vive and to cut back on or liquidate that power may cast a peril to human rights. It was further claimed and contended by Mr. Das that appropriate Writ or Writs can go against a public body i.e., the Board in the instant case, even though their action as challenged, would come within the domain of contract and in support of such submissions, he referred to the case of(10) The D.F.O. South Kheri & Ors. It was further claimed and contended by Mr. Das that appropriate Writ or Writs can go against a public body i.e., the Board in the instant case, even though their action as challenged, would come within the domain of contract and in support of such submissions, he referred to the case of(10) The D.F.O. South Kheri & Ors. v. Ram Sanhai Singh, AIR 1973 SC 205 , where in has been indicated that where the action of a public authority invested with statutory powers is challenged, the writ petition is maintainable even if the right to relief arises out of an alleged breach of contract. The said submissions were also sought to be supplemented by Mr. Das, on a reference to the case of (11) Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. Brajo Nath Ganguly & Anr., AIR 1986 SC 1571 . which according to the editorial notes as pointed out by Mr. Das, is a landmark case relating to the service contracts and it was pointed out by him that on interpretation of the relevant Service Rule the Supreme Court held that the Rule empowering the Government Corporation to terminate services of its permanent employees by giving notice or pay in lieu of notice period is opposed to public policy and violative of Article 14 and directive principles contained in Articles 39(8) and 41. In that case, a Company carrying on the business of maintenance or running of river services entered into a scheme of Arrangement with the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited, a Government Company owned by Central Government and to two State Governments and therefore, they have been held and found to be "State" within the meaning of Article 12. It would appear that a scheme which was framed, was approved by this Court and the Company in question, was dissolved by the order of the High Court. It has been indicated that the officers of the Company had no real choice when they accepted the job with the Corporation as, in the alternative, they would have received meagre sums by way of compensation and would have been required to search for alternative jobs. They had no real choice when the rules were framed by the Corporation for the officers as refusal to accept the rules would have resulted in termination of their services. They had no real choice when the rules were framed by the Corporation for the officers as refusal to accept the rules would have resulted in termination of their services. It has been indicated that a sub-clause in a rule provided for termination of services of the officers by giving three months' notice and that clause in the rule was struck down by the High Court and the Supreme Court also approved the said decision by observing that considering the inequality in the bargaining power of the parties the clause in the contract of employment was void under section 23 of the Contract Act as opposed to public policy, besides being ultra vires Article 14. In fact, the Supreme Court has observed amongst other that where an interpretation clause defines a word to mean a particular thing, the definition is explanatory and prima fade restrsctive ; and whenever an interpretation clause defines a term to include something, the definition is extensive. While an explanatory and restrective definition confines the meaning of the word defined to what is stated in the interpretation clause, so that wherever the word defined is used in the particular statute in which that interpretation clause occurs, it will hear only that meaning unless where, as is usually provided, the subject or context expands or extends the meaning of the word defined to include within it what would otherwise no have been comprehended in it when the word defined is used in its ordinary sense. Article 12 uses the word "includes". It thus extends the meaning of the expression "the State" so as to include within it also what otherwise may not have been comprehended by that expression when used in its ordinary legal sense. Article 12 defines the expression” the State" while the other Articles of the Constitution, such as Article 152 and Article 308, and clause (58) of section 3 of the General Clauses Act define the term “State”. The deliberate use of the expression "the State" In Article 12 as also in Article 36 would have normally shown that this expression was used to denote the State in its ordinary and Constitutional sense of an independent or sovereign State and the inclusive clause in Article 12 would have extended this meaning to include within its scope whatever has been expressly set out in Article 12. The definition of the purposes of Paris III and IV of the Constitution. The contents of these two parts clearly show that the expression "the State" in Article 12 as also in Article 36 is not confined to its ordinary and Constitutional sense as evtended by the inclusive portion of Article 12 but is used in the concept of the State "in relation to the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution and the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in Part IV of the Constitution which principles are declared by Article 37 to be fundamental to the governance of the country and enjoins upon the State to apply in making laws, apart from indicating that if there is an instrumentality or agency of the State which has assumed the garb of a Government Company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, it does not fallow that it thereby ceases to be an instrumentality or agency of the State. For the purposes of Article 12 one must necessarily see through the corporate veil to ascertain whether behind that veil is the face of an instrumentality or agency of the State. The Central Inland Water Transport Corporation, squarely falls within these observations and it also satisfies the various tests which have been laid down. Merely because it has so far not the monopoly of Inland water transportation is not sufficient to divest it of its character of an instrumentality or agency of the State. It is nothing but the Government operating behind a corporate veil, carrying out a governmental activity and governmental functions of vital public Importance, There cand thus be no doubt that the Corporation is "the State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and also observing that Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd, is not only a Government Company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, but is wholly owned by the Central Government and two State Governments jointly. It is financed entirely by these three Governments and is completely under the control of the Central Government, and is managed by the Chairman and Board of Directors appointed by the Central Government and removable by it. In every respect it is thus a veil behind which the Central Government operates through the instrumentality of a Government Company. The activities carried on by the Corporation are of vital national importance. In every respect it is thus a veil behind which the Central Government operates through the instrumentality of a Government Company. The activities carried on by the Corporation are of vital national importance. It is ridiculous to describe the Corporation are of great importance to public interest concern and welfare, and are activities of the nature carried on by a modern State and particularly a modern Welfare State. 24. The Supreme Court has further observed that the principle deducible from various precedents is that the Courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract, or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract entered into between panics who are not equal in bargaining power. For instance, the above principle will apply where the inequality of bargaining power is the result of the great disparity in the economic strength of the contracting parties. It will apply where the inequality is the result of circumstances, whether of the creation of the parties or not. It will apply to situation in which the weaker party is in a position in which he can obtain goods or services or means of livelihood only upon the terms imposed by the stronger party or go without them. It will also apply where a man has no choice, or rather no meaningful choice but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in a prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of rules as part of the contract, however unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a clause in that contract or form or rules may be. The types of contracts to which the principle formulated above applies are not contracts which contain terms which are so unfair and unreasonable that they shock the conscience of the Court. They are opposed to public policy and require to be adjudged void, and the officers of the Corporation challenging the validity of the Rules had no real option when they accepted the appointment with the Corporation when the Company in which they were serving was dissolved by the order of High Court, after the High Court approved the Scheme of Arrangement entered into by the Company with the Corporation. They had also no choice in the matter of acceptance of the Rules when they were framed as non-acceptance would have resulted in termination of their services. The Rules in question form part of the contract of employment who are not workmen. These employees had no powerful workmen's Union to support them. They had no choice but to accept the said Rules as part of their contract of employment. There is gross disparity between the corporation and its employees, whether they be workmen or officers. The Corporation can afford to dispense with the services of an officer. It will find hundreds of others to take his place but an officer cannot afford to lose his job because if he does so, there are not hundreds of jobs waiting for him. A clause such as clause (i) of Rule 9 is against right and reason. It is wholly unconscionable. It has been entered into between parties between whom there is gross inequality of bargaing power. Rule 9(i) is a term of the contract between the Corporation and all its officers. It affects a large number of persons and it squarely falls within the principle formulated above. A clause such as Rule 9(i) in a Contract of employment affecting large sections of the public is harmful and injuries to the public Interest for its tends to create a sense of insecurity in the minds of those to whom it applies and consequently is against public and. Such a clause, therefore, is opposed to public policy and being opposed to public, it is void under section 23 of the Contract Act. While on the point, reference was further made by Mr. Das, to the Bench decision in (12) M/s. Gupta Biscuit Pvt. Ltd. v. United Commercial Bank & Anr., 1987 (1) Cal LJ 474, where this Court had occasion to hold amongst others, that in exceptional cases, Writ will lie to enforce a contractual obligation between a bank and its depositors. A further reference, while on the point, was by Mr. Das to the case of (13) Central Group & Ors. A further reference, while on the point, was by Mr. Das to the case of (13) Central Group & Ors. v. Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority & Ors., 1982 (2) CHN 90 , where a learned Single Judge of this Court in the facts of that given case, has observed that if the petitioners seeks to enforce a purely contractual term, the Court normally does not entertain an application for such purposes under Article 226 of the Constitution. But when one of the contracting parties is the State and the challenge is thrown by the petitioner alleging that certain action as arbitrarily, and attack to such an action under Article 14 of the Constitution is fully favourable. Mr. Das submitted that the case of Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation V. Shyam Ganeriwala (Supra), as referred to and relied on by the learned trial Judge while making the determinations, would not be applicable in this case and such determinations cannot also be held to be the good law in view of the determinations in the cases of Ramanna Dayaram Sethi v. International Airport Authority (Supra), Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited & Anr. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr. (Supra), and The D.F.O. South Kheri & Ors. v. Ram Sanhai Singh (Supra), and more particularly when the contract before the determinations of the Division Bench of this Court in the case as mentioned hereinbefore, was one pure and simple, but here in this case, such a contract was entered into or executed in exercise of statutory powers under the provisions of the said Act, the particulars whereof, have been quoted hereinbefore. It was further claimed by Mr. Das that the said Calcutta decision is also distinguishable as in that case, there was no question of promissory estoppel raised or there was any question of violation of principles of natural justice the want of the exercise of fair action. 25. It was further claimed by Mr. Das that the determinations in the case of M/s. Radhakrishna Agarwal & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (Supra), as indicated and referred to by the learned trial Judge, should not have been applied in this case, since the said determination has been duly and appropriately distinguished in the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited & Anr. (Supra). v. State of Bihar & Ors. (Supra), as indicated and referred to by the learned trial Judge, should not have been applied in this case, since the said determination has been duly and appropriately distinguished in the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited & Anr. (Supra). He claimed further that since the State or a statutory authority as in this case was required to act fairly and not arbitrarily, in exercise of their statutory powers and the said Board has admittedly acted contrary to such provisions, the learned trial Judge should have held that interference in this case was just and required and in not doing so, the learned trial Judge had not acted duly. Mr. Das further indicated that the case of M/s. S. Pal & Co. v. The State of Tripura & Ors. (Supra), and the determinations as made therein, cannot be made applicable in the facts of this case since in that case, there was no allegation of any breach of statutory contract which incidentally is the case here. 26. It was the further submission of Mr. Das that since the refusal to allot the flat to the appellants in there two appeals, was cases of unfair discrimination, as others have been allotted flats the self same and similar circumstances, so there was unfair discrimination in the instant case and that being the position, following the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of (14) Manager, Government Branch Press & Anr. v. D.B. Belliappa, AIR 1979 SC 429 , the learned trial Judge should have, on making the necessary interference, allowed the Writ petition. 27. Lastly, Mr. Das referred to another Bench decision of this Court in the case (15) Biswanath Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 93 CWN 19, that was also a case under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, regarding allotment of flats, by the said Board on the basis of their Brochure as in this case, and Their Lordships of the said Division Bench, had occasion to construe the said Brochure and the relevant paragraph of the same. It would appear that in that case the writ petitioner-appellant applied to the West Bengal Housing Board for allotment of a flat after making the necessary monetary deposit initially. It would appear that in that case the writ petitioner-appellant applied to the West Bengal Housing Board for allotment of a flat after making the necessary monetary deposit initially. Thereafter he made the second deposit when the Respondents No.5 being satisfied about the eligibility of the writ petitioner, directed him to made such a deposit. The said deposit was, however made subsequent to the date fixed. Thereafter, the writ petitioner married and after marriage it transpired that his wife had earlier to the said marriage been allotted a flat by the West Bengal Housing Board. Eventually, the allotment of the flat in favour of the writ petitioner was cancelled on the ground that his wife had been allotted a flat. The writ petition being dismissed, the present appeal was brought to challenge the said cancellation of the allotment of the flat as also the decision of the learned trial Judge and it has been held that the appellant was eligible to get allotment of flat when he made an application for the same and when on scrutiny of the relevant facts, letter of allotment was also issued in his favour, apart from indicating that paragraph 5 of the Brochure published by the West Bengal Housing Board relating to Golf Green Urban Complex, Phase IV specifically provides for the rules and procedure to be followed for documentation and transfer of the flats in clauses (i) to (iv) thereof. It has also been indicated in this case that if an allotment of a flat has been made in favour of the applicant on fulfilment of all the terms a conditions to get an allotment, such allottee is entitled to get the document of transfer of the flat in terms of para 5 of the Brochure published by the West Bengal Housing Board, Golf Green Urban Complex, Phase IV and the general guidelines do not override such specific provisions and once all allotment is made in favour of an applicant on fulfilment of all the conditions for getting allotment, the transfer of the flat since allotted to an applicant is a matter of course and consequential to allotment of the flat. Such an allotment can only be cancelled if the allottee fails to pay the price within the stipulated time and/or fails to obtain permission from the authorities of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, apart from holding further that the said Board cannot refuse transfer of a flat already allotted to an applicant eligible to get allotment of such flat, if such applicant gets permission from the competent authority and pays the price of the flat and other outgoings within the stipulated time. The rules and/or guidelines do not provide that successful allottes will not get the effect of allotment on execution of the deed of transfer in his or her favour on the score that subsequently a member of the family of the allottee happens to own a house and/or a flat and paragraph 5 of the Brochure published by the West Bengal Housing Board for allotment and transfer of the flat in Golf Green Complex governs the terms and conditions of such transfer and the General Guidelines are basically informative in nature and these indicate only the eligibility of an applicant to get allotment and/or transfer of a flat belonging to the said Housing Board and these Guidelines do not override the specific provisions of allotment and consequential transfer of the flat and its delivery of possession. 28. On the basis of the facts and circumstances of the present case and the submissions as recorded hereinbefore, it was the specific and categorical submissions of Mr. Das that firstly, the action in the instant case, which was used and exercised by the said Board, which is a statutory authorities, was arbitrary and the contract in the instant case being a statutory one, any breach of the same or infraction, could be interfered with by this Court and since the action in the instant case was arbitrary and against the well laid norms of promissory estoppel or more particularly when, the appellants have acted to their detriment and prejudice and have changed their position on the basis of such premises and more particularly when, the action of the answering respondents was arbitrary and against the principles of natural justice, interference by this Court was necessary and could be possible. Such being the position, It was the further submission and claim of Mr. Such being the position, It was the further submission and claim of Mr. Das that this Court would not be denuded of its powers to make the necessary interference as asked for and more particularly when, the contract in the instant case, was a statutory one and there was or has been admitted infrition of the same. It was his further submission that the infraction in the instant case was not of a contract simplicitor. 29. Mr. Dutta, appearing for the said Board and opposing the submissions of Mr. Das claimed that the Brochure in question, which was and is binding on the parties, was not a statutory one and such being the position and more particularly when, the parties in the instant case, were bound by the terms of the said Brochure, the contract in this case was nothing but a contract simplicitor and such being the position, this Court had no jurisdiction to make any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and such being the admitted position, the learned trial Judge was not wrong and he acted within his jurisdiction, competence and power, to make the order as impeached. 30. To establish his submissions, Mr. Dutta referred to the case of Har Shankar & Ors. v. The Deputy Excise and Taxation, Commissioner & Ors, AIR 1975 SC 1121 with particular reference to paragraph 23 of the report which indicates that a writ petition is not an appropriate remedy for impeaching validity of contractual obligations. In that case the Supreme Court was considering the question of grant and allocation of liquor shops under the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 and in proceedings arising out of an appeal from a judgment and order under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Then, he referred to the observations in the case of (16) Premjibhai Parmer & Ors. v. Delhi Development Authority & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 738 and specific reference was made by him to paragraphs 7 and 8 of that report. Then, he referred to the observations in the case of (16) Premjibhai Parmer & Ors. v. Delhi Development Authority & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 738 and specific reference was made by him to paragraphs 7 and 8 of that report. It would appear that a preliminary objection was raised by the authority that the concerned objections were not maintainable under Article 32 of the Constitution inasmuch as the petitioners did not come to the Court for enforcement of a fundamental-right conferred upon them under Part-III of the Constitution but they had invoked jurisdiction of the Court for a relief of re-opening of concluded contract and also submitted that if the Court accepts the contention of the petitioners, they would derive an unfair advantage on others, who may not have applied flats because of the prices set-out in the Brochure and if surcharge was excluded, they may have applied for flats at a lower price and, therefore also, the Court should not entertain the petitions, on such facts amongst others and more particularly when discriminatory treatment was allowed. It has been indicated that while determining the prices of flats, the authorities concerned act purely in executive capacity and when State or its agents enter into contractual field, the relationship are not governed by a constitutional province arid such being the position in case of the concerned nature, there would be no question of violation of any contractual provisions, including Article 14 of the Constitution of India. On the basis of the above determinations, Mr. Dutta indicated that since in this case the statutory authority, if the said Board has such a character had entered into the concerned contract in their executive capacity, this Court will have right in not making any interference. 31. While on the question of power of interference by this Court in a proceedings of the present nature, Mr. Datta claimed and contended that since in the instant case, the right as claimed is not threatened under a statute, but under a contract simplicitor, this Court should not and cannot make any interference. In support of such submissions, he referred to the case of (17) Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Datta claimed and contended that since in the instant case, the right as claimed is not threatened under a statute, but under a contract simplicitor, this Court should not and cannot make any interference. In support of such submissions, he referred to the case of (17) Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Escorts Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1986 SC 1370 and he made specific reference to the observations to the effect that while it cannot be doubted that every action of the State or an instrumentality of the State must be informed by reasons and that, in appropriate cases, actions uninformed by reasons may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution, Article 14 cannot be construed as a character for judicial review of State action and to call upon the State to account for its actions in its manifold activities by stating reasons for such actions. For example, if the action of the State is political or sovereign in character, the Court will keep away from it. The Court will not debate academic matters or concern itself with the intricacies of trade and commerce. If the action of the State is related to contractual obligations or obligations arising out of the tort, the Court may not ordinarily examine is unless the action has some public law character attached to it. Broadly speaking, the Court will examine actions of State if they pertain to the public law domain and refrain from examining them if they pertain to the private law field. The difficulty will lie in demarcating the frontier between the public law domain and the private law field. It is impossible to draw the line with precession and it may not be attempted. The question must be decided in each case with reference to the particular action, the activity in which the State or the instrumentality of the State is engaged when performing the action, the public law or private law character of the action and a host of other relevant circumstances. When the State or an instrumentality of the State ventures into the corporate would and purchases the shares of a company, it assumes to itself the ordinary role of a shareholder, and dons the robes of a shareholder, with all the rights available to such a shareholder. When the State or an instrumentality of the State ventures into the corporate would and purchases the shares of a company, it assumes to itself the ordinary role of a shareholder, and dons the robes of a shareholder, with all the rights available to such a shareholder. There is no reason why the State its a shareholder should be expected to state its reasons when it aware or change the management, by a resolution of the Company like an other shareholder, and then to the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited & Anr. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr. (Supra), to which reference was also made by the learned trial Judge. In fact, Mr. Dutta indicated that the Supreme Court has observed that the principle deducible from various precedents is that the Courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract, or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract, entered into between parties who arc not equal in bargaining power. For instance, the above principle will apply where the inequality of barganing power is the result of the great disparity in the economic strength of the contracting parties. It will apply where the inequality is the result of circumstances, whether of the creation of the parties or not. It will apply to situations in which the weaker party is in a position in which he can obtain goods or services or means of livelihood only upon the terms imposed by the stronger party or go without them. It will also apply where a man has no choice, or rather no meaningful choice, but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in a prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of rules as part of the contract, however unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a clause in that contract or form or rules may be. The types of contracts to which the principle formulated above applies are not contracts which are tainted with illegality but are contracts which contain terms which are so unfair and unreasonable that they shock the conscience of the Court. They are opposed to public publicy and require to be adjudged void. The officers of the Corpn. The types of contracts to which the principle formulated above applies are not contracts which are tainted with illegality but are contracts which contain terms which are so unfair and unreasonable that they shock the conscience of the Court. They are opposed to public publicy and require to be adjudged void. The officers of the Corpn. challenging the validity of the Rules had no real option when they accepted the appointment with the Corporation when the Company in which they were serving was dissolved by the order of High Court after the High Court approved the Scheme of Arrangement entered into by the Company with the Corporation. They had also no choice in the matter of acceptance of the Rules when they were framed as non-acceptance would have resulted in termination of their services. The Rules in question form part of the contract of employment between the Corporation and its employees who are not workmen. These employees had no powerful workmen. Union to support them. They had no voice in the framing of the said Rules. They had no choice but to accept the said Rules as part of their contract of employment. There is gross disparity between the Corporation and its employees. Whether they be workmen or officers. The Corporation can afford to dispense with the services of an officer. It will find hundreds of others to take his place but an officer cannot afford to lose his job because if he does so, there are not hundreds of jobs waiting for him. A clause such as clause (i) of Rule 9 is against right and reason. It is wholly unconscionable. It has been entered into between parties between whom there is gross inequality of bargaining power Rule 9(1) is a term of the contract between the Corporation and all its officers. It affects a large number of persons and it seqarely falls within the principle formulated above. A clause such as Rule 9(i) in a Contract of employment affecting large sections of the public is harmful and injurious to the public interest for its tends to create a sense of insecurity in the minds of those to whom it applies and consequently is against public good. Such a clause, therefore is opposed to public policy and being opposed to public policy, it is void under section 23 of Contract Act. Such a clause, therefore is opposed to public policy and being opposed to public policy, it is void under section 23 of Contract Act. It was further claimed that the said determination was made, since the terms were found to be unconscionable and be supplemented his submissions by saying that here the terms were not unconscionable, but they were admittedly known and accepted and such being the position, even an application of the principles as laid down in the concerned case, this Court cannot and should not interfere in a case of the present nature. Mr. Dutta made further reference to the case of M/s. Radhakrishna Agarwalla & Ors. V. State of Bihar & Ors. (Supra), and on the basis of the determinations therein, claimed that since the instant case was not a case of threatened violation of rights and obligations followed from the Brochure in question, so no interference could be made by this Court. In fact, the learned trial Judge has also made a reference to the judgment under consideration. Thereafter, reference was made by Mr. Dutta to the case of Hindusthan Petroleum Ltd. & Ors. v. Shyam Ganeriwala (Supra), which has also been referred to and relied on by the learned trial Judge and claimed that since in the instant case, the contract was a concluded one, so applying the tests as mentioned in the case under consideration, the judgment and order as made by the learned trial Judge was due, legal, proper and authorised. It was his further claim that the contract in the instant case was not a statutory one, but a contract simplicitor and to establish the norms to find out if a given contract is a statutory one or contract simplicitor, he claimed that the Court should first try and find out for answering the question in the affirmative whether there is or has been a statutory duty or a sovereign obligation to be performed. In support of such submissions, Mr. Dutta made a reference to the case of (18) Kulchhinder Singh & Ors. v. Hardayal Singh Brar & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 2216 , where it has been indicated that the remedy of Article 226 is unavailable to enforce a contract qua contract. A mere contract agreeing to a quota of promotions cannot be exalted into a service rule or statutory duty. v. Hardayal Singh Brar & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 2216 , where it has been indicated that the remedy of Article 226 is unavailable to enforce a contract qua contract. A mere contract agreeing to a quota of promotions cannot be exalted into a service rule or statutory duty. Private law may involve a State, a statutory body, or a public body in contractual or tortious actions. They cannot be siphoned off into the writ jurisdiction. Although Article 226 is of wide amplitude to correct manifest injustice, but contractual obligations in the ordinary course, without even statutory complexion cannot be enforced by this short, though, wrong cut. Hence, a writ petition merely to enforce an agreement entered into between the employees and the co-operative Bank about giving certain percentage of promotions to existing employees is not maintainable. While on the point Mr. Dutta also placed strong reliance to the case of The Divisional Forest Officer Vs. Biswanath Tea Company Ltd. (Supra), in which case a Company tried to enforce through a Writ petition the right to remove timber without the liability to pay royalty and it was held that the Company was not enforcing its right under Rule 37 of the Assam Land & Revenue and Local Rates Regulations but was seeking to enforce a contractual right under the specific terms of contract of lease agreed between the Company and the Government. Such contractual right, therefore, it has been observed, could not be enforced through a Writ petition. 32. We have indicated earlier that submissions were made by the learned Advocate appearing for the appellants on promissory estoppel. Mr. Dutta on a reference to the pleadings claimed that such argument, not having either been taken in the writ proceedings nor any exception being taken on such basis, the said argument cannot be allowed to be made now and at this stage of the appeal. It was pointed out by Mr. Dutta that only in affidavit-in-reply the appellant has claimed that the respondents are in the habit of harassing the allottees by issuing cancellation notices and later on by wrongful pursuation they withdraw such notices. I may mention that the flats allotted to Sri Pradip Kumar Das Gupta. Indu Bhusan Patra, Sm. Shankari Das Gupta and Sri Bhupendra Lal Nath were cancelled by notice Nos. 6278/WB dt. 2.7.83, 6277/WB dt. 2.7.83, 6286/WB dt. 2.7.83 and 6275/WB dt. I may mention that the flats allotted to Sri Pradip Kumar Das Gupta. Indu Bhusan Patra, Sm. Shankari Das Gupta and Sri Bhupendra Lal Nath were cancelled by notice Nos. 6278/WB dt. 2.7.83, 6277/WB dt. 2.7.83, 6286/WB dt. 2.7.83 and 6275/WB dt. 2.7.83 respectively but these flats were again given back to the aforesaid allottees after having wrongful gains from them. I further state that the respondents have accepted payments from me even after issue of the said cancellation notices. Not because that the payment was receive without any security of the papers but the payments were accepted after the receipt were scrutinised by various departments and then passed for payment and such being the position, the submission on promissory estoppel should also be allowed to be advanced. While dealing with the question, reference was made by Mr. Dutta to the case of (19) Bhagabati Prosad v. Chandramal, AIR 1966 SC 735 , where it has been observed that undoubtedly if a party asks for relief on a clear and specific ground, and in the issues or at the trial no other ground is covered either directly or by necessary implication, it would not be open to the said party to attempt to sustain the same claim on a ground which is entirely new. But in considering the application of the doctrine to the facts of particular case, Court must bear in mind the other principles that consideration of form cannot override the legitimate consideration of substance. While on the points, further reference was made by Mr. Dutta to the case of (20) Ramswarup Gupta (dead) by L.R. v. Vishnu Narayan Inter College & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1242 , which was dealing with a question regarding lack of pleadings and has also indicated that it is not desirable to place undue emphasis on form instead, substance of pleadings should be considered. It was Mr. Dutta's specific submission that even if we look to the substance of pleadings or considered the same, the case under consideration, was such, where no interference could be made. Dealing with the question as indicated hereinbefore, a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of (21) Union of India v. Narayan Chandra Chakraborty, 1982(1) CHN 1 , was also referred to and relied on by Mr. Dealing with the question as indicated hereinbefore, a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of (21) Union of India v. Narayan Chandra Chakraborty, 1982(1) CHN 1 , was also referred to and relied on by Mr. Dutta which has indicated that pleadings have to be interpreted not with formalistic rigour but with due consideration of or awareness of low legal literacy of the people. In that case the learned Judge in his judgment in accepting the respondent’s claim founded on the basis of promissory estoppel has mainly relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1979 SC 621 . Since in judgment appealed against observations of the Supreme Court in that case so far as relevant to the facts of this case has been quoted in extenso to avoid prolixity it is not necessary to reiterate the same. From the said decision it appears that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to appeal in future knowing or Intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom promise is made and it is In fact so acted upon by the other party the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties and this would be irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not. It further appears that the doctrine of promissory estoppel need not be inhibited by the same limitation as estoppel in the strict sense of the term. It being an equitable principle involved by the Court for doing justice there is no reason why it would be given only limited application by way of defence. It was further observed that there was no reason or logic or principle why promissory estoppel should also not be available as a cause of action. Further, for application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel it is not necessary that the promisee acting in reliance of the promise should have altered his position in reliance on the promise. It was further observed that there was no reason or logic or principle why promissory estoppel should also not be available as a cause of action. Further, for application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel it is not necessary that the promisee acting in reliance of the promise should have altered his position in reliance on the promise. But if by detriment it is meant some injustice to the promisee which results if the promissor were allowed to recede from his promise the detriment would certainly come in as a necessary ingredient. In the above can Supreme Court has in detail dealt with the doctrine of promissory estoppel as applicable in India. 33. It was also suggested by Mr. Dutta that if at all, the terms of the Brochure in question, which had not had a statutory character, were not complied with and therefore, there was admitted non-compliance with the terms of the same, but such non-compliance, on the basis of the observations as indicated hereinbefore or the decision as cited at the Bar, would not authorise this Court to make any interference in the present proceedings. 34. Mr. Dutta submitted that in the case of Premjibhoi Parmar & Ors. v. Delhi Development Authority & Ors. (Supra), no question of arbitrary action was involved and the question was one if proper price was charged or to get back the price and no physical possession in that case was given and since no physical possession in this case was also given, the re-opening of contractual obligation as in this case, duly authorised this Court to make any enquiry or interference. He submitted that Escorts's case (Supra), as relied on by Mr. Das would not apply in this case since the field of enquiry therein, was different from the present case and the relevant pleadings as indicated earlier, was absent. On the effect of paucity of pleadings on promissory estoppel, reference was made by Mr. Dutta to the cases of The Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. M/s Lotus Hotel Pvt. Ltd. (Supra), and be claimed that if the said determination is strictly scanned, it would appear that this Court in the state of pleadings In this case, would not be entitled to make any interference in this case and same was also the submission or Mr. Dutta on the determinations as made in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd v. Union of India (Supra). In that case on or about 19th April, 1969, the appellant Company filed a complaint under Sections 14(1)(a) and (b) of the Railways Act 1890 before the Railway Rates Tribunal, Madras and contended that the Railway Board was estopped and/or precluded from going back on the assurance of quoting station to station concessional rate 85-B when the Company had invested a large amount of capital in setting up the factory at a place away from the refinery or port and the rate charges by the Railway for the carriage of Naptha between two stations as mentioned, was unreasonable under section 41(1)(b) of the Railways Act, 1980 and the Railways were showing undue preference or advantage in respect of other traffic and contraventing the provisions of section 28 of the Railways Act, 1890. On such pleadings amongst others an issue was framed to the effect whether this estoppel by the doctrine of promissory estoppel in view of the assurance given in their letter in question which was marked Ex. C and it has been observed by the Supreme Court in the facts of that case that the Railways Rates Tribunal apparently appears to have gone off the track. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has not been correctly understood by the Tribunal. It is true, that in the formative period, it was generally said that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked by the promisee unless he has suffered 'detriment' or prejudice'. It was often said simply, that the party asserting the estoppel must have been induced to act to his detriment. But this has now been explained in so many decisions all over. All that is now required is that the party asserting the estopped must have acted upon the assurance given to him. Must have relied upon the representation made to him. It means, the party has changed or altered the position by relying on the assurance or the representation. The alteration of position by the party is the only indispensible requirement of the doctrine. It is not necessary to prove further any damage, detriment or prejudice to the party asserting the estoppel. The Court, however, would compel the opposite party to adhere to the representation acted upon or abstained from acting. The alteration of position by the party is the only indispensible requirement of the doctrine. It is not necessary to prove further any damage, detriment or prejudice to the party asserting the estoppel. The Court, however, would compel the opposite party to adhere to the representation acted upon or abstained from acting. The entire doctrine proceeds on the premise that it is reliance based and nothing more. 35. On consideration of the cases as cited at the Bar; we find that the said Board, in view of its character and composition, is certainly a statutory body and as such, even though the same is not a State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, at least the same is an instrumentality of the State and under the said Act. The Brochure in question in this case, was framed, formulated and issued under the said Act, and as such, has also the statutory character and cannot be claimed and considered to be a contract simplicitor and that being the position, the authorities under the said Act are not entitled to act arbitrarily or against the principles of natural justice and they are to act fairly and independently, if the provisions or terms of the Brochure in question, have been duly followed and complied with. Above being our views and our considered opinion, we cannot disagree with the observations in Biswanath Sarkar v. State of West Bengal (Supra), and hold, as indicated earlier, that if the terms of the Brochure are duly complied with and an intending allotee duly complied with the terms of the same or performs his obligations thereunder, allotment of flats cannot and should not be refused. 36. The distinguishing features of the above mentioned Division Beach judgment of this Court and the present one is that, in that case, after the intending applicant complied with the necessary terms, allotment was made in his favour and here, even if the intending claimants made the applications, they have been found, not to have duly complied with the necessary terms and requirements and as such, allotments were refused. If the said claimant had really complied with the terms of the Brochure like the facts of the other case, there would have been no justification, for refusing allotment to her. If the said claimant had really complied with the terms of the Brochure like the facts of the other case, there would have been no justification, for refusing allotment to her. But, she, in our view has not duly and appropriately complied with the necessary and relevant terms of the contract as indicated in the Brochure, incorporating the terms, even inspite of opportunities and as such, she in our view, has appropriately been refused allotment of the flat. 37. We feel that the relation of the applicant to suit was not necessary and required, if the terms of the Brochure, which is a statutory contract, as indicated earlier, were complied with and even if such compliance is made now. 38. With observations as above, we dismiss the appeal and set-aside the judgment and order as impeached and have on record, that if the appellant, complied with the terms of the Brochure now and duly, her claim for allotment, be considered by the said Board and their authorities, in accordance with law. 39. The Appeal is thus disposed of as above. There will be no order as to costs. 40. We keep it on record that, we have not separately dealt with the facts in the case of (22) Bepin Vora v. West Bengal Housing Board & Ors., F.M.A. No. 951 of 1987, since the facts and point of law involved there, are the same as in this appeal of Kanchan Vora. 41. Thus, the order which we have proposed that will also govern the case of Bepin Vora. Consequent to the order which we propose, we then dispose of the cross-objections as filed. On the prayers of Mr. Das, we decide that the order which we propose to day, shall be kept in abayance for eight weeks. He has agreed that his client will duly comply with the terms and conditions as indicated earlier, within four weeks. We further decide that if such compliance. is made, by two weeks of the said compliance, the authorities should decide the matter in terms of the directions and then till eight weeks from today, status quo as on today, be maintained. Ganguly, J.: I agree.