ORDER K.M. Natarajan, J. 1. This petition is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, to condone the delay of 2144 days in filing the appeal against the ex-parte decree passed in O.S. No. 4683 of 1982 on the file of the XI Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. It is averred in the affidavit filed in support of the petition that the respondent filed the suit O.S. No. 4683 of 1982 for specific performance of sale to her of the half share of the suit property bearing premises No. 414 Raja Naicken Thottam, Vannia Teynampet, Madras. She was not at all served with summons in the said suit and the respondent managed to have the suit summons not served on her land obtained an ex-parte decree on 9th November, 1982. After obtaining the ex-parte decree, the respondent filed C.P. No. 1440 of 1983, for execution of the ex-parte decree for getting sale deed. The petitioner was served with notice in the said execution petition. Thereafter, she came to know of the passing of the ex-parte decree. She filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in I.A. No. 3465 of 1984 and it was dismissed, though she was not at all served with the suit summons and the service of summons was effected by substituted service. As against the same, she was advised to file a revision. She filed C.R.P. No. 4262 of 1984 before this Court and the same was dismissed on 7th August, 1985. The respondent filed another execution petition in E.P. No. 2022 of 1985 for possession. The petitioner filed E.A. No. 5215 of 1985 under Section 47, C.P. Code, to declare that the decree in O.S. No. 4683 of 1982 was not a valid one and not binding on her. The said execution application was also dismissed. As against the said order, she filed C.R.P. No. 542 of 1986 before this Court and it was dismissed on 22nd July, 1988. It is further stated that she is an illiterate woman without any help. She had not the timely help and advice from her lawyers who were attending to her case in various stages. In a nutshell, she stated that she suffered from illiteracy and lack of proper legal advice and guidance. It is further stated that she has engaged another counsel after getting the papers from the previous counsel. She had not the timely help and advice from her lawyers who were attending to her case in various stages. In a nutshell, she stated that she suffered from illiteracy and lack of proper legal advice and guidance. It is further stated that she has engaged another counsel after getting the papers from the previous counsel. Only now she has come to know of the real position. She has obtained certified copies of the ex-parte decree and judgment and filed the appeal with this petition to condone the delay of 2144 days in filing the appeal. Hence, she prayed for condonation of the delay. 2. The said application is resisted by the respondent who denied the allegations. In her counter-affidavit it is inter alia averred as follows-It is stated that the very appeal is incompetent by reason of the fact that what was sought to be set aside was an ex-parte decree which has become final when C.R.P. No. 4262 of 1984 was dismissed on 7th August, 1985. Further, so far as the execution of the decree is concerned, it has been duly executed and possession was also effectively delivered in E.P. No. 2022 of 1985, even on 6th September, 1985 itself after execution of the sale deed. This Court in C.R.P. No. 2305 of 1986 has recorded the factum of delivery of possession in the order dated 21st January, 1987 and dismissed the application for stay. Ultimately, C.R.P. No. 542 of 1986 was dismissed on 22nd July, 1988. The said C.R.P. No. 542 of 1986 arose out of the petition in E.A. No. 5215 of 1983, filed by the very same petitioner for declaring that the decree is not a valid one and binding, which was also dismissed. Thus, it is clear that the decree in question has been the subject matter for consideration before the trial court under Section 47, C.P. Code and thereafter before the High Court. Thus it has become final and it is binding on the respondent. She cannot seek to reopen the issue by filing a regular appeal against the ex-parte decree. It is further alleged that it cannot be said that there was an improper or illegal advice when the matter was adjudicated upon already upto this Court. Thus it has become final and it is binding on the respondent. She cannot seek to reopen the issue by filing a regular appeal against the ex-parte decree. It is further alleged that it cannot be said that there was an improper or illegal advice when the matter was adjudicated upon already upto this Court. But, on the other hand, the affidavits filed in the earlier proceedings would amply show that she had at all material point of time engaged advocate and was prosecuting the matter diligently. Under these circumstances of the case, the delay 2144 days, which remains unexplained, cannot be condoned and the petitioner is now trying to shield her own follies by throwing the blame on her advocates who appeared for her. Further, the present attempt to reopen the issue by filing a regular appeal is barred by res judicata in view of the petition filed under Section 47, C.P. Code. The petitioner has not at all explained each day's delay and particularly the inordinate delay of 2144 days. It is further stated that the petition has resorted to violence and caused damages to the hut and the fences put up by the respondent after delivery of possession and the matter is now pending investigation on a complaint given by the respondent against the petitioner and her men, and this present attempt is only to drag on the issue and get over the criminal prosecution. The present application is nothing but an abuse of the process of court and hence it is liable to be dismissed. 3. After hearing the learned Counsel appearing on either side and going through the affidavit and the counter affidavit, I find that the petitioner had the advantage of the legal advice of Mr. V.N. Krishna Rao, Advocate, who is a leading member of the Bar. It is also seen that against the ex-parte decree passed, the petitioner rightly filed an application to set aside the ex-parte decree with an application to condone the delay in filing the application to set aside the ex-parte decree. The petitioner was unsuccessful upto the High Court in C.R.P. No. 4262 of 1984. The petitioner was admittedly served with notice in the execution proceedings in E.P. No. 1440 of 1983, for execution of the sale deed in pursuance of the decree obtained by the respondent. The sale deed was also executed. The petitioner was unsuccessful upto the High Court in C.R.P. No. 4262 of 1984. The petitioner was admittedly served with notice in the execution proceedings in E.P. No. 1440 of 1983, for execution of the sale deed in pursuance of the decree obtained by the respondent. The sale deed was also executed. Then another petition E.P. No. 2022 of 1985 was filed for delivery of possession. The petitioner filed E.A. No. 5215 of 1985 under Section 47, C.P. Code to declare that the decree in O.S. No. 4683 of 1982, which is now the subject matter of the present unnumbered appeal, was not valid and binding on her. She was unsuccessful. This Court also confirmed the order of the lower court in C.R.P. No. 542 of 1986 on 22nd July, 1988. Possession was delivered with police aid and nothing survives in the said proceedings. It is only at this stage, nearly six years after the passing of the decree, the appeal with the petition to condone the delay in filing the appeal is filed on the ground that the petitioner is illiterate and she had no proper legal advice. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner drew the attention of this Court to various decisions in support of his contention. In State of West Bengal v. Howrah Municipality, it was held ... The words 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. It was further held: If a party had acted in a particular manner on a wrong advice given by his legal adviser, he cannot be held guilty of negligence so as to disentitle the party to plead sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji, it was observed... The Legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. The expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But, the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. In that case their Lordships laid down certain principles and it is stated: "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational commonsense pragmatic manner'. In Maganlal v. Laxmidas A.I.R. 1980 Guj.48, it was held... It is a well settled that 'sufficient cause' has to be construed liberally so as to advance the cause of justice and not the cause of technicalities. As far as possible; a case should be decided on merits and a party should not be deprived of his right to get the case examined on merits. In Subbarayan v. Ravaimaniammal, it was observed... It is a well settled principle of law that the judicial discretion vested with the court in considering the question whether a delay, however small or however huge and enormous it may be, rests with the Court's discretion and it is that discretion that matters at the end. However, much evidence may be available explaining each day's delay, yet it is not as if the so called explanation for each day's delay is one which may stand or may not stand judicial scrutiny. The background against which the question of delay has to be approached is, whether opportunity has to be granted or not to the person who knocks at the doors of the temple of justice for adjudication of the matter that had already been decided ex-parte and a conclusion is to be arrived at. It is pertinent to note here that the ratio laid down in the above decisions is not applicable to the facts of this case. In the instant case, on the basis of an agreement of sale, the suit was filed for the relief of specific performance. It is pertinent to note here that the ratio laid down in the above decisions is not applicable to the facts of this case. In the instant case, on the basis of an agreement of sale, the suit was filed for the relief of specific performance. After the service of summons to the petitioner was held to be sufficient, an ex-parte decree was passed as early as 9th November, 1982. E.P. No. 1440 of 1983 was filed for execution of the sale deed and admittedly notice was served on the petitioner in that petition. This being an ex-parte decree, she was properly advised to file a petition to set aside the ex-parte decree with a petition to condone the delay in I.A. No. 3465 of 1984. That petition was dismissed. She was unsuccessful before this Court in C.R.P. No. 4262 of 1984, as early as 7th August, 1985. After execution of the sale deed, another petition E.P. No. 2022 of 1985 was filed for delivery of possession. Then the petitioner filed E.A. No. 5215 of 1985 under Section 47, C.P. Code raising the very same contentions and praying for a declaration that the ex-parte decree was not a valid one and binding on her. She was unsuccessful and her revision was also dismissed. Possession was also delivered in pursuance of the decree. Only long afterwards, having failed in all her proceedings, which have been rightly instituted, she has now come forward with the appeal with a petition to condone the delay contending that her signature was obtained in the said document alleging that it was a mortgage deed for Rs. 33,000 and that she was paid Rs. 10,000 on the promise that the balance of Rs. 23,000 would be paid later. There is absolutely no justification in the allegation that she had no proper legal advice. In any event, there is absolutely no justification in the allegation that a wrong advice was given by the previous counsel and that only after engaging the present counsel she was given proper advice and hence delay could be condoned. In the circumstances of this case, it has to be construed that these allegations were now trotted out only for the purpose of filing this petition and that there is absolutely no bona fides, whatsoever in this petition. In the circumstances of this case, it has to be construed that these allegations were now trotted out only for the purpose of filing this petition and that there is absolutely no bona fides, whatsoever in this petition. In view of the fact that the decree was executed by executing the sale deed and possession was delivered and in view of the admitted fact that the petitioner has been fighting from 1983, it is not open to the petitioner to file the petition for condonation of delay of 2144 days in filing the appeal. In view of the decision already made in the petition filed by the petitioner under Section 47, C.P.C., and the other earlier proceedings, no useful purpose would be served by filing the appeal against the very same ex-parte decree on the same grounds. For all these reasons, I am of the view that the delay of 2144 days in filing the appeal cannot be condoned and the petition deserves to be dismissed. 5. In the result, the petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.