JUDGMENT - G.H. GUTTAL, J.:---The principal question which arises in this suit is this:---Where two partners together hold the premises of the firm as tenants, does the relinquishment of his interest in the tenancy by one partner in favour of the other, constitute, assignment or the transfer of his interest in the tenancy, which is forbidden by section 15(1) of the Bombay, Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act ? The suit instituted by Dr. Nariman Irani, the partner of the Defendant Dr. Adi Merwan Irani in the business known as "Dr. Irani's Maternity and Surgical Nursing Home, at 7, Jer Mansion, 1st Floor, 70-B, Gowalia Tank Road, Bombay-26", is mainly for a declaration that two writings executed by him on 13th October, 1976, purporting to "gift" his share in the partnership in favour of the Defendant are not valid and that the partnership firm continues to exist as it did, before the execution of the two writings. 2. The plaintiff's case is as under :--- The plaintiff and the defendant together hold, on lease, a flat at Jer Mansion, Gowalia Tank Road, Bombay-26. Subsequent to the acquisition of the lease, they started the Nursing Home in partnership in accordance with the terms embodied in the partnership deed, dated 31st July 1967. (Exh. `C'. It records that the business was of running "Maternity and Surgical Nursing Home at 7, Jer Mansion, 1st Floor, 70-B, Gowalia Tank Road, Bombay 26. The plaintiff and the defendant each brought Rs, 15,000/- into the capital. Due to the debts, the expenditure on repairs and so on, the plaintiff never earned profits. Disputes started between the plaintiff and the defendant, as the plaintiff thought that the defendant was making profits contrary to the partnership deed. According to the plaintiff, the defendant wrongfully retained his consultation fees which were agreed to be part of the partnership assets he, treated the patients expected to be treated at the Nursing Home, at some other place and always showed losses though the Nursing Home earned profits. On 19th February, 1973. (Exh 3'), the defendant wrote a letter to the plaintiff which illustrates how strained the relations between the partners were. By this letter, he recalled the discussion in regard to the dissolution of the firm and set out certain conditions which included payment of Rs. 72,000- to the plaintiff. On 19th February, 1973. (Exh 3'), the defendant wrote a letter to the plaintiff which illustrates how strained the relations between the partners were. By this letter, he recalled the discussion in regard to the dissolution of the firm and set out certain conditions which included payment of Rs. 72,000- to the plaintiff. The partnership was proposed to be terminated with effect from 1st April, 1973. But the partnership continued. The relations between the partners continued to be none too happy due to the frequent demands for contribution for the repairs of the building, furniture and so on. The absence of any profits troubled the plaintiff; so much so, that on 13th October, 1976, out of sheer disgust and huff he wrote a letter to the defendant, enclosing therewith the declaration. These writings (Exh. 'D'-Pages 1 and 2) are in his own hand. In the letter, he states "I am enclosing herewith a declaration making you the sole proprietor of Dr. Irani's Maternity and Surgical Nursing Home, Jer Mansion, 1st Floor, Gowalia Tank, Bombay, as of today the 13th October, 1976". Then, he goes on to record "I have no claim whatsoever over the said Nursing Home-------". The enclosed declaration was also in similar language. It declares "I am giving my half partnership of the hospital named as Dr. Irani's Maternity and Surgical Nursing Home--------". Then he described the transaction "as a gift-----as of today the 13th October, 1976." Nothing happened for a considerable time. According to the plaintiff, on 21st November 1976 he and the defendant met in the Nursing Home. The plaintiff explained to the defendant that the harassment and continuous demand of money by the latter disgusted him and, therefore, he wrote the letter and declaration in a huff without intending that they be carried out. The defendant accepted this position. Both of them decided that the letter and the declaration dated 13th October, 1976, should be treated as non-extant and they continued to be the partners as before. But the plaintiff was surprised to receive a letter dated 27th December, 1976, written by the Defendant (Exh. `D' Page 5), apparently on legal advice. In this letter, he thanked the plaintiff for the gift he had made and recorded his acceptance. But the plaintiff was surprised to receive a letter dated 27th December, 1976, written by the Defendant (Exh. `D' Page 5), apparently on legal advice. In this letter, he thanked the plaintiff for the gift he had made and recorded his acceptance. It is at this stage that the Plaintiff became aware of the fact that because of what he wrote in disgust and huff, he was about to lose his property. By his letter dated 19th January, 1977 (Exh. `D' page 7), he repudiated the fact that he had gifted his partnership share. He recalled that i.e. Defendant knew fully well the circumstances under which he wrote the letter dated 13th October 1976, and that it was agreed that the declaration was not to be acted upon the stood cancelled. The defendant, by his reply dated 16th February, 1977 (Exh. `D' page 9) denied that there was such agreement not to act upon the letter and the declaration. Thereafter, correspondence followed to which reference is unnecessary. The suit was instituted on 14th May, 1977. The Plaintiff's case is :--- (i) By agreement arrived at on 21/11/1976, the letter and the declaration ceased to exist; (ii) Alternatively he contends that even if such agreement is not proved, the documents which are not registered, cannot create a valid transfer of the Plaintiffs share which includes immovable property; (iii) The transfer embodied in the letter and declaration dated 13th October, 1976, involves transfer of tenancy. The transfer of tenancy is forbidden by section 15 (1) of the Bombay Rent Act and, therefore void. 4. The defendant asserts that a valid gift or transfer of the Nursing Home was made or at any rate the Plaintiff relinquished his share in the firm. He disputes the meeting alleged to have been held on 21st November, 1976, and the agreement set up by the plaintiff. 5. A number of documents, such as, rent receipt jointly in the names of the parties (Exh. 'A') partnership deed (Exh. 'C'), correspondence (Exhs. 'D', 'E', 'F', 'G', 'H', 'I', 'J', 'K', 'L', 'M' and 'O'), and the income tax returns of the firm (Exh. 'N'), have been produced. But the area of controversy is limited to the validity of the transfer. Therefore I do not propose to examine the documentary and oral testimony except for the purpose of determining this limited question. 6. 'D', 'E', 'F', 'G', 'H', 'I', 'J', 'K', 'L', 'M' and 'O'), and the income tax returns of the firm (Exh. 'N'), have been produced. But the area of controversy is limited to the validity of the transfer. Therefore I do not propose to examine the documentary and oral testimony except for the purpose of determining this limited question. 6. The circumstances in which the plaintiff executed the letter and the declaration dated 13th October, 1967, may be considered. The documentary evidence consisting of the letter dated 29th June, 1974, (Exh. `F') by Dr. Banu, the plaintiff's wife, the letter dated 6th June 1974 (Exh. `I') by the defendant, and the letter dated 28th May, 1974 (Exh. `J') by the Defendant clearly prove that soonafter the commencement of the Nursing Home, disputes started as the defendant showed losses and insisted on excluding his consultation fees from the income of the firm. The Defendant demanded from the plaintiff different amounts towards the repairs or renovation of the premises by his undated letters (Exhs `K' and `L'). These documents support the plaintiff's case that the defendant created such conditions that he was disgusted with the affairs of the firm. The defendant has not denied that he demanded the amounts towards the plaintiff's share of the expenses. The plaintiff, who had hardly earned any profit was faced with frequent demands of money, naturally felt a fit of anger which compelled him to write the letter and the declaration. I accept the plaintiff's case that he wrote the letter dated 13th October, 1976 and made the declaration of the same date in a huff as claimed by him. However, it needs to be mentioned that the plaintiff does not seek to avoid the documents on the ground that he did not know what he was doing. 7. The next question is whether on 21st November, 1976, the plaintiff and the defendant net and agreed that the letter and the declaration dated 13th October, 1976, were not intended to be acted upon and, therefore, cancelled them. There are other facts which have been set out in the evidence and are subjected to cross-examination, but they are not relevant for any issue arising in this suit. The plaintiff realised, immediately on 14th October, 1976, that he had erred in writing the letter and declaration in a huff. There are other facts which have been set out in the evidence and are subjected to cross-examination, but they are not relevant for any issue arising in this suit. The plaintiff realised, immediately on 14th October, 1976, that he had erred in writing the letter and declaration in a huff. Having realised this mistake, it was natural for him to contact the defendant and withdraw the letter and declaration. He admits in his testimony that between 14th October, 1976 and 27th December, 1976 he continued to visit the Nursing Home. But surprisingly he never contracted the defendant to repudiate or withdraw the letter and the declaration. This conduct, unnatural as it is, is inconsistent with the plaintiff's case. What is important is that in the belated reply dated 19th January, 1977 to the defendant's letter dated 27th December ,1976 and the decision taken at that meeting held on 21st November, 1976 by which the letter communicated the acceptance of the gift, the plaintiff did not write about the meeting held on 21st November, 1976 and the decision taken at that meeting. The fact that the plaintiff and the defendant met on 21st November, 1976 and decided to treat the writings as cancelled, has been set out for the first time in the plaint. It is, therefore, difficult to believe that the meeting, in fact, did take place. The plaintiff has failed to prove that at the meeting held between him and the defendant on 21st November, 1976, it was agreed to treat the letter and the declaration as void. 8. The nature of the transaction evidenced by the letter and declaration dated 27th October, 1976, their effect and validity may now be considered. The defendant, by his letter dated 27th December, 1976, accepted the "gift" made by the plaintiff of his share in the Nursing Home. The validity of this transfer is seriously challenged by the plaintiff. It is, therefore, necessary to understand what the letter and the declaration purport to create. In the declaration (Exh. `D' page 1), the plaintiff says "I am giving my half partnership of the hospital named as Dr. Irani's Maternity and Surgical Nursing Home at 7, Jer Mansion 1st Floor, 70-B, Gowalia Tank Road, Bombay-26 to my partner......... Dr. Adi Merwan Irani". Then, he goes on to describe the transaction as "a gift to him". In the declaration (Exh. `D' page 1), the plaintiff says "I am giving my half partnership of the hospital named as Dr. Irani's Maternity and Surgical Nursing Home at 7, Jer Mansion 1st Floor, 70-B, Gowalia Tank Road, Bombay-26 to my partner......... Dr. Adi Merwan Irani". Then, he goes on to describe the transaction as "a gift to him". In the letter of the same date addressed to the defendant, the plaintiff says that by the declaration, he was making the defendant sole proprietor of Dr. Irani's Maternity and Surgical Nursing Home.........". The plaintiff sets out the consequence of the `gift' and his status in relation to the Nursing Home. In the letter, he says "I cease to be a partner from today". 9. The plaintiff has used the word "gift" to describe the "transfer". What he gifted was in his own words "his half partnership" (emphasis supplied). The consequence of this gift has been stated by him in the declaration in these words: "I am not responsible for any loss or profits in the said Nursing Home as on 13th October, 1976". In a nutshell, he gave up all that he had, as a partner to the defendant and ceased to be liable for any losses as from the date of execution of these documents. By whatever name the transaction is described, the substance of the matter is that the plaintiff gave up his share as partner to the defendant and ceased to be entitled to profits and liable for losses. This was accepted by the defendant in his letter dated 27th December, 1976. Therefore the plaintiff retired from the firm by relinquishing his rights as a partner which means his right to the profits and his liability for the losses. This is the substance of the transaction notwithstanding of the label of "gift" attached to it" 10. According to the plaintiff the "gift" is not valid as it is not made by registered instrument and attested by two witnesses as required by section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act. The defendant, on the other hand, assests that the share in the partnership property even if it includes immovable assets is not immovable property. In view of the Supreme Court's ruling in (Addanki Narayanappa and another v. Bhaskara Krishnappa and others)1, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1300. The defendant, on the other hand, assests that the share in the partnership property even if it includes immovable assets is not immovable property. In view of the Supreme Court's ruling in (Addanki Narayanappa and another v. Bhaskara Krishnappa and others)1, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1300. Followed in (Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal v. Juggilal Kamlapat)2, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 401. I uphold the submission of Mr. Vyas, learned Counsel for the defendant, that the interests of partners in a partnership firm, although it owns immovable property including leasehold interest, is movable property and, therefore, a document evidencing relinquishment of interest of one partner is not compulsorily registrable. (Addanki Narayanappa and another v. Bhaskara Krishnappa and others), A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1300. There is no merit in the plaintiff's contention that the gift has not been accepted. The conduct of the parties and especially the letter dated 27th December, 1976 (Exh. D page 5) written by the defendant proves acceptance of the gift. 11. The next question is whether the tenancy is an asset of the partnership Mrs. Bharucha urged what is "transferred" by the plaintiff is what he held as partner; for the declaration says "I am giving my half partnership of the hospital". According to her, the tenancy is not an asset of the firm and, therefore, the plaintiff's share in the tenancy does not pass to the defendant even if the "gift" or relinquishment is proved. 12. The property of the firm includes all property and rights and interests in property "originally brought into the stock of the firm" (Section 14. Partnership Act). But this is subject to contract between the partners. Under section 14 of the Partnership Act, property belonging to a person, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, does not, on the person entering into a partnership with others, become the property of the partnership, merely because it is used for the business of the partnership. It will become property of the partnership only if there is an agreement express or implied - that the property was under the agreement of partnership, to be treated as the property of the partnership, (Arjun Kanoji Tankar v. Santram Kanoji Tankar)3, 1969(3) Supreme Court Cases 555. It will become property of the partnership only if there is an agreement express or implied - that the property was under the agreement of partnership, to be treated as the property of the partnership, (Arjun Kanoji Tankar v. Santram Kanoji Tankar)3, 1969(3) Supreme Court Cases 555. In view of this statement of law by the Supreme Court, the question is whether there is any agreement to treat the tenancy of the premises at 7, Jer Mansion, Gowalia Tank Road, Bombay-26, as the property of the partnership. There is no such evidence. Indeed the partnership deed and the balance sheets exclude inference of such agreement. (The Income Tax returns and the balance sheets for 1968-69 and 1969) (Exh. `N') record the assets of the firm; the tenancy is not included in the assets. What each partner brought into the stock is recorded; but tenancy is not mentioned as the property brought into the stock of the partnership. The partnership deed (Exh. `A') merely records the suit premises as the place of business without making the premises as property of the firm). Therefore, when the plaintiff made "a gift" of his "half partnership of the hospital", he gave all his share except the share in the tenancy, for, the tenancy was never the property of the firm. This inference is difficult to escape. 13. But there is hurdle which the plaintiff has to cross. The plaint does not contain an averment that the leasehold interest of the partners is not property of the firm. After hearing the arguments of Mr. Vyas, the plaintiff made an application for amendment of the plaint to introduce a statement that the tenancy is not property of the firm. I rejected the application on 8th March, 1989, as it was belated and would necessitate further evidence. I accept the argument of Mr. Vyas that the plaintiff cannot be permitted to urge that the tenancy does not belong to the partnership because the defendant had no opportunity of meeting such a case. For this reason, I reject the submission of Mrs. Bharucha. 14. This brings me to the important argument advanced by Mrs. Bharucha. The argument is this : Assume that the leasehold interest in the premises is an asset of the firm. Admittedly the plaintiff and the defendant are the lessees. For this reason, I reject the submission of Mrs. Bharucha. 14. This brings me to the important argument advanced by Mrs. Bharucha. The argument is this : Assume that the leasehold interest in the premises is an asset of the firm. Admittedly the plaintiff and the defendant are the lessees. The defendant cannot claim that the relinquishment of the plaintiff's "half share of hospital" conveys to him the plaintiff's interest in the lease. The reason is that such transfer is forbidden by section 15 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as "the Bombay Rent Act". Therefore, the transfer of plaintiff's share in the tenancy is void. This question is complex and defies an easy answer. Yet a careful analysis of the scheme of the Partnership Act, the concept of partner's interest and the legislative intent underlying section 15 of the Bombay Rent Act promises a way out. The difference between the argument upheld by me in paragraph 10 above and this submission should be clearly understood. No doubt the property of a firm, even if it includes immovable assets - is moveable property. Upon dissolution of a firm or retirement of partners, the assets of the firm change hands. The document embodying the terms of dissolution or retirement which may effect transfer of immovable assets is not compulsorily registrable. But this does not necessarily mean that when a partner relinquishes his interest in the partnership, no transfer of immovable property takes place. It is not lawful for any tenant to "sublet the whole or any part of the premises let to him or to assign or transfer in any other manner his interest therein. (Section 15(1) Bombay Rent Act). Mrs. Bharucha urged that the "transfer" of the plaintiff's share in the leasehold interest in the premises, even as an asset of the partnership, falls within the statutory prohibition against "assignment or transfer in any other manner his interest therein," making such transfer void. 15. The question, therefore, is whether the relinquishment by a partner as a part of his share in the partnership constitutes (1) assignment or transfer of "his interest therein"; (ii) in any other manner. It should be remembered that section 15(1) takes effect notwithstanding anything contained in any law. 15. The question, therefore, is whether the relinquishment by a partner as a part of his share in the partnership constitutes (1) assignment or transfer of "his interest therein"; (ii) in any other manner. It should be remembered that section 15(1) takes effect notwithstanding anything contained in any law. Therefore, the prohibition against "assignment or transfer in any other manner" of a tenant's interest in the premises is absolute and is subject only to the exceptions created by section 15 of the Bombay Rent Act and no other law. The prohibition against such transfer or assignment is subject to two exceptions---(i) The contract between the landlord and tenant may permit such assignment or transfer. (Section 15(1) Bombay Rent Act), (ii) The State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette permit the transfer of interest in the premises held under such leases or class of leases and to such extent as may be specified in the notification. (Proviso to Section 15(1) - Bombay Rent Act). Subject to these exceptions, the prohibition against transfer or assignment of a tenant's interest is absolute. The key words in the section are "assign or transfer in any other manner" and "his interest therein". The fundamental test, therefore, is whether relinquishment of tenancy as partner's share conveys to the transferee partner "his interest" in the premises. Consider how and when such "interest" is transferred. Such interest may be created if the defendant did not previously have interest in the whole of the tenancy. For instance, if the plaintiff and the defendant, each, had interest in the whole of the lease, there is no question of transfer of the plaintiff's interest to the defendant, because the defendant, too, has interest in the plaintiff's property in the premises. To put it differently, if the plaintiff and the defendant had community of interest of unity of title, the question of transfer of interest may nor arise, for the simple reason that both have antecedent title to the whole interest. The idea of transfer of property presupposes that title to the property did not vest in the transferee before the transfer, (V.N. Sarin v. Ajit Kumar Poplani)4, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 432. Paragraph 13. The question then is : Do the plaintiff and the defendant who hold the lease together, have title to the whole of the lease ? Do they have unity of title ? Paragraph 13. The question then is : Do the plaintiff and the defendant who hold the lease together, have title to the whole of the lease ? Do they have unity of title ? or each of them has separate titles to the tenancy? In other words, does each of them have identical interest in the whole premises and in every inch of it ? These questions are manifestations of the concepts of property known as "Joint tenancy" and "tenancy-in-common". They are marked by distinct features. Property held as Joint tenancy passes on the death of one Joint tenant, by survivorship. Among tenants-in-common, it passes by succession. Even among Hindus a Joint gifts or bequest creates tenancy-in-common. (Principles of Hindu Law, Sir D. F. Mulla, Fourteenth Edition, Page 471). The difference in the incidents of joint tenancy and tenancy in common should be borne in mind in considering the nature of the partner's interest in the property of the firm. If they hold the leasehold interest as tenants-in-common, there is no unity of title ; their titles are separate. If they hold as joint tenants, there is unit of title and each is the owner of every inch of the premises. (For incidents of joint tenancy and tenancy-in-common. See law of Rent Control by Andhyarujina (1974) page 946). 16. Now, if the plaintiff and the defendant hold the tenancy jointly in the sense that each of them is a tenant of every part of the premises, it means that the defendant has interest in every part of the premises which further means that even before the date of relinquishment, interest in the subject matter of relinquishment vested in the defendant. In such an event, the relinquishment, by the plaintiff does not transfer "any interest" to the defendant because the defendant already has interest in what the plaintiff seeks to transfer. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff and the defendant hold the lease in such manner that their titles are separate, distinct and defined, it means that the title to the interest relinquished, did not vest in the defendant. 17. The "transfer" in question is by a partner to another partner. Its incidents and effect should not be confused with the petition of Hindu coparcenery property, for, their characteristics are, as will be shown a little later, different. 17. The "transfer" in question is by a partner to another partner. Its incidents and effect should not be confused with the petition of Hindu coparcenery property, for, their characteristics are, as will be shown a little later, different. Therefore, the nature of partner's interest and his title to the assets of the firm should be clearly understood. When two or more persons join in business as partners, do they have unity of title to every asset or the profits ? What is the significance of sharing of profits and losses ? When one refers to partnership in business, the idea of defined shares is the dominant thought. What flashes in the mind is the idea that the partners own the business in share such as 1/2 : 1/2 or 1/3 : 2/3, and so on. The concept of ownership in unity or partners right to every inch of the property is alien to the concept of partnership. How true this is, will be seen from the provisions of the partnership Act. In this case, the leasehold interest of both the partners is assumed to be the property of the partnership for the purposes of section 14 of the Partnership Act. Where one partner transfers his interest in the partnership, the transferee does not have the same rights as the transferor. The transferee is by the statutory provisions merely entitled to receive the share of profits of the transferring partner. (Section 29(1)-Partnership Act) implying thereby that the transferring partner has a distinct and defined interest in the profits. But the firm may be dissolved, or, as in this case, the transferor may cease to be partner. In such an event, the transferee is entitled "to receive the share of the assets of the firm to which the transferring partner is entitled" (Section 29(2)-Partnership Act). For this purpose, the share of the transferring partner is ascertained on taking accounts from the date of the dissolution. Section 29(2)-Partnership Act) or the date on which the transferor ceases to be a partner. The rules of settling the accounts require that, firstly, losses, deficiencies in the capital are paid, if necessary, by the partners individually "in the proportions in which they were entitled to share profits". Section 29(2)-Partnership Act) or the date on which the transferor ceases to be a partner. The rules of settling the accounts require that, firstly, losses, deficiencies in the capital are paid, if necessary, by the partners individually "in the proportions in which they were entitled to share profits". (Section 48(a)-Partnership Act) Secondly, the assets of the firm are applied for payment of debts, partners' advances and what is due to the partners on account of capital Section 48(b)(i) (iii) Partnership Act). Lastly, and significantly, the residue, if any, shall be divided among the partners in the proportions in which they were entitled to share profits. (Section 48(b)(iv)-Partnership Act). 18. The scheme of Partnership Act is that partner's interest in the assets of the firm which includes leasehold interest is conceived in severalty, each partner being liable to contribute to the losses and deficiencies in the capital and each partner being entitled to the residue in proportion to his share in the profits. His entitlement is determined by the "proportion" in which he shares the profits. Suppose two partners share profits in the proportion 1:2. If on dissolution and accounts, immovable assets are left, they would receive the assets of their value in the proportion 1:2. The partner having 1/3rd share has no interest in the remaining 2/3rd property. Suppose in this case the partnership were dissolved and after making payments in accordance with section 48 of the Partnership Act, the leasehold interest is left as the residue of the assets of the firm, how will the tenancy be divided ? The answer is: "in the proportion in which" the partners shared profits. Thus, the defendant will have to claim no the plaintiff's proportionate share in the tenancy. Therefore, where partners take premises jointly on lease for the business of the partnership, there is no unity of title. The law clearly conceives their interests in severalty in proportions defined by them. 19. Having regard to the above analysis, I have no doubt that partners hold the partnership property as tenants in common and not as joint tenants. Besides "the presumption in India must always be in favour of tenancy-in-common rather than joint tenancy". (Mohd. Jusab Abdulla v. Fatmabai Jusab Abdulla)5, 49 Bom.L.R. 505. 19. Having regard to the above analysis, I have no doubt that partners hold the partnership property as tenants in common and not as joint tenants. Besides "the presumption in India must always be in favour of tenancy-in-common rather than joint tenancy". (Mohd. Jusab Abdulla v. Fatmabai Jusab Abdulla)5, 49 Bom.L.R. 505. Chagla, J., in the above quoted case was, no doubt dealing with a case under Mohammedan Law ; but even among Hindus, a joint gift or bequest creates a tenancy-in common (Principles of Hindu Law Sir D. F. Mulla, Fourteenth Edition, page 471). The general law, therefore, is that the acquisition of property by two or more persons creates tenancy-in-common. In my opinion, therefore, since the plaintiff and the defendant, as partners, own the leasehold interest as tenants-in-common, the defendant does not have any interest in the plaintiff's property which the latter purported to "gift" or relinquish. To use the words of the Supreme Court the title to the property relinquished or transferred by the plaintiff "did not vest in the defendant prior to such transfer". V. N. Sarin v. Ajit Kumar, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 432. The Supreme Court held in paragraph 13 "In dealing with the present appeal, we propose to confine our decision on the narrow question which arises before us and that relates to the construction of section 14(6). What section 14(6) provides is that the purchaser should acquire the premises by transfer and that necessarily assumed that the title to the property which the purchaser acquires by transfer did not vest in him prior to such transfer". (Emphasis supplied) If the plaintiff thus "transferred" property in which the defendant has no antecedent interest, what actually occurred was a transfer of plaintiff's interest in the tenancy. This transfer or assignment which admittedly does not attract the exceptions set out in paragraph 15 above, is clearly forbidden by section 15(1) of the Bombay Rent Act. 20. But, Mr. Vyas, learned Counsel for the defendant relied upon certain judicial decisions which I will presently consider. This transfer or assignment which admittedly does not attract the exceptions set out in paragraph 15 above, is clearly forbidden by section 15(1) of the Bombay Rent Act. 20. But, Mr. Vyas, learned Counsel for the defendant relied upon certain judicial decisions which I will presently consider. In (Shyam Sunder and others v. Brijlal Chimanlal and others)6, A.I.R. 1968 Punjab28 the Punjab High Court laid down this proportion : where upon dissolution of a firm, the tenancy held by the firm devolved upon one partner by reason of relinquishment by the heirs of the other partner, such relinquishment is not "transfer" of tenancy so as to attract section 13(2)(ii)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. The rationale of the decision was that transfer by one co-tenant to another co-tenant is different from transfer to a stranger. But this reason does not answer the question whether such a transfer affects "transfer of interest" in the tenancy. What is forbidden by law is transfer or assignment of "interest" in the tenancy whether it is in favour of a stranger or a co-tenant. Such transfer is as effective in favour of a stranger as it is in favour of a co-tenant. It has been held that admission of a stranger as partner does not involve "transfer" of tenancy. The reason is that the admission of a new partner-though a stranger does not necessarily involve "transfer of interest" in the premises to the partnership. (Uttamlal v. Hasan)7, C.R.A. No. 1204 of 1951 decided by Chagla, J on 29th July, 1952. Therefore what is of cardinal importance is the element of transfer of interest. I am afraid, the character of a transferee as stranger is not a relevant consideration. What is important is whether an interest in the property is transferred. There is another approach to the question. There exists between the lessor and the two lessees a privity of estate. Where two partners hold the lease and one transfers his share to the other, is the estate affected ? In such a case, the transferring partner effectually deals with the estate. Upon transfer of his interest by one co-lessee, the privity of estate between the transferring partner and the lessor is extinguished. This happens because there has been a transfer of interest in the property. Shyam Sundar does not consider this. 21. In such a case, the transferring partner effectually deals with the estate. Upon transfer of his interest by one co-lessee, the privity of estate between the transferring partner and the lessor is extinguished. This happens because there has been a transfer of interest in the property. Shyam Sundar does not consider this. 21. The relevance of the distinction between transfer to a co-tenant and transfer to a stranger is one factor considered by the Punjab High Court. There is an additional reason which flows from two assumptions, not relevant to the nature of partnership property. The assumptions are : (i) "Community of interest and unity of possession are the necessary attributes of partnership property". Shyam Sundar and ors. v. Brijlal Chimanlal and ors. A.I.R. 1968 Punjab 28 paragraph. 10." (ii) Upon dissolution, "various partners got exclusive title to the joint partnership property coming to their share and relinquished their rights in the remaining partnership property going to other partners". (Shyam Sundar and others v. Brijlal Chimanlal and others), A.I.R. 1968 Punjab 28 paragraph 10. Having made these assumptions, the Punjab High Court, on the analogy of Hindu coparcenery property, held that the relinquishment of tenancy does not constitute "transfer:. The Supreme Court's Judgement in V.N. Sarin v. Ajit Kumar Poplai, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 432, on which the Punjab High Court relied, is the source of the reasoning in Shyam Sundar case. It is, therefore, necessary to consider whether the Supreme Court's judgment supports the conclusions of Shyam Sundar. The Poplai family consisting of B. S. Poplai, Ajitkumar Poplai and Vinodkumar Poplai owned, as Hindu Coparceners, a bungalow and other properties. V.N. Sarin was inducted as tenant of the bungalow by B. S. Poplai much prior to the partition. In the partition of the Joint Hindu Family property, the bungalow fell to the share of Ajitkumar Poplai. After partition, Ajitkumar Poplai applied under section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (59 of 1958) for eviction of V. N. Sarin on the ground that he required the premises bona fide for his own residence. Under section 14(6) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, a landlord who has "acquired any premises by transfer" cannot apply for eviction of tenant unless a period of five years had elasped from the date of the acquisition. Ajitkumar Poplai had applied before the expiry of the statutory period of five years. Under section 14(6) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, a landlord who has "acquired any premises by transfer" cannot apply for eviction of tenant unless a period of five years had elasped from the date of the acquisition. Ajitkumar Poplai had applied before the expiry of the statutory period of five years. V.N. Sarin urged that the acquisition of the bungalow by partition was acquisition by transfer and therefore Ajitkumar's application for eviction was incompetent. The Supreme Court was dealing with the incidents of coparcernery property which, in the words of the Supreme Court, is characterised by "community of interest and unity of possession, which are the essential attributes of coparcernery property". (V. N. Sarin v. Ajit Kumar)4, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 432 paragraph 10. After considering the nature and effect of partition of coparcernery property, the Supreme Court took into account the fact that "each coparcerner has an antecedent title to the said property though its extent is not determined until partition takes place:. These basic rules of Hindu Law of coparcernery property were the foundation of the Supreme Court's judgment. Since coparcernery property of Hindus is held as joint tenants, the Supreme Court was considering the case of joint tenants and not tenants-in-common. That is why the Supreme Court finally held that since Ajitkumar, as a coparcerner and joint tenant had interest in the property before the partition, the allotment of bungalow to him was not transfer for the purpose of section 14(6) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The Supreme Court, aware of the distinction between the incidents of joint tenancy and tenancy-in-common, held that transfer for the purpose of section 14(6) of the Delhi Rent Control Act presupposes that "the title to the property: which the transferee acquires by the transfer "did not vest in him prior to such transfer" V.N. Sarin v. Ajitkumar, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 432 paragraph 13) was unlike the case I am dealing with-was a case in which the transferee held interest in the property prior to the transfer. 22. The assumption made by (Shyam Sunder v. Brijlal Chamanlal others), A.I.R. 1968 Punjab 28 that community of interest and unity of possession are the necessary attributes of partnership property is an erroneous extension of the rule of Hindu Law to partnership property. 22. The assumption made by (Shyam Sunder v. Brijlal Chamanlal others), A.I.R. 1968 Punjab 28 that community of interest and unity of possession are the necessary attributes of partnership property is an erroneous extension of the rule of Hindu Law to partnership property. Similarly, the analogy of dissolution of partnership with partition of partition of coparcernery property is an equally incorrect application of the concept of partition of coparcernery property ; firstly because the division of assets of the partnership is governed by a separate set of rules set out in paragraphs 17 and 18 above which conceive interests of partners in severalty as distinguished from the unitary interest of Hindu coparcerners, and secondly because in the case of coparcerners the extent of the coparcerners title is not determined until partition takes place ; whereas the shares of partners in the assets of the firm are previously determined by their contract. 23. In my opinion, the judgement of the Supreme Court in V. N. Sarin v. Ajitkumar, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 432 does not support the conclusions of Shyam Sunder v. Brijlal Chamanlal, A.I.R. 1968 Punjab 28. The lesson of V. N. Sarin is that partition of coparcernery property in which all co-parcerners have antecedent interest cannot constitute "transfer" because the "transferee" already has interest in the subject-matter of the transfer. This Hindu Law perception is the centre piece of the decision: In other words, V. N. Sarin's case has no application to property not governed by the rules applicable to Hindu Coparcernery property. In a sense, the Supreme Court's observations in paragraph 13 impliedly repudiate the broad proposition made by Shyam Sundar. 24. (Mathuradas v. Purushottamdas)8, 1959 Nagpur Law Journal (Notes) 11 on which Shyam Sundar relied also assumed that the tenancy was of 'joint ownership of both the partners'. (Baldev Mitter and Tirath Prakash v. Basant Ram and another)9, A.I.R. 1979 Delhi 110 : follows Shyam Sunder which I have already considered. (Badri Narayan Jha others v. Rameshwar Dayal Singh and others)10, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 186; a Supreme Court's decision and (Vrajlal Makandas Valiya v. L. D. Joshi, Asst.. Collector, Bhavnagar)11, (1971)XII Gujarat Law Reporter 586 : of Gujarat High Court, are not applicable because the question of transfer did not arise for consideration in those cases. 25. In Shyam Sundar's case, the Punjab High Court relied upon two from the Madras High Court. Collector, Bhavnagar)11, (1971)XII Gujarat Law Reporter 586 : of Gujarat High Court, are not applicable because the question of transfer did not arise for consideration in those cases. 25. In Shyam Sundar's case, the Punjab High Court relied upon two from the Madras High Court. It is appropriate to deal with them. The facts of (Koragalva v. Jakri Beary and others)12, A.I.R. 1927 Madras 261; were these : The mulgeni lease was in favour of three lessees. One of the co-lessees alienated his share to another co-lessee. The Madras High Court held that "the alienation in favour of co-lessee by another lessee of his right in the lease is not an alienation which will work a forfeiture unless such is prohibited by the lease deed". Two reasons for this decision are discernible from the report : (i) It is not a fair construction to hold that the person who is already a tenant should obtain the consent of the landlord......................., if the clause of the lease deed ought to be strictly construed. (ii) The law of landlord and tenant in England being more favourable to the landlord than to the tenant, the English Law on the subject should not be followed in India. Since the Madras High Court considered the question not in the context of the property of partnership firm but in the narrow context of the document it was called upon to construe, the decision must be understood in the light of the document. Under the clause prohibiting alienation by the lessees, the three lessees agreed that "we are not entitled to alienate the said land to any one else................"(Koragalva v. Jakri Beary and others), A.I.R. 1927 Madras 261 : the clause quoted in the report reads :---"If we find that we do not require this mulgeni we should obtain from you only the consideration for the improvements that may be justly be effected by us and surrender the said land to you and we are not entitled to alienate the said land to anyone else by mortgage, arwar, sale gift, mulgeni. owdigeni, kayamgeni or by injunction, attachment, auction in any decree that may be passed against us in any Court or in any other manner whatever". (emphasis supplied). The Madras High Court qualified its decision by use of the words "unless such (alienation) is prohibited by the lease deed:. owdigeni, kayamgeni or by injunction, attachment, auction in any decree that may be passed against us in any Court or in any other manner whatever". (emphasis supplied). The Madras High Court qualified its decision by use of the words "unless such (alienation) is prohibited by the lease deed:. Koragalva v. Jakri Beary and others, A.I.R. 1927 Madras 261, at page 263 : Therefore, the Court was examining whether the lease deed prohibited alienation by one co-lessee to another. Now mark the words in the lease deed. The three lessees were prohibited from alienating the land "to any one else". (emphasis supplied). The words "else" is understood in different senses depending upon the context. Its plain dictionary meaning is "besides" or "nobody else:. (The Pocket Oxford Dictionary Seventh Edition). It may be used to distinguish the identity of persons or things (Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1971) ) as in the sentence "such decisions are to be made by a Commanding Officer and no one else". The identity of the named person is differentiated from others. In the context of the clause construed by the Madras High Court "we (the lessees)", have identity different from "anyone else". The word also means "apart from that" or "with the exception of that". Used in this sense, the three lessees agreed that they were not entitled to alienate the said land to anyone apart from themselves. The word "else" also means "in addition to". This would by clear if the meaning of "besides" is borne in mind, for, "besides" is used to mean "in addition to" or "apart from". The word in its correct application suggests that the lease deed prohibited alienation to "anyone in addition to us" or to "anyone besides us", or to anyone "apart from us". Therefore, the lease deed construed by the Madras High Court prohibited alienation to anyone in addition to the three lessees or to anyone besides the lessees. In other words, under the lease deed, there was no prohibition against alienation between co-lessees inter-se. That is why Devadoss, J., held that a person who is "already a tenant" need not seek the consent of the landlord in order to acquire the interest of another tenant for the simple reason that the lease deed contained no such prohibition. 26. In other words, under the lease deed, there was no prohibition against alienation between co-lessees inter-se. That is why Devadoss, J., held that a person who is "already a tenant" need not seek the consent of the landlord in order to acquire the interest of another tenant for the simple reason that the lease deed contained no such prohibition. 26. The ratio of the judgment is that where the lease deed prohibits alienation by the lessees of their leasehold interest to "anyone else", transfer of leasehold interest by a co-lessee to another co-lessee, not being a transfer to "anyone else" is not forbidden by the contract. The Madras High Court arrived at the decision in a case where the lease deed confined the prohibition against alienation to persons other than the lessees. The judgment has no application to the facts of this case. 27. Then, there is the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in (K. Devarajulu Naidu v. C. Ethirajavathi Thayaramma)13, A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 25 which followed Koragalva's case. As the judgment reveals, after the dissolution of the partnership, one of the partners "was allowed to use the premises for his sole business". That is why the Madras High Court says "this act on the part of the two partners cannot amount to transfer or subletting............". The act complained off was "allowing" the use of the premises. The question of transfer did not fall for consideration. 28. Koragalva's decision is based on the construction of the lease deed which precluded the lessees from alienating their lease hold interest to "anyone else", implying permission to transfer by one co-lessee to another. The words used in the contract interpretated by the Madras High Court clearly exclude prohibition against alienation by one co-lessee to another and therefore, the judgment has no application to this case. In the case of K. Devarajulu Naidu, there was a mere permission to use the premises and no question of transfer arose. 29. I am not called upon to apply rules of English Law. As the judgment of Chagla, C. J., and the commentary of Sir D. F. Mulla on Hindu Law referred to in paragraph 19 above would point out, the concept of joint tenancy and tenancy-in-common are a part of Indian jurisprudence. 30. I will, now, consider two judgments of the Supreme Court on which Mr. Vyas strongly relied. As the judgment of Chagla, C. J., and the commentary of Sir D. F. Mulla on Hindu Law referred to in paragraph 19 above would point out, the concept of joint tenancy and tenancy-in-common are a part of Indian jurisprudence. 30. I will, now, consider two judgments of the Supreme Court on which Mr. Vyas strongly relied. In (M/s. Madras Bangalore Transport Co. (West) v. Inder Singh and others)14, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1964 ; a partnership firm in possession of premises as a tenant founded a limited company in which all the partners were Directors. The firm allowed the Company to operate from the tenanted premises. Since the firm continued to be in occupation along with the Company and since the Company was a creature of the partnership, it was held that there was no sub-letting so as to attract section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. This case is different from a case where interest in the premises is transferred. All that the tenant did was to allow the Company to use the premises which is not forbidden by law, (See Chagla C.J. in Uttamlal v. Hasson), C.R.A No. 1204 of 1951; In (Murlidhar Dhar v. Chunilal and others)15, 1970 All India Rent Control Journal 1922; an old firm ceased to exist and possession of the shop was taken by a new firm. But one of the partners of the extinct firm continued to be a partner of the new firm. The Supreme Court held that the occupation by the new firm did not amount to subletting. The reasons were : --- (i) Mere possession by somebody other than the tenant does not mean subletting. (ii) Admittedly, there was no evidence of the fact of subletting. (iii) Since one of the original tenants continued to be in occupation as partner of the new firm, there could not be sub-letting. Since admittedly there was no evidence of sub-letting, all that plaintiff proved was possession of the premises by another set of partners. The question of transfer of tenant's interest did not arise for consideration. The Judgment is not an authority for the position that relinquishment of tenancy by a partner is not transfer of interest therein. 31. However, there is a judicial pronouncement of this Court which needs careful consideration. The question of transfer of tenant's interest did not arise for consideration. The Judgment is not an authority for the position that relinquishment of tenancy by a partner is not transfer of interest therein. 31. However, there is a judicial pronouncement of this Court which needs careful consideration. In (Shah Babubhai alias Gangji Devji v. Prakash Ratansey Merchant and others)16, 1986(I) All India Rent Control Journal 144 ; * Jahagirdar, J. held that where, notwithstanding the change in the composition of a firm from time to time, one of the original partners continued to be a partner, "The addition or deletion of one or the other partner" does not result in unlawful transfer of tenancy. He refrained from holding that substitution of an altogether new group of partners would amount to such transfer of tenancy. Consider the facts of that case. Shah Babubhai was not, at the inception of the tenancy, a partner of the firm, Bharat General Stores, in whose favour the lease was created. He became a partner as a result of a subsequent reconstitution of the firm. Devji Dharsi against whom the decree for eviction was made was a partner of Bharat General Stores at all times. There were other partners too. The composition of the firm underwent changes by the exit of some and entry of other partners. Devji Dharsi was alone joined as the defendant. Shah Babubhai obstructed execution of the decree and claimed tenancy as a partner. The landlord urged that admission of Shah Babubhai to the partnership subsequent to the creation of lease amounts to unlawful transfer of tenancy. Jahagirdar, J., held that the "addition", of Shah Babubhai as a partner did not constitute transfer of tenancy. The facts of the case do not bring out : (a) How the tenancy was dealt with upon retirement of "deletion" of the outgoing partners. (b) Whether the tenancy was held by Devji Dharsi alone and whether the tenancy was an asset of the firm. 32. No doubt, mere "addition" of Shah Babubhai as a partner or "deletion" of other partners cannot constitute transfer of tenant's interest. The reason is that such "addition" or deletion is consistent with mere use of the premises which as already stated, is not forbidden by the Bombay Rent Act. But, then transfer requires something more than permission to use the premises. It requires divesting of transferor's interest in property. The reason is that such "addition" or deletion is consistent with mere use of the premises which as already stated, is not forbidden by the Bombay Rent Act. But, then transfer requires something more than permission to use the premises. It requires divesting of transferor's interest in property. The facts of the case of Shah Babubhai do not reveal whether Devji Dharsi was the sole owner of the leasehold interest, whether the tenancy was brought into the stock of the firm whether Shah Babubhai or the firm got anything more than a mere user of the premises. Nor are the terms of partnership or dissolution clear from the facts. What is important is that there was no finding by the Court of Small Causes, Bombay that the partnership firm was a tenant. (Shah Babubhai alias Gangji Devji v. Prakash Rattansey Merchant and others)16, 1986(I) All India Rent Control Journal 144 ; Therefore, the judgment cannot be understood to have held that relinquishment of tenancy by one partner to another does not constitute transfer for the purpose of section 15 of the Bombay Rent Act, for the simple reason that the existence of lease in favour of Bharat General Stores had not been proved at the stage when Jahagirdar, J. , remanded the proceedings to the Court of Small Causes, Bombay. However, "addition" or "deletion' of partners by itself cannot amount to transfer, because such "addition" or "deletion" may be a mere use of premises. The "addition of Shah Babubhai as partner by itself does not mean that Devji Dharsi or other partners, dealt with the lease hold interest which, as the findings of the Court of facts revealed, did not belong to the partnership. In my opinion, Jahagirdar, J., did not hold that relinquishment by a partner of his share in the tenancy as a part of his share in the partnership, in favour of another partner, does not constitute transfer of his interest therein for the purpose of section 15(1) of the Bombay Rent Act. 33. (Koragalva v. Jakri Beary and others), A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 261 considered the validity of the transfer of interest by a co-lessee to another co-lessee in the context of the relevant clause of the contract. (Shyam Sunder v. Brijlal Chamanlal), A.I.R. 1968 Punjab 28; interpreted section 13(2)(ii)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. 33. (Koragalva v. Jakri Beary and others), A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 261 considered the validity of the transfer of interest by a co-lessee to another co-lessee in the context of the relevant clause of the contract. (Shyam Sunder v. Brijlal Chamanlal), A.I.R. 1968 Punjab 28; interpreted section 13(2)(ii)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. V. N. Sarin v. Ajitkumar, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 432 ; decided whether partition of coparcernery property constitutes "transfer" for the purpose of section 14(6) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. As already stated this Court in (Shah Babubhai alias Gangji Devji v. Prakash Ratansey Merchant and others), 1986(I) All India Rent Control Journal 144 ; did not hold that relinquishment by a partner of his share in the lease as a part of his share in the partnership, does not constitute transfer of "his interest" in the premises for the purpose of section 15(1) of the Bombay Rent Act. The prohibition against transfer of tenant's interest in the premises enacted by section 15(1) of the Bombay Rent Act, is marked by a unique feature. The transfer of tenant's interest cannot be made, not only by subletting or assignment, but "in any other manner". None of the judicial decisions cited so far were called upon to consider the effect of the words "in any other manner" Learned Counsel for the plaintiff urged that the words "in any other manner" employed with reference to the prohibited transfers, manifest the legislative intent to prevent parting with of tenant's interest in the premises, by any mode whatsoever. 34. The legislative prohibition against the transfer of tenant's interest in the premises, operates "notwithstanding anything contained in any law". These words signify the overriding effect of the legislative command that a tenant shall not transfer his interest in the tenancy. After setting out the prohibition, the legislature enumerates two specific modes of the prohibited transfers. They are : sub-letting and assignment. In order to preclude transfer by a mode not named in the section, the legislature employed the words "in any other manner". 35. The word "transfer" in the clause "transfer in any other manner" is used in its generic sense to denote the idea of making over property to another person. They are : sub-letting and assignment. In order to preclude transfer by a mode not named in the section, the legislature employed the words "in any other manner". 35. The word "transfer" in the clause "transfer in any other manner" is used in its generic sense to denote the idea of making over property to another person. Rejecting the restricted meaning of "transfer" in the Transfer of Property Act, this Court went so far as to hold that devolution of tenant's interest by bequest falls within the prohibition of section 15(1). (Dr. Anant Trimbak Sabnis v. Vasant Partap Pandit)17, A.I.R. 1980 Bombay 69. The broad generic sense, taking in its sweep all species of dealings with tenant's interest, resulting in making over of the property is consistent with the object of the section. 36. The legislature has used the word "any" which is a word with a wide meaning and is used to exclude all limitations. (Clarke Jervoise v. Scutt)18, 1920(1) Ch. Page 382. The legislature could not have foreseen the modes that may by employed for the purpose of transferring tenancy. Aware of this , the legislature specified subletting and assignment, the two known modes of transfer ; but it took care to use the words signifying exclusion of any other mode, arrangement or process of transfer. The significance of the word "any" is clear if one notices its meaning. It means "in any degree, to any extent or at all". Therefore, when the legislature used the word "any with reference to the transfer, it clearly intended to say that no transfer "at all" or "to any extent" or "in any degree" shall be made. (New Websters Dictionary of the English Language). The meaning of the word "other" in the context of transfer is also significant. It is used to denote a form of transfer "different or distinct from the ones mentioned or employed." 37. Whether a tenant sublets or assigns his interest-the obvious modes named by the statute-or the tenancy is made over to another through the medium of dissolution of a firm or retirement from the partnership, the result is identical ; for, the tenant's interest has been parted with. Aware of this possibility, the legislature used these words to mean that the tenant's interest in the premises shall not be made over to another person by any mode at all. 38. Aware of this possibility, the legislature used these words to mean that the tenant's interest in the premises shall not be made over to another person by any mode at all. 38. In my opinion therefore, having regard to the meaning of the words "in any other manner" the transfer of tenant's interest through the mode of dissolution of partnership or retirement from partnership is a transfer forbidden by section 15(1) of the Bombay Rent Act. 39. My conclusions on the question of the validity of the transfer of tenancy may be summarised as under : The partnership Act conceives the interests of partners in severalty. There is no community or unity of interests between partners. Therefore, they hold immovable property of the firm as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants. Having regard to the incidents of tenancy-in-common, one partner has no interest in the share in the property of another partner. Where one partner transfers or relinquishes his share in the partnership business to another, the transferee partner has no antecedent title to the share of the transferring partner. Therefore, the making over or relinquishment of leasehold interest as a part of the transferor's share in the assets of the firm, constitutes transfer of such leasehold interest. Section 15(1) of the Bombay Rent Act prohibits transfer of tenant's interest in the premises not only by subletting or assignment but also "in any other manner". The words "in any other manner" mean a manner other than by sub-letting and assignment. The effect of giving up of his share in the tenancy by a partner as a part of his share in the partnership is to make over his share in the tenancy. Such making over of tenancy or parting with tenancy, constitutes transfer of tenant's interest "in any other manner". Such transfer of tenancy is forbidden by section 15(1) of the Bombay Rent Act and is, therefore, void. The transferee partner does not, therefore, acquire the transferor's interest in the tenancy. For these reasons, I hold that the defendant did not acquire the plaintiffs interest in the tenancy of premises under the letter and declaration dated 13th October, 1976. 40. Therefore, I answer issues as follows : Issues Findings 1 Is it proved by the plaintiff that he In the affirmative. For these reasons, I hold that the defendant did not acquire the plaintiffs interest in the tenancy of premises under the letter and declaration dated 13th October, 1976. 40. Therefore, I answer issues as follows : Issues Findings 1 Is it proved by the plaintiff that he In the affirmative. wrote the letter dated 13-10-1976 and made the declaration of the same date in the circumstances stated in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the plain? 2. Is it proved by the plaintiff that at the In the negative meeting held on 21st November, 1976, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the letter and declaration dated 13-10-1976 were not to be acted upon and that consequently the plaintiff and the defendant continued to be partners? 3. Is it proved by the plaintiff that the letter and the declaration dated 13-10- 1976 do not create a valid transfer of The assets of the partnership the Nursing Home and other property being movable property, their mentioned in the letter and transfer is not required to be made declaration for the reasons stated in by a registered instrument and, paragraphs 11and/or 12-A of the therefore, it is valid. The transfer of lease-hold interest is forbidden by section 15(1) of the Bombay Rent Act and is therefore void. 4. It is proved by the defendant that by the In the affirmative. letter and declaration dated 13-10-1976, the plaintiff abando- ned or relinquis- hed his position as partner and his inte- rest in the Nursing Home as alleged in paragraph 3(k) of the written statement? 5. If the answer to Issue No. 4 is in the The relinquishment of the plaintiff's affirmative, is the relinquishment set up share in partnership is valid, but the by the defendant void for the reasons relinquishment of the plaintiff's stated in paragraph 12-B of the plaint? interest in the premisesis void. 6. Has the firm been dissolved by the In the negative. The plaintiff retired plaintiff's notice dated 17th March, 1977 from the partnership by relinquishing as alleged in paragraph 10 of the plaint? his share therein. 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any As per order below. relief, and if so, what relief? 41. On the one hand, the plaintiff fails on his plea that he has not transferred his share in the firm to the defendant, for, the document evidencing such transfer has been established. his share therein. 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any As per order below. relief, and if so, what relief? 41. On the one hand, the plaintiff fails on his plea that he has not transferred his share in the firm to the defendant, for, the document evidencing such transfer has been established. On the other hand, the plaintiff succeeds in establishing that such transfer does not effect the transfer of his share in the tenancy of the premises. Since the plaintiff has retired from the firm, there is no question of dissolution of the firm at the plaintiff's instance, I therefore, make the following decree. (i) So far as prayer (a) is concerned, the suit is dismissed with this modification that the plaintiff's retirement from the partnership or relinquishment of his share in favour of the defendant shall not effect the transfer of the plaintiff's share in the tenancy. Both of them continue to be the tenants as before. (ii) Prayers (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) are rejected. (iii) Since the plaintiff has failed to prove the Issue No. 2 but has succeeded in proving that the tenancy has not been validly transferred, there will be no order as to costs. Order accordingly. -----