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1989 DIGILAW 159 (HP)

MUNNA DEVI v. DAROPATI DEVI

1989-10-23

BHAWANI SINGH

body1989
JUDGMENT Bhawani Singh, J.—The tenant, a widow, has a grievance against the judgment of Appellate Authority (Rent Act), Solan, in Rent Appeal No. 10-S/14 of 1984, decided on 19-8-1985. By this decision, the Appellate Authority has allowed the appeal of the landlady, thus, directing the tenant to put the landlady in possession of the premises in dispute within a period of three months from the date of the order thereby setting-aside the judgment of the Rent Controller, Solan, in Case No. 89/2 of 1982, decided on 23-4-1984, dismissing the petition of the landlady. 2. The essential facts of the case are that the tenant is in occupation of two rooms, one kitchen and one verandah in House No. 114 in Solan Town. The tenant pays Rs. 30 as monthly rent. The landlady moved a petition for the eviction of the tenant under section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act (hereafter briefly the Act), on the grounds that the premises were unfit for human habitation and were in dilapidated condition and some portion of the building had fallen. It has also been averred that the building was required for reconstruction and rebuilding. 3. The tenant has stated that the building is in good condition and not in a dilapidated condition, as alleged. Further, it is also averred that the claim of the landlady under para 16 (a) and (b) was false. The building being in good condition, had no chance of collapse, as contended by the landlady. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the Rent Controller framed the following issues : “l. Whether the premises are in dilapidated condition and cannot be reconstructed without vacating as alleged ? OPP. 2. Whether the premises are required for reconstruction and rebuilding as alleged ? OPP. 3. Whether the premises are unfit for human habitation ? OPP 4. Relief." 5. The Rent Controller, after trial of the matter, came to the conclusion that the premises were not in dilapidated condition nor the same were required for reconstruction and rebuilding. It was also held that the premises were not unfit for human habitation. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. On appeal before the Appellate Authority, the parties pressed their pleas again. The Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that it could not be said that the premises in dispute were totally damaged, were in dilapidated condition and were unfit for human habitation. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. On appeal before the Appellate Authority, the parties pressed their pleas again. The Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that it could not be said that the premises in dispute were totally damaged, were in dilapidated condition and were unfit for human habitation. However, it observed that the premises were old enough but not found to be damaged though this damage could be anticipated in case the portion occupied by the landlady was not reconstructed or remains as it exists at the spot. It approved the findings of the Rent Controller on issue No. 3-So far as issues Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned, the Appellate Authority disagreed with the view taken by the Rent Controller and allowed the claim of the landlady for the eviction of the tenant on the ground of reconstruction and rebuilding since, according to it, the same could not be carried out without the premises being vacated. 6. Shri Harish Behal, learned Counsel appearing for the tenant, has very strenuously assailed the findings arrived at by the Appellate Authority. He contends that the findings of the Rent Controller were absolutely correct and in accordance with law and evidence, therefore, there was no justification to set-aside the same. Elaborating his submissions, Shri Behal contends that the first claim of the landlady that the premises were in dilapidated condition and were unfit for human habitation, was found to be wrong not only by the Rent Controller but also by the Appellate Authority. This means the claim of the landlady on the other ground, cannot, at all, be considered to be bonafide since the attempt of the landlady has been to evict the tenant by one way or the other. There is force in this submission of Shri Harish Behal. The conclusions of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority on this aspect of the matter are correct and in accordance with the evidence available on the record of this case. Now, the question to be seen is whether the other submission that the landlady has failed to make out a case for reconstruction and rebuilding of the premises is correct or not. Here, Shri K.D. Sood, who appears for the landlady, has submitted that the decision of the Rent Controller on this aspect was wrong and the same has been correctly up-set by the Appellate Authority. Here, Shri K.D. Sood, who appears for the landlady, has submitted that the decision of the Rent Controller on this aspect was wrong and the same has been correctly up-set by the Appellate Authority. In order to prove the bonafide claim of the landlady, Shri K.D. Sood refers to circumstances,, namely, that the building is an old one and that some part of it has collapsed and that the Municipal Committee, Solan, has already granted sanction to reconstruct the same and that the landlady has funds to do so and the landlady has every justification to put the premises to profitable use by reconstructing the same Reference to AIR 1979 SC 1559, Metalware & Co. etc. v. Bansilal Sharma and others etc. and Civil Revision No. 36 of 1983, Smt. Dakhanu v. Hem Raj and others, decided on July 11, 1989 by this Court, was made. 7. On the other hand, Shri Harish Behal places reliance on AIR 1988 SC 1432, tiara Lal v. Kewal Krishan Chopra and contends that in view of the evidence in this case, only a small portion of the roof had fallen down and that too, due to the non-attention of the landlady to put the same in order. Otherwise, the premise are in good condition and the claim of the landlady is malafide and a reference to the decision of this Court reported in AIR 1981 HP 689 Surinder Nath v. P.N. Dhawan, was also made. 8. The Rent Controller inspected the spot on 20-9-1983 and observed as under : "2. The roof of the building in dispute is in two parts and the roof towards the right hand side if one stands facing the house is in a dilapidated condition, so-much-so that the some part of it does not exist. Beneath this part of the roof there is a vacant room and a cow-shed. ; 3. However, the other part of the roof which rests on a slightly higher wall is in a comparatively better condition and there are no apparent cracks in the wall beneath this roof. The respondent is also residing in the room beneath this part of the roof. The walls of the building are in mud plaster." 9. It appears from this report that the roof of the building is in two parts and the tenant occupies the premises which pertain to the other part of the roof. The respondent is also residing in the room beneath this part of the roof. The walls of the building are in mud plaster." 9. It appears from this report that the roof of the building is in two parts and the tenant occupies the premises which pertain to the other part of the roof. This portion of the premises, according to this report, is not in bad shape, as alleged. The Appellate Authority also inspected the spot on April 17, 1985, although basically the finding is common to the one drawn by the Rent Controller, but further inference that if the building and the premises in occupation of the tenant remains in the same state, the same will definitely affect the physical condition of the part of the building in occupation of the tenant, is without any justification. 10. Shri Asha Ram Kashyap, husband of the landlady, points out that he had undertaken repairs to this house two years back. His statement further indicates that the landlady had been allowing some others also to occupy other premises in the building on rent, although the sanction once granted by the Committee has lapsed. The evidence relating to availability of funds for the construction of the building is scanty and unbelievable in the sense that the building, according to him, will need Rs. 30,000 and in order to meet the same he could sell some part of his orchard and the jewellery of his wife. It is not believable that the funds would be arranged and augmented by this method and other sources stated by him are quite meagre and cannot be said to be adequate to meet the requirement. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the claim of the landlady for reconstruction and rebuilding of the premises is bonafide and, therefore, I am not impressed by any of the submissions of Shri K.D. Sood. 11. Moreover, one more fact needs to be mentioned. The landlady has not stated in the petition for eviction that the premises cannot be reconstructed and rebuilt without vacating the premises in dispute. The authorities below have proceeded as if specific plea on this aspect is not necessary or the same be presumed to have been taken. This is not so. Moreover, one more fact needs to be mentioned. The landlady has not stated in the petition for eviction that the premises cannot be reconstructed and rebuilt without vacating the premises in dispute. The authorities below have proceeded as if specific plea on this aspect is not necessary or the same be presumed to have been taken. This is not so. In order to succeed on this aspect, the landlady has to specifically allege that the reconstruction or rebuilding cannot be carried out without getting the premises vacated. As said earlier, neither this plea has been specifically taken nor evidence adduced by the landlady to prove it. The result is that this ground of eviction set-up by the landlady also fails. 12. The examination of the matter in the light of the evidence on record as well as the decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the parties, shows that the landlady has miserably failed to establish a case bonafide claim—for the eviction of the tenant. To conclude otherwise would be quite hazardous and against the evidence on record, thus, causing palpable error of law and grave injustice to the tenant, which is not the object of the legislation in question. 13. The result is, there is merit in this revision petition, the same is allowed and the order of eviction passed by the Appellate Authority is set-aside and the eviction petition is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Revision Petition allowed.