JUDGMENT Bhawani Singh, J.—This appeal arises out of the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Solan, in case No. 100/3 of 1983 decided on 18-9-1985 involving offence under section 16 (I) (a) (i) read with section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The State feels aggrieved by the same and assails this judgment by this appeal. 2. The brief facts of the case can be summarised in the way that Shri S. N. Sharma, Food Inspector (P. W. 1), visited the premises of the accused on 5-4-1983 and purchased 600 grams of gur against payment of60paise against a proper receipt (Ex. P. B.) for the purpose of analysis. The gur was divided into three equal parts, put in three clean and dry bottles which were properly corcked, labelled and sealed in accordance with law. A Panchnama was also prepared in the presence of witnesses and duly signed by them. The sample did not fulfil the standard requirements and hence challan was filed against the accused in the court for his prosecution. 3. The defence of the accused was that he did not sell the gur for human consumption to the Food Inspector. The same was meant for animals and was sold as such. He also states that the price realised by him for the same even from the Food Inspector at the time of taking the sample was at the rate of one rupee per kg. whereas the price of gur meant for human consumption was Rs. 2.50 per kg. He admits his signatures on the Panchanama but submits that he had specifically mentioned therein that the gur was meant for animal consumption and request in this regard was made with folded hands to the Food Inspector. Perusal of Ex. PA. and Ex. P. C at point ‘B and point A contained this writing on the part of the accused. Now, I proceed to examine the rival submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties. 4. It was contended by the learned counsel for the accused that it is established beyond doubt that the gur in question was neither food nor meant for human consumption. Reference to Ex. PA and Ex. Now, I proceed to examine the rival submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties. 4. It was contended by the learned counsel for the accused that it is established beyond doubt that the gur in question was neither food nor meant for human consumption. Reference to Ex. PA and Ex. PC as well as to the statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was made besides to the statement of Food Inspector (P. W. 1) where this fact has not at all been disputed. It is further contended that the case of the accused has been this right from the beginning and it was due to the non-availability of separate shops in this part of the State that this kind of gur was kept in the same shop. The fact urn of variation of rates in these two kinds of gur has not been denied in cross-examination by the Food Ins pector (P. W. 1). Even Ved Parkash (P. W. 2) has admitted that gur meant for human beings is dry whereas it is moist in the case of gur meant for animals. 5. Shri M. S. Guleria, the learned Assistant Advocate General, has submitted that gur in question is food irrespective of its nature and sale to the Food Inspector is also sale within the provisions of Food Adulteration Act. If this is so, he contends, the article having been found not conforming to the provisions of the Act, the accused is liable to be punished. Looking to the submissions of the learned counsel for the accused, as referred to above, I am not impressed by the submissions of the learned Assistant Advocate General. The explanation of the accused, as narrated above, is quite cogent and convincing. Every article cannot be considered to be food within the meaning of Food Adulteration Act. Article Food has to be meant for human consumption as against animal consumption. When first criterian is found and established, the second criterion of sale comes into operation and there is no dispute on this aspect of the matter when once it is found that the article in question is food for human consumption and the accused sold the same for human consumption. When first criterian is found and established, the second criterion of sale comes into operation and there is no dispute on this aspect of the matter when once it is found that the article in question is food for human consumption and the accused sold the same for human consumption. Such like situations have been elaborately discussed and decided in the decision of this court in Ashok Kumar v. State of H. P., ILR 1984 HP 371, and it can be safely concluded that the prosecution has not established that the gur in question was food and meant for human consumption and sold as such. 6. The last submission of the learned counsel for the accused is on the point of sanction Ex. PE/1. Reference is made to Criminal Appeal No. 47 of 1985 (State of Himachal Pradesh v. Mussa) decided on January 6, 1989. This submission has force. The sanction order does not satisfy the principle laid down in the decision referred to by the learned counsel for the accused. On this account as well, the case against the accused is bad for want of legal sanction. 7. In view of what has been discussed above, the only conclusion which can be drawn, in the light of the facts and circumstances of this case, there is no merit in this appeal, the same fails and is accordingly dismissed. The personal bond and the surety bond, if any, executed at any stage of the case by the accused are hereby cancelled. Appeal dismissed.