H. P. FINANCIAL CORPORATION v. NARINDER INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION
1989-10-23
BHAWANI SINGH
body1989
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Bhawani Singh, J.—This appeal arises out of the order of the District Judge, Solan, in Main Misc. Petition No. l-S/2 of 1978, decided on December 26, 1980, whereby the objections raised by the appellant were dismissed and the sale was confirmed. 2. The facts, in brief, are that the appellant moved a petition under section 31 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951, on May 16, 1978, for the sale of the mortgaged property of the J.D. M/s. Narinder Industrial Corporation (herein respondent No.1) when they failed to pay the loan advanced to them running over Rs. 2,00,000. The sale was fixed on number of occasions but somehow or the other it could not be materialised and ultimately on October 15, 1980, the property was sold for Rs. 70, 800 in an open auction to Shri Laxmi Chand, respondent No. 2, being the highest bidder. 3. The appellant came forward with certain objections alleging certain irregularities, namely, that 25% of the sale price was not paid at the time of the close of the final bid but was paid, by a bank draft, the next day thus violating the provisions of Order XXI Rule 84 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code) and that the drawing up of proclamation of sale was defective in the sense that the same did not conform to the provisions of Order XXI Rule 66 of the Code nor the properties intended to be sold were comprehensively detailed thus causing injury to the appellant in not attracting the prospective bidders and fetching more price than it actually did. One more objection pertained to the conducting of auction by the Naib Nazir of the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge in place of Nazir, who was not competent to do so. 4. These objections were controverted by respondent No. 2 and it was asserted that the auction was completed at about 5 p.m. and the sale price to the extent of 1/4th of the total amount was offered there and then but the Naib Nazir asked him to give the amount by a bank draft the next day. Accordingly the payment was made through a bank draft. The respondent further states that in case this was not a proper procedure, the same having been suggested by the Court official, he could not be allowed to suffer for such a fault.
Accordingly the payment was made through a bank draft. The respondent further states that in case this was not a proper procedure, the same having been suggested by the Court official, he could not be allowed to suffer for such a fault. Regarding the proclamation of sale, it is stated that the property was correctly and comprehensively mentioned. It gave description of the building of the factory with machine and the decree-holder did not suffer any injury on that count. About the conduct of sale by the Naib Nazir in the absence of the Nazir who was on leave, it was averred that the same was not bad since in the absence of the Nazir, any other official appointed by the Court could do so. 5. The District Court directed the parties to put in their respective affidavits in support of their contentions but no affidavit was filed by the decree-holder. The auction purchaser not only filed his own affidavit but also filed the affidavit of the Naib Nazir of the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Solan, who conducted the auction sale. The version of the auction purchaser has been supported by the Naib Nazir and in a nutshell their affidavits point out that the auction sale was legal, valid and devoid of any legal infirmity. The District Judge went through the respective contentions of the parties and finally came to the conclusion that the objections were untenable and the sale was confirmed. 6. Shri A.K. Goel, who appears for the appellant has re-asserted the same objections which the appellant had taken before the District Court. However, the same were pressed not only with his usual vehemence but reliance on certain decisions was also placed. Adverting to the first objection that the provisions of Order XXI Rules 84 to 86 of the Code were ignored by the District Court, the learned Counsel places reliance on Manilal Mohanlal Shah and others v. Sardar Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mahmad and another, AIR 1954 SC 349, Hira Lal and others v. Mst. Champa and others, AIR 1955 All 226, Tapesh Chandra Bagchi v. United Bank of India Ltd. and others, AIR 1969 Assam and Nagaland 10, Nichhattar Singh and others v. Babu Khan and others, AIR 1972 P&H 204, Mrs.
Champa and others, AIR 1955 All 226, Tapesh Chandra Bagchi v. United Bank of India Ltd. and others, AIR 1969 Assam and Nagaland 10, Nichhattar Singh and others v. Babu Khan and others, AIR 1972 P&H 204, Mrs. Margaret A. Skinner v. M/s-Empire Store Connaught Place New Delhi-l and others, 1976 PLR 64, and Kalala Laxma Reddy and another v. Sayed Burhamuddin Hussain and others, AIR 1977 AP 78. On the basis of these pronouncements, Shri A.K. Goel contends that failure of the respondent to pay the 1/4th amount of the total sale value of the property on the fail of the hammer meant no sale having been terminated in favour of the respondent and the action of the Court official in accepting the sale price the next day was illegal and did not in any way legalise the auction which had been reduced to nothingness on the failure of the respondent paying the l/4th of the sale price at the close of the auction. Finally, a frail plea that the remaining amount was tendered by way of cheque which was neither legal nor proper, did not amount to deposit of the balance amount of sale price within the period prescribed under Order XXI Rule 25 of the Code. Shri Lokender Thakur places reliance on AIR 1970 Delhi 56, Uma Datt v. R.K. Sardana and another, and AIR 1964 SC 1300, Dhirendra Nath Gorai and Subal Chandra Nath Saha and others v. Sudhir Chandra Ghosh and others. I am neither convinced nor impressed by any of the submissions of the learned Counsel for the appellant. There is no dispute with the principles as laid down in the judgments in question but the facts in the present case are quite different and do not attract the prohibitions being pressed to assail the auction in question. There is no reason to disbelieve the statement of the respondent that l/4th of the total sale price of the sale was offered there and then but the Court official asked him to deposit the same by way of a bank draft the next day since the same could not be prepared on that day, at that time, as the auction ended at about 5 p.m. by which time the Banks had closed. Accordingly, as per the direction of the Court official, the amount was deposited the next day by way of bank draft.
Accordingly, as per the direction of the Court official, the amount was deposited the next day by way of bank draft. The Court official has in his affidavit supported this version of the respondent. There is no violation of the kind contended by the appellant and the deposit is thus deemed to be a deposit sequel to and in pursuance of the offer of this amount made on the close of the auction sale in favour of the respondent on October 15, 1980 and report submitted to the Court wherein mention of the bank draft with its number does not make any substantial defect as contended by Shri A.K. Goel since the same was actually submitted the next day after the receipt of the draft though dated October 15, 1980 on which date the auction had taken place. In the peculiar circumstances of this case which are hot available in any of the judgments referred to above, the deposit on October 16, 1980 does not amount to extension of time, as contended. Moreover the depositing of the amount by bank draft and cheque cannot be considered to be illegal in view of the present day bank rules, prevailing circumstances and normal incident of present day life, AIR 1989 SC 1553 K. Saraswathy alias K. Kalpana {dead) by LRs v. P.S.S. Somasundram Chettiar. 7. The second objection regarding the proclamation of sale is equally devoid of merit since it is a stage prior to the actual sale of the property and in case the appellant had any objection as to the manner and form of drawing it the same could be raised at the appropriate stage. Now in view of Order XXI Rule 90 (3) of the Code such an objection is untenable. Even otherwise, the contents of this document do not disclose any such defect as to cause any prejudice worth complaining. Shri Goel, learned Counsel, further argues that the conduct of sale by the Naib Nazir in place of Nazir of the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge is bad as such a course is not permissible- The auction, learned Counsel urges, can be done by the Nazir of the Court only. This objection has also no force. Such provisions, in my opinion, are not mandatory. They are regulatory and permissive in nature.
This objection has also no force. Such provisions, in my opinion, are not mandatory. They are regulatory and permissive in nature. Naturally in the absence of Nazir on leave Naib Nazir is next to him in rank, the auction could thus be conducted by him. Even otherwise, the Court could permit or authorise any person or official other than these officials to conduct the sale. It is not understood how the appellant has suffered on this account ? This appears to be an objection for the sake of objection, hence rejected. Finally, Shri A.K. Goel submits that the appellant could not file the affidavits before the District court due to the non-appearance of its Counsel who had to attend the cremation ceremony of late Justice Chet Ram Thakur on this day. This plea is also without any force since the appellant had engaged another local Counsel Shri Laxmi Narain Sharma at Solan to appear in this case, who could have very well appeared in the case and filed the affidavits or atleast prayed for adjournment of the matter to some other day, but that has not been done. Moreover as observed by the District Judge that although the prayer of the appellant for breaking open the locks and the doors of the mortgaged property was allowed still it did not care to take serious interest in the further proceedings in the matter and felt contended by sending(only a peon at the time of the auction. The matter has been examined quite exhaustively by the District Judge and in my considered view the objections raised by the appellant have been rightly rejected. In the absence of clear and convincing averments and proof it cannot be said that the sale is liable to be set aside simply on the ground that the appellant think that the price fetched in the auction was not high and to their satisfaction. No other point was argued by the counsel for the parties. 8. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that there is no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.