JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE petitioner was employed by M. P. S. R. T. Corporation, Indore in its Ratlam Depot The petitioner was dismissed on September 1, 1983 from service without any enquiry. The petitioner filed an application under Section 31 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (for short "the Act") against his dismissal in the Labour Court, Indore. The respondent No. 2 denied the allegations made in the application, but stated that under Standard Standing Order 11 (a) and (b) the services of the petitioner were dispensed with. The Learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court after recording of the evidence held that the termination of the services was an illegal retrenchment and ordered reinstatement of the petitioner with back wages. Aggrieved by the order of the Labour Court dated August 27, 1984, the respondent-Corporation tiled an appeal before the Industrial Court. After hearing the appeal, the Industrial Court allowed it and set aside the order of reinstatement of the petitioner passed by the Learned Labour Court. Hence, this petition. ( 2. ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, the termination of the petitioners services was illegal and punitive in nature. Although the respondent-M. P. S. R. T. Corporation (henceforth the "corporation" for brevity) supported the dismissal on the ground that it was a simple discharge under Standard Standing Order 11 (a) (b), whereas the Corporation had not set up defence at any point of time, that the petitioners services were dispensed with because of misconduct. The only question before the Court was whether the order in question was punitive in nature or not. In the event of the order being found to be punitive, the Court had no jurisdiction to allow the employer to lead evidence in support of a charge of misconduct, which was, whereas both the Tribunals below dealt with the case and proceeded to examine as to whether the petitioner was guilty of the misconduct or not? Such an approach was dearly without jurisdiction. The appreciation of the evidence by the Learned Industrial Court was challenged on the ground that it was not proper. Even the finding of the Industrial Court disclosed that the petitioner was held to be guilty of misconduct. Therefore, the order of discharge, being punitive, could not be maintained. ( 3. ) THE respondent No. 2 Corporation, in its return, has supported the order impugned, passed by respondent No. 1. Even the finding of the Industrial Court disclosed that the petitioner was held to be guilty of misconduct. Therefore, the order of discharge, being punitive, could not be maintained. ( 3. ) THE respondent No. 2 Corporation, in its return, has supported the order impugned, passed by respondent No. 1. According to the Corporation, the services of the petitioner were terminated, vide order dated September 1, 1983 and in that order, all the material facts were set out, besides, the petitioner had adverted to the said facts in the application filed under Section 61 read with Sections 31 and 62 of the Act and had also asserted that the allegations levelled against him in the order of termination, were of major misconduct, and were incorrect. Therefore, the Learned Labour Court was justified in granting the prayer of respondent No. 2, to adduce evidence on merits of the misconduct. In the Labour Court itself, the petitioner did not challenge right of the respondent No. 2 to adduce evidence and himself led evidence in rebuttal. Therefore, he is now estopped from saying that the Corporation was wrongly permitted to adduce evidence. According to the Corporation, the services of the petitioner were terminated for the reasons set out in the order of termination. It was pointed out in that order that in a checking held on May 28-29, 1983, the petitioner was caught carrying ticketless passengers, from whom he had already recovered the fare and was also found carrying 560 kilograms of luggage without luggage ticket. This act of the petitioner along with his previous record led the Corporation to take a decision that it was not desirable to retain such an employee in the services. It was, therefore, a case of loss of confidence. Therefore, the Learned Industrial Court was justified in passing the impugned order. ( 4. ) SHRI V. K. Kokje, Learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri M. L. Dhupar, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 Corporation, were heard in support of their respective contentions. It was, therefore, a case of loss of confidence. Therefore, the Learned Industrial Court was justified in passing the impugned order. ( 4. ) SHRI V. K. Kokje, Learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri M. L. Dhupar, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 Corporation, were heard in support of their respective contentions. The contention of the petitioner that the order of termination dated September 1, 1983 passed under Rule 11 (a) and (b) of the Standard Standing Orders framed under the Madhya Pradesh Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1961 is, in fact, not a discharge simpliciter but the petitioner has been punished for a major misconduct and a stigma has been cast on the petitioner without affording him an opportunity of hearing and without following the mandatory procedure, which has been laid down in rule 12 of the Standard Standing Orders, has a great force. It is not disputed before us that the Standard Standing Orders govern the terms and conditions of employment of an employee in the respondent-Corporation. The Standard Standing Orders are statutory. Therefore, the employer, before taking an action, has to proceed in accordance with the Standard Standing Orders. It is no doubt true that Rule 11 deals with termination of employment simpliciter. Rule 11 (a) states that if the services of a permanent employee has to be terminated he would be given one months notice or shall be paid a months pay in lieu of notice. Rule II (b) lays down that reasons are to be recorded in writing for termination and are to be communicated to the employee unless such a communication of reasons, in the opinion of the Manager, directly or indirectly, lay the Company or the management or the person sending the communication, open to civil and criminal proceedings at the instance of the employee. Rule 12 of the Standard Standing Orders deals with the disciplinary action for misconduct. Major misconducts have been enumerated in Clause (1) of Rule 12. Minor misconducts have been enumerated in Clause (2) of Rule 12. Rule 12 of the Standard Standing Orders deals with the disciplinary action for misconduct. Major misconducts have been enumerated in Clause (1) of Rule 12. Minor misconducts have been enumerated in Clause (2) of Rule 12. Clause (3) (a) of Rule 12 deals with punishment for minor misconduct, Clause (3 (b) of Rule 12 deals with the punishment for a major misconduct and Clause (3) (c) states that in awarding the punishment, the management shall take into account the gravity of the misconduct, the previous record of the employee, if any, and any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances. Clause (4) of Rule 12 is in a negative mandate that no punishment shall be imposed on an employee unless proved guilty of misconduct in an enquiry conducted in the manner provided by the Standard Standing Orders. Therefore, from a bare reading of these provisions, it is clear that if an employer wants to take action against an employee for any of the grounds of major misconduct, the employer cannot overlook the statutory provision of Rule 12 and cannot take action under Rule II. The intent of the legislature is that the employer should not adopt the century back policy of hire and fire and if any action is necessitated, the employee must be afforded an opportunity of hearing after holding a due enquiry of the charges levelled against him. ( 5. ) IN industrial jurisprudence, it is settled that the form of the order of termination and the language, in which it is couched, are not conclusive. The Court will lift the veil to see the true nature of the order and the form of the order of termination is not conclusive of the true nature of the order, for it is possible that the form may be merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal. It is, therefore, always open to the Tribunal or the Labour Court to go behind the form and look at the substance and if it comes to the conclusion that though in the form, the order amounts to discharge simpliciter and in reality, it is discharge simpliciter for misconduct, it will be open to set it aside as a colourable exercise of the power. A bare reading of the order of termination dated September 1, 1983 clerarly shows that it is not an order of discharge simpliciter but the services of the petitioner have been terminated for a major misconduct under Rule 11 (1) (b) and (d) of the Standard Standing Orders though after narrating the acts, the Corporation has stated that it has lost confidence in the petitioner. Hence, the services of the petitioner are terminated. Loss of confidence is not one of the enumerated misconducts under Rule 12 of the Standard Standing Orders, but it certainly affects the character or reputation of the employee and, therefore, the plea of loss of confidence in the employee indeed casts a stigma on the petitioner (See Kamalkishore Lakshman v. The Management of Pan American World Airways and Ors. (1987-I-LLJ-107) and Chandulal v. Pan American World Airways (1985-I-LLJ-181 ). Therefore, the order passed against the petitioner cannot be held to be an order of discharge simpliciter and is in a shape of an order of punishment. Therefore, it would not amount to discharge simpliciter or retrenchment under Section 2 (oo), Industrial Disputes Act, even if the inquiry has not been held. ( 6. ) IN such a situation when the enquiry has not been held and the procedural safeguards have not been followed in cases of workmen, who are governed by the Industrial Law, now it is settled that the order could be justified even in the course of adjudication before the appropriate Tribunal or the Labour Court under the Act or the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 -See (AIR) 1987. SC. 229, (AIR) 1985. SC. 1128, The Workmen of Firestone Tyres and Rubber Co. of India Private Limited v. The Management and Ors. (1973-I-LLJ-278), The Workmen of Motipur Sugar Factory Private Limited v. The Motipur Sugar Factory Private Limited (1965-II-LLJ-162); The Management of Ritze Theatre (Private) Limited v. Its Workmen (1962-II-LLJ-498); The Management of U. B. Dutt and Co (Private) Ltd v. The Workmen of U. B. Dutt and Co (AIR) 1963. SC. 411 and the Division Bench decision of this Court in Nathuram Namdeo v. State Industrial Court 1980 MPLJ 24 and M. P. Electricity Board, Jabalpur v. State Industrial Court 1980 MPLJ 41. SC. 411 and the Division Bench decision of this Court in Nathuram Namdeo v. State Industrial Court 1980 MPLJ 24 and M. P. Electricity Board, Jabalpur v. State Industrial Court 1980 MPLJ 41. As the object of industrial adjudication is to put to an end the industrial dispute as early as possible, by permitting the employer to prove before the Labour Court that the termination is justified on the ground of misconduct, the industrial dispute is brought to an end and the employee is given the benefit of an independent adjudication by the Labour Court without leaving him to the mercy of an adjudication in a domestic enquiry held by the employer. The effect of not holding an enquiry is that the Tribunal or the Labour Court would not have to consider only whether there was a prima facie case. In the absence of an enquiry, it has never been recognised that the Tribunal should straightway, without anything more, direct reinstatement of a dismissed or discharged employee, once it is found that no domestic enquiry has been held or the said enquiry is found to be defective See (1973-I-LLJ-278) and a Division Bench case of this Court in M. P. Electricity Board v. State Industrial Court 1980. MPLJ. 41 (supra ). ( 7. ) THE position is not changed after amendment in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by inserting Section 11-A or by amending the State Act by inserting Sec. 107-A - See (1973-I-LLJ-278) (supra ). Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that no enquiry was held on the major misconduct against him, cannot be accepted. ( 8. ) BUT, it does not mean that the employer is given a free hand or unfettered power to terminate the service of an employee under the garb of the order of discharge simpliciter or to adopt the hire and fire policy and to terminate the services of an employee for a misconduct without following the procedure prescribed; and then come before the Court to state the reasons for termination. In such a situation, if a dispute is raised, the employer is bound to satisfy the Labour Court or the Tribunal that he acted bona fide and there was no colourable exercise of power as immediate action was necessitated, or enquiry was not possible, or because of the absconsion of the employee, the enquiry was not held, or, for the like reason. The Court or the Tribunal, if the employer justifies his action, is bound to judge the bona fides of the employer after considering the overall picture, circumstances and the evidence led before the Court. It is not that the employer can justify his action before the Court overlooking the mandatory provisions of holding an enquiry. The Standard Standing Orders have been framed for the security and protection of the employees so that unfair labour practice may not be committed or the employee may not be victimised. If the action has been taken bona fide, then certainly the Management can justify its action before the Court so as to put to an end the industrial strife. In such a situation, the matter is at large before the Court. The Court has been given power to look into the reasons and bona fides of the employer and then to pass an award or order accordingly. The Courts have also been given powers in view of the provisions of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and Section 107-A of the State Act, to interfere in the matter of punishment and to pass an appropriate order in the facts of a particular case, looking to the nature of the misconduct committed and to see that the punishment of dismissal under the garb of discharge simpliciter, is not too harsh or lacking on bona fides or is by way of victimisation. ( 9. ) THE other contention of Shri Kokje, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the Court committed an illegality and acted without jurisdiction in allowing the Corporation to justify its action by leading evidence. ( 9. ) THE other contention of Shri Kokje, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the Court committed an illegality and acted without jurisdiction in allowing the Corporation to justify its action by leading evidence. In the facts of the case, as observed above, the management can justify its action, it is also settled that the employer should seek permission to justify its action at the earliest opportunity by filing an application for permission to lead evidence in support of the reasons, charge or charges framed against the workmen or by pleading and praying for leading of evidence, if it is not pleaded and prayed in the written statement or prayer is not made before filing of the written statement, the employer cannot be allowed to do so at any later stage of the litigation by filing an application for the purpose, which may result in delay, which may lead to wrecking the morale of the employee and compel him to surrender which he may not otherwise do- see Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda (1983-IILLJ-415 ). In the instant case, the employer came with a case of misconduct. In the written statement, the employer took a stand of loss of confidence giving reasons and then led evidence before the Labour Court and in rebuttal, the petitioner also led evidence. Therefore, in our opinion, the Labour Court has not committed any illegality in the circumstances of the case. ( 10. ) THE last contention of Shri Kokje, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the punishment of dismissal, in the circumstances of the case, is too harsh as the petitioner has not misappropriated the income of the Corporation. On the other hand, the petitioner entered all the tickets in the additional trip sheet and deposited the amount. The discrepancy of two passengers arose because of the miscalculation and because of the statement of the checkers, which is not material so as to warrant the punishment like that of dismissal taking the bread and butter of an employee. Shri Dhupar, learned counsel for the respondent Corportion, tried to convince this Court that the petitioner committed a serious misconduct and the act of the petitioner led the Corporation to suffer the loss of income and in such circumstances, no interference is warranted with the punishment for a major misconduct. Shri Dhupar, learned counsel for the respondent Corportion, tried to convince this Court that the petitioner committed a serious misconduct and the act of the petitioner led the Corporation to suffer the loss of income and in such circumstances, no interference is warranted with the punishment for a major misconduct. In the circumstances of the case, we are not convinced with the submission, made by the Learned Counsel for the respondent. It is not disputed that the petitioner has not misappropriated the amount and has deposited the same and entry of 14 tickets has been made in the additional collection sheet. In such circumstances, we feel that the punishment of termination of the employment was too harsh, as it has been held by a series of decisions of this Court that when an employee commits an act of dereliction in his duties and permitted the passengers to board the bust before issuing tickets to them and did not make entries in the trip sheet or collection sheet, dishonesty, in such circumstances, cannot be inferred. This Court has held that the forfeiture of back wages would be a sufficient punishment. In a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in supervisory jurisdiction, this Court is not empowered to pass an order on the merits of the case or to pass an order of punishment; it can merely quash the order of the lower Tribunal. Therefore, as in our opinion, the punishment of termination, in the circumstances of the case, was too harsh, which amounted to victimisation, the order of the Industrial Court maintaining the order of the Corporation is hereby quashed. Let the Indusustrial Court decide the case afresh and pass an order in respect of punishment. The parties shall appear before the Industrial Court on June 20, 1989. No fresh notices shall be necessary to the parties to appear. Thereafter, the Industrial Court shall proceed to decide the case expeditiously, in accordance with law, not later than three months, as the services of the employee concerned were terminated as long back as in the year 1983. ( 11. ) IN the result, this petition is allowed, as stated hereinabove. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own cost of this petition. The amount of security deposit, if any, be refunded to the petitioner, after verification.