JUDGMENT : L. Rath, J. - This petition u/s 482, Code of Criminal Procedure is directed against an order of the Sessions Judge, Sambalpur, refusing the petition filed by the State for permission to cross-examine P.W. 3. The opposite party is facing trial u/s 302 I. P. C in Sessions Trial No. 96 of 1988 and admittedly the two eye-witnesses to the occurrence are p. ws. 2 and 3 of which P.W. 2 is the field servant of the opposite party and having turned hostile was cross-examined by the prosecution. P.W. 3 was examined on 12-12-1988 and 13-12.1988. While P.W. 3 had deposed narrating fully the prosecution case, yet the last sentence of her deposition had been recorded as if she was accepting the suggestion of the defence that her statement that she bad gone to the bushy jungle behind the house of the accused and had seen him assaulting the deceased are all false and the result of the tutoring by the police and the threats of her father-in-law. The Court remained closed from 24-12-1988 to 1-1-1989 and after re-opening, the certified copy was compared with the original deposition of P.W. 3 where it was noticed that in the original deposition the word not showing the suggestion of the defence to have been denied had been, scored through and hence on 3-1-1989 a petition was filed to treat the evidence of P.W. 3 as it was before the correction. The petition being resisted by the opposite party the P.W. 3 was directed to appear on 16-1-1989 for clarification of her evidence. On that day the witness on being recalled at the instance of the Court, made the statement that the last sentence in her deposition recorded on 13-12-1988 that she had been for easing to the bushy jungle and saw the accused assaulting the deceased was the result of the tutoring by the police and the threats given by her father-in-law. A petition was thereafter filed by the learned public prosecutor for permission to put questions to the, witness but the same was rejected and the witness was discharged. It is such order which is impugned in this miscellaneous case. 2. A petition was thereafter filed by the learned public prosecutor for permission to put questions to the, witness but the same was rejected and the witness was discharged. It is such order which is impugned in this miscellaneous case. 2. A perusal of the evidence of P.W. 3 shows her to be an eye-witness to the occurrence and having denied all negative suggestions of the defence, but the last two sentences of her deposition recorded on 13-12-1988 were as follows: ... It is a fact that my father-in-law threatened to drive me out from the house unless I made the statement before the Magistrate in accordance with the police tutoring. It is a fact that my evidence that I went for easing to the bushy jungle behind house of accused and that I saw the accused assaulting the deceased are all false and the result of the tutoring by the police and the threats of my father-in-law. There was a word 'not' in the last sentence after 'the words 'it is' but such word was scored through under the signature of the presiding Officer. On 16-1-1989 the witness sought to clarify her statement thus: The last sentence in my deposition on the last date that I had been for easing to the bushy jungle and saw the accused assaulting the deceased was the result of tutoring by the police, and the threats given by my father-in-law. 3. Mr. Mishra, learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party, has urged of there having been no scope for the State to be misled by the recording of the last sentence of the deposition of P.W. 3 on 13-12-1988 since even in' the' sentence immediately preceding it, she had stated that it was a fact that her father-in-law had threatened to drive her out from his house, unless she makes the statement before the Magistrate in accordance with the police tutoring. It is submitted that there was no inconsistency in her statements in the Court disowning the prosecution case and it is also his further contention that the evidence of P.W. 3 does not disclose any hostile animus or attempt on her part to speak falsehood and hence there is no justification to treat her as a hostile witness. 4. It is submitted that there was no inconsistency in her statements in the Court disowning the prosecution case and it is also his further contention that the evidence of P.W. 3 does not disclose any hostile animus or attempt on her part to speak falsehood and hence there is no justification to treat her as a hostile witness. 4. Reading the evidence of P.W. 3 recorded on 16-1-1989 and 13-12-1988 there appears to be some confusion since in the last sentence of her deposition on 13-12-1988 she never stated of having gone to the bushy jungle for easing and having seen the accused assaulting the deceased there and on the contrary, denied the same by saying that such statements made earlier were false and the result of tutoring by the police and the threats by her father-in-law. On 16-1-1989 while giving clarification, she however stated of having made such a statement in the last sentence of her deposition on 13-12-1988. Be that as it may, on a reading of the evidence of both the days, it is clear that she has attempted to resile from her entire deposition in the Court by maintaining that the most vital part of her evidence was false and was the 'result of the police tutoring which she was compelled to depose under the threats of her father-in-Law. The statement was completely destructive of the prosecution case and was wholly contrary to her statement before the police and hence there cannot be any doubt that if her statement before the police is to be believed, she was resorting to falsehood and that otherwise if her evidence regarding the threat and tutoring is to be accepted it, shall completely demolish the prosecution case which assumes even greater importance since in effect she is the sole eye-witness the other eye-witness P.W. 2 having already turned hostile. It thus stands to reason that the public prosecutor was perfectly justified in seeking permission of the court to cross-examine the witness and the order of the learned Sessions Judge in refusing the prayer without assigning any reason is not in accordance with law. 5. Supporting the order Mr. It thus stands to reason that the public prosecutor was perfectly justified in seeking permission of the court to cross-examine the witness and the order of the learned Sessions Judge in refusing the prayer without assigning any reason is not in accordance with law. 5. Supporting the order Mr. Mishra also urged that the petition filed by the Public Prosecutor to cross-examine the witness after cross-examination by the defence was over was not maintainable since according to him, such opportunity could be availed by the prosecution only before the cross-examination by the defence and not after it. The provision relating to cross-examination by a party of his own witness is as contained in Section 154, Evidence Act which vests absolute discretion in the Court to permit the, person to put questions to his own witness by way of cross-examination. The discretion is not fettered in any manner so as to confine it to be exercised only at a particular stage. The different stages in the examination of a witness as contained in Sections 137 and 138 of the Evidence Act have nothing to do so far as the powers of the Court u/s 154 are concerned since neither the scheme of the sections nor the words thereof land themselves to any such limitation. The question was examined in Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker Vs. State of Gujarat where the Court held that Section 154 does not, in terms or by necessary implication, confine the exercise of the power by the Court before the examination-in-chief is concluded or to any particular stage of the examination of the witness and that the discretion is left entirely to the Court to exercise the same when the circumstances demand and that to confine that power only to the stage of examination-in-chief would in practice make the power ineffective. It was pointed out that a clever witness in his examination-in-chief may faithfully conform all what he stated earlier to the police or in the committing Court but in the cross-examination may introduce the statements in a subtle way contradicting in effect what he stated in the examination-in-chief and if his design is obvious, the Court can during course of his re-examination permit the person calling him as a witness to put questions to him by way of cross-examination. 6. 6. To exercise discretion u/s 154, Evidence Act for permitting a party to cross-examine his own witness the conditions to be satisfied are that either the statement of, the witness must have exhibited an element of hostility or that he bad resiled from a material statement made before any earlier authority, or that there is some material to show that the witness was not speaking the truth. It was held in Shri Rabindra Kumar Dey Vs. State of Orissa while lying down the tests, that in order to ascertain the intention of the witness or his conduct the concerned Judge may look into his statements before the investigating officer or the previous authorities to find out whether or not there is any indication of the witness making a statement inconsistent on a most material point with the one which he gave before the previous authority. But however a distinction is to be drawn between a statement by way of an unfriendly or hostile act and a statement in which the truth is let out without any hostile intention and that the consideration of such matter will largely depend on the facts and circumstances of each case as also satisfaction of the Court based upon those circumstances. In an earlier decision Sat Paul Vs. Delhi Administration the Court held that the discretion u/s 154 is unqualified and untrammelled and is to be liberally exercised whenever the Court from witness's demeanour, temper, attitude, bearing or the tenor and tendency of his answers or from a perusal of his previous inconsistent statements, or otherwise thinks that the grant of such permission is expedient to extract the truth and to do justice. In a later case G.S. Bakshi etc. etc. v. State (Delhi Administration AIR 1979 S.C. 569 ), the Court again held that when a prosecution witness turns hostile by stating something which is destructive of the prosecution case, it is entitled to pray that the witness be treated as hostile and that in such a case, the trial Court must allow the Public Prosecutor to treat the witness as hostile. Applying such principles, it does not need much persecution to bold that in the instant case P.W.3 has made statements in a positive hostile manner completely destructive of the prosecution case. Applying such principles, it does not need much persecution to bold that in the instant case P.W.3 has made statements in a positive hostile manner completely destructive of the prosecution case. The statements are thoroughly inconsistent with her statements on the most material aspect of her statements to the previous authorities and hence there could not be any semblance of a reason to withhold permission to the Public Prosecutor to declare the witness hostile. Hence the order of the learned Sessions Judge cannot be sustained in law and is quashed. 7. In the result the Criminal Miscellaneous Case is allowed. The lower Court records be sent back forthwith. Since in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 71 of 1989 disposed of on 25-1-1989 there was a direction for expeditious hearing of the sessions trial, learned Sessions Judge is directed to resume the trial as soon as the records are received back and dispose of the same. Crl. Misc. Case allowed. Final Result : Allowed