T. N. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) THE two appeals were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment. Misc. First Appeal No. 15/1973 is preferred by the contesting defendants, while Misc. F. A. No. 18/1973 is by the plaintiff, since deceased and represented by his legal representatives. ( 2 ) ON 31-10-1966 plaintiff instituted the suit for declaration, partition and mesne profits in which judgment was rendered on 2-2-1973. Plaintiff's claim was decreed in part. In their appeal (Misc. F. A. No. 15/1973) the contesting defendants have made a grievance not only against the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff but also in favour of defendant 15 by the trial Court. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff came up with a case that in respect of the land of Schedule A of the plaint he was a 'pakka Krishak' with 'mourusi' rights on the material date, namely, 20-6-1950, and that he was 'up Krishak' (Shikmi) in respect of Schedule B land, under Gulab Kunwar, admittedly, a widow. On 20-6-1950 Madhya Bharat Model Farming Society (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'the Society') was formed with those lands and some other lands thrown into hotchpotch by one Harbilas Singh, not impleaded in the suit. The Society was, admittedly, an unregistered body and was formed with six members with the two contributors, namely, the plaintiff and Harbilash Singh, and four others who were defendant 14 Raja Pancham Singh, defendant No. 18 Rao Sultan Singh, defendant No. 16 Thakur Narendra Singh and defendant 17 Pt. Vishnu Datt. As per deed of agreement between the four members of the Society, according to the plaintiff, he was given 2 annas and 2 paise (old) share in the lands of the Society, while Raja Pancham Singh was given 10 annas share, but defendant 15 Kanhaiyalal had an interest to the extent of 2 paise in that share of Raja Pancham Singh. Other members, Harbilas and Rao Sultan Singh, were each given one anna share, and Narendra Singh and Vishnu Datt were each given 3 paise share in the lands of the Society. However, he admitted that he had sold his 21/2 annas share for a consideration of Rs. 8000/- vide Ext. D-1, dated 29-6-1965, to the contesting defendants namely, defendants 1 to 13. However, he admitted that he had sold his 21/2 annas share for a consideration of Rs. 8000/- vide Ext. D-1, dated 29-6-1965, to the contesting defendants namely, defendants 1 to 13. In the suit he laid claim for declaration and partition with respect to one anna share ' in Schedule A land which he had purchased for Rs. 1500/- as per Ext. P-4 on 6-7-65 from three sons of Harbilas, who died, in the meantime, in 1958. He made a further claim in the suit, similarly, for 31/2 annas share in Schedule B land on the footing that his original 21/2 annas share therein had remained unalienated and his purchase from 3 sons of Harbilas vide Ext. P-4 also included one anna share in Schedule B land. Admittedly, other members of the Society had alienated their share in the suit land to the contesting defendants. ( 4 ) IN the course of hearing of the appeal when Ext. P-1 was examined and its content and effect analysed, the plaintiff's counsel was faced with a situation under which it became necessary for the Court to consider the possibility of the suit being dismissed. That happened on 12-5-1989. Accordingly, on 16-5-1989 I. A. No. XI was filed on behalf of the plaintiff in F. A. No. 18/1973 praying for leave to amend the plaint. By that application para 5 (a) is sought to be inserted in the plaint and consequent amendment in the relief para is also prayed by adding para 1 (a) therein. By the amendment the plaintiff seeks to set up a new case that if under Ext. P1 the Court holds that no transfer had taken place in favour of the members of the Society, the plaintiff be declared Bhumiswami of the land covered there under in the right of his original title and, accordingly, the several sale deeds executed by the members of the Society be declared void. On the proof of that claim, plaintiff has sought the relief that Ext. P-1 be declared void and the entire suitland be declared of the exclusive title of the plaintiff. On the proof of that claim, plaintiff has sought the relief that Ext. P-1 be declared void and the entire suitland be declared of the exclusive title of the plaintiff. When hearing of the two appeals was resumed on 16-5-1989 the amendment prayed was seriously challenged but at the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved by orders on the aforesaid I. A. No. 11, taking the view that, that may be dealt with and disposed of in the final judgment, to be rendered in the two appeals. ( 5 ) ACCORDINGLY, I propose to dispose of first I. A. No. XI which, in my opinion, is wholly misconceived and is liable to be rejected. By now, law is well settled that " the test for allowing the amendment is to find whether the proposed amendment works any serious injustice to the other side. " In other words, although Courts are expected to be liberal in granting the prayer for amendment of pleadings, they have to consider still whether the nature of the suit was altered and whether any valuable right of limitation accrued to the defendant was being taken away by the proposed amendment. Reference in this connection may also be made to the decision in the case of Prem Raj, AIR 1968 SC 1355 , wherein the Apex Court took the view that although under O. 7, R. 7, C. P. C. plaintiff could pray for inconsistent reliefs, he must show that the alternative plea was maintainable in law. In the instant case, Harbilas or his legal representatives are not impleaded in the suit, and there is no prayer for the legal representatives of Harbilas to be impleaded even in the amendment application aforesaid. Obviously, in their absence the alternative case now set up cannot be decided, because Harbilas was a member of the Society and his heirs had executed sale deeds, among others, to plaintiff himself, in respect of the share of Harbilas in the land of the Society under Ext. P-1. That apart, time evidently is the great stumbling block which must repel the alternative case being set up now after a lapse of 39 years. Valuable right is accrued by lapse of time to answering defendants, albeit, in virtue of sale deeds now impugned after a lapse of 24 years, which evidently is likely to cause serious injury and injustice to the answering defendants. Valuable right is accrued by lapse of time to answering defendants, albeit, in virtue of sale deeds now impugned after a lapse of 24 years, which evidently is likely to cause serious injury and injustice to the answering defendants. The prayer for amendment of the plaint as per I. A. No. II is, accordingly, rejected. ( 6 ) IT is, indeed, unfortunate that the trial Court failed to appreciate the legal effect of the crucial document (Ext. P- 1) and took it for granted that a valid transfer of right, title and interest in the land with respect to which the 'agreement' (Ext. P-1) was executed, passed thereunder to the six members of the Society. The main question, indeed, is whether the plaintiff and Harbilas could throw their own lands into the hotchpotch and divest themselves of their own right, title and interest in their lands so as to transfer the same to the Society by the said 'agreement'. That apart, construing on its own language and terms, it is difficult to read in the 'agreement' any transfer of the land allegedly conveyed to the Society or in favour of its members because of what is to he read in the three important clauses thereof. The purport of Cl. 1 is distribution of profit and loss only among the members in the proportion indicated therein because of unspecified financial contribution of those members to be made for developing the lands and for making other necessary arrangements. It is the misreading of this important clause by the trial Court that has vitiated the impugned judgment because the proportion in which the members are supposed to share profit and loss was taken at their respective shares in the land conveyed to the society under the 'agreement'. It is true that the members, namely, Raja Pancham Singh, the plaintiff, Harbilas, Rao Sultan Singh Thakur Narendra Singh and Pt. Vishnu Datt, were to share profit and loss in proportion respectively of 10 annas 21/2 annas, 1 anna each (by Harbilas and Rao Sultan Singh) and 3 paise each (by Thakur Narendra Singh and Pt. Vishnu Datt) and, indeed, the share of Kanhaiyalal (defendant 15) to the extent of 2 paise, is mentioned, but that is all; and it is not mentioned that they will have any other interest in the property itself. In Cl. Vishnu Datt) and, indeed, the share of Kanhaiyalal (defendant 15) to the extent of 2 paise, is mentioned, but that is all; and it is not mentioned that they will have any other interest in the property itself. In Cl. 2 is mentioned the contribution of plaintiff and Harbilas of their respective holdings with which the hotchpotch was formed of their lands given in the management of the Society. True, it is also mentioned therein that the name of the members of the society in respect of those lands shall be entered in the revenue records maintained by the Patwari. But even that recital would not consitute a transfer. Indeed, what Cl. 3 contemplates destroys the basis of the alleged transfer because the purported vesting of title or interest in respect of the lands in question in the Society or members thereof was made conditional there under. In Cl. 3 right was reserved, for any member of the Society to be excluded on default, by that member, in paying his dues to the Society or carrying out his duties and responsibilities to the Society envisaged under the 'agreement'. In that event, it was contemplated, the member concerned will lose all his rights in the lands of the Society. ( 7 ) THE trial Court has, however, noted admissions of the contesting defendants and has otherwise also tested the plaintiff's claim with respect to entitlement claimed by him under Ext. P-4. It has been held that although Harbilas had one anna share in Schedule A land under Ext. P-1, his 3 sons could convey to the plaintiff their 3/5th share only, in regard to the interest of Harbilas, because Harbilas died leaving behind two other legal heirs also, who were his wife Mahadevi and widow of his predeceased son, Betibai, who had by separate sale deed (Ext. D-2) executed on 181-1971, transferred validly 2/5th share of the interest of Harbilas to the contesting defendants. Accordingly, decree was passed in plaintiff's favour in respect of 3/5th share in one anna of Schedule A land, though plaintiffs claim for 31/2 annas in Schedule B land was rejected in toto. D-2) executed on 181-1971, transferred validly 2/5th share of the interest of Harbilas to the contesting defendants. Accordingly, decree was passed in plaintiff's favour in respect of 3/5th share in one anna of Schedule A land, though plaintiffs claim for 31/2 annas in Schedule B land was rejected in toto. It was held that Schedule B land could not vest in the Society because plaintiff had no right as a 'up Krishak' to transfer his interest therein to the Society as his landlady Gulab Kunwar was a 'disabled person' and her interest was legally protected by the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. Indeed, for that reason it was held, the plaintiff got nothing under Ext. P-4 in so far as Schedule B land is concernd. ( 8 ) ACCORDING to me, if the plaintiff has to succeed and, indeed, to the extent his suit was decreed by the trial Court in respect of 3/5th share in one anna in Schedule A land, basis for that must be found in the admission of the contesting defendants; and not in Ext. P-1 or Ext. P-4. Both documents, according to me, created no right, title and interest in any person in view of the legal position hereinabove noted. I accept the finding of the trial Court that possession of the Society in respect of Schedule B land was that of a trespasser, and I also accept its finding recorded at para 5 (page 69 of the Paper Book) and para 12 (page 75 of the Paper Book) regarding admission of the defendants. They had conceded to the plaintiffs right, title and interest of 2/5th share of the interest of Harbilas to the extent of one anna in Schedule A land. I profitably extract from the judgment following admission of the defendants noted by the trial Court :"these defendants have pleaded that they have no concern with the lands falling into the share of Harbilas and they are not in possession of the lands of that share. In fact, more lands than the share of Harbilas Singh are still lying fallow on the spot and the plaintiff can very well seek partition and take the possession of those lands. In fact, more lands than the share of Harbilas Singh are still lying fallow on the spot and the plaintiff can very well seek partition and take the possession of those lands. " ( 9 ) I find sufficient warrant for the view taken by me in the provisions of O. 12, R. 6, C. P. C. It is permissible for the Court to pronounce at any stage judgment suo motu "where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise. " I do not think if it is a case in which proof of vesting of title decreed in plaintiff's favour has to be insisted, because the declaration in that regard made by the trial Court in virtue of the provisions of S. 34 of the Specific Relief Act shall have the effect, according to S. 35 thereof, of binding only the parties to the suit. The declaration is not in respect of any legal character or status of the plaintiff so as to debar grant of declaration on admission of claim. ( 10 ) ACCORDINGLY, I find no merit in plaintiff's appeal, namely, F. A. No. 18/1973, which is dismissed without ado. If I have to say anything more to buttress the conclusion reached, I may refer to the provisions of Ss. 185 and 190 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, which had come into force on 2-10-1959. By operation of law, in virtue of S. 185 (2) any person "who holds in Madhya Bharat region any Inam land as a tenant" becomes an 'occupancy tenant' of such land, but the land must be in 'actual possession' of such a tenant. Again, as per S. 190 (2-A), in terms of those provisions and subject to conditions thereof being satisfied by the 'occupancy tenant' (as contemplated under S. 185 (2)), rights of a Bhumiswami accrue to him. If the plaintiff has to succeed in terms of these provisions he has to fulfil strictly the requirements envisaged therein by pleading and proving his case in accordance therewith. The least said about that is, the plaintiff has not done anything of that sort. ( 11 ) IN so far as the other appeal is concerned, something more has to be said because that appeal, for reasons to follow, succeeds partially albeit on two counts. The least said about that is, the plaintiff has not done anything of that sort. ( 11 ) IN so far as the other appeal is concerned, something more has to be said because that appeal, for reasons to follow, succeeds partially albeit on two counts. Firstly, against the decree of mesne profits passed by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff against the contesting defendants that decree cannot stand as plaintiff's declaration granted by the trial Court has been upheld on the basis merely of the admission of the contesting defendants, and admissions must be read as a whole. The relevant portion of the admission afore extracted clearly establishes the position that the contesting defendants have not deprived the plaintiff of his right to use and cultivate the Schedules land claimed by him through Harbilas. They have rather conceded that the plaintiff is entitled to take by partition that land and carry on cultivation thereon as they have no concern with that land and that land was not in their possession. Indeed, in regard to this part of the impugned decree of mesne profits, it has also to be observed that the trial Court has not discussed the pleadings or the evidence relevant to the question and has not recorded the basis of its finding as to how mesne profits could be awarded to him. ( 12 ) SECONDLY, the decree, as contesting defendants rightly contend, declaring interest of defendant 15 Kanhaiyalal through his legal representatives in the suit land and granting him mesne profits, is also illegal and without jurisdiction. The legal representatives of defendant 15 filed their written statement on 29-6-1968. It is true that court-fees were paid and affixed on that written statement, and it is also true that in para 6 thereof a flimsy and bald claim was made denying plaint statement of para 6, claiming in their own right, as per Ex. P-1. separate possession and mesne profits. On that vague claim decree in that regard could not be passed in favour of defendant 15 for several reasons. True, the provisions of sub-rules 6a and 6g inserted in O. 8, C. P. C. in 1977 regarding 'counter claim' were not available to defendant 15 but his claim had to be still tried otherwise in accordance with law. On that vague claim decree in that regard could not be passed in favour of defendant 15 for several reasons. True, the provisions of sub-rules 6a and 6g inserted in O. 8, C. P. C. in 1977 regarding 'counter claim' were not available to defendant 15 but his claim had to be still tried otherwise in accordance with law. That written statement could have been treated as a plaint in cross suit but the Court should have permitted the plaintiff as also the contesting defendants an opportunity to present their written statements to that claim as envisaged under Rules 1 and 9 of O. 8. However without doing so, immediately on the date on which it was filed the court ordered fixing the next date for settling issues. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision in Laxmidas v. Nanabhai, AIR 1964 SC 11 wherein it was held that when a counter claim was made under the old provisions that had to be treated as a plaint in cross suit and proceeded with in accordance with law for rendering a decision in that cross suit which could be tried jointly with the main suit. ( 13 ) HOWEVER, for another salutary reason also, claim of defendant 15 must fail and the decree passed by the trial court must be set aside. I have already held that Ext. P-1 was a zero document and thereunder no right, title and interest accrued in favour of the members of the Society or to anybody including Kanhaiyalal, (defendant 15) whose limited claim was rooted in the share of Raja Pancham Singh. The case of defendant 15 is evidently distinguishable from that of the plaintiff because the contesting defendants have not made any admission in his favour and have rather seriously contested his claim. ( 14 ) FOR the several foregoing reasons, First Appeal No. 15/1973 succeeds partially. The decree passed by the trial Court of declaration of right, title and interest of defendant 15 or, for that reason, of his legal representative in any part of the suit-land is held illegal and without jurisdiction and is set aside. The trial Court's decree granting mesne profits to defendant 15 and also to the plaintiff is also set aside. ( 15 ) IN the result, First Appeal No. 18/1973 fails and First Appeal No. 15/1973 succeeds to the extent indicated hereinabove. The trial Court's decree granting mesne profits to defendant 15 and also to the plaintiff is also set aside. ( 15 ) IN the result, First Appeal No. 18/1973 fails and First Appeal No. 15/1973 succeeds to the extent indicated hereinabove. ( 16 ) PARTIES are left to bear their own costs in this court. Order accordingly. .