A.K. MATHUR, J.—This is an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. invoking the inherent Jurisdiction of this Court for quashing the order dated 10-3-1987 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate No. 1 Jodhpur whereby he has taken cognizance against the accused petitioner. 2. The brief facts giving rise to this case are that a first information report was filed at Police Station, Udai Mandir, Jodhpur wherein it was alleged that there was a partnership firm known as M/s. Saleem Chouhan which was doing the business of contractors. It was also alleged that the accused induced the complainant along with his brothers Abdul Aziz and Abdul Mazid to enter into a partnership and they agreed to be inducted in the partnership firm This firm took a contract from PHED for constructing of Sewerage lines on 4-6-1983. M/s Saleem Chouhan also got a contract for construction of sewerage lines in Ratanada area. Toward that contract earnest money of Rs 6 000/- and money for purchasing the tender form was paid by his brother Abdul Mazid being one of the partners of this firm. Similarly an amount of Rs 760/- was also paid by Abdul Mazid for another tender but the contract could not be obtained. It was alleged that this amount was also withdrawn by the accused petitioner and he misappropriated the same. It was alleged that there were six partners in this partnership firm. Out of these six partners, Abdul Hamid (complainant), Abdul Aziz and Abdul Mazid are brothers and Saleem Chouhan (accused-petitioner), Ibrahim Khilzi and Abdul Haman are related to each other. It was alleged by the complainant Abdul Hamid in this first information report that he along with his brothers has invested a sum of Rs. 2 08 700/- for this contract for construction of sewerage lines in Ratanada area He and his brothers has also invested a sum of Rs. 1,57,345/-. For the above works a partnership deed was executed on 28-2-1984 between the parties to the effect that they will share the profit and loss of this business. These allegations were inquired into by the Police. 1,57,345/-. For the above works a partnership deed was executed on 28-2-1984 between the parties to the effect that they will share the profit and loss of this business. These allegations were inquired into by the Police. But the Police gave a final report in the matter When this final report was filed in the court, a protest petition was filed by Abdul Hamid and it was requested that cognizance may be taken against the accused under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. On this protest petition the learned Magistrate took cognizance under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. against the accused under Sections 409 and 420 IPC. The learned Magistrate after recording the necessary evidence found that there is a prima facie case against the accused and, therefore, he took cognizance against the accused under Sections 409 and 420 I.P.C. by his order dated 10-3-1987. Aggrieved against this order the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court for quashing this order taking cognizance against the accused under Sections 409 and 420 IPC. 3. Mr. Jasmatiya, learned counsel for the petitioner, has urged before me that before filing this complaint before the police and protest petition before the learned Magistrate a civil suit was also filed by the complainant party and a compromise was arrived at on 22-5-1985. 3. Mr. Jasmatiya, learned counsel for the petitioner, has urged before me that before filing this complaint before the police and protest petition before the learned Magistrate a civil suit was also filed by the complainant party and a compromise was arrived at on 22-5-1985. The terms of the compromise read as under: ^^1- izfroknh ua- 1 lyhe pkSgku bl vej dk nsaxs fd nkok fMØh gksus ij nks yk[k :io;s rd og oknhx.k dks vnk djsaxsA 2- blh izdkj oknh ua- 1 vCnqy gehn tekur bl vej dh nsaxs fd izfroknh ua- 1 ds i{k esa nkok fMØh gksus ij og ,d yk[k :i;k rd izfroknh ua- 1 dks vnk djsaxsA 3- fookfnr Bsds dk dk;Z izfroknh ua- 1 lyhe pkSgku fujUrj djrs jgsaxsA 4- izfroknh ua- 1 lyhe pkSgku Bsds ls lEcfU/kr fglkc izfrekg dh nl rkjh[k rd U;k;ky; esa isk djsaxsA 5- fglkc isk djus ls iwoZ mldh udy oknh ua- 1 vFkok oknhx.k ds fo}ku odhy egksn; dks nsaxsA 6- twu ekg esa nhokuh U;k;ky; dk vodkk gksus ds dkj.k ls ebZ twu dk fglkc 10 tqykbZ] 1985 rd isk djsaxsA 7- oknh ua- 1 vCnqy gehn pkgs rks ekSds ij uki rksy o etnwjh dh gktjh psd dj ldrs gSA 8- fglkc ds fo:) 15 fnu ds vUnj oknhx.k ,srjkt isk dj ldrs gSA 9- 1-6-85 rd oknh ua- 1 o izfroknh ua- 1 tekurs isk dj nsaxsA 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of the terms of the compromise there was no occasion for the complainant party to have filed this complaint for cheating and breach of trust. When the matter has already been compromised and the terms of the compromise have been reduced into writing. Learned Magistrate should not have taken cognizance against the accused as civil remedy for the same purpose has been availed and a compromise has been arrived at between the parties. 5. Learned counsel next contended that no offence under Section 406 or 409 is made out against the accused in the present case as all the partners are equally owners of the partnership property and there is no question of any breach of trust as they are owner of the partnership property in their own rights. 5. Learned counsel next contended that no offence under Section 406 or 409 is made out against the accused in the present case as all the partners are equally owners of the partnership property and there is no question of any breach of trust as they are owner of the partnership property in their own rights. Learned counsel next submitted that the offence under Sections 406 and 420 I.P.C. cannot go simultaneously as there was no illegal inducement, on the contrary the partnership was at will and as such the allegation of illegal inducement does not arise in the present case. 6. As against this Mr. Boda, learned counsel for the complainant party submitted that simply because a civil litigation on the same subject-matter is pending that will not absolve the accused of his criminal liability if such arises in a given situation. Learned counsel also submitted that in partnership, one of the partners can be held guilty of misappropriation of the funds. 7. I have heard both the learned counsel at length and considered the rival contentions. 8. So far as the first submission that when a civil suit is pending, no criminal prosecution can be launched and criminal liability will automatically stand absolved, in support of this submission, the learned counsel has invited my attention to Vijay Khanna vs. Jumbo Electronics Co. Ltd. (1). In this case, it was observed that the Courts should exercise caution in dealing with allegations before a criminal court which also raise dispute between the parties of a civil nature. For this aggrieved party must ordinarily invoke the aid of a civil process and preclude the possibility of a mere convenient forum of a criminal court. This may be mala fidely selected by an aggrieved person in preference to prefix and costly civil process with a view to have an expeditious settlement of a bona fide dispute or to twist the tail of the accused for a settlement more favourable to the party, seeking the aid of the criminal process. This authority does not lay down the preposition that in all criminal cases any dispute pending before a civil court will absolve the criminal liability if it arises in the matter. This authority does not lay down the preposition that in all criminal cases any dispute pending before a civil court will absolve the criminal liability if it arises in the matter. It is true that a caution has to be observed that the party who was resorting to a civil process should not use the criminal court for twisting the tail of the accused for settlement which is more favourable to the party. 9. As against this Mr. Boda, learned counsel for the respondent complainant party has invited ray attention to Ram Chandra Rathi vs. Sunil Khosla (2), Gopal Chouhan vs. Smt. Satya (3), Chintaman vs. Dhawneshwar (4), Rajpal Singh vs. State of Haryana (5), Biswanath Agarwalla vs. The State (6) and Pratibha Rani vs. Suraj Kumar (7). The ratio laid down in all these authorities is that simply because a civil suit has been filed that will not operate as a bar for a criminal complaint if any offence gives rise out of that transaction. 10. I have given my considerable thought to the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and I think the submission of Mr. Boda is sustainable. Simply because a civil suit has been filed for resolving the dispute that will not operate as a complete exoneration to the other party from the criminal liability if arises out of that transaction. It is true that some times a civil suit has to be resorted for the recovery of certain amount, but at the same time if it gives rise to a criminal offence then filing of the civil suit will not condone the criminal liability arising out of that transaction. It depends upon case to case whether those facts constitute any criminal offence or not. There-fore, this contention of Mr. Jasmatiya that a civil suit has been filed that would absolve the person concerned from criminal liability cannot be accepted as it is. 11. Now, adverting to the facts of the present case and I have to examine that in the present case any criminal liability arises in this matter or not and what is the effect of the compromise arrived at between the parties before the learned Additional District Judge, Jodhpur on 21-5-1985. It is an admitted case of the parties that a partnership was entered into in the name of M/s. Saleem Chouhan & Co. It is an admitted case of the parties that a partnership was entered into in the name of M/s. Saleem Chouhan & Co. My attention was also invited to the partnership deed which is on record and it appears from a perusal of it that it was partnership at will. The terms of the partnership were detailed in the deed and it was decided that profit and loss will be equally shared. It appears that the dispu?e arose on account of some misunderstanding between the parties. I do not make any observation as to whether the dispute is genuine or not or it was misapprehension of the party. But one thing stands out very clearly that Saleem Chouhan did close certain accounts at one place and open the account at another place in order to encash the cheque which was received from the PHED. But at the same time Mr. Jasmatiya has invited my attention to the admitted case of the complainant party that a sum of Rs. 1,14,724/- was paid from time to time by M/s. Saleem Chouhan to the complainant party. This was also admitted in the suit filed before the civil court. It is also alleged that accounts were opened in the name of the firm M/s Saleem Chouhan on 13-3-84 and it was closed on 29-3-1984. It is also alleged that an account was opened at one or two banks and the last bank was Central Cooperative Bank wherein the account was opened in the name of M/s. Saleem Chouhan as a sole proprietory firm. Thereafter, he encashed one cheque which was received in the name of M/s. Saleem Chouhan & Co Be that as it may, the fact remains that in May 1985 both the parties agreed in the civil court and entered into a compromise the terms where of have been reproduced above, which clearly shows that an excisable settlement has been arrived at between the parties. When an amicable settlement has been arrived at between the parties and the terms and conditions of the compromise have been reduced into writing I have to examine in that context whether this criminal complaint should survive or not. 12. As I have already held above that it cannot be said that all the civil suits will condone the criminal liability. 12. As I have already held above that it cannot be said that all the civil suits will condone the criminal liability. But in the facts and circumstances of the present case it appears that when a civil suit is pending and the parties have entered into a compromise whether it is proper to allow this criminal complaint to continue so as to twist the tail of the accused in order to obtain a favourable settlement in his favour. This cannot be permitted. 13. I need not to go into the question whether one partner can be held guilty for breach, of trust or not. Since I have found that the matter has been compromised and the terms of the compromise have been reduced into writing I do not think that it will be expedient in the interest of justice to allow this complaint to continue to give an unfavourable advantage to the other side. 14. Mr. Jasmatiya, learned counsel for the petitioner has also invited my attention to Velji Raghavji Patel vs. The State of Maharashtra (8) that a partner cannot misappropriate his own money. As against this Mr. Boda, learned counsel for the respondent complainant party has invited ray attention to R.K. Dalmia vs. The Delhi Administration that in partnership one partner can be held liable for breach of trust. I do not want to enter in this controversy at this stage. Since I have found that a compromise has been arrived at between the parties and detailed terms and conditions have already been arrived at it will not be expedient in the interest of justice to allow this complaint to survive now. 15. In the result, I allow this application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and set aside the order dated 10-3-1987 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Jodhpur.