JUDGMENT P.C. Balakrishna Menon, C.J.—The tenant-respondent has filed this revision against the orders of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority directing him to put the landlord in possession of the premises, namely, the first floor, Snow View, Circular Road, Simla-1. 2. There is no dispute before me that the building belongs to the petitioners and had been in the occupation of the tenant-respondent on a monthly rent of Rs. 111.34 plus a sum equal to 7 per cent of the municipal taxes due on the building. Eviction of the tenant was sought on the ground of arrears of rent for the period 1-8-1969 to 30-9-1971. The petition for eviction under section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 was filed on 16-10-1971. The tenant filed a counter on 4-7-1972 denying the arrears of rent. The Rent Controller by his proceedings dated 5-4-1978 passed an order of eviction on the ground that the tenant was in arrears of rent as alleged in the petition for eviction. His appeal to the Appellate Authority was dismissed by order dated 28-10-1981 confirming the order for eviction passed by the Rent Controller. 3. Learned Counsel, Shri Devinder Gupta, has raised the following three points before me in this revision :— 1. The Rent Controller who passed the order of eviction had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. 2. The Appellate Authority has failed to consider the tenants case that he was not in arrears on the date on which the petition for eviction was presented. 3. For the reason of the repeal of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 by the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 and its subsequent repeal by the 1987 Act, the order for eviction can only be in conformity with the 1987 Act and in that case the tenant is entitled to further time for payment of the arrears of rent. 4. 4. The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Punjab Act) by section 13, enacts that a tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall not be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of the Act Sub-section (2) of section 13 enables the landlord to apply to the Controller for eviction of the tenant on the ground that he has not paid or tendered rent due in respect of the building or the rented land within 15 days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy or in the absence of any such agreement by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable. The proviso to clause (i) of sub-section (2) enables the tenant to pay or tender the arrears of rent with interest at six per cent at the first hearing of the application and on such payment or tender, the tenant shall be deemed to have duly paid or tendered the rent within time. The expression Controller is defined in section 2 (b) of the Act to mean any person who is appointed by the State Government to perform the functions of a Controller under the Act. 5. The petition for eviction was filed before the Senior Sub-Judge, Simla (admittedly a notified Controller under the Act) at the time when the Punjab Act was in force. The building involved in these proceedings is situate in an area which formed part of the State of Punjab before the Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966. That Act came into force on 1-11-1966. The Senior Sub Judge made over the case to Sub-Judge (I) Simla (a class I Subordinate Judge) and the petition was entertained by the transferee court. It is the contention of Shri Devinder Gupta that Sub-Judge (I) Simla is not a Controller notified under the Punjab Act for the reason that on the date on which the case was transferred to him the area had become part of the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh and the notifications of the Government of Punjab constituting Sub-Judges classes I, II and III as Controllers could not extend to the Sub-Judge (I) Simla to invest him with jurisdiction to entertain a petition under the Act. Since the premises in question are situate in an area which formed part of the State of Punjab before its accession to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh, the Punjab Act and the notifications issued thereunder continued to be in force. The notification dated 17-4-1951 issued by the Governor of Punjab invests Sub-Judges of classes 1 and II with jurisdiction as Rent Controllers under the Punjab Act. The Sub-Judge (I) Simla who dealt with this rent control petition had therefore, jurisdiction under the Punjab Act to entertain the petition. It is however, contended by Shri Gupta that the Punjab Act itself was repealed by the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 that came into force on 17-11-1971, shortly after the institution of the proceedings before the Senior Sub-Judge, Simla. The 1971 Act repealed the Punjab Act in so far as it applied to the territories that formed part of the State of Punjab prior to the Re-organisation Act. The repeal will not, however, affect the continued operation of the notification constituting Sub-Judges of classes I and II as Rent Controllers under the Punjab Act. Section 23 of the Himachal Pradesh General Clauses Act specifically provides that where an Act is repealed and re-enacted with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any appointment, notification, order, scheme, rule form or bye-law, made or issued under the repealed Act, shall be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted, unless it is superseded by the provisions of the re-enacting Act In the absence of a notification under the repealing Act superseding the notification constituting Sub-Judges of Classes I and II as Rent Controllers, the notification issued under the repealed Act continued to be in force and the Sub-Judge (I) Simla should, therefore, be held to have jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the reason that he is one of those persons covered by the notification issued under the Punjab Act. I, therefore, see no merit in point No.1 urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 6. Point No.2. The learned Counsel for the tenant points out that the entire arrears of rent had been paid during the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Authority in virtue of the interim order passed by this Court in Civil Revision No. 98 of 1978. 6. Point No.2. The learned Counsel for the tenant points out that the entire arrears of rent had been paid during the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Authority in virtue of the interim order passed by this Court in Civil Revision No. 98 of 1978. The civil revision arose out of an order of the Appellate Authority dismissing an application for stay of execution of the order of eviction pending disposal of the appeal. This court in revision granted a stay pending the appeal on condition that the tenant deposits the entire arrears of rent up to the date of the order. It is brought to my notice that this order had been complied with and all arrears of rent up to the date of the order in Civil Revision No. 98 of 1978 had been deposited. The compliance of that order enables the tenant to continue in occupation of the building pending disposal of the appeal before the Appellate Authority. Learned Counsel Shri Devinder Gupta submits that the specific case of the tenant in his counter was that there was be arrears of rent as claimed in the petition and without considering the question of arrears of rent, the Appellate Authority was wrong in confirming the order of eviction for the reason of the default of the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent on the date of the first hearing of the petition. The Appellate Authority in its order has stated as follows :— "At the time of arguments before me the learned Counsel for the respondent conceded that the respondent failed to pay arrears of rent either on the first hearing as provided in the Punjab Act nor did he pay till today." 7. It has been shown that the last part of the statement is not correct as the tenant had in compliance to the order passed by this Court in Civil Revision No. 98 of 1978 deposited the entire arrears of rent to enable him to continue in occupation of the building until the disposal of the appeal. But what is conceded by the learned Counsel for the tenant before the Appellate Authority is not merely that the arrears of rent were not deposited on the first hearing of the petition, but the concession involves also an admission that the tenant was in arrears on the date of the petition. But what is conceded by the learned Counsel for the tenant before the Appellate Authority is not merely that the arrears of rent were not deposited on the first hearing of the petition, but the concession involves also an admission that the tenant was in arrears on the date of the petition. In view of this concession by Counsel the Appellate Authority was not called upon to consider the question whether there was any arrears of rent as claimed. It is also not open to this court to go into this question in the light of the concession of Counsel referred to above. I, therefore, over-rule also the second point urged by the learned Counsel for the tenant. 8. The Punjab Act, as earlier stated, was repealed by the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 and that Act itself was repealed by the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987. A proviso to clause (i) of sub-section (2) of section 14 in identical terms in both these enactments enables the tenant to pay the amounts due from him to the landlord within 30 days from the date of the order of the Controller. Subsection (2) of section 28 of the 1971 Act contained a provision that all pending proceedings are to be disposed of in accordance with the repealed Act as though the said Act had continued to be in force. It is in virtue of that provision that the order of eviction was passed for the reason of failure of the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent on the date of the first hearing of the petition for eviction. Sub-section (2) of section 34 of the 1987 Act reads as under :— "(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, but subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (3), all suits, appeals and other proceedings including execution proceedings, under the said Act pending, before any court or appellate or revisional authority, on the day shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act, as if the provisions contained in this Act were at the relevant time, in force." 9. As per this provision, pending proceedings are to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the 1987 Act. As per this provision, pending proceedings are to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the 1987 Act. It is accordingly submitted that the proviso to clause (i) of section 14 (2) of the Act enabling the tenant to pay the amount due to the landlord within 30 days from the date of the order should be applied in his favour for the reason that payment had already been made in pursuance to the order in Civil Revision No. 98 of 1978. That order, as earlier stated, was one staying the execution of the order for eviction pending the appeal before the appellate authority. The tenant has taken advantage of that order and on deposit of the arrears had continued in occupation of the premises. The third proviso to clause (i) of sub-section (2) of section 14 of the 1987 Act reads as under :-— "Provided further that the tenant against whom the Controller has made an order for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent due from him shall not be evicted as a result of his order, if the tenant pays the amount due within a period of 30 days from the date of order ; " 10. No payment was made in the present case within 30 days of the order of eviction passed by the Controller. The subsequent payment to enable the tenant to continue in occupation of the building pending the appeal is not of any avail to attract the 3rd proviso quoted above. V.D. Misra, C.J. in ILR 1982 HP 279, M/s. K.N. Trading Company v. Masonic Fraternity of Simla, referring to a similar provision in the 1971 Act, stated at page 283 : "This section gives various opportunities to a tenant to pay the arrears of rent. The second proviso gives a last chance to the tenant to pay up the amount due from him This he can avail even after the order of eviction has been passed. The period during which he can deposit the dues is fixed. It is 30 days from the date of the order. He can save the eviction only if he pays the amount due within the prescribed period in terms of the aforementioned proviso. This period can neither be enlarged nor abridged by the court. There is no provision for condonation of the delay in depositing the rent. It is 30 days from the date of the order. He can save the eviction only if he pays the amount due within the prescribed period in terms of the aforementioned proviso. This period can neither be enlarged nor abridged by the court. There is no provision for condonation of the delay in depositing the rent. Since the time is fixed by law there is no question of anyone misleading the tenant about the same." The same view was expressed by Pathak, C.J. in ILR 1977 HP 122, Krishan Kumar v. Gurbax Singh, wherein it is stated at page 124 : "It is apparent that the statute itself provides a period of 30 days from the date of the order for payment of rental arrears by the tenant. On such payment, the statute declares, effect will not be given to the order of eviction. The statute does not leave the determination of the period to the Rent Controller. It is not open to the Rent Controller, when disposing of the petition for eviction, to make an order either abridging or enlarging the period of 30 days. Indeed, the period having been determined by the statute itself, no order was necessary by the Rent Controller." 11. Since no payment had been made within the period of 30 days from the date of the order of the Controller, the tenant has not availed of the benefit of the proviso introduced m the 1971 Act and re-enacted in the 1987 Act. I, therefore, see no merit in the third point also urged on behalf of the revision petitioner. 12. In the result, the revision is dismissed. The parties will suffer their respective costs. Counsel for the petitioner prays for time to vacate the premises. Learned Counsel for the landlord does not have any serious objection in granting time to the tenant to vacate. The tenant will have six months time to vacate on condition that he files an undertaking before this Court within one month from today that he will vacate the premises at the end of the period of six months. Revision dismissed.