MILAP CHANDRA, J.—This revision petition has been filed against the order of the learned Additional District Judge, No. 2, Sri Ganganagar dated January 21, 1989 by which he dismissed the application of the defendant petitioner moved under section 51 and order 47 Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) and Section 14(4), Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and also application moved under section 5, Limitation Act for reviewing the order dated December 9, 1985 striking out his defence and condoning the delay for depositing the amount of rent determined. The facts of the case giving rise to this petition may be summarised thus. 2. The plaintiff non petitioner instituted a suit against the defendant petitioner for his eviction on various grounds including the ground of default in payment of rent. On July 30, 1985, the learned Additional District Judge provisionally determined the amount of Rs. 33,105.13 as rent etc. It was not paid within fifteen days. An application for extension of time for payment was made by the defendant petitioner. By order dated September, 2, 1985, two months time was further granted. The petitioner did not make payment even within the extended period, i.e. by October 14, 1985. On November 25, 1985 the petitioner again moved an application for extension of the time for the payment of the said amount. After hearing both the parties, the trial court dismissed the application by its order dated Dec. 9, 1985, holding that time cannot be extended beyond three months in view of the express provisions of sub sec. (4) of Section 13 of the Act. By the same order, the petitioners defence against the eviction was struck out. An appeal against this order was filed in this Court. It was dismissed on January 30, 1986. D.B. civil Special Appeal No. 8/86 was filed by the defen-dant petitioner against this decision. It was also dismissed by a division bench on February 10, 1986. The judgment is reported in 1986 R. L. W. 333 - 1986 R.L.R. 236. The defendant petitioner also filed Special Leave Petition No. 4035/ 86 before the Honble Supreme Court. It was dismissed on April 3, 1986. In the year 1988 the defendant petitioner moved an application under sec. The judgment is reported in 1986 R. L. W. 333 - 1986 R.L.R. 236. The defendant petitioner also filed Special Leave Petition No. 4035/ 86 before the Honble Supreme Court. It was dismissed on April 3, 1986. In the year 1988 the defendant petitioner moved an application under sec. 151 and order 47 Rule 1 of the Code and section 13(4) of the Act for reviewing the earlier order dated December 9, 1985 by which the defence was struck out and another application under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay for depositing the said amount of Rs. 33,105.83. The plaintiff respondent seriously opposed both the applications. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the trial court dismissed both the applications by its lenghty order dated January 30, 1989 which has been challenged in this revision petition. 3. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the defendant petitioner that the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated February 10, 1986 (reported in 1986 R L.W. 333 1986 R.L.R. 236) has been overruled by the Full Bench in the case of Vishandas vs. Sawitri Devi (1) and it has been held by the Full Bench that the provisions of Section 13(5) of the Act are directory and not mondatory. He further contended that this position would be deemed to be prevailing when the trial court struck out the defence by its order dated December 9, 1985 and as such the petitioner is entitled to get it reviewed. He also contended that the Full Bench has also held that the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable and the delay can be condoned for depositing the amount of rent. He lastly contended that the learned trial court seriously erred in not invoking the provisions of Sec. 151, C. P. C. for reviewing its order and not allowing the application moved under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. He relied upon 1987 All. 319, 1977 A. L. J. 171, 1982(2) W. L. N. 141 and A. I. R. 1989 S.C. 291. 4. In reply, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff non petitioner that the provisions of order 47 Rule 1 and Section 151, C. P. C. are not applicable and the learned trial court has rightly dismissed the applications. 4. In reply, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff non petitioner that the provisions of order 47 Rule 1 and Section 151, C. P. C. are not applicable and the learned trial court has rightly dismissed the applications. He also contended that the order striking out defence dated December 9, 1985 stood merged in the order of the Honble Supreme Court and there was no question of its review after its merger. He relied upon 1984 W.L.N. (Calcutta) 324, 1967 R.L.W. 548 and Deshraj v. Omprakash (2). 5. Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code runs as under:— "1. Application for review of judgment (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved— (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal if allowed but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, of on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of record, or for any other sufficient reason, or order made against him may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applied for the review. Explanation:-The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment" 6. Admittedly, an appeal was filed by the defendant petitioner against the order dated December 9, 1985 in this court and it was dismissed by single Bench on January 30, 1986. Admittedly, an appeal was filed by the defendant petitioner against the order dated December 9, 1985 in this court and it was dismissed by single Bench on January 30, 1986. As such the above quoted clause(a) was fully attracted and these provisions could not be invoked for getting the said order reviewed. 7. The review petition is based on the ground that the judgement dated February 10, 1986 of the Division Bench (1986 R.L.W. 383) dismissing the Special Appeal of the defendant petitioner, has been over ruled by the Full Bench in case of Vishandas v. Savitridevi, (supra) The above quoted explanation prohibits review on this ground. The decision given in State of U.P. v. Raghunath Singh (3) given before the amendment of the Code by C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976. This explanation was added by this Amendment Act. 8. The learned counsel for the defendant petitioners has laid a great stress on the inherent power of the court for reviewing the said order in the interest of justice. It has been held in Sankatha Singh V. State of UP. (4) as follows:- "Inherent powers cannot be extended to do what the Code specifically prohibits the court from doing:" 9. It has been observed in Arjunsingh v. Mohinder Kumar (5) as follows:-"It is common ground that the inherent powers of the court cannot over ride the express provisions of the law. In other words, if there are specific provisions of the Code dealing with a particular topic and they expressly or by necessarily implication exhaust the scope of the powers of the Code or the jurisdiction that may be examined in relation to a matter, the inherent powers of the court cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code. The prohibition contained in the Code need not be expressed but may be implied or be implicit from the very nature of the provisions that it makes for covering the contingencies to which it relates." 10. It has been observed in Cotton Corporation of India v. United Indisu-trial Bank (6) as under:- ".....and it must be remembered that inherent power of the court cannot be invoked to nullify or stultify a statutory provision." The provisions of sec. 151 of the Code cannot be invoked in this case because of the express prohibition contained in the explanation of 0.47 Rule 1 of the Code. 151 of the Code cannot be invoked in this case because of the express prohibition contained in the explanation of 0.47 Rule 1 of the Code. The learned trial court rightly dismissed the review petition, holding that the provision of Sec. 151 and 0.47 Rule 1 of the Code are not applicable. It has been held in Deshraj. v. Omprkash (supra) that the decision of the Full Bench reported in 1988 (1) R.L. R, 1 cannot help a tenant to raise the controversy afresh. 11. The facts of the cases Ramesh Chandra v. Manmohan Singh (7) Jagannath Prasad y. District Judge, (8) and Manmohan kaur v. Suryakant, (9) are quite different and distinguishable. In none of these reported cases there was no point regarding review of an earlier order,. Only after the review of the order date December 9, 1985, the question regarding condonation of delay for depositing the amount determined would arise. 12. There is also great force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of the trial court striking out the defence has merged into the order of the Honble Supreme Court. Admittelly, defendant petitioner filed special leave petition against the decision of the Division Bench (1986 R.L.W. 333) and it was dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court. The point which was under consideration before the trial court was also under consideration for decision before the Division Bench of this Court and also before the Honble Supreme Court in the Special Leave Petition. Thus the order of the trial court striking out the defence dated 9.12.1985 stood merged in the order of the Superior Court. Thereafter the order dated December 9, 1985 could not be reviewed by the trial court. Thus there is no force in the revision petition. 13. Consequently, the revision petition is dismissed with costs.