Judgment B.N.AGRAWAL, J. 1. This application is for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus after quashing the order of detention passed by the respondent-District Magistrate on 29-11-1988 in the exercise of powers conferred upon it under Sub-Sec. (2) of S.3 of the National Security Act, 1980 (Act No. 65 of 1980) (hereinafter referred to asthe Act), contained in Annexure-1, and the order of the State Government confirming the same. 2. Necessary facts giving rise to this application are that on 2-1-1986 the respondent-District Magistrate in the exercise of powers under S.3(2) of the Act passed an order of detention (hereinafter referred to as "the first detention order" against the petitioner and the order was confirmed by the State Government. The detenu challenged his detention by filing a writ application before this Court, which was dismissed. Thereafter he moved the Supreme Court by filing a special leave petition against the order of dismissal of his writ application and after grant of special leave to appeal, an appeal was preferred by the detenu. He also filed a writ application under Art.32 of the Constitution challenging the said order of detention. The writ application and the appeal both were decided by the Supreme Court by judgment dated 26-9-1986 : (reported in AIR 1986 SC 2090 : (1986 Cri LJ 1959) and the order of detention was quashed on the ground that the same was served upon the detenu in Jail while he was in custody in connection with a substantive criminal case and there was nothing to show that the detention authority was aware of the fact that the detenu was in Jail in connection with a substantive criminal case and he might be released on bail. It was observed by the Court that if the detaining authority is of the opinion that the detenu is likely to be released on bail in the substantive case, he may pass a fresh order of detention under S.3(2) of the Act on the same very materials which were the subject matter of the first order of detention. 3. It was observed by the Court that if the detaining authority is of the opinion that the detenu is likely to be released on bail in the substantive case, he may pass a fresh order of detention under S.3(2) of the Act on the same very materials which were the subject matter of the first order of detention. 3. Thereafter, when the detenu was still in custody in connection with substantive criminal cases and was going to be released on bail, he was served in Jail with a fresh order of detention passed by the respondent-District Magistrate on 12-10-1986 (hereinafter referred to as the second order of detention) in exercise of powers conferred upon it under S.3(2) of the Act on the same very grounds, which were subject-matter of the first detention order. The said detention order was challenged before the Supreme Court by filing a petition under Art.32 of the Constitution, but by order dated 7-1-1987 the writ application was dismissed, whereafter a writ application was filed before this Court by mother of the petitioner for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the detention of the petitioner from 9th of January, 1987 and onwards was unwarranted as under proviso to S.14(2) of the Act if on the same ground successive detention orders are passed, a person cannot be detained for a total period in excess of 12 months. It was held by a Bench of this Court, to which I was a Member, that for calculating the period of 12 months, which is the maximum period of detention under the provisions of the Act in the cases of like nature, the period of detention under both the detention orders, referred to above, which were passed on the same very grounds, shall be taken into consideration and that being so, the detention of the petitioner from 9th of Jan., 1987 and onwards became unwarranted. In view of the aforesaid facts this Court by its judgment dated 14-4-1987 : (reported in 1988 Pat LJR (HC) 982) : (1988 Cri LJ 1044) directed the petitioner to be released forthwith if he was not required in connection with any substantive criminal case. 4. In view of the aforesaid facts this Court by its judgment dated 14-4-1987 : (reported in 1988 Pat LJR (HC) 982) : (1988 Cri LJ 1044) directed the petitioner to be released forthwith if he was not required in connection with any substantive criminal case. 4. It appears that the petitioner was released on bail in substantive cases and while on bail, he misused the privilege thereof and committed offences under S.307 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to asthe Penal Code) and S.27 of the Arms Act on 4-8-1987, for which Katras Police Station and in the said substantive case the petitioner was taken into custody, but he was released on bail. The incident in the aforesaid Katras Police Station Case No. 176 of 1987 led to passing of an order of detention by the respondent-District Magistrate on 5-9-1987 (hereinafter referred to asthe third order of detentio) in exercise of powers conferred upon it u/s. 12(2) of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 (Bihar Act 7 of 1981) (hereafter referred to asthe Bihar Act). The said order of detention could not be served upon the petitioner as he was on bail and evading arrest. He surrendered on 10-3-1988 in connection with some other case and thereafter only the order of detention could be served on him. Under the Bihar Act a person can be detained under S.12(2) of the Act only if he is an antisocial element which means, inter alia, under the provisions of the Bihar Act to be a person who habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of fences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. In the grounds of detention six substantive cases, which were subject-matter of the earlier two detention orders, were referred to as the background. The order of detention was quashed by this Court by judgment dated 10-5-1988 : (reported in 1988 Pat LJR (HC) 1077 : (1989 Cri LJ NOC 69)) on the ground that the six cases referred to in the grounds of detention as background were irrelevant as the same were subject-matter of the earlier two detention orders, and the same could not have been taken into consideration for holding that the petitioner was an antisocial element. It was observed that if those six cases mentioned in the grounds of detention as background would have been excluded from consideration by the detaining authority, the detenu could not have been said to be an antisocial element for being made an accused in a solitary substantive case. 5. During the pendency of the writ application before this Court, referred to in the preceding paragraph, it appears that on 18-4-1988 an application was filed before the learned Sessions Judge for grant of bail to the petitioner in connection. with the aforesaid Katras Police Station Case No. 176 of 1987 and in that bail application by his order dated 29-4-1988, the learned Sessions Judge granted provisional bail to the petitioner till 13-5-1988 and the fact that the petitioner was in custody in connection with the third order of detention was not brought to the notice of the learned Sessions Judge. After this Court by its judgment dated 10-5-1988 : (reported in 1989 Cri LJ NOC 69) quashed the third detention order, on 12-5-1988 the petitioner was released from custody. On 13-5-1988 the Public Prosecutor filed a petition for cancellation of provisional bail granted to the petitioner by the learned Sessions Judge, which was directed to be put up on 20-5-1988; as such the provisional bail granted to the petitioner was extended to 20-5-1988, on which date the provisional bail was cancelled on the ground that he had misused the privilege thereof. The petitioner then appears to have again moved the learned Sessions Judge far grant of bail and by order dated 30-8-1988 he was granted provisional bail for a period three months for attending his ailing wife. When the petitioner was on the aforesaid provisional bail he misused the privilege thereof by committing various acts on 19-11-1988, 20-11-1988 and 21-11-1988 for which station diary entries were made. During the said period of provisional bail, the petitioner committed substantive offence on 25-11-1988 for which Jogta Police Station Case No. 113 of 1988 dated 25-11-1988 was registered under Ss.387 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code and S.27 of the Arms Act and these instances led to passing of an order of detention by the respondent-District Magistrate on 29-11-1988 in the exercise of powers conferred upon it under S.3(2) of the Act, contained in Annexure-2. 6. 6. Thereafter, on 3-12-1988 the respondent-District Magistrate passed an order to serve the order of detention upon the petitioner in Divisional Jail, Dhanbad stating therein that from the report of the Superintendent of Police the order was to be served upon the petitioner on 30-11-1988 after his provisional bail had been extended by the learned Sessions Judge for a week, but in the meanwhile the petitioner managed to free himself and requested the learned Sessions Judge to send him to Jail custody. It has been further mentioned in the order dated 3-12-1988 that according to the report of the Superintendent of Police, there was every like hood of petitioners being released on bail any day and thereafter, it would be difficult to serve the order of detention upon him. It was further reported by the Superintendent of Police that the petitioners remaining outside the Jail will be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The said order passed by the respondent-District Magistrate on 3-12-1988 is contained in Annexure-6 to the writ application relevant portion whereof reads thus : "As per the report of the Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad, the order was to be served upon him on 30-11-88, after his provisional bail had been extended by the District and Sessions Judge, Dhanbad. Meanwhile, he managed to free himself and requested the judge to send him to jail custody. The Superintendent of Police has reported that there is every likelihood of his being released, any day, after which, it will be difficult to serve the order upon him, and his remaining outside the Jail will be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order." The order of detention dated 29-11-1988, contained in Annexure-1, and the aforesaid order dated 3-12-1988 passed by the respondent-District Magistrate, contained in Annexure-6 along with the grounds of detention and enclosures thereto were served upon the petitioner in Jail on 4-12-1988. 7. In view of the points raised in this writ application I think it would be necessary to quote the grounds of detention as well as the statements made in enclosures thereto duly translated by the High Court translator from copies of the said enclosures filed on behalf of the State. The grounds reads thus : Ground No. 1 :- "On 25-11-1986 O/C Jogta P.S. was camping at the office of the General Manager Area-IV B.C.C.L. where tender papers were to be submitted. The grounds reads thus : Ground No. 1 :- "On 25-11-1986 O/C Jogta P.S. was camping at the office of the General Manager Area-IV B.C.C.L. where tender papers were to be submitted. He heard noise and firing of shots. He ran towards the place from where the shots appeared to have been fired, and found that the subject, along with his brother was terrorising the people with a country made pistol in his hand. The people were running helter and shelter. The traffic on the road was disrupted. Shop keepers started downing their shutters. On Seeing the police party, the subject managed to escape, but his brother was apprehended. On enquiry it was revealed to the O/C that the subject was terrorising those who had come to file tender papers and had been demanding "rangdari tax" from them. In the process he had fired from his country made pistol to create panic. The activities of the subject disturbed normal tempo of life in the area. The public was, thus, disturbed. This refers to Jogta P.S. Case No. 113 dated 25-11-1988 u/s. 387/307, Indian Penal Code, 1860 and S.27 Arms Act (copy of fardbeyan/FIR enclosed)". (Emphasis added) 7A. Relevant portion of the fardbeyan (written report) on the basis of which Jogta Police Station Case No. 113 dated 25-11-1988 was registered as referred to in Ground No. 1 and served upon the detenue reads thus : "Sir, To day on 25-11-88 from 9 Oclock in the morning I along with constable 662 Rama Shankar Singh, Constable 626 Rajat Indwar, constable 665 Gopinath Hansada, Constable 641 Mohan Lal Mahto of B.M.P. 3 was present on duty in police jeep No. Ber 1550 with driver for maintaining law and order at the time of filing tender in the office of area four. On 19-11-88 information regarding tender was given by the Civil Engineer of area four. Accordingly, after recording sanaha No. 466 dated 25-11-88 I had proceeded at 9 OClock in the morning on 25-11-88 with police party for maintaining law and order. While I was discharging duty with police party in front of the office of the Civil Engineer, in course of that at about 10 OClock hulla and sound of gun firing were heard towards north about 100 yards from there. While I was discharging duty with police party in front of the office of the Civil Engineer, in course of that at about 10 OClock hulla and sound of gun firing were heard towards north about 100 yards from there. When I ran on that side with police party, I saw that Vinod Singh and his brother Manoj Singh were threatening to kill some persons present there. In the meanwhile Vinod Singh fired with his country-made pistol as a result of which people present there started running helter-shelter and cryingpolice, police. I ran on that side with police party. On seeing the police force Vinod Singh and Manoj Singh began to flee away, but Manoj Singh was caught by encircling him at the distance of about 100 yards. In spite of this people were scared and started fleeing away towards the gate of area office for saving their lives. Some persons started fleeing towards main road. Coming and going of vehicles stopped. People who had come for filing tender, also started running away. Shutters of the shops situated at that place were also downed and people started running away after closing their shops. I along with the police party caught Manoj Singh. Vinod Singh succeeded in fleeing away in whose hand we also saw country-made pistol. Thirty to forty persons had assembled there who had come to file tender. On inquiry it was revealed that Vinod Singh and his brother were threateining them and were demanding rangadari tax. They were saying that so long as they do not get rangadari tax, they would not allow them to file tender. When the persons filing tender were not ready to give rangadari tax to them, they threatened to kill and took out pistols and fired shots. On this these persons cried police, police and called police to save their lives. I inquired from the persons filing tender viz. Samsuddin Mian, D.K. Singh, Bhola Prasad Singh and others. They were saying that Vinod Singh was a notorious criminal of that place and he always used to move with pistol and cartridges and could kill these persons at any moment. No one dares to help these persons out of his fear and they do not have courage to depose against him. The officers and staff of B.C.C.L. are fearful from him and they are not able to give security against him. No one dares to help these persons out of his fear and they do not have courage to depose against him. The officers and staff of B.C.C.L. are fearful from him and they are not able to give security against him. Even now the people are fearful." (Emphasis added) Ground No. 2 :- "On 19-11-88, Girindra Mohan Singh son of Bishwanath Singh a local contractor in the BCCL had gone to purchase tender papers in the Area Office of the BCCL. He was asked by brother and other associates of the subject that he must see him (subject) immediately. When Girindra Mohan Singh went to the house of the subject, he was threatened with dire consequences for having dared to purchase tender papers. The subject even threatened to kill him. The subject also warned him not to visit the house of Ajit Kumar Choudhary son of Saildendra Prasad Choudhary and directed his associates to look the house of Shri Choudhary. On 20-11-88 Shri Choudhary and his wife returned after holidaying at Patna, he found his house had been looked. The neighbours informed him that it had been locked by the subject, and he (Sri Chodhary) must visit him asordered by the subject, who asked him not to keep in the company of Girindra Mohan Singh as he (Sri Singh) had dared to purchase tender papers to compete with the subject. On 21-11-88 when Girindra Mohan Singh was going to file tender papers in the Area Office at Sijua, he was asked by an unidentified person not to go there, otherwise he might be killed. Being apprehensive of the consequences, Girindra Mohan Singh went to the BCCL Hqr at Koyla Bhawan, Dhanbad and fled his tender papers. 8. The above incidents refer to Jogta P.S. S/D entry Nos. 394 dated 21-11-88 and 417 dated 22-11-88. Having received the above information, the O/C Jogta P.S. made an enquiry personally and found them correct. (copy of concerned S/D entries and enquiry report of O/C, Jogta P.S. enclosed). The people having learnt about these incidents were in great panic. It was discovered the O/C during enquiry that the subject had created a reign of terror in the area. He has been threatening the witnesses, gives physical and punitive "punishment" to those who dares to say or do anything against his wishes. The people having learnt about these incidents were in great panic. It was discovered the O/C during enquiry that the subject had created a reign of terror in the area. He has been threatening the witnesses, gives physical and punitive "punishment" to those who dares to say or do anything against his wishes. Thus, since after his release on provisional bail, the aforesaid incident by the subject, disturbed normal mood and tempo of life, and public order." (Emphasis added) 9 Relevant portion of Station Diary Entry No. 394 dated 21-11-1988, mentioned in Ground No. 2, reads thus : "I, B.K. Chaturvedi, Officer-in-charge returned back to P.S. and took charge of the diary. I brought the fardbeyan of Ajit Kumar Choudhary with me which is as follows :- My name is Ajit Kumar Choudhary. Today, i.e. 21-11-88 at about 1.30 hours in the day I make my statement before you, the Bara Babu (Officer-in-charge) of Jogta P.S. at Sijua More, that I along with my family members had gone to Patna by Ganga Damodar (train) in the night of 14-11-88. When I returned back in the morning of 20-11-88 at my Angarpathara residence, my neighbour Tribhuwan Singh, clerk. Angrapathara, told me that Vinod Singh and Tun Bahadur had locked my residence which they had opened and that Vinod Singh and Tun Bahadur Singh had called me. At this I along with my wife at 7.30 a.m. on 20-11-88 went to the residence of Binod Singh, which is situated at Sijuar More, where Vinod Singh and many other persons were sitting. Vinod Singh asked me as to why Girindra Mohan Singh used to come at my residence as he has personal enmity with him. Out of fear of Binod Singh nobody gives shelter to him. Binod Singh said as to why I gave shelter to Girindra Mohan at this, I replied that I had good relations with him. Thereupon, Vinod Singh said that he would shoot me otherwise I should stop the visit of Girindra Mohan Singh at my residence and if not he would murder me." 10 Relevant extract of the inquiry report submitted by the Officer-in-charge of Jogta Police Station in relation to the aforesaid station diary entry No. 394 dated 21-11-1988 is reproduced below :- "I made local enquiry in this connection and also made investigation regarding charges levelled against Vinod Singh. In course of investigation I enquired from certain persons of that area and all of them confirmed the charges in one voice. In course of investigation the facts which have come to light are highly thrilling. As a result of the various crimes committed by Vinod Singh and his gang the public peace has been disturbed and the people in general are terrified. The public peace is in danger. Small businessmen, shop-keepers and contractors are apprehending danger to their lives, they are giving Rangadari tax out of fear and even then they are the school going small children also shiver out of fear because they have threatened them to knidnap. Such facts are being specifically mentioned in the following paragraphs :- (1) Vinod Singh with his friends went to the house of Sri Ajit Kumar Choudhary situated at Angar Pathara and locked (the house) and on the point of pistol they openly declared, asking Ajit Choudhary to be present in his court room and not to allow Girindra Mohan Singh to come to his house. They also threatened that if he does not agree to them, he would be shot at with his pistol. He also threatened, he would lift his school going children and would kill by kidnapping them. (2) On 20-11-88 at 7.30 Oclock in the morning Ajit Kumar Choudhary himself along with his wife appeared at the house of Vinod Singh. He was told to remain standing with folded hands before Vinod Singh. Vinod Singh ordered that if he allowed Girindra Mohan Singh to come to his house he would be killed, therefore, he should not allow him to come. He said that this is the order of his court. When Sri Choudhary and his wife went on imploring, then Vinod Singh again said that he would lift his school going children and throw them out. Accepting his decision with folded hands the husband and wife both returned. (3) In course of investigation it has also been revealed that people are produced in the court room of Vinod Singh and given corporal punishment and imposed fine and are threatened to accept the decision of the court of Vinod Singh. They are also threatened with dire consequences, if they go to the police. This report is submitted for necessary action. The terror of Vinod Singh is increasing day by day". They are also threatened with dire consequences, if they go to the police. This report is submitted for necessary action. The terror of Vinod Singh is increasing day by day". (Emphasis added) 11 Extract of the Station diary entry No. 417 dated 22-11-1988 mentioned in Ground No. 2 reads thus : "I, B.K. Chaturvedi, Officer-in-charge returned back to P. S. from the office of the Dy S.P., and took, charge of the diary. I brought Fard-beyan of Girindra Mohan Singh which is as follows :- My name is Girindra Mohan Singh. I work as a contractor and in this capacity I always go in the office of BCCL. My work is mainly done at Sijua and Katrash. On 19-11-88 at about 12.00 hours I had gone to Sijua Area 5 (BCCL) for taking tender papers and there I was talking regarding tender with the officers in the office. In the meantime two persons on behalf of Binod Kumar son of late Mukhram Singh of Sijua came in which one was Manaj Singh resident of Sijua and the other was unknown and asked me to come as Binod Singh is calling me. I said that I would come after some time. On this both those persons said that I am not understanding as to who is calling me. I said that I shall came after finishing my work in one hour. I went to the house of Binod Singh at about 1.30 hours Binod Singh, his brother Tun Bahadur Singh, Manoj Singh and other 10/12 unknown persons were present there. Binod Singh asked me whether I have purchased tender papers. I replied in affirmative. On this Binod Singh said that his rule prevails here, why I did not see his signature on the register. The result of this will be horrible, my life is left for two days only. I said that I have purchased tender papers and I shall file it. Binod Singh and Tun Bahadur Singh said that he has become very heartened, shoot him Binod Singh ordered me to flee away now but asked not to file tender. Binod Singh further forbade me to go to the house of Ajit Kumar Choudhary otherwise he (A.K. Choudhary) would have also to leave the area and ordered his men to lock the house (residence) of Choudhary and when he comes back from home, he will meet him first. Binod Singh further forbade me to go to the house of Ajit Kumar Choudhary otherwise he (A.K. Choudhary) would have also to leave the area and ordered his men to lock the house (residence) of Choudhary and when he comes back from home, he will meet him first. I went towards Katras. Subsequently I came to know that Binod Singh misbehaved with Mr. and Mrs. Choudhary on 20/11 and threatened them to kill. When I was going to Sijua on 21/11 to file tender papers, I met an unknown person at about 11.30 hours on Hirak bypass road who stopped me and farbade me to go to Sijua to file tender papers as there the condition is serious and I will be shot at (there). Being terrorised I went to Koyla Bhawan and there I filed my tender papers in the office of the Chief Engineer, (Civil). Now Binod Singh, Tun Bahadur Singh, Manoj Singh - all the three brothers along with criminal elements are hatching a conspiracy to kill me and also harassing the Choudhary family because Sri Choudhary is my friend and he had been on visiting terms with me." 12 The officer-in-charge of Jogta Police Station after making inquiry in relation to the aforesaid S.D. Entry No. 417 dated 22-11-1988 submitted his report relevant portion of which runs thus : "I made local inquiry in connection with this Sanha and also made investigation regarding charges levelled against Vinod Singh. In course of investigation, I made inquiry from the local people. All the persons confirmed the charges in one voice. In course of investigation the facts which have come to light are highly thrilling. The various crimes committed by Vinod Singh and his gang disturbed_the public tranquillity and terrified the general public. Committing various crimes, and disturbing public tranquillity by Vinod Singh and his gang are their specific programme. The public peace is in danger. Small businessmen, shopkeepers and contractors are feeling danger to their lives. They are business, shopkeepers and contractors are feeling danger to their lives. They are giving Rangdari tax out of fear and even then they are trembling out of fear of Vinod Singh. (1) Girindra Mohan Singh had come at area-5 on 19-11-88 for a talk with regard to contract. Small businessmen, shopkeepers and contractors are feeling danger to their lives. They are business, shopkeepers and contractors are feeling danger to their lives. They are giving Rangdari tax out of fear and even then they are trembling out of fear of Vinod Singh. (1) Girindra Mohan Singh had come at area-5 on 19-11-88 for a talk with regard to contract. When he was talking, Manoj Singh and one unknown person came to him and told him the order of Vinod Singh that he was being called upon in his court. (2) On the same day at 1.30 hours in the day Girindra Mohan Singh appeared before Vinod Singh in his house. He was asked to remain standing with folded hands before Vinod Singh. Vinod Singh ordered him that he could not be allowed to file tender paper as the area belonged to him. He could not work as contractor without taking his permission or without giving him Rangdari tax. If he files tender paper, he would be shot at. (3) He further ordered that if he would go to the house of Ajit Kumar Choudhary, he would be shot at in his house. At the same time all family members including children would be shot dead. (4) In course of investigation, it was also learnt_that the people are produced in the court of Vinod Singh which is his residence, they_are awarded physical and pecuniary punishment and they are threatened to obey the decision of the court of Vinod Singh and if they go to the police they would have to lose their lives. This report is being submitted for necessary action." (Emphasis added) 13 Ground No. 3 :- "The subject fired upon Jai Prakash Singh son of Jogendra Singh on 4-8-87 who was an important prosecution witness in Katras P.S. Case No. 331/85 u/s 149/307/326 Indian Penal Code, 1860 and 27 Arms Act in which the subject is the main accused. Shri Singh was fired at around 2.00 p.m. when he was going to his residence at Gazlitand under Katras P.S. The firing in broad day light created panic in the area. There was stampede among the colliery workers who lift their places of work in panic. The coal loading operation at the hard cokeBhatta and the near by Gazlitand colliery pit head completely stopped till the police reached there. The residents close their doors. There was stampede among the colliery workers who lift their places of work in panic. The coal loading operation at the hard cokeBhatta and the near by Gazlitand colliery pit head completely stopped till the police reached there. The residents close their doors. The local police had to introduce patrolling in the area to restore order and normalcy. The case was supervised by the Dy. S. P. as well as the S.P. Dhanbad, and it was revealed that apart from attempt to murder Jai Prakash Singh the firing in broad daylight was resorted to terrorise the local people and to establish his supremacy as a Rangdar in the _area. This incident refers to Katras P.S. Case No. 176 dated 4-8-87 u/s 307 Indian Penal Code, 1860 and S.27 Arms Act. The case has since been charge-sheeted (Copy of fardbeyan, FIR and supervision note of Dy. S.P./S.P. enclosed). It will be worthwhile to mention that the subject had been ordered to be detained under the provisions of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act vide order No. 2 dated 5-9-87 and the same was served upon him on 28-3-88. The order was approved by the Govt. and confirmed by the Advisory Board. Meanwhile the subject went to the Hon ble High Court, and the Hon ble Judge, in Cr. W.J.C. No. 72/1988 though allowed the application, but observed that the authority might consider detention of the petitioner on the same ground under the provisions of the National Security Act, as the incident had disturbed public order. Despite this order by the Hon ble High Court, the subject was not released since his bail in S.T. No. 219/88 (Katras P.S. Case No. 176/87) has been earlier refused by the District and Sessions Judge, Dhanbad. Meanwhile the subject was released by the District and Sessions Judge on provisional bail. It is during this period of provisional bail, that the subject started terrorising the local people, contractors and innocent citizen_for which aforesaid S/D entries have been made and the case has been registered. On the basis of these facts and circumstances and the grounds as mentioned above, I am satisfied that if the said Biriod Singh is allowed to remain at large, he will indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public_ order". (Emphasis added) 14. On the basis of these facts and circumstances and the grounds as mentioned above, I am satisfied that if the said Biriod Singh is allowed to remain at large, he will indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public_ order". (Emphasis added) 14. Extract of the fard-beyan on the basis of which Katras Police Station Case No : 176 dated 4-8-1987 was instituted reads thus :- "I Jai Prakash Singh, today dated 4-8-1987 at about 3.00 p.m., on coming to Angarpathra O.P., give my statement before you, the Head Clerk of Angarpathra O.P. that today at about 2.00 p.m. I was going on fact from Katras to my residence at Gazlitand and when I reached near Kali temple ahead of hard coke kiln, Binod Singh son of late Mukhram Singh resident of Sijua, Police Station Jogta came from the side of Chanaka (pitts). He was armed with gun. On seeing me, Binod Singh fired his gun at me but the gun shot did not hit me as on seeing Binod Singh I became alert. I ran from there towards the river. Binod Singh fired two shots on me but I fled away. Binod Singh had fired on me to murder me. The cause of occurrence is that I am the nephew of Birendra Singh, resident of Pancharhi, P.S. Katras and I reside with him. In 1985 there was an exchange of firing between Birendra Singh on one side and Binod Singh and others on the other side Katras dump in which case and counter case were filed and the same are still pending in the court. "With this enmity Binod Singh fired at me to murder me. At the time of the occurrence; several persons were present at the Chanak (Pitts) of Angarpathra union who have seen the occurrence and can say on asking. I do not know anybody who were at the Chanak (Pitts). I charge Binod Singh to have fired by the fun to murder me. A stampede took place amongst the persons of Chanak (Pitts) due to gun shots." (Emphasis added) 15. I do not know anybody who were at the Chanak (Pitts). I charge Binod Singh to have fired by the fun to murder me. A stampede took place amongst the persons of Chanak (Pitts) due to gun shots." (Emphasis added) 15. Relevant extract of the supervision note of the Deputy Superintendent of Police in Katras Police Station Case No. 176 dated 4-8-1987, referred to in Ground No. 3, is reproduced below :- "The place of occurrence of this case is the Kachi road passing between the Gazlitand hard coke kiln and pitt No. 6 situate in village Union Angarpathra. This road emanating from Katras-Sijua pitched road and on coming from west, turns towards north at this place. The facts regarding firing of gun shot at the complainant at this very place has been stated. Kali Temple is situated at about 75 yards west north and pitts No. 6 is situated at 50 yards East-north. Accused Binod Singh has fired from the side of this pitts. Some wads were found lying at a distance of about 5 feet south-west from this place. There is a Kachi road adjacent east to the aforesaid Chanak (Pitts) where a trecker, brought by the accused, was standing. This road leads towards Sijua through Shyam Bazar. The complainant Jai Prakash Singh wholly supported his FIR and the occurrence. Due to this occurrence he had become much nervous as by chance his life was saved. He stated that Binod Singh was standing ahead of all, holding a two barreled gun and fired at him on which there was a stampede amongst the labourers there. He stated that he is nephew of Birendra Singh and there is personal enmity between Birendra Singh and Binod Singh. His uncle has influence in Gazlitand colliery area but Binod Singh is trying to establish his Rangadari (bossism) in this area since the time he was released from Jail. Binod Singh has started to collect Rs. 130.00 per truck from the businessmen of coal taken through the private party of Gazlitand hard coke kiln as Rangdari. In fact; on the day and at the time of occurrence he objected to the collection of such type of Rangdari on which Binod Singh fired at him with intention to murder but he was alert and fled away saving his life. In fact; on the day and at the time of occurrence he objected to the collection of such type of Rangdari on which Binod Singh fired at him with intention to murder but he was alert and fled away saving his life. Witness Ahmad Hussain son of Sultan Hussain Trolly man, pitt No. 6, has stated that at the time of occurrence he was on duty at Chanak (pitts), when to the east of Chanak Pitts, a trecker came and stopped and four to five persons stepped down from it. While he was engaged in his work, sound of gun shots heard with the interval of 5-10 minutes and a stampede occurred amongst the labourers working at Chanak (pitt) and all the labourers fled away leaving the work. After about one hour, when peace restored all the labourers gradually came on work. Witness Sri Brij Nandan Singh son of Bacha Singh, Attendance Clerk, Chanak (pitts) No. 6, has stated that about 1.15 p.m. his one Dumpher was under break down and to give the information of the same he went to colliery office and at about 2.10 p.m. when he was coming back to chanak pitts, Sound of Two gun shots were heard and he saw the labourers, working on the Chank pitts fleeing away hither and thither, whereupon out of fear he also did not come to the Chanak (pitt). Lukman Mian, Trolly man son of Abdul Waheed, Karu Bhuian son of Girdhari Bhuian Trolly man and Ram Khelawan Bhuian, Trolly man, working on the Chariak (pitts) at the time of occurrence have also stated that they were working at the Chanak (pitts) at the time of occurrence. It was about 2.00 p.m. to 2.15 p.m. All of a sudden sound of two gunshots were heard and all those persons_fled away leaving behind the work. After about an hour when it became gradually evident that now there is no danger, then they all came back to their work. Witness Munshi Gope son of Gangadhar Gope, Night Guard, Hard coke kiln has supported the hearsay facts regarding this occurrence and stated that he does not remain on duty during day. He further stated that the trucks of private traders used to come to load goods from Hard coke kiln. Witness Munshi Gope son of Gangadhar Gope, Night Guard, Hard coke kiln has supported the hearsay facts regarding this occurrence and stated that he does not remain on duty during day. He further stated that the trucks of private traders used to come to load goods from Hard coke kiln. The rangdars (persons) used to collect money from these trucks owners on account of which such kind of occurrence often takes place. He refused to state the names of the Rangdars (ruffians) and stated that he is a poor Man and If he gives out names, his life may also be imperilled. In the process of investigation and supervision on the basis of the available facts and evidence, this case seems to be true against accused of the FIR Binod Singh and others. This occurrence has taken place as a result of creating. influence of Rangdari at Gazlitand colliery area and in this occurrence unfavourable effect has been exercised on the public life. Accused Binod Singh is a leader of Mafia gang of the District of Dhanbad." (Emphasis added) 16. On 13-12-1988 the present writ application was filed challenging the order of detention, which was admitted on 15-12-1988. On 19-12-1989 the matter was referred to the Advisory Board. On 4-1-1989 the petitioner submitted his representation before the Jail authorities, which was received on 6-1-1989 by the respondent-Under Secretary from the Superintendent of Jail, Dhanbad. As 9-1-1989 was the date fixed by the Advisory Board for its sitting, the representation was forwarded to it on 7-1-1989. Thereafter, the aforesaid representation filed by the petitioner was rejected on 24-1-1989 by the State Government. The detention of the petitioner, upon receipt of report from the Advisory Board, was confirmed and the said order was communicated to the petitioner. 17. Thereafter, the aforesaid representation filed by the petitioner was rejected on 24-1-1989 by the State Government. The detention of the petitioner, upon receipt of report from the Advisory Board, was confirmed and the said order was communicated to the petitioner. 17. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised the following points in support of this writ application challenging the order of detention :- (1) When the order of detention was passed, the petitioner was on provisional bail in a substantive case, but at the time the order was served upon him he was in custody in the said case and there was nothing to show that the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu was in custody and likely to be released on bail when the order of detention was served, yet the Detaining Authority was satisfied that it was necessary to detain the petitioner under the provisions of the Act. (2) The representation filed by the petitioner was not disposed of with utmost expedition. (3) Ground No. 3 which was subject-matter of the third order of detention, quashed by this Court, could not have been taken into consideration in passing the present detention order. (4) All the three grounds of detention are vague. (5) None of the three grounds shows that the petitioner was acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 18. Point No. 1 :- It was submitted that the order of detention was passed on 29-11-1983 on which day the petitioner was continuing on provisional bail granted in a substantive criminal case under S.307 of the Indian Penal Code and S.27 of the Arms Act, which was valid till 30-11-1988. On 30-11-1988 the petitioner appeared before the learned Sessions Judge and on prayer being made on his behalf the period of provisional bail was extended by one week. It is stated on behalf of the petitioner that when the petitioner was going out from the court room, a police officer entered the court room and caught him and for the sake of protection to his life the petitioner made a prayer before the learned Sessions Judge for remanding him to custody after recalling the order by which the period of provisional bail was extended. Upon the said prayer the order extending the period of provisional bail of the petitioner was recalled and he was remanded to custody. Upon the said prayer the order extending the period of provisional bail of the petitioner was recalled and he was remanded to custody. Thereafter, the respondent-District Magistrate passed an order on 3-12-1988 directing to serve the order of detention in Jail. The stand of the State in this connection is that after the period of provisional bail was extended on 30-11-1988 the police officer wanted to serve the detention order upon the petitioner apprehending that he may abscond, but the petitioner managed to free himself and requested the learned Sessions Judge to remand him to custody after recalling the order by which the period of provisional bail was extended. I may state that a very serious question arises as to whether the police officer who wanted to arrest or arrested the petitioner in the court room itself in presence of the Presiding Officer without obtaining his permission, has thereby committed contempt of court. In my view, it is not necessary in this judgment to express any opinion on this matter in view of the fact that by a separate order, I am calling for a report from the learned Sessions Judge for proceeding against the concerned police officer for contempt of court. 19. It will be relevant to state that in Katras Police Station Case No. 176 dated 4-8-1988 the petitioner was granted provisional bail for a period of three months on the 30-8-1988 for attending his ailing wife. When the petitioner was on provisional bail, he committed various acts prejudicial to the maintenance of public order on 19-11-1988, 20-11-1988 and 21-11-1988 giving rise to Station. Diary Entries Nos. 394 dated 21-11-1988 and 417 dated 22-11-1988 at Jogta Police Station. Besides this, on 25-11-1988 the petitioner along with others armed with country made pistol went to the office of the General Manager, Area-4, B.C.C.E. and he was terrorising the people there and fired from his country made pistol to create panic as a result of which the normal tempo of life in the locality was disturbed, traffic on the road was disrupted and the shops were closed for which a substantive case bearing Katras Police Station Case No. 176 dated 25-11-1988 was instituted against the petitioner under S.307 of the Indian Penal Code and S.27 of the Arms Act. 20. 20. In support of his first submission, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has placed reliance upon the case of Binod Singh V/s. District Magistrate, Dhanbad AIR 1986 SC 2090 : (1986 Cri LJ 1959), in which the first order of detention passed against the petitioner was quashed. In that case when the order of detention was passed the petitioner was outside the Jail, but, thereafter he surrendered in court in the substantive case and the order was served upon him in Jail. Their Lordships following the law laid down in the cases of Rameshwar Shaw V/s. District Magistrate, Burdwan, AIR 1964 SC 334 : (1964 (1) Cri LJ 257) and Ramesh Yadav V/s. District Magistrate, Etah AIR 1986 SC 315 : (1986 Cri LJ 312) quashed the order of detention on the ground that though there was statement to the effect in the grounds of detention that the petitioner was in Jail and was likely to be enlarged on bail, but there was no statement that it was necessary to detain him under provisions of the Act. It was not clear on what consideration that opinion was expressed, specially in view of the fact that the petitioner was in custody in connection with a murder case and the prayer for bail could have been opposed on cogent materials before the concerned court. Their Lordships observed as follows : "It, however, appears that after the order of detention was passed and before the actual service of the order of detention, the petitioner was taken into custody. From the affidavit of the District Magistrate it does not appear that either the prospect of immediate release of the detenu or other factors which can justify the detention of a person in detention were properly considered in the light of the principles noted in the aforesaid decision and especially, in the decisions in Rameshwar Shaw V/s. District Magistrate, Burdwan (1964) 4 SCR 921 : AIR 1964 SC 334 : (1964 (1) Cri LJ 257) and Ramesh Yadav V/s. District Magistrate, Etah (1985) 4 SCC 232 : AIR 1986 SC 315 : (1986 Cri LJ 312), though there was a statement to the effect that the petitioner was in Jail and was likely to be enlarged on bail. But on what consideration that opinion was expressed is not indicated especially in view of the fact that the detenu was detained in a murder charge in the background of the facts mentioned before. His application for bail could have been opposed on cogent materials before the Court of Justice." "In this case there were grounds for the passing of the detention order but after that the detenu has surrendered for whatever reasons, therefore the order of detention though justified when it was passed but at the time of the service of the order there was no proper consideration of the fact that the detenu was in custody or that there was any real danger of his release. Nor does it appear that before the service there was consideration of this aspect properly. In the facts and circumstances of this case, therefore, the continued detention of the detenu under the Act is not justified." 21. The judgment in the case of Binod Singh (1986 Cri L.J 1959) (SC) (supra) was of two judges Bench delivered by Mukherjee, J. The same very learned Judge in the case of Suraj Pal Sahu V/s. State of Maharashtra AIR 1986 SC 2177 : (1986 Cri LJ 2047) delivered a judgment, which was of a three judges Bench and in that case it was explained as to what was the meaning of the observations made by the Court in the case of Ramesh Yadav (1986 Cri LJ 312) (SC) (supra) which was followed in the case of Binod Singh (1986 Cri LJ 1959) (SC) (supra). Their Lordships were of the view that if the offences in respect of which the detenu is accused are so inter-linked and continuous in character and are of such nature that these affect continuous maintenance of essential supplies and thereby, jeopardize the security of the State, in that event, an order of detention can be justifiably made even in cases where the accused is in custody in a substantive criminal case and there are chances of his being released on bail. The relevant portion of the judgment of the Supreme Court reads thus :- "In Ramesh Yadav V/s. District Magistrate, Etah (1985) 4 SCC 232 : AIR 1986 SC 315 : (1986 Cri LJ 312) it was held that merely on the ground that an accused in detention as an under-trial prisoner was likely to get bail, an order of detention under the National Security Act should not ordinarily be passed. If the apprehension of the detaining authority was true, Court observed, the bail application had to be opposed and in case bail was granted, challenge against that order in the higher forum had to be raised. We respectfully agree with this conclusion. But this principle will have to be judged and applied in the facts and circumstances of each case. Where a person accused of certain offences whereunder he is undergoing trial or has been acquitted, the appeal is pending and in respect of which he may be granted bail may not in all circumstances entitle an authority to direct preventive detention and the principle enunciated by the aforesaid decision must apply but where the offences in respect of which the detenu is accused are so interlinked and continuous in character and are of such nature that these affect continuous maintenance of essential supplies and thereby jeopardize the security of the State, then subject to other conditions being fulfilled, a man being in detention would not detract from the order being passed for preventive detention." 22. In the case of Smt. Poonam Lata V/s. M.L. Wadhawan AIR 1987 SC 2098 : (1987 Cri LJ 1924), their Lordships reviewed all the cases of the Supreme Court including those of Rameshwar Shaw (1964 (1) Cri LJ 257) (supra), Ramesh Yadav (1986 Cri LJ 312) (supra), Binod Singh (1986 Cri LJ 1959) (supra) and Surajpal Sahu (1986 Cri LJ 2047) (supra). The order of detention in that case was upheld and the law was laid down as follows :- "It is thus clear that the fact that the detenu is already in detention does not take away the jurisdiction of the detaining authority in making an order of preventive detention. The order of detention in that case was upheld and the law was laid down as follows :- "It is thus clear that the fact that the detenu is already in detention does not take away the jurisdiction of the detaining authority in making an order of preventive detention. What is necessary in a case of that type is to satisfy the court when the detention is challenged on that ground that the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu was already in custody and yet he was subjectively satisfied that his order of detention became necessary. In the facts of the present case, there is sufficient material to show that the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the petitioner was in custody when the order was made, yet he was satisfied that his preventive detention was necessary. 23. In the case of Smt. Shashi Aggarwal V/s. State of U.P. AIR 1988 SC 596 : (1988 Cri LJ 839), after taking into consideration the cases of Binod Singh (1986 Cri LJ 1959) (SC) (supra), Ramesh Yadav (1986 Cri LJ 312) (SC) (supra) and Poonam Lata (1987 Cri LJ 1924) (supra), their Lordships observed that if an accused is in custody, the mere possibility of grant of bail will not be sufficient for passing an order of detention, but there must be credible reasons apparent on the record to show that if the detenu is enlarged on ball, he would be acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. This Court observed thus :- "Every citizen in this country has the right to have recourse to law. He has the right to move the court for bail when he is arrested under the ordinary law of the land. If the State thinks that he does not deserve bail the State could oppose the grant of bail. He cannot, however, be interdicted from moving the court for bail by clamping an order of detention. The possibility of the court granting bail may not be sufficient. Nor a bald statement that the person would repeat his criminal activities would be enough. He cannot, however, be interdicted from moving the court for bail by clamping an order of detention. The possibility of the court granting bail may not be sufficient. Nor a bald statement that the person would repeat his criminal activities would be enough. There must also be credible information or cogent reasons apparent on the record that the detenu, if enlarged on bail would act prejudicial to the interest of public order." "In the instant case, there was no material made apparent on record that the detenu, if _released on bail is likely to commit activities prejudicial to the maintenance of Public order. The detention order appears to have been made merely on the ground that the detenu is trying to come out on bail and there is enough possibility of his being bailed out. We do not think that the order of detention could be justified only on that basis." (Emphasis added.) 24. On a conspectus of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, it becomes clear that if a person is already in custody in connection with a substantive case and there are chances of his being released, in that event, he can be detained if there are materials apparent on the record that the detenu, if released on bail, is likely to commit activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In the case in hand, as stated above, it would appear that after being released on provisional bail on 30-8-88 for a period of three months the petitioner had committed various acts on 19-11-1988, 20-11-1988, 21-11-1988 and 25-11-1988 for which substantive case and station diary entries were made and duly enquired. His activities disturbed the normal tempo of life in Jogta police station. The perpetuated acts of the detenu which have been fully described in Ground Nos. 1 and 2 and its enclosures, referred to above, indicate that it was a calculated moved on the part of the petitioner to create panic and fear complex in the mind of the people. In view of these facts, I do not find any force in the first point raised on behalf of the petitioner. 25. point No. 2 :- On behalf of the petitioner it has been submitted that his representation was not disposed of with utmost expedition, as the same was filed on 4-1-1989 and disposed of after 20 days on 24-1-1988. In view of these facts, I do not find any force in the first point raised on behalf of the petitioner. 25. point No. 2 :- On behalf of the petitioner it has been submitted that his representation was not disposed of with utmost expedition, as the same was filed on 4-1-1989 and disposed of after 20 days on 24-1-1988. In support of the submission, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Harish Pahwa V/s. State of U.P. AIR 1981 SC 1126 : (1981 Cri LJ 750), in which case representation was filed on 3rd of June 1980 and rejected on 24th of June, 1980 and it was held that the same was not disposed of with utmost expedition and consequently, the order of detention was quashed on this ground. Their Lordships have observed as follows :- "In our opinion, the manner in which the representation made by the appellant has been dealt with reveals a sorry state of affairs in the matter of consideration of representation made by persons detained without trial. There is no explanation at all as to why no action was taken in reference to the representation on 4th, 5th and 25th of June, 1980. It is also not clear what consideration was given by the Government to the representation from 13th June, 1980 to 16th June, 1980 when we find that it culminated only in a reference to the Law Department, nor it is apparent why the law Department had to be consulted at all. Again, we fail to understand why the representation had to travel from table to table for six days before reaching the Chief Minister who was the only authority to decide the representation. We may make it clear, as we have done on numerous earlier occasions, that this Court does not look with equanimity upon such delays when the liberty of a person is concerned. Calling comments from other departments, seeking the opinion of Secretary after Secretary and allowing the representation to lie without being attended to is not the type of action which the State is expected to take in a matter of such vital import. Calling comments from other departments, seeking the opinion of Secretary after Secretary and allowing the representation to lie without being attended to is not the type of action which the State is expected to take in a matter of such vital import. We would emphasise that it is the duty of the State to proceed to determine the representations of the character abovementioned with utmost expedition, which means that the matter must be taken up for consideration as soon as such a representation is received and dealt with continuously (unless it is absolutely necessary to wait for some assistance in connection with it) until a final decision is taken." 26. In this connection I may usefully refer to observation of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Jayanarayan Sukul V/s. State of West Bengal AIR 1970 SC 675 : (1970 Cri LJ 743), wherein their Lordships have observed that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to within what time a representation should be disposed of, but it has to be shown that the Government was vigilant in disposing of the representation of the detenu. The Court observed thus :- "First, the appropriate authority is bound to give an opportunity to the detenu to make a representation and to consider the representation of the detenu as early as possible. Secondly, the consideration of the representation of the detenu by the appropriate authority is entirely independent of any action by the Advisory Board including the consideration of the representation of the detenu by the Advisory Board. Thirdly, there should not be any delay in the matter of consideration. If is true that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to measure of time taken by the appropriate authority for consideration but it has to be remembered that the Government has to be vigilant in the governance of the citizens. A citizens right raises a correlative duty of the State." (Emphasis added) From the aforesaid decisions, it becomes clear that the representation of the detenu has to be considered and disposed of with utmost expedition and if the same has not been so disposed of, the order of detention is liable to be quashed on this ground alone. 27. A citizens right raises a correlative duty of the State." (Emphasis added) From the aforesaid decisions, it becomes clear that the representation of the detenu has to be considered and disposed of with utmost expedition and if the same has not been so disposed of, the order of detention is liable to be quashed on this ground alone. 27. In the present case, from the counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the respondent State and the District Magistrate as well as from the original file of the Government in relation to the detention of the petitioner duly maintained by the Government, which has been produced before this Court from perusal, it would be clear that the representation was filed before the Jail authority on 4-1-1989 and the same was received in the office of the Respondent Under Secretary on 6-1-1989. On 7-1-1989 the respondent Under Secretary forwarded the petitioners representation to the Advisory Board as 9-1-1989 was the date fixed by the Advisory Board for considering the detention matter of the petitioner. Thereafter, on 9-1-1989 a report was called for from the respondent-District Magistrate by the respondent-Under Secretary and on 10-1-1989 the report was received by the Government. Since earlier three detention orders were passed against the petitioner, all of which were quashed as referred to above, the office had to prepare a long note giving the past history of the earlier detention orders and 21/2 pages note was prepared by the office and the same was got typed out. This seems to have taken two days time and the note was signed by the Sectional Officer on 12-1-1989 for being forwarded to the concerned under Secretary. 13th was a working day. 14th of January being the second Saturday and 15th being Sunday, the office was closed for these two days; as such no steps could be taken on these two days and the respondent Under Secretary prepared two pages note and got the same typed out on 13-1-1989 and 16-1-1989 for being forwarded to the Joint Secretary, Home (Special) Department (hereinafter referred to asthe Joint Secretary) and the note was signed on 16-1-1989 and the file was sent to the respondent-Joint Secretary. But it appears from the note that the file was put up before the Joint Secretary on 18-1-1989, who forwarded the file on 19-1-1989 to the Special Secretary (Home), who immediately on the next day, that is, on 20-1-89 put his note and submitted the file to the Chief Minister for considering the representation of the petitioner. The Chief Minister rejected the representation of the petitioner on 24-1-1989. From the aforesaid facts it is not possible to hold that the representation of the petitioner was not disposed of with utmost expedition, as such this point raised on behalf of the petitioner must fail. 28 Point No. 3 :- It is said that Ground No. 3, which was subject-matter of the third order of detention, which was quashed by a learned single Judge of this Court, could not have been taken into consideration for passing the present order of detention. The third detention order was passed on only one ground, which is Ground No. 3, in the present case. I may usefully quote observations of the learned Judge in the said case which runs thus :- "This, in my opinion, cannot be said to be a case of law and order only." "In the earlier part of the judgment, I have held that the ground on which the petitioner has been detained certainly creates problem of public order but I have allowed the application on the ground that it has not been established that the petitioner is an antisocial element. The authority, if so advised, may consider if the petitioner can be detained on the same ground under the National Security Act." From a bare perusal of the aforesaid observations made by the learned single Judge, it would appear that the third order of detention was not quashed for the reason that the facts stated therein could not have been taken to be a ground for passing the order of detention rather in that case it was held that on that ground the detention order could not have been passed under the Bihar Act, whereunder the pre-requisite for passing the order of detention was that a person must be an antisocial element within the meaning of the Bihar Act, which means that the State was bound to show in that case that there were more than one substantive cases against the detenu under Chapters XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Since in that case, reference was made of only one case in the ground this Court had no option but to quash the detention as the petitioner could not have been treated to be an antisocial element. It would further appear from the aforesaid observations of this Court that on merit this Court was clearly of the view that on the basis of that ground an action could have been taken under the provisions of the Act, as the act of the detenu disclosed in the solitary ground of that case was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. His Lordship was further of the view that it would be open to the authority to pass an order of detention under provisions of the Act on the same very ground. Thus, I have no difficulty in rejecting the third point raised on behalf of the petitioner, which is accordingly rejected. 29. point No. 4 :- According to the petitioner, all the three grounds on the basis of which the impugned order of detention has been passed are vague, whereas, on the other hand, according to the respondent-State, none of the grounds is vague. It was pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that in Ground No. 1, names of the shop-keepers, who had downed their shutters and in Ground Nos. It was pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that in Ground No. 1, names of the shop-keepers, who had downed their shutters and in Ground Nos. 2 and 3, names of witnesses who had seen the incidents were not disclosed, therefore, the grounds being vague it was not possible for the detenu to file an effective representation. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance upon the case of Gulab Mehra V/s. State of U.P. AIR 1987 SC 2332 : (1988 Cri LJ 168), in which Their Lordships observed :- "In the instant case the order of detention has been made by respondent No. 2, District Magistrate, on the basis of two criminal cases in respect of two incidents which occurred on October 2 and 3, 1986. So far as the case being G.D. No. 38 is concerned, allegation was that the appellant was threatening the traders of Khalasi Line who participated in the auction at the fort and he was saying that he could not collect money from them on the last occasion because the police were posted there but in case they did not collect money and give it to him he would shoot all of them. Because of this terror the shopkeepers closed the doors and windows of their shops and houses. The report of this incident was made by the picket employed at police station, Kydganj. It appears from this report that there are no particulars about the shopkeepers who have been terrorised and threatened for money nor the names of any of the witnesses in whose presence the threat or terror was given and money was demanded, are mentioned at all. It appears from this report that there are no particulars about the shopkeepers who have been terrorised and threatened for money nor the names of any of the witnesses in whose presence the threat or terror was given and money was demanded, are mentioned at all. The report is absolutely vague and it is not possible for the detenu to give an effective representation against the aforesaid ground which is one of the constitutional requirement enjoined in Art.22(5) of the Constitution." Their Lordships further observed : "There is nothing to show that there was awareness in the mind of the District Magistrate, the detaining authority of the fact that the appellant was in Jail at the time of clamping of the order of detention, and the detaining authority was satisfied in considering his antecedents and previous criminal acts, that there is likelihood of his indulging in criminal activities jeopardizing public order if he is enlarged on bail and that there is every likelihood that the appellant will be released on bail within a short time. On this ground alone, the order of detention is invalid." "On considering these decisions, we are constrained to hold that the clamping of the order of detention is not in accordance with the provision of the Act. Furthermore, the history-sheet does not at all link to the proximity of the two incidents on the basis of which the order of detention was made. It has been vehemently urged before us by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that in none of the cases mentioned in the history-sheet the appellant has been convicted and moreover these cases related to a period much earlier than the period in which the two cases have occurred. It has also been submitted in this connection by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant had not been convicted in any of the cases and the submission of the Sub-Inspector of police that the witnesses are afraid disclosing their names and coming toward to give evidence is wholly incorrect and false inasmuch as witnesses in fact gave the evidence in a criminal case which ended in acquittal. It has also been submitted by the learned counsel that the shopkeepers of the locality where the alleged hurling of bombs took place have made an application in this case that no such incident occurred on the said dates. It has also been submitted by the learned counsel that the shopkeepers of the locality where the alleged hurling of bombs took place have made an application in this case that no such incident occurred on the said dates. In the premises aforesaid, we hold that the impugned order of detention is illegal and invalid." (Emphasis added.) 30. From the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court, it will appear that in that case, the order of detention was quashed also for the reason that there was nothing to show that the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the appellant was in Jail at the time of passing the order of detention, there was every likelihood of his being released on bail and keeping in mind his antecedents and the previous criminal acts, if was necessary to pass the order of detention. The other reason for quashing the order of detention was that there was no proximity between the act of the detenu, complained of, enumerated in the grounds of detention and passing of the order of detention. The next reason it is stated for quashing the order of detention was that in the report of the police, names of the shopkeepers, who were terrorised and threatened by the detenu were not stated. So far this is concerned, in my view the order of detention has not been quashed for the reason that the shopkeepers were not named, but because of the fact that the shopkeepers of the locality, where the alleged incidents had taken place, had made an application in that case to the effect that no such incidents occurred on the dates alleged. So far the reason for quashing the order of detention for non-disclosure of the names of the witnesses in the report of the police officers, who are said to have witnessed the incidents, is concerned; it may be stated that the detention order has not been quashed on the ground of non-disclosure of such names, but the same has been quashed an the ground that the report of the police officer, which is the basis for the ground, is false in which it was stated that the witnesses who had seen the occurrence were afraid of the detenu in coming forward to give evidence whereas, as a matter of fact, the witnesses who claimed to have witnessed the incident deposed in the substantive case, which ended in acquittal. This, in my view, from the aforesaid facts, it becomes clear that in the case of Gulab Mehra (1988 Cri LJ 168) (SC) (supra) no such law has been laid down categorically by the Supreme Court that if names of the shopkeepers, who were victims and witnesses who are said to have seen the incident were not disclosed in the grounds of detention the detention would be liable to be quashed. 31. Alternatively, even it is held that in the case, of Gulab Mehra (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down the law that in the absence of names of shopkeepers and witnesses in the grounds, the order of the detention becomes invalid, in my view, the petitioner in the present case cannot take advantage on the basis of the law laid down therein as in that event, the law laid down in that case would be contrary to the same laid down in earlier decision of the Supreme Court by a Bench of three Judges in the case of Sk. Hasan Ali V/s. State of West Bengal AIR 1972 SC 2590 , in which Khanna, J., as he then was, observed thus :- "On 27-3-1971 at about 10.10 hrs, you along with your associates were found engaged in smuggling rice by train No. 110 Dn. at Radhamohanpur Rly. Station under Kharagpur C.R.P.S. Shri N.G. Saha, Inspector of Police, Cordoning Midnapore was there on duty to prevent smuggling of rice from cordoned areas of Midhapore district to the statutory rationing area of Howrah and Calcutta. at Radhamohanpur Rly. Station under Kharagpur C.R.P.S. Shri N.G. Saha, Inspector of Police, Cordoning Midnapore was there on duty to prevent smuggling of rice from cordoned areas of Midhapore district to the statutory rationing area of Howrah and Calcutta. He secured arrest of some smugglers and seized huge quantity of rice there, when you along with your associates attacked the police party, assaulted some of them, snatched away a portion of the seized rice and rescued some of the arrested smugglers. Thus you acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community." Perusal of the above goes to show that the date, time and place of the incident was specified. Particulars were also given regarding the nature of the activity of the petitioner. The facts stated in the ground of detention were sufficient to apprise the petitioner of the precise activity on account of which the order of his detention has been made and, in our opinion, it cannot be said that the petitioner was in any way handicapped in making an effective representation against the detention order. What has to be seen by the Court is that the ground of detention supplied to the petitioner was not so vague as to prevent him from making an effective representation. In the present case, as mentioned earlier the ground of detention does not suffer from any infirmity of vagueness. The fact that the names of the associates of the petitioner were not given in the ground of detention would not make the ground to be vague (Emphasis added). 32. From a bare perusal of this judgment, it would appear that what are necessary to be specified in the grounds are date, time and place of incident and particular regarding the nature of the activity of the detenu. In their Lordships opinion if these facts were disclosed in the ground of detention, the detenu could have filed an effective representation against the order of detention. In their Lordships opinion, the ground can be said to be vague only if a detenu is not in a position to make an effective representation. Their Lordships were further of the view that merely because names of the associates of the detenu were not disclosed in the grounds of detention the same would not make the grounds vague. In the case of Sk. Their Lordships were further of the view that merely because names of the associates of the detenu were not disclosed in the grounds of detention the same would not make the grounds vague. In the case of Sk. Hasan Ali, ( AIR 1972 SC 2590 ) (supra) the Court was considering the order of detention, which was made for preventing the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, but the same did not relate to the act of the detenu, which was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In the said case, their Lordships have approved the law laid down by a Bench of two Judges in the case of Deb Sadhan Roy V/s. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1972 SC 1924 : (1973 Cri LJ 446) wherein the Court was dealing with a case relating to act of the detenu, which was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and in that case also, it was held that the order of detention cannot be said to be vague merely because the names of the associates of the detenu were not mentioned in the ground of detention. The law laid down in the case of Sk. Hasan Ali (supra) has been reiterated by a two judges Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Milan Banik V/s. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 1214 : (1974 Cri LJ 917), wherein the Court was dealing with a case of act of detenu prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and in that case also, Khanna, J., who delivered the judgment, reiterated that non-disclosure of names of the associates of the detenu in the grounds of detention did not make the same vague so as to invalidate the order of detention. 33. From the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Gulab Mehra, (1988 Cri LJ 168) (supra) by a Bench of two judges, it would appear that none of the aforesaid three decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, cases of Sk. 33. From the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Gulab Mehra, (1988 Cri LJ 168) (supra) by a Bench of two judges, it would appear that none of the aforesaid three decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, cases of Sk. Hasan Ali, ( AIR 1972 SC 2590 ) (supra), Deb Sadhan Roy, (1973 Cri LJ 446) (supra) and Millan Banik, (1974 Cri LJ 917) (supra) has been even referred to therein and this being the position, I am clearly of the opinion that the petitioner cannot take any advantage from the case of Gulab Mehra (supra) for non-disclosure of names of the shopkeepers and the witnesses especially in view of the fact that judgment in the case of Sk. Hasan Ali (supra) was by a larger Bench consisting of three judges. 34. Moreover, from a perusal of the grounds of detention together with its enclousures, which were served upon the detenu, it would appear that none of three grounds of the detention was vague. The date, time and places of incidents were specified. Particulars were also given regarding the nature of the activity of the detenu. So far Ground No. 1 is concerned in its enclosure, namely, the written report, it has been stated that in presence of B.K. Chaturvedi, Rama Shankar Singh, Rajat Indwar, Gopinath Hansada and Mohan Lal Mahto, the detenu was giving out threates of killing and was firing his pistol. In the said written report, it has been further stated that Sasmuddin Mian, D.K. Singh and Bhola Pd. Singh, were the persons to whom threates were given out by the detenu of being killed and for terrorising these people along with thirty to forty other persons the detenu resorted to firing in a public place. They have further stated that the detenu was a notorious criminal of the locality, always used to move with pistol and cartridges, could kill anybody at any moment and they had no courage to depose against him in Court. So far Ground No. 2 is concerned, in its enclosures, which were also served upon the detenu, names of the witnesses and victims were both disclosed and their names are Tribhuwan Singh, Girindra Mohan Singh, Ajit Singh and his wife besides Mr. A.K. Choudhary and his wife. So far Ground No. 2 is concerned, in its enclosures, which were also served upon the detenu, names of the witnesses and victims were both disclosed and their names are Tribhuwan Singh, Girindra Mohan Singh, Ajit Singh and his wife besides Mr. A.K. Choudhary and his wife. Likewise, in Ground No. 3, names of victims and witnesses have been also stated in its enclosures served upon the detenu along with the grounds, namely the fardbeyan and the supervision note of the Deputy Superintendent of Police. Names of such persons are Jai Prakash Singh, Ahamad Hussain, Brij Mohan Singh, Lukman Mian, Karu Bhuiyan, Ram Khelawan Bhuiyan and Munshi Gope. From the aforesaid facts, it becomes clear that in any view of the matter, none of the three grounds can be said to be vague. 35. point No. 5 :- Now I proceed to consider the last point raised on behalf of the petitioner, that is, that the acts of the detenu disclosed in the grounds of detention cannot be in any way said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, but the same at the highest may be prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order. It may be stated that the expressions "public order" and "law and order" have been subject-matter of consideration before the Supreme Court in various cases. In Arun Ghosh V/s. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 1228 : (1970 Cri LJ 1136) the Supreme Court while laying down the law has observed that : "public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality, Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. Take for instance, a man stabs another. People may be shocked and disturbed, but the life of the community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much on may dislike the act. Take another case of town where there is communal tension. A man stabs a member of the other community. This is an act of a very different sort. Take for instance, a man stabs another. People may be shocked and disturbed, but the life of the community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much on may dislike the act. Take another case of town where there is communal tension. A man stabs a member of the other community. This is an act of a very different sort. Its implications are deeper and it affects the even tempo of life and public order is jeopardized because the repercussions of the act embrace large Sections of the community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order and to subvert the public order. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different." 36. In the case of Gulab Mehra V/s. State of U.P., AIR 1987 SC 2332 : (1988 Cri LJ 168) after referring to all the earlier decisions of the apex Court, it was observed : "Thus from these observations it is evident that an act whether amounts to a breach of law and order or a breach of public order solely depends on its extent and reach to the society. If the act is restricted to particular individuals or a group of individuals it breaches the law and order problem but if the effect and reach and potentiality of the act is so deep as to affect the community at large and/or the even tempo of the community then it becomes a breach of the public order." ........"On a conspectus of all those decisions it has been observed by this court in the case of State of U.P. V/s. Hari Shankar Tewari, (1987) 2 SCC 490 : AIR 1987 SC 998 : (1987 Cri LJ 840), that conceptually there is difference between law and order and public order but what in a given situation may be a matter covered by law and order may really turn out to be one of public order. One has to turn to the facts of each case to ascertain whether the matter relates to the larger circle or the smaller circle. An act which may not at all be objected to in certain situations is capable of totally disturbing the public tranquility. One has to turn to the facts of each case to ascertain whether the matter relates to the larger circle or the smaller circle. An act which may not at all be objected to in certain situations is capable of totally disturbing the public tranquility. When communal tension is high, an indiscreet act of no significance is likely to disturb or dislocate the even tempo of the life of the community. An order of detention made in such a situation has to take note of the potentiality of the act objected to. Thus whether an act relates to law and order or to public order depends upon the impact of the act on the life of the community or in other words the reach and effect and potentiality of the act if so put as to disturb or dislocate the even tempo of the life of the community, it will be an act which will affect public order." Thus from the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court, it will be clear that the acts of the detenu would be prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order if the same affect even tempo of the life of the community as a whole or even in a specified locality. So long as the act of the detenu, complained of, remains within the realm of affecting particular individual or group of individuals only without having any impact thereof upon the even tempo of the life of the community in a particular locality, the same cannot be said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 37. Keeping in mind these principles, I now proceed to consider as to whether the acts of the detenu disclosed in the grounds of detention together with its enclosures would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. So far Ground No. 1 is concerned, it has been mentioned that the petitioner was giving out threats in public place and was indulging in firing in broad day light as a result of which people started running helter, skelter, the traffic on the road was disrupted and the shopkeepers started downing their shutters. People of the locality became panicky, because the detenu was a notorious criminal and used to move in the locality with pistol and cartridges by which he could have killed anybody and out of his fear nobody could dare to depose in any case. People of the locality became panicky, because the detenu was a notorious criminal and used to move in the locality with pistol and cartridges by which he could have killed anybody and out of his fear nobody could dare to depose in any case. The officers and staff of B.C.C.L. also became panicky. The detenu was demanding Rangdari tax from the people in the locality and on refusal by them he used to give out threats to them of being killed. These facts disclosed in Ground No. 1 and the written report, which is its enclosure, would go to show that the acts of the detenu were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and not law and order. 38. So far the second ground of detention is concerned, from a bare perusal of the two inquiry reports, which were submitted in relation to the station diary entries Nos. 394 and 417 and which are enclosures to Ground No. 2 and copies whereof were served upon the detenu, it would appear that upon inquiry by the officer-in-charge of the police station thrilling facts were revealed. The detenu and the members of his gang were disturbing the public peace and by their activities the people in general were terrified. The public peace was in danger. Small businessmen shopkeeper and contractors were apprehending danger to their lives and were giving Rangadari tax to the petitioner out of fear. It was not possible for the school going children to prosecute their studies as threatenings used to be given out by the detenu and his associates for kidnapping them. It was further reported that there was reign of terror of the detenu in the locality. People used to be produced before the petitioner, as if he was a court and they used to be awarded corporal punishment as well as fine. People of the locality were forced to accept such decisions given by the petitioner, failing which, they had to face dire consequences. Thus, I am clearly of the view that the acts of the detenu, referred to above, can be clearly said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 39. People of the locality were forced to accept such decisions given by the petitioner, failing which, they had to face dire consequences. Thus, I am clearly of the view that the acts of the detenu, referred to above, can be clearly said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 39. Now coming to the last ground of detention, I cannot do better than quoting the observations of the learned single Judge in the case of Binod Kumar Singh V/s. State of Bihar, 1988 Pat LJR (HC) 1077 : (1989 Cri LJ NOC 69) in which the third order of detention of the petitioner was being considered and Ground No. 3 of the present detention order was the sole ground in that case. It was submitted in that case that the said ground together with its enclosure, namely, the First Information Report and the Supervision Note of the Deputy Superintendent of Police cannot show that the acts of the detenu were prejudicial to the maintenance of Public order, but the same at the highest can be said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order. Repelling the submission, the learned Judge observed thus : "It is said that allegation was that the petitioner fired a gun in broad daylight as a result of which there was panic in the area. This, according to Mr. Prasad, was at best law and order problem and cannot be termed to be a problem of public order. I have quoted the ground on the basis of which the petitioner has been taken into custody. A perusal of that show as a result of the firing by the petitioner, there was panic in the area and also stampede among the colliery workers. The coal loading operation at the Hard CokeBhatta and the nearby Gazlitand colliery pit head completely stopped till the arrival of the police. Further more important thing is that the residents of the area closed their doors and the police had to start patrolling to restore normalcy. These facts in my opinion were such on the basis of which the detaining authority was justified in coming to the conclusion that the incident disturbed the normal tempo of life and public order. Further more important thing is that the residents of the area closed their doors and the police had to start patrolling to restore normalcy. These facts in my opinion were such on the basis of which the detaining authority was justified in coming to the conclusion that the incident disturbed the normal tempo of life and public order. I am conscious of the fact that in some cases shooting of guns per se in a crowded area may not create the problem of public order but no hard and fast rule can be laid down for that purpose. It depends on the facts of each case. In this case not only the shutters were downed in the market but the colliery workers also stopped the work. People in the area closed their doors and police patrolling had to be introduced to bring back confidence of the people. This, in my opinion, cannot be said to be a case of law and order only." 40. Apart from the aforesaid facts, which weighed with the learned Judge in the aforesaid case, I find that it has been mentioned in the grounds that after the detenu was released on provisional bail, he started terrorising the people for which various station diary entries were made. The Deputy Superintendent of Police in his supervision note has found that the occurrence had taken place as a result of influence of Rangdars in the colliery area and refusal by the police to pay the Rangdari tax. The Deputy Superintendent of Police has further found that the petitioner was a leader of Mafia gang of Dhanbad District. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the learned single of this Court, in the case referred to above and hold that the acts of the detenu disclosed in Ground No. 3 and its enclosure are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. This being the position, in my view, there is no merit even in the last point raised on behalf of the petitioner. 41. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any merit in this writ application, which is accordingly dismissed. 42. BINODANAND SINGH, J. :- I agree. Petition dismissed