JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE petitioner Municipal Corporation, Ujjain (for short "the Corporation"), has preferred this revision under section 392 of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (Act No. XXIII of 1956) (for short "the Corporation Act"), against the order dated 22-9-1984, passed in Miscelleneous Civil Appeal No. 10/84, whereby the IInd Additional Judge to the Court of the District Judge, Ujjain had held that the assessing authority of the Corporation was not competent to proceed with the assessment proceedings for imposing property tax in view of the notification issued by the Central Government under sub-clause (b) of section 18-FB (1) of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (for short "the Act") to assess and recover the tax during the duration of such notified order or till the duration is extended from time to time by further notified orders issued under section 18-FB (2) of the Act. ( 2. ) THE brief facts leading to this revision are thus: A textile Industry known as Indore Textile Mill earlier was being run in the name and style of Phonex Mills, Unit No. 2, as the same was purchased by the Phonex Mills Limited sometime in September, 1973. Thereafter, this Mill was purchased by the Indore Textile Mills on 10-2-1977 from the Phonex Mills. As the management of the industrial undertaking was not running efficiently, there was substantial fall in the volume of production and it also remained closed for a period of three months and such closure was prejudicial to the concerned industry, i. e. the cotton textile industry and the condition of the plant and machinery of the undertaking was such that it was possible to restart the undertaking and such restarting was necessary in the interests of the general public. Therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) of section 18-AA (1) of the Act, the Central Government authorised the Madhya Pradesh State Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management of the whole industrial undertaking subject to certain conditions, vide notification No. Section 0617 E/18aa/idra/77 published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary, Part 611, section 3 (11) dated 12-8-1977. After this notification another notification No. Section 0118 FB/idra/78 dated 17-2-1978 published in Gazette of India Extraordinary, Part-II, section 3, sub-section (ii) dated 17-2-1988 was issued, in exercise of the powers conferred under clause (b) of section 18-FB (1) of the Act, whereby the Central Government declared that the operation of all contracts, assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders, or other instruments in force immediately before the date of issue of this order (other than those relating to secured liabilities to banks and financial institutions to which the industrial undertaking is a party) shall remain suspended for a period of one year from such date and that all the rights, privileges, obligations and liability accruing before the said date, shall remain suspended for the said period. This period of suspension was extended from time to time till 11th August, 1984 by various notifications. During this period of suspension, the assessing authority of the Corporation, which was invested with the powers of the Commissioner, assessed the property tax of Rs. 7,807. 82 for the year 1977-78 with effect from 1-4-1977. Against this order of assessment the Industrial Undertaking preferred an appeal under section 149 of the Corporation Act on various grounds amongst which an objection was taken that in view of the notification issued under section 18-FB (1) (b) of the Act, the assessing authorities had no jurisdiction to proceed with the assessment proceedings. The Appellate Court accepted the contention that in respect of the notification issued under section 18-FB (1) (b), the assessing authority was not competent to assess and recover the tax during the enforcement of the orders issued from time to time, as the liability remained suspended, even in respect of payment of the property tax under the Corporation Act. It is this order, which has been challenged in this revision. ( 3. ) THE contention of Shri C. M. Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioner Corporation is that in clause (b) of section 18-FB (1) of the Act, the word instruments does not include legislative enactments like the Corporation Act. It is this order, which has been challenged in this revision. ( 3. ) THE contention of Shri C. M. Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioner Corporation is that in clause (b) of section 18-FB (1) of the Act, the word instruments does not include legislative enactments like the Corporation Act. As such, the operation of the Corporation Act or the rights and liabilities arising thereunder regarding assessment and imposition of property tax, cannot be deemed to be suspended, and the Corporation was quite competent to assess, impose and realise the property tax in accordance with the provisions as contained in Part-IV, Chapter-XI of the Corporation Act. Learned counsel placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Vishnu Pratap Sugar Factory v. Chief Inspector, AIR 1968 SC 102 . ( 4. ) SMT. Meena Chaphekar, learned counsel for the respondents, contended that looking to the aims and objects of section 18-FB of the Act whereby during the enforcement of the orders issued under section 18-FB (1) (b) suspending the operation of contracts, assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders, or other instruments in force includes the legislative enactments also so as to provide a breathing time to the industrial undertaking during which the industrial undertaking is temporarily freed from the crippling burden imposed by its previous obligations so as to put back the industry on its feet. Learned counsel placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of the Patna High Court in M. K. Sinha v. Persiding Officer, Labour Court, Patna, 1978 LIC 115. ( 5. ) NOW the question arises whether under section 18-FB (1) (b) of the Act, the word "instruments" used also covers the legislative enactment and suspends the liabilities arising therefrom. Learned counsel placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of the Patna High Court in M. K. Sinha v. Persiding Officer, Labour Court, Patna, 1978 LIC 115. ( 5. ) NOW the question arises whether under section 18-FB (1) (b) of the Act, the word "instruments" used also covers the legislative enactment and suspends the liabilities arising therefrom. Section 18-FB of the Act reads as under : "section 18-FB : Power of Central Government to make certain declarations in relation to industrial undertakings, the management or control of which has been taken over under section 18-A, section 18-AA or section 18-FA : (1) The Central Government, if it is satisfied, in relation to an industrial undertaking or any part thereof, the management or control of which has been taken over under section 18-A, whether before or after the commencement of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 1971, or under section 18-AA or section 18-FA, that it is necessary so to do in the interests of the general public with a view to preventing fall in the volume of production of any scheduled industry, it may, by notified order, declare that (a) all or any of the enactments specified in the Third Schedule shall not apply or shall apply with such adaptations, whether by way of modification, addition or omission (which does not, however, affect the policy of the said enactments) to such industrial undertaking as may be specified in such notified order, or (b) the operation of all or any of the contracts, assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders or other instruments in force (to which such industrial undertaking or the company owning such undertaking is a party or which may be applicable to such industrial undertaking or company) immediately before the date of issue of such notified order shall remain suspended or that all or any of the rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities accruing or arising thereunder before the said date, shall remain suspended or shall be enforceable with such adaptations and in such manner as may be specified in the notified order. (2) The notified order made under sub-section (1) shall remain in force, in the first instance, for a period of one year, but the duration of such notified order may be extended from time to time by a further notified order by a period not exceeding one year at a time : Provided that no such notified order shall in any case, remain in force (a) after the expiry of the period for which the management of the industrial undertaking was taken over under section 18-A, section 18-AA or section 18-FA, or (b) for more than eight years in the aggregate from the date of issue of the first notified order, whichever is earlier. (3) Any notified order made under sub-section (1) shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law, agreement or instrument or any decree or order of a Court, tribunal, officer or other authority or of any submission, settlement or standing order. (4) Any remedy for the enforcement of any right, privilege, obligation or liability referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) and suspended or modified by a notified order made under that sub-section shall, in accordance with the terms of the notified order, remain suspended or modified, and all proceedings relating thereto pending before any Court, tribunal, officer or other authority shall accordingly remain stayed or be continued subject to such adaptations, so, however, that on the notified order ceasing to have effect (a) any right, privilege, obligation or liability so remaining suspended or modified shall become revived and enforceable as if the notified order had never been made; (b) any proceeding so remaining stayed shall be proceeded with, subject to the provisions of any law which may then be in force, from the stage which had been reached when the proceedings became stayed. (5) In computing the period of limitation for the enforcement of any right, privilege, obligation or liability referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1), the period during which it or the remedy for the enforcement thereof suspended shall be excluded. " A bare reading of the section shows that the Central Government under section 18-FB has been invested with two types of powers. " A bare reading of the section shows that the Central Government under section 18-FB has been invested with two types of powers. Section 18-FB (1) (a) gives power to the Central Government not to apply, or apply with such adaptations whether by way of modification, addition or omission, certain enactments specified in the IIIrd Schedule to the Act, to such industrial undertaking as may be specified in such notified order. In this Schedule only three enactments have been specified which have not been made to be applicable after the enforcement of the order, which are : 1. The Industrial Employement (Standing Orders) Act, 1946; 2. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; and 3. The Minimum Wages Act, 1948. Therefore, if a declaration is made under sub-clause (a) of section 18-FB (1) of the Act, such enactments shall not apply to an industrial undertaking in relation to which a notification has been issued to that effect. The result of the notification under clause (a) is that no rights under those enactments accrue at all. Thus, clause (a) deals with the position after the issuance of the notified order whereby certain enactments are not to apply or to apply with such adaptations as may be made during the enforcement of the order under section 18-FB (1) (a) of the Act. 5-A. The power conferred under sub-clause (b) on the Central Government is to suspend the operation of any contract, assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders or other instruments in force immediately before the date of issue of such notified order; the area of any of the rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities accruing or arising thereunder before the date of notification, shall remain suspended and shall not be enforced for the period as may be specified in the order or extended from time to time under section 18-FB (2) (b) but not more than. 8 years in the aggregate from the date of the issue of the first notified order. Therefore, clause (b) deals with the position as it stood immediately before the issue of the notified order. The two powers are, i. e. in clauses (a) and (b) of section 18-FB (1) of the Act are therefore, distinct and separate and have different objects. In clause (a) of section 18-FB (1) legislative enactments have been specified in the Schedule III but in clause (b) legislative enactments have not been specified. The two powers are, i. e. in clauses (a) and (b) of section 18-FB (1) of the Act are therefore, distinct and separate and have different objects. In clause (a) of section 18-FB (1) legislative enactments have been specified in the Schedule III but in clause (b) legislative enactments have not been specified. Therefore whether the words other instruments in force in clause (b) of section 18-FB (1) can only be considered to mean writing, which generally imports a document of a formal legal kind or in context legal enactments also. ( 6. ) THE Patna High Court in the case of M. K. Sinha (supra), while considering a case arising out of the proceedings under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, a remedy for enforcement of a right, after considering the scheme, aims and object of section 18-FB and the distinct object of the two powers of Central Government under section 18-FB (1) (a) and (b), and the meaning assigned to the expression instrument used in the context in clause (b) of section 18-FB of the Act, held that the intention of the legislature is to include within its sweep under clause (b) of section 18-FB (1) of the Act not only the rights and obligations arising under the contract, but also arising out as a result of adjudication or as a result of statutory provisions or as a result of orders made in pursuance of statute. The expression other instruments should be construed generally and given a wide connotation so as to include within its ambit the legislative enactments also. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of M. P. State Textile Corporation (supra) while considering a case of rights and liabilities arising under the Payment of Wages Act, held that the non-inclusion of the Payment of Wages Act in Schedule III to the Act in clause (a) has no effect as it is clause (b) which applies in relation to the liability before taking over the management and not clause (a) of section 18-FB (1) of the Act. In a single Bench decision Shri V. D. Gyani, J. in case of M. P. State Textile Corporation Ltd. , Ujjain v. Controlling Authority and Asstt. Labour Commissioner (Central), Bhopal and Anr. In a single Bench decision Shri V. D. Gyani, J. in case of M. P. State Textile Corporation Ltd. , Ujjain v. Controlling Authority and Asstt. Labour Commissioner (Central), Bhopal and Anr. , 1986 LIC 1043, after considering the objects of the Act and the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and the non-obstante clause under section 14 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, whereby the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act were given overriding effect on other enactments after considering the object of section 18-FB and the Division Bench decision of the Patna High Court in M. K, Sinhas case (supra) and the language of section 18-FB (1) (b), held that the suspension of contracts and commencements of an undertaking ordered under section 18-FB of the Act are only temporary, the orders so issued under section 18-FB (1) (b) were held to override the provisions under section 14 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, so that the proceedings for recovery, gratuity payable by the authority concerned, were held to be suspended during the period the order was in operation. Therefore, in the context of the language used under section 18-FB (1) (b), it is not only the duration of contracts, assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards; standing orders but it also includes suspension of any right or financial liability arising out of any statutory enactment, which will be covered in the words "other instruments in force. " If the rights and liabilities arising out of the legislative enactments, prior to the date of the notified order issued under section 18-FB (1) (b) of the Act are not suspended, the purpose of taking over management in the interest of the general public with a view to preventing fall in the volume of production and the scheduled industry is not achieved because by exercising the power under section 18-FB, such a scheduled industry of which management has been taken over has been given time so as to free from its financial liabilities so that it may stand on its own footing. If this is not the intention of the legislature, then the liability, arising out of the contracts, assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders, though shall remain suspended during the duration of the notified order, but the financial liabilities like that of payment of property tax, which may be in thousands or which may affect the financial conditions of such industrial undertaking, will not remain suspended. If such a liability does not remain suspended, then the object of section 18-FB (1) (b) of the Act, which gives breathing time to the industry to improve its sale and to stand on its own footing with a view to preventing fall in production and in the interest of general public and also in the interest of the workers, who are employed in the industry is not achieved. Moreover, in clause (b) there was no necessity to use the word "instruments in force" if the word instrument meant only a writing, importing of document of formal legal kind, as for that contracts, assurances, agreements, settlements, awards etc. have already been used in clause (b ). Clause (b) does not mean only the bilateral deeds, contracts, assurances of property etc. but it speaks in very clear terms, that all or any of the rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities accruing or arising thereunder before the said date, shall remain suspended or shall be enforceable with such adaptations and in such manner as may be specified in the notified order. The later words "shall be enforceable with such adaptations" cannot mean bilateral documents but it is the unilateral act of the Central Government to enforce the legislative enactments with such adaptations and in such a manner as may be specified in the notified order. Therefore, even in clause (b) if legislative enactments are to be enforced, the Central Government has got power to apply them with such adaptations and in such manner as may be specified in the notified order. Therefore, even in clause (b) if legislative enactments are to be enforced, the Central Government has got power to apply them with such adaptations and in such manner as may be specified in the notified order. Therefore, a complete reading of clause (b) of section 18-FB (1), and other such clauses of the section 18-FB, in my opinion, the words, "other instruments in force", clearly in the context and keeping in mind the object of the section means not only a writing importing document of formal legal kind but it includes the legislative enactments also and as such the rights and liabilities arising out of the legislative enactments shall also remain suspended till the enforcement of the order under section 18-FB (1) (b) of the Act. ( 7. ) THE decision of the Apex Court in the case of The Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works Ltd. (supra), in my opinion, is of no help to the petitioner. The Apex Court while considering the provisions of section 7 (iv) (a) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, as amended, was considering the expression used in that section in relation to payment of Court Fees in a suit on the plaint for cancellation of an instrument or for the adjudgment of an instrument void. Therefore, the Apex Court observed that generally, an instrument means a writing, importing a document of formal legal kind but it does not include the Acts of legislature unless there is statutory definition to that effect in any Act and it would not be correct to say that the Acts alleged in the plaint to be void are instruments within the meaning of sub-section (IV-A) of section 7. The Apex Court after quoting sub-section (IV-A) of section 7, posed a question in para 3 for determining whether an Act passed by the Central or the State Legislature can be said to be an instrument and, if so, an instrument securing money or other property having such value. The Apex Court observed that the Court Fees Act does not define the word instrument the ordinary dictionary meaning, was taken. After quoting the meaning from the Strouds Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edition, Volume-2, on page 1472, the Supreme Court observed as under : "according to Strouds Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edition, Volume II, page 1472, instrument means a writing, and generally imports a document of a formal legal kind. After quoting the meaning from the Strouds Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edition, Volume-2, on page 1472, the Supreme Court observed as under : "according to Strouds Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edition, Volume II, page 1472, instrument means a writing, and generally imports a document of a formal legal kind. Semble, the word may include an Act of Parliament (See Deed of Settlement) so, in the Trustees Act, 1925 (15 Geo. , 5, c 18) section 68 (ii) Conveyancing Act, 1881 (44 and 45 Viet. c. 41) section 2 (xiii), "instrument" includes deed, will, inclosure, award and Act of Parliament. Thus, an instrument may include a statute enacted by Parliament if the particular statute in its context includes it as an instrument. " In the present case, after considering the scheme, aims and object of section 18-FB (1) (b) of the Act, it is clear that in the context, the expression "other instruments in force" includes legislative enactments. See also the Division Bench case of the Patna High Court in M. K. Sinha v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patna. ( 8. ) THE right of Corporation to determine Annual Value and then assess and impose a tax from the assessment year 1977-78, flows from the provisions as contained in Part IV of Chapter II of the Corporation Act. The Corporation has got a right to impose tax after following the procedure prescribed and for the aggrieved assessee, the remedy of appeal etc is provided. But as the assessment in question was prior to the period of notified order dated 17-2-1978 issued under section 18fb (1) (b) of the Act, the right of Corporation to assess the property tax and to determine the liability of property tax shall be deemed to be suspended for the period specified in the Notification and extended from time to time to a maximum period of 8 years. Thus, the assessing authority was not competent to proceed with the proceedings for assessment and imposition of tax till the expiry of 8 years, which now has expired. Now the petitioner Corporation is free to proceed with the assessment and imposition of tax and its recovery for the said period. It may also be made clear here that clause (b) of section 18-FB (1), speaks of suspension of obligation rights and liabilities of an industrial undertaking before the Notification and not thereafter. Now the petitioner Corporation is free to proceed with the assessment and imposition of tax and its recovery for the said period. It may also be made clear here that clause (b) of section 18-FB (1), speaks of suspension of obligation rights and liabilities of an industrial undertaking before the Notification and not thereafter. As such, the Corporation for the period subsequent to the Notification under section 18-FB (1) (b) of the Act could have determined the annual value and assessed and imposed the property tax on the building and land of the respondent. ( 9. ) AS a result of the above discussion, I am of the opinion that the Appellate Court was right in holding that the assessing authority of the petitioner Corporation, Ujjain, was not competent to proceed with the assessment and imposition of tax under the Corporation Act for the period commencing from 1-4-1977 and ending on 31-3-1978, in view of the Notification issued under section 18-FB (1) (b) of the Act. ( 10. ) IN the result, this revision petition fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.