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1989 DIGILAW 171 (DEL)

HYDER v. UNION OF INDIA

1989-04-07

P.K.BAHRI

body1989
P. K. BAHRI, J. ( 1 ) IN this writ petiton filed under Article226 of the. Constitution of India read wish Section 482 of thecode of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner has challenged thedetention order dated 11/05/1988, passed under Section 3 (1)of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention ofsmuggling Activities Act, 1974 (for short cofeposa Act )and a declaration dated 1/06/1988, passed under Section 9 (1)of COFEPOSA Act. ( 2 ) 13 grounds have been raised in this writ petition forchallenging the impugned orders but Mr. Rohit Kochhar, thelearned counsel appearing for the petitioner, confined the challenge only to four grounds and has given up all other grounds. ( 3 ) THE first ground raised is that the representation dated 18/07/1988, made by the detenu to the Central Governmentwas not dealt with due promptitude. In the counter-affidavitfiled by Shri C. Rajan, Under Secretary, on behalf of the Centralgovernment, it has been mentioned that the said representation was received in COFEPOSA Section on 3/08/1988. Asthe representation was in Kannada language, a copy of the samewas forwarded to the sponsoring authority tor comments and itsenglish translation and the same was received at Bangalore on 8/08/1988 and its English translation was obtained and after obtaining the comments, the same were sent to the Central Government on 12/08/1988 and after they were receivedon 17/08/1988, in the Central Government and after dueconsideration the representation was rejected on 19/08/1988. So, there is no delay made in considering the said representation. ( 4 ) THEN there is a reference to representation dated June I,1988, which was received on 9/06/1988, by the COFLPOSASection and was sent to the sponsoring authority for comments,which was received by sponsoring authority on - 13/06/1988and a? certain allegations had been made in the representationthat the petitioner had been maltreated by the concerned officers,the representation was sent to the Additional Collector of Customs on 14/06/1988 and the comments dated 16/06/1988,were received on the next date and the following two days wereholidays and the comments and the English translation were sentto the Central Government on 20/06/1988 and the said representation was put up before the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, who in turn put up before the Minister ofstate for Revenue and the same was forwarded to the Financeminister and it came to be considered on 28/06/1988. It ismentioned that the Finance Minister had sought certain clarifications and thus a telex message was issued to the sponsoringauthority and the sponsoring authority at Bangalore sent themessage to the Additional Collector of Customs. . Mangalore andthe comments were received through Special Messenger atbangalore on 4/07/1988 and were sent to the Central Government where they were received on 11/07/1988 and the representation was rejected by the Finance Minister on 18/07/1988. In between the Minister of State was on tour and only on hisrrturn from the tour the matter was put up before the Financeminster. So, it is evident from the facts given in the affidavitthat the representation had been dealt with promptly at all levelsand the delay, if any, has been made in considering the representation the same stands well explained. So. I negative thisparticular ground. ( 5 ) THE next ground urged is that an order of bail had beenmade by the court and the same had not been placed beforethe declaring authority. Reliance is placed by the learned counselfor the petitioner on Harbhajan Singh v. Union of India, 1989 (1)DL 118 , (1) where it has been laid down that an order grantingor refusing bail is a material document which is required to beplaced before the declaring authority as well. However, in thepresent case I have been shown the original record and I findthat copy of the bail order had been placed before the declaringauthority. So, nothing turns on this ground on merits. ( 6 ) THE third ground pleaded by the learned counsel for thepetitioner is that in the representation made to the Advisoryboard the detenu has prayed that he may be permitted toexamine his co-detenus in rebuttal to the allegations made againsthim but still his request was not acceded to and hence, theimpugned orders stand vitiated as the petitioner has not beenafforded reasonable opportunity of substantiating his defencebefore the Advisory Board. ( 7 ) IT is true that in the representation made to the Advisoryboard the petitioner had pleaded that his co-detenus may beexamined as witnesses, in rebuttal to the allegations made againsthim. ( 7 ) IT is true that in the representation made to the Advisoryboard the petitioner had pleaded that his co-detenus may beexamined as witnesses, in rebuttal to the allegations made againsthim. Shri G. Venkataiah, Secretary to the Advisory Board,has filed the affidavit in which it is mentioned that detenu hadmade a request to the Advisory Board to permit the petitionerto cross-examine the co-detenus in rebuttal of allegations madein the grounds of detention and the Board thought it fit; not toaccede to such request of the petitioner. It is, hence, evidentthat the petitioner had modified his request to the Advisoryboard when he was granted personal hearing by requesting thathe may be permitted to cross-examine the co-detenus. Thereis DO such right conferred on the detenu that he could crossexamine the witnesses on whose statements reliance has beenplaced by the detaining authority for coming to subjective satisfaction that the detention order should be made against a particular petitioner. The detenu has a right to examine witnessesin defence if he causes the witnesses to be present on the daythe personal hearing is granted to the detenu by the Advisoryboard. Such is not the case here. The detenu had made aprayer to the Advisory Board to permit him to cross-examinethe co-detenus and he had not orally prayed to the Advisoryboard that he may be permitted to examine the co-detenus aswitnesses in his defence. So, it cannot be held that the petitioner has been deprived of his legal right to examine any witnesses in defence by the Advisory Board in any manner, negative this particular ground as well. ( 8 ) THE last and the final ground raised by the learned counselfor the petitioner is that the petitioner had in his representationto the detaining authority as well as to the Central Governmentmade a request for supply of certain docunts but the requestwas not complied with and, hence, the petitioner has beendeprived of making an effective and purposeful representationagainst the impugned orders. The petitioner had asked forcopies of documents relating to search conducted at variouspremises of. his co-detenus including search conducted at Kudlu,kasargod (Kerala) on 7/04/1988 and at the Bombay addressfound in the driving licence of the petitioner. The detainingauthority in its letter dated 8/08/1988, informed the petitioner that all documents, which are relied upon and standmentioned in the list at serial Nos. his co-detenus including search conducted at Kudlu,kasargod (Kerala) on 7/04/1988 and at the Bombay addressfound in the driving licence of the petitioner. The detainingauthority in its letter dated 8/08/1988, informed the petitioner that all documents, which are relied upon and standmentioned in the list at serial Nos. 1 to 23 annexed with thegrounds of detention, have been supplied to the detenu alongwiththe order of detention and in respect of the other documentsit was pleaded that the request of the petitioner to supply thesaid documents cannot be acceded to as these documents didnot concern the detention of the petitioner. In para 9 of thewrit petition, the petitioner has mentioned about the said documents and non-supply of the same by the authorities in spiteof the detenu making a demand for the supply of said docunments. In paras 16 and 17 of the counter-affidavit filed byshri Cecil Noronha, Commissioner and Secretary to the Government, State of Karnataka, it has been pleaded that all documentswhich were relied upon in the grounds of detention have beensupplied while the documents, of which copies were asked forby the detenu, were not relied upon and they had nothing todo with the detention order of the petitioner. Hence, it wasnot incumbent upon the authorities to supply copies of the saiddocuments. It was mentioned that in spite of the search carriedout Kudlu, Kasargod (Kerala) and at the Bombay address foundin the driving licence of the petitioner, the documents pertainmgto the same were not relied upon for the purpose of detentionof the petitioner while other documents were neither relied uponnor referred to in the grounds of detention. In the grounds ofdetention only a passing reference has been made to. the searchconducted at Kudlu,-Kasargod (Kerala) and at the Bombayaddress found in the driving licence of the petitioner, from wherenothing was recovered. So, there is no reference made even byway passing or casually in the grounds of detention to any otherdocuments except to the documents pertaining to the searchcarried out at the aforesaid premises. ( 9 ) THE crucial question which arises for decision in the presentcase is whether any legal duty was cast on the detaining authorityto supply copies of documents pertaining to the said searchesconducted at the aforesaid places on demand being made by thedetenu inasmuch as there has been made reference to such documents of search in the grounds of detention. ( 9 ) THE crucial question which arises for decision in the presentcase is whether any legal duty was cast on the detaining authorityto supply copies of documents pertaining to the said searchesconducted at the aforesaid places on demand being made by thedetenu inasmuch as there has been made reference to such documents of search in the grounds of detention. As far as law onthe subject is concerned, there is conflict of judgments broughtto my notice. However, as far as Delhi High Court is concerned, the law has been made clear in Vinod Kumar Arora@ Viliod Kumar v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi andothers, ILR (1984) I Delhi 497. (2) In the said case, in thegrounds of detention a passing reference had been made to someair-tickets and the detenu had sought supply of copies of saidair-tickets. The copies were not supplied. The contention wasraised by the authorities before the High Court that ths saiddocuments were not relied upon by the detaining authority inthe grounds of detention and thus, there is no obligation cast onthe respondents to supply copies thereof and that the documentswere not relevant and thus, the detaining authority had rightlydeclined the request of the petitioner for supply of their copies. The Division Bench of this Court while dealing with such a pointheld that the documents to which a reference is made by thedetaining authority although not relied upon yet they ought tosupply to the detenu when he makes a specific request forsupply of the same so as to enable him to make an effectiverepresentation. Reliance was placed for this ratio on the judgment given by Bombay High Court in Mohd. Hussain v. Secretary, Govt. of Maharashtra, 1982 Cr. L. J. 1848. (3) It was alsoheld that it is for the detenu to decide whether such a documentis relevant to bit. defence or not and the question of relevancewas not to be decided by the court. The case of Mst. L. M. S. Ummu Saleema v. B. B. Gujaral and Anothoer, AIR 1981 SC1191 (4), was relied upon by the authorities but the same wasdistinguished. It was held that in case request. is made by thedetenu seeking copies of documents to which reference has beenmade, the failure of the detaining authority to supply copies ofsuch documents would amount to infringement of the provisionsof Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. It was held that in case request. is made by thedetenu seeking copies of documents to which reference has beenmade, the failure of the detaining authority to supply copies ofsuch documents would amount to infringement of the provisionsof Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. This judgment hasbeen followed by another Division Bench of this Court in Criminal writ Petition No. 357/88, N. Abdul Rasheed v. Union ofindia and Others, decided on Februay 15, 1989. (5) The learnedcounsel for the respondents has vehemently argued that theratio given in Mst. L. M. S. Ummu Saleema (supra) has net beenproperly understood and if the observations made by the Supremecourt in para 5 of the judgment are taken notice of the courtcould come to the conclusion that the Supreme Court has laiddown the law that there is no duty cast upon the authority tosupply copies of documents to which only passing or casualreference has been made in the. grounds of detention whilenarrating the facts if those documents are not reliedupon by the detaining authority in making the orderof detention. In the aforesaid case the question posedbefore the Supreme Court was whether all documentsto which passing reference has been made in the grounds ofdetention are liable to be supplied to the detenu or not alongwithtlie grounds of detention. The point whether such documentsought or ought not to be supplied to the detenu on his makinga demand for the same was not in issue in th said judgment. The Supreme Court had no occasion thus to pronounce on thisparticular legal point. It has been, no doubt, held in para 5 ofthe said judgment that mere non-supply of copies of documents,which are not relied upon by the detaining authority althuoghreference has. been made to the same in a casual or passing wayin the grounds of detention, does not infringe the fundamentalright conferred under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. It is quite clear that as a first facet of the safeguards enshrined inarticle 22 (5) of the Constitution the detenu is to be. supplied only he material documents which are relied upon by the detainingauthority for making the detentionorder. The documents towhich only passing reference is made in the grounds of detentionare not. liable to be supplied to the detenu alongwith the groundsof detention if such documents are not relied upon and are notthe basis of passing of detention order. supplied only he material documents which are relied upon by the detainingauthority for making the detentionorder. The documents towhich only passing reference is made in the grounds of detentionare not. liable to be supplied to the detenu alongwith the groundsof detention if such documents are not relied upon and are notthe basis of passing of detention order. The crucial questionwhether the detenu should or should not be supplied copies ofsuet documents which are not relied upon but to which a casualreference has been made in the grounds of detention on suchdocuments being demanded by the detenu never came up forconsideration by the Supreme Court in this case. No other judgment of the Supreme Court has been cited where such a specificquestion had been considered. The reason why the detenu shouldbe supplied copies of documents on demand to which only casualreference has been made in the grounds of detention is that thedetenu has to be afforded a reasonable opportunity of making aneffective and purposeful representation against his detentionorders. It is for the detenu to make up his mind as to what helphe can derive out of the said documents while making an effective or purposeful representation. The court or the detainingauthority pre not supposed to go into the question as to whetherm fact such documents could possibly furnish any material to thedetenu for making an effective or purposeful representation. Aduty lies on the detaining authority to comply with the demandof the detenu in this connection and it is for the detenu to seehow he can make out any defence out of such documents inmafaing an effective or purposeful representation against the detention order. It is true that while considering the proceduralsafeguards enshrined in Article 22 of the Constitution the courtmust construe the same in proper light and from pragmatic commonsense point. (See Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commissionerand Secretary, Govt. of Kerala and Others, AIR 1986 SC 687 ). (6 ). ( 10 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents has vehementlyargued that in the present case nothing was recovered from thesaid places and thus, on the face of it the seacch warrants andthe panchnamas prepared regarding the searches could not havepossibly furnished any sort of defence or meterial to the detenufor making any effective or purposeful representation. It hasbeen argued that in the case of N. Abdul. It hasbeen argued that in the case of N. Abdul. Rasheed (supra) certainmaterial was found in the searches carried out and thus, the detenu could utilise the documents of the search for making somedefence in his representation but that is not the case here. However, the ratio has been laid down by a Division Bench of thiscourt that if a copy of the document, which is referred to inthe grounds of detention although not relied upon, is demandedby the detenu then it is not for the detaining authority or thecourt to go into the question furher as to whether such a document could furnish any material to the detenu for making a representation and it is for the detenu to decide as io how he canderive any benefit from such a document for making a purposefulrepresentation. So, this ratio is binding on this court while sittingsingly. The learned counsel for the respondents has also madereference to a case G. Pichaimahi v. State of Karnataka, Writpetition Nos. 84 and 85 of 1986, decided on 25/07/1986 (7)by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court where the lawlaid down by this Court in the case of Vinod Kumar Arora (supra) and also by Bombay High Court in the case of Mohd. Hussain (supra) was not agreed upon. I have gone through thisjudgment and find that Karnataka High Court also, while referring to the different cases of the Supreme Court including thecase of Mst. L. M. S. Ummu Saleema (supra), came to the conclssion that there is no judgment of the Supreme Court whichdeals with the aforesaid point and the High Court proceeded todecide the said point on first principles but still the High Courtrelied upon the observations made in the case of Mst. L. M. S. Ummu Saleema (supra) for coming to the conclusion that evenon demand by the detenu the copies of the documents which arenot. relied upon but are referred to casually or in a passing wayare not to be supplied to the detenu. It is not possible to, hence,countenance the view expressed by the Division Bench of thekarnataka High Court in preference to the law laid down by thetwo Division Benches of this Court. relied upon but are referred to casually or in a passing wayare not to be supplied to the detenu. It is not possible to, hence,countenance the view expressed by the Division Bench of thekarnataka High Court in preference to the law laid down by thetwo Division Benches of this Court. So, in view of the abovediscussion, I hold that continuted detention of the petitioner standsviriatod on account of non-supply of copies of the documentspertaining to the search of the aforesaid places to which a reference has been made casually in the grounds of detention ondemand being made by the detenu which had the effect of depriving the detenu from making an effective and purposeful representation. ( 11 ) I allow the writ petition, make the rule absolute andquash the continued detention of the petitioner and direct that thepetitioner be set at liberty forthwith if not required to be detainedin any other case. The parties are left to bear their own costs.