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1989 DIGILAW 173 (KER)

Subbayya Chettiyar v. Ayyappan Pillai

1989-04-07

BALAKRISHNAN

body1989
Judgment :- 1. The revision petitioner filed O.A.119 of 1983, under S.80B of the K.L.R. Act for purchase of kudikidappu right. The application was allowed by the Land Tribunal by its order dated 6-8-1985 finding that the revision petitioner is a kudikidappukaran. Against that order the first respondent herein filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority. The appeal was allowed by the Appellate Authority. The petitioner challenges the order passed by the Appellate Authority. 2. According to the revision petitioner he is occupying a but in Sy.No.14/54 Iranimuttom Village in Trivandrum taluk. The Land Tribunal found that the petitioner has been residing in the but for the last 30 years, and the cost of construction of the hut would come to Rs.300/-. It was also found that the applicant-petitioner was not having any land of his own either as owner or as tenant where he could construct a building. Exts.C1 and C2 are the report and the draft sketch prepared by the revenue inspector. The revenue inspector in his report dated 22-2-1985 stated that the applicant has been residing in a small thatched hut and the walls of the hut are made up of mud and there are only two rooms and a'charthu' and on the basis of this evidence the Land Tribunal allowed the application for purchase of kudikidappu rights. 3. The Appellate Authority interfered with the finding of the Land Tribunal for the reason that the applicant had filed an application under S.13 of Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act (Act 2 of 1965) and therefore he cannot claim that he is a kudikidappukaran. The Appellate Authority relied on the decision of this Court in Kumaran Nair v. Damodaran Nair (1986 KLT. 461). The finding of the Appellate Authority seems to be that since the petitioner invoked the benefit of the provisions of Act 2 of 1965 he is estopped from contending that he is a kudikidappukaran. In the decision cited above the petitioner filed an application for fixation of fair rent. Thereafter he also filed an application under S.13 of Act 2 of 1965 for the restoration of the amenities withheld by the landlord. The landlord contended that he is kudikidappukaran and a petition under S.13 of Act 2 of 1965 was not maintainable. Despite the objection by the landlord the petitioner therein maintained that he is a tenant entitled to. Thereafter he also filed an application under S.13 of Act 2 of 1965 for the restoration of the amenities withheld by the landlord. The landlord contended that he is kudikidappukaran and a petition under S.13 of Act 2 of 1965 was not maintainable. Despite the objection by the landlord the petitioner therein maintained that he is a tenant entitled to. the benefit of the provisions of Act 2 of 1965. Subsequently he filed petition under S.80B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. Then the court held that he had invoked the provisions of Act 2 of 1965 and contended that he was a tenant of a building and the definition of the tenant of a building does not include a kudikidappukaran. Therefore he was estopped from contending at a later stage that he was a kudikidappukaran. The claim of kudikidappu was repelled by this court with the following observation. "The rights enjoyed by the tenant under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964 and the Kerala Rent Control Act are in fact alternative rights. The rights or privileges aforesaid are rights or privileges conferred on the tenant by the above statutes. These rights and privileges rest in the individual and they are intended for his sole benefit.The provisions in the Rent Control Act and the K.L.R. Act are made for the benefit and protection of private rights and therefore the person for whose benefit these provisions are enacted, can waive the said rights Having elected to avail of the right conferred on him under the Rent Control Act and got an order from the authorities constituted under that Act to the prejudice of the landlord, the petitioner shall not be permitted to give up that stand and take shelter under the K.L.R. Act and avail of the benefit of S.75 thereof." The above observations were made since the applicant therein repeatedly filed petition before the Rent Control Court and availed of the benefit as a tenant. But, in this case the petitioner filed an application under S.80B of the K.L.R.Act for purchase of kudikidappu right. Thereafter he filed an application before the Accommodation Controller for restoration of certain amenities enjoyed by him. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner points out that even in that petition the petitioner had not stated that he was not a kudikidappukaran. Thereafter he filed an application before the Accommodation Controller for restoration of certain amenities enjoyed by him. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner points out that even in that petition the petitioner had not stated that he was not a kudikidappukaran. It is difficult to hold that a person who filed an application before the Accommodation Controller would cease to become a kudikidappukaran if he really was a kudikidappukaran as per the definition of S.2(25) of the Act. The question is whether by his conduct in filing an application under Act 2 of 1965 he would be estopped from contending that he is a kudikidappukaran under the K.L.R.Act. S.115 of the Evidence Act defines the term "estoppel" as follows: "115. Estoppel:--When one person has, by his declaration, actor omission intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative, to deny the truth of that thing." 4. Estoppel being a principle of law of evidence, it creates no substantive rights of an absolute character, but can only operate to close the mouths of certain people who have acted in certain way. It is a rule of pleading based upon man's conduct who by representation to another has induced the latter to alter his position. Estoppel can arise only if a party has altered his position on the faith of a representation or promise made by the other. It can come into play when there has been a change of position in consequence of the representation of the conduct of the other party. No declaration, act or omission will amount to an estoppel unless it has caused the person to whom it concerns to alter his position and to do this, he must both believe in the facts stated or suggested by it and must act upon such belief. Representation or admission on matters of law or ignorance of legal rights cannot constitute any basis of estoppel. Any act done under a misapprehension of legal rights does not create an estoppel. A person cannot be estopped for a misrepresentation on a point of law. Representation or admission on matters of law or ignorance of legal rights cannot constitute any basis of estoppel. Any act done under a misapprehension of legal rights does not create an estoppel. A person cannot be estopped for a misrepresentation on a point of law. An admission of point of law is not an admission of a "thing" so as to make the admission a matter of estoppel within the meaning of S.115 of the Evidence Act. In the Carl Zeiss case (1967) 1 A.C.853, 947 Lord Upjohn said: "All estoppels are not odious but must be applied so as to work justice and not injustice and I think the principle of issue estoppel must be applied to the circumstances of the subsequent case with this overriding consideration in mind." 5. If the above principles are applied, what the revision petitioner has done is that he filed an application under Act 2 of 1965 before the Accommodation Controller. He never wanted to waive his kudikidappu right. Probably the petitioner did this thinking that the Accommodation Controller is a proper authority. Such ignorance will not operate as estoppel so as to disentitle the petitioner from claiming kudikidappu right. 6. The evidence in this case show that the petitioner is occupying a building. The cost of construction of the building is less than Rs.750/-. The revenue inspector filed Exts. C1 and C2 reports and stated that the cost of construction of the building would be Rs.300/-. The Land Tribunal also visited the kudikidappu site. Of course the 1st respondent has raised certain objections to the revenue inspector's report. He had also contended that this was a part of a line building. But no such contention is seen specifically raised in revision. The report of the revenue inspector also does not show that the hut formed part of a line building. 7. The Appellate Authority reversed the finding of the Land Tribunal for the reason that the kudikidappukaran filed an application under Act 2 of 1965 and therefore he waived his kudikidappu right. 8. There was no express or implied waiver of the kudikidappu rights by the petitioner. The Appellate Authority has seriously erred in finding so. I set aside the same and the order of the Land Tribunal is restored. The Land Tribunal may issue purchase certificate to the revision petitioner. C.R.P. is disposed of as above. No costs.