JUDGMENT Satyeshwar Roy, J. Defendant is the appellant. . 2. The respondent filed the suit for eviction of the appellant from a building on the ground that the appellant had defaulted in paying rent from 15.4.1983 to 14.7.1983 (three months), that the respondent required the building for his own use and occupation, that the appellant had committed breach of the terms of tenancy and that the period for which-the building was let out had expired. 3. There was no dispute between the parties that the month was not according to English calender month but it began from 15th of a month and ended on 14th of the next following month. On the point of default, according to the respondent, the rent was neither paid nor validly remitted for three months, i.e, from 15.4.1983 to 14.7.1983. On the point of personal necessity it was stated by the respondent that he was an old man of 85 years and the accommodation was a very small portion of the ground floor, 'which was not" sufficient for his family; and his nephews and nieces are dependent on him. He required the building for him including his nephews and nieces and also for starting a Dharam Sala. So far the' breach of terms of the tenancy was concerned, it was asserted that anti-social elements were allowed to reside in the hotel premises. So far the expiry of period of lease was concerned, it was asserted in the plaint that the building was let out to the appellant for a period of 11 months from 15.8.1982 which expired on 14.7.1983. All these were controverted by the appellant in his written statement. So far the default was concerned, it was stated that he tendered the rent to the respondent and as he refused to accept the same, he remitted it by money order., So ,far the personal necessity was concerned, it was stated that the respondent has large accommodation in a separate building in which he inducted several tenants. The respondent had suitable accommodation at his disposal. The family of the respondent consisted only of him self and his wife. Starting of Dharam Sala could not be said to be a personal necessity. The allegation of breach of the terms of tenancy was also denied. The respondent had suitable accommodation at his disposal. The family of the respondent consisted only of him self and his wife. Starting of Dharam Sala could not be said to be a personal necessity. The allegation of breach of the terms of tenancy was also denied. So far expiry of the period of lease was concerned, it was, inter alia, stated that as the building was let out on the basis of written instrument, it required registration and as it was not done it was not admissible in evidence. Tile appellant, was a tenant month to month. 4. The court below did not accept the case of the respondent on default, personal necessity and breach of the terms of tenancy. It, however, accepted the' case that as the period of lease had expired the appellant was liable to be evicted. 5. The court below framed eight issues of which, in view of the submissions made on behalf of the parties, the relevant are: "3. Whether the tenancy is for a fixed period and' the same has expired. 4. Whether the appellant was defaulter within the meaning of law. 5. Whether the respondent required the premises reasonably, bonafide and in good faith." 6. The points for determination in this appeal are: (i) Whether the instrument, exhibit 2 was the basis' of lease or not and if it was the basis of the lease whether it was compulsorily registerable. (ii) Whether the appellant had defaulted in paying the rent for the period 15.4.1983 to 14.7.1983; and (iii) Whether the respondent required the building for his own use and occupation. 7. So far 'point no. (i) is concerned, that has been discussed by the court' below in issue no. 3. It is the admitted case of the parties that exhibit 2. was executed by both,: the parties. The court below relying in Om Prakash vs. Additional Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna : A.I.R. 1956 Patna, 305, held that the Bihar Buildings Lease, Rent and Eviction Control Act, (the Building Act) was a self contained Act and no recourse can be had to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act (T. P. Act for short) to see whether the exhibit 2 was compulsorily registerable or not. It appears from the judgment of the court below that it noticed. It appears from the judgment of the court below that it noticed. Babu Jagatanand vs. Satyanarainji and Laxmiji: 1961 B.L.J.R. 219, but no reason has been assigned by it for not following that judgment. 8. Exhibit 2 was dated 11.7.1982. From its language it appeared that the lease of the building was given to the appellant under exhibit 2 with effect fro in 15th August, 1982, i.e. more than one month after the date of execution of the instrument. Relevant portion of exhibit 2 reads as follows : “..........the LESSOR hereby grants the LESSEE a lease of the premises fully described below. ..." In paragraph 2 of the plaint the respondent stated that the appellant took the suit premises for 11 months orally coupled with delivery of possession which was subsequently reduced into writing by way of memorandum. That factually was not correct in view of the facts which I have noticed with reference to exhibit 2. It must, therefore, be held that the building was not let out to the appellant on the basis of any oral agreement• followed by delivery of possession for a fixed period of 11 months. 9. The question, therefore, is as exhibit 2 was pot registered, was it admissible in evidence to determine whether the tenancy of the' appellant was for a fixed period or not. In Om Prakash's case (supra) a Bench of this court held that the Building Act is a complete Act by itself and does not depend on any other Act for the purpose of working out the provisions contained therein. The provisions of the T.P. Act and of the Building Act are distinct and the provisions should be applied independently. I may point out that at the relevant time jurisdiction for passing an order of eviction was with the Tribunal constituted under the Bihar Building Act. It was observed in that case that the Rent Controller under that Act was -entitled under the law to take into consideration the deed of agreement although unregistered in. order to arrive at a conclusion whether it was a month to month tenancy or for specified period. Section 2 (e) of the Bihar Buildings Act, as stood then, defined who was month to month tenant. order to arrive at a conclusion whether it was a month to month tenancy or for specified period. Section 2 (e) of the Bihar Buildings Act, as stood then, defined who was month to month tenant. In 'Baidyanath Prasad's case, the' learned Single Judge observed that as the period of tenancy under the instrument in question was for eleven months, it did not require registration. The case of Om Prakash was followed. In Babu Jagatnnand's case (supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that an unregistered lease deed for one year required registration in view of section 107 T.P. Act and as Kirayanama I was not registered it could not have been taken into evidence in view of section 49 of the Registration Act. The Division Bench decision in Om Prakash's case was not brought to the notice of the Bench hearing Jagatanand's case 'and, therefore, there is no reference of Om Prakash's case in Jagatanand's case.- In Baidyanath Prasad's case, Jagatanand's case was not I brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge. It will thus be noticed that there are two Division Bench decisions, of this Court, in one it was held that no reference can be made to the T.P. Act for deciding the matters under the Building Act and in the other it was held that section 107 of the T.P. Act shall have to be looked into. 10. Normally, the proper procedure in this case for me would have been to refer the matter to a larger Bench for reconciling the conflict between Om Prakash and Jagatanand. But that is not necessary in view or the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanpal Chettiar vs. Yesodai Ammal: A.I.R. 1979 S. C. 1745. In that case the Supreme Court was considering whether before filing a suit for eviction of a tenant from a building, a notice determining the tenancy as contemplated under section 106 of the T. P. Act was necessary or not. The Supreme Court observed that "Purely as a matter of contract, a lease comes into existence under the Transfer of Property Act. The Supreme Court observed that "Purely as a matter of contract, a lease comes into existence under the Transfer of Property Act. But in all social legislations meant for the protection of the needy not necessarily the so called weaker section of the society as is commonly and popularly called, there is appreciable inroad on the freedom of contract and a person becomes a tenant of a landlord even against his wishes on' the allotment of a particular premises to him by the authority concerned." It noticed section 107 of the T.P. Act and observed that "None of the State Rent Acts has abrogated or affected this provision", although inroad has been made into section 108 of the T. P. Act. In view of the observation of the Supreme Court, it must be held that lease of a building to which Bihar Building Act is attracted must be created in one or other manner provided' in section 107 of the T.P. Act. We are, therefore, to judge whether exhibit 2 can be looked into in support of the case of the respondent that the building was let out to the appellant for a fixed period. 11. Section 107 of the T.P. Act provides that a lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. All other leases may be made either by registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. The latter part of the section gives option to the parties, either by registered instrument or by oral agreement. If the lease is made even for a period of one year or less by an instrument, it shall have to be registered. And that is what has been held in Jagatanand's case. The judgment in Om Prakash's case and in Baidyanath Pruad's case, if I may say so with great respect, are not good law. Exhibit 2 was, therefore, required to be registered. 12. Although there was averment in the plaint that the appellant was put in possession of the building on the basis of the oral agreement, during hearing respondent relied on exhibit 2. The court below also relied on the same to hold that the building was let out for a fixed period of eleven months. 12. Although there was averment in the plaint that the appellant was put in possession of the building on the basis of the oral agreement, during hearing respondent relied on exhibit 2. The court below also relied on the same to hold that the building was let out for a fixed period of eleven months. In view of the legal position noticed above, exhibit 2 was in admissible in evidence to determine whether the lease was for a fixed period. If exhibit 2 could not be looked into for that purpose, it must be held that the appellant was tenant month to month. The finding of the court below with regard to this point cannot be sustained. 13. So far point no. (Ii) is concerned, it appears that the appellant did not produce that part of money order coupons which were returned to him by the post office and also the money receipts showing remittance. His case was that those were lost and were not available. He filed certificate, issued by the Post Master, Ranchi Head Post Office, to show the dates on which he sent money by money order, the dates when it was tendered to the respondent and the dates when it was refused. The certificate granted under the, signature of the Head Post Master was marked as exhibit A without objection. The respondent in his evidence stated that for the period 15.4.1983 to 14.7.1983 the rent was never tendered by the appellant. The appellant stated in his evidence that he went to the respondent and tendered the rent to him, but as he refused, he remitted the same by money order. The court below has noticed that there was dispute between the parties with regard to the water supply which according to the appellant was disconnected by the respondent. The matter went up to the Commissioner wherein a direction was given to the respondent to restore the water supply to the appellant. It was also ordered that if it was not done, the appellant would be at liberty to get it done at his own cost. The period for which the rent was either not received or not paid' was after that. The court below was of the opinion that in the circumstances it was quite probable that the respondent refused to accept the rent which was sent by the appellant by money order. 14. Mr. The period for which the rent was either not received or not paid' was after that. The court below was of the opinion that in the circumstances it was quite probable that the respondent refused to accept the rent which was sent by the appellant by money order. 14. Mr. Kishore, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that primary evidence were the money order coupons and money order receipts. If those were not available, according to him, appellant ought to have taken steps for production of tile records on the basis of which the certificate, exhibit A, was given. Without those, certificate could not have been marked as exhibit. From the record, it appears that exhibit A was marked without objection. The respondent cannot be allowed to raise the question in appeal. Mr. Kishore next urged that the appellant had admitted in, the evidence that he maintained books of accounts and has entered all the amount that had been sent by money order. But the appellant did not choose to produce the books of accounts. According to Mr. Kishore for this reason adverse inference should be drawn against him. No notice was given by the respondent to the appellant to produce the books of accounts. That being the position there is no question of drawing an adverse inference against the appellant. Exhibit A was not a document created by the appellant. I find no reason why this should not be relied upon only because the corrobrative piece of evidence, i.e. books of accounts were not produced-by the appellant. 15. For the reasons, recorded by the court below, and for the reasons given above, this point must be answered in favour of the appellant. 16. So far point no. (iii) was concerned, according to the plaint accommodation available with the respondent was a very small portion of the ground floor which Was not sufficient for his family and his nephews and nieces who were dependent on him. The respondent in his evidence stated that his brother and nephews were in the 'Border', Perhaps by this he wanted to mean that they were in the border area of India and Pakistan. There is no averment in the plaint that his brother and nephews intend to come to Ranchi shortly and to reside here permanently. This fact has also not been stated in evidence. There is no averment in the plaint that his brother and nephews intend to come to Ranchi shortly and to reside here permanently. This fact has also not been stated in evidence. It has come in evidence that there are four to five rooms in occupation of the respondent. His family for the present consisted of himself and his wife. He has not stated either in the plaint or in the evidence how many brothers and nephews the respondent has. He has also not stated in his evidence what was the age of his brothers and the nephews and whether each of them required independent room. That being the position, in my opinion, it cannot be said that the respondent required. the building, for his own use and occupation reasonably and in good faith. The finding recorded by the court below is affirmed. 17. Mr. Kishore submitted that since the respondent intends to start a Dharam Sala in the building it must be held that be required the building for his own use and occupation. The words his own use and occupation' cannot be stretched to include his desire or intention to start a Dharam Sala. What the Legislature has meant is that if the landlord proves that he requires the building for his own use and occupation, i.e. for starting business or for his own residence, the court shall pass a decree for eviction of the tenant. 18. Mr. Kishore relied on Hamant Kaur and ors. V. Harinam Sankirtan Mandal and another; 1972 R.C.J. 865, a Single Judge decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. From that judgment, it appears that owner of the property was Harinam Sankirtan Mandal. They were running a school up to 5th class in a building adjacent to the premises in dispute. The number of students on the roll of the school was 185, but because of the paucity of accommodation, further admission, of students could not be made. In the facts of that case, it was held that the plaintiff required the building for its own use and .occupation, i.e. extension of, the school would amount to requirement of the owner of the property. That is not the position so far this case is concerned. That case therefore is of no assistance to the respondent here. I, therefore, hold that this point has also been correctly decided by the trial court. 19. That is not the position so far this case is concerned. That case therefore is of no assistance to the respondent here. I, therefore, hold that this point has also been correctly decided by the trial court. 19. In the result, this appeal is allowed, judgment and decree of the court below are set aside and the suit is dismissed so far prayer for eviction was concerned. The cross-objection is allowed in part and the suit is decreed so far the prayer for arrear rent is concerned. Parties shall bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.