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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

1989 DIGILAW 177 (HP)

OM PARKASH v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

1989-11-30

BHAWANI SINGH

body1989
JUDGMENT Bhawani Singh, J.—Petitioner Om Parkash of M/s. Ajit Singh Om Prakash, Commission Agents, Nawanshahar (Punjab) challenges the issuance of notice by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Una, in a complaint under section 16 (1) (a) (i) and section 16 (1-a) read with section 7 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. This challenge is by way of a petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the quashing of the complaint and the proceedings pending in the Court at Una. 2. Briefly, the facts are that the Food Inspector visited the premises of M/s. Milkhi Ram, Ram Paul at village Sainsowal on 9-9-1986 and purchased Haldi powder for the purpose of analysis. The same was processed in accordance with the Act and the Rules relevant for the purpose and on the basis of information to the Food Inspector, the present petitioner was added as a party as accused No. 3 since the firm M/s Ajit Singh Om Prakash, of which accused No. 3 is a partner, was the warranter, thus, equally liable as alleged in the complaint. 3. The sample was tested and the report of the Public Analyst is as under :— “1. Insect infestation Nil 2. Rodent hair and excreta Nil 3. Foreign starch=About 30% rice starch is detected by quantitative microscopy. 4. Added colouring=An oil soluble orange coal tar dye other than matter. prescribed is present. 5. Moisture 11.0% 6. Total ash 6 1% 7. Ash insoluble in dil Hcl. 1.6% 8. Test for lead chromate Negative 9. Total starch 55%." The Public Analyst was of the opinion that :-— "a prohibited oil soluble orange coat tar dye is present in the Haldi powder. Also prohibited admixture of about 30% rice starch is detected by quantitative microscopy. The use of prohibited coal tar dye in an article of food is injurious to health. And the ash insoluble in dil Hcl is in excess by 0.1% than maximum prescribed limit." 4. The matter was initiated in the Court and sanction of the Chief Medical Officer, Una, under section 20 of the Act, 1954 was also filed along-with other necessary documents. The Court issued summons for the appearance of the accused and to answer the charge that was still to be framed. 5. Sh. D.S. Sawhney and Sh. C.B. Barowalia appearing for the petitioner have raised three submissions. The Court issued summons for the appearance of the accused and to answer the charge that was still to be framed. 5. Sh. D.S. Sawhney and Sh. C.B. Barowalia appearing for the petitioner have raised three submissions. The first submission deals with the sanction part of the case. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the sanction is not in accordance with law and in accordance with the decisions given by this Court as well as some other decisions of other Courts. Elaborating the submission, it is argued that it is on a printed form and it is very clear from the perusal thereof that the Sanctioning authority has not applied its mind before the sanction was given T see good deal of substance in this argument- It is a printed form columns of which have been filled in, though elaborately, by someone and the Sanctioning authority has simply appended its signatures thereon. It has been held in a number of decisions by now that the sanction to prosecute is not an idle formality. It has to be done seriously and carefully after due application of mind by the Sanctioning authority. Ex-facie, these factors seem to be completely missing from this order. 6. Sh. M.S. Guleria, learned Asstt. Advocate General argues that this kind of sanction is enough for the purpose of prosecution since how it was done, in what manner the mind was applied are to be proved at the subsequent stage of the trial. I do not agree with this submission of the learned Asstt. Advocate General. Sanction has to be in accordance with law and must satisfy the tests of a valid and proper sanction. In case it fails to come within these parameters, there is no sanction and the matter cannot proceed on such defective and invalid sanction. 7. The next point pertains to the delay in launching the prosecution. Here, it is pointed out that the sample was taken on 19-9-1986 and the prosecution was launched on 15-12-1988, nearly after a period of 2 years and 3-1/2 months. On this point, it is contended that the prosecution deserves to be quashed as there was no reason for launching the prosecution at such belated stage. Reference to decisions like 1989 (II) F.A.C. 3, 1980 (II) F.A.C. 191, 1984 (II) FAC 121 and 1989 (1) FAC 23 was made. On this point, it is contended that the prosecution deserves to be quashed as there was no reason for launching the prosecution at such belated stage. Reference to decisions like 1989 (II) F.A.C. 3, 1980 (II) F.A.C. 191, 1984 (II) FAC 121 and 1989 (1) FAC 23 was made. It is enough to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in 1980 (II) FAC 191, Nebh Raj v. The State (Delhi Administration and another, wherein O. Chinappa Reddy speaking for the Court observed :— “.........We desire to add that there was no justification whatever for launching the prosecution more than two years after the sample was taken and after obtaining the report of the Public Analyst. To launch a prosecution at such a belated stage may result in causing harassment to the accused in some case and may also result in genuine offenders escaping punishment. We are unable to see why simple cases under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act should be launched so late Tardiness in these matters is inexcusable." 8. These observations aptly apply to the present case. It is noticeable that the prosecution has been launched after such a belated stage for no reasons, putting the petitioner to unnecessary harassment for all this period. In these circumstances, the prejudice to the petitioner is obvious and calls for no further elaboration and explanation. 9. Sh. M.S. Guleria, learned Asstt. Advocate General refers to AIR 1971 SC 1277 and AIR 1972 SC 1631 and argues that delay is not fatal for launching and continuing the prosecution since the petitioner has not been prejudiced on that account. I am not convinced by this submission for the simple reason that this aspect of the matter was not at all in issue before the Supreme Court in these decisions. The point in issue was relatable to the provision of section 13 (2) of the Act which pertains to the right of the accused to apply and send the sample for analysis to the Director Central Food Laboratory. In these cases the Court came to this conclusion because the accused had not applied to the Court thereby exercising his right under section 13 (2) of the Act for sending the sample for analysis to the Central Food Laboratory. It was in these circumstances that it was held that no prejudice was caused to the accused. In these cases the Court came to this conclusion because the accused had not applied to the Court thereby exercising his right under section 13 (2) of the Act for sending the sample for analysis to the Central Food Laboratory. It was in these circumstances that it was held that no prejudice was caused to the accused. As a matter of fact, the observations of the Supreme Court in Nebh Raj’s case (supra) are nearest to the issue involved in the present case and universally applicable in situations where the launching of prosecution is delayed without any justifiable cause. It is thus held that the delay in the present case is fatal and prejudice to the accused is obvious. So, the prosecution cannot be allowed to continue. 10. Lastly, it is argued by Sh. D.S. Sawhney that the accused cannot be prosecuted alongwith others in a joint trial since no basis for the same has been laid connecting his client with others involved in this case. This submission has no substance, more particularly, in view of the pleadings in Para 8 of the complaint as well as the fact that the details regarding the same are still to be given in case the trial commences. Although Counsel for the parties made elaborate reference to AIR 1975 SC 1309, M/s Bhagwan Dass Jagdish Chander v. Delhi Administration and another, in my opinion, the same does not come to the rescue of the petitioner. A joint trial is legal and there is no infirmity on this count. 11. Since I have already held that the trial cannot continue for want of legal and valid sanction and that the same cannot continue also due to delay in launching the prosecution, the proceedings are quashed and set aside. It appears that there are other accused in this case who have not filed any petition for the quashing of these proceedings. The question arises as to whether this case will continue against them or not. In view of the aforesaid decision qua the petitioner Om Prakash, there is no justification to continue the same against those who have not approached this Court since the question in issue qua all the accused is the same. 12. The result is that the proceedings against them are also quashed. Order accordingly.