ORDER K.M. Natarajan, J. 1. This revision is directed by tenant against the order of eviction passed by the Revenue Court (Special Deputy Collector), Madurai. 2. The facts which are necessary for the disposal of the revision are briefly as follows: The first respondent herein filed as petition for eviction of the revision-petitioner and respondents 2 and 3 herein, in T.CT.P.No.7 of 1987 on the ground that they committed wilful default in payment of rent for the faslis 1384 to 1387 and 1389 to 1391 at the rate of 30 bags per year, each measuring 54 mm. The said application was resisted by the tenants and in their counter they would state that there was no proper yield during the relevant faslis on account of want of rain and that they have not committed default want only. The first respondent herein (Landlord) was examined and she reiterated the same allegations in her evidence. The revision-petitioner and other tenants did not turn up and they were set ex-parte. The Revenue Court came to the conclusion that the Subordinate Judge, Madurai, Passed a decree for Rs. 8,400 on 22-12-1979 towards arrears of lease amount for faslis 1384 to 1387 and that the revision petitioner has paid only a sum of Rs. 3,983 and the balance is due. Further, in respect of the lease amount for faslis 1389 to 1391, the first respondent-land-lady filed T.CT.P.No.28 of 1982 and in that case the tenants were directed to pay the arrears. In spite of the order, they did not pay the amount. However, they paid the lease amount only for fasli 1388. Though the tenants contended that they could not pay the arrears of lease amount as there was no proper rain due to draught, they did not adduce evidence in support of the same. But, on the other hand, it was urged on behalf of the first respondent-landlady, that the tenants were chronic defaulters and every time she had to resort to proceeding before court for realising the lease amount. On these reasonings, the Special Deputy Collector came to the conclusion that the relief prayed for by the first respondent-landlady is just and fair and that she has established the claim. However, on an earlier occasion, the Special Deputy Collector dismisses? the petition on the ground that wrong provision of law was quoted, in the petition for eviction. On these reasonings, the Special Deputy Collector came to the conclusion that the relief prayed for by the first respondent-landlady is just and fair and that she has established the claim. However, on an earlier occasion, the Special Deputy Collector dismisses? the petition on the ground that wrong provision of law was quoted, in the petition for eviction. Subsequently the first respondent herein filed M.P. No. 2 of 1987 to review the said order condending that the provision of law already quoted namely, Section 3(4)(a) of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955 is the correct provision, that no wrong provision was quoted and that it requires review. The Special Deputy Collector took up the petition on file and issued notices to both the parties. Though it was adjourned for the hearings on 4-4-1988,2-5-1988 and 13-6-1988, the revision-petitioner did not appear. As the review petitions and other tenants were absent even for the hearing on 13-6-1988, they were set ex-parte. The Special Deputy Collector considered the question of wilful default committed by the tenants and reiterated the earlier order passed by him before the review application was filed. The Special Deputy Collector also took into consideration that in spite of the fact that the Special Deputy Collector, Thirunelveli, within jurisdiction the properties originally situated, has passed an order even on 29-7-1982 in T.CT.P.No.28 of 1982 directing them to pay the arrears, no amount was paid. In such circumstances, the Special Deputy Collector found that the revision petitioner and other tenants are liable to be evicted from the lands and consequently ordered eviction. The Special Deputy Collector came to the conclusion that the tenants have committed willful default in payment of rent for faslis 1384 to 1387 and 1389 to 1391 and that their liability to pay the said arrears was established already in the order passed by the competent civil court as well as the earlier order passed by the Special Deputy Collector, Tirunelveli, which were not challenged. Aggrieved by the same, this revision is filed. 3. Aggrieved by the same, this revision is filed. 3. Learned Counsel for the revision-petitioner, Mr.Subbiah, mainly contended that in view of the fact that the petition was dismissed by an earlier order passed on 25-5-1987 on the ground that the provision of law quoted is not correct and that review petition was filed, the Special Deputy Collector ought to have re-heard the matter in its entirety and without doing so, he has allowed the review and passed the eviction order at the same time and as such the said order is illegal. According to the learned Counsel, the Special Deputy Collector ought to have passed two orders - One order allowing the review application and another order subsequently after hearing the parties on merits either allowing or dismissing the main petition. In this connection, the learned Counsel drew my attention to the provision of Order 47, Rule 8, Code of Civil Procedure and it reads: When an application for review is granted, a note thereof shall be made in the register and the Court may at once re-hear the case of make such order in regard to the rehearing as it thinks fit. The said provision does not help the case of the revision, petitioner as it is nowhere stated therein that there should be two enquiries and two orders. It only contemplates that in case the Court granted the review, it should be entered in the register and the court should at once re-hear the case or make such order as it thinks fit. It is pertinent to note that in the instant case, upon the review application filed by the first respondent herein, the Special Deputy Collector issued notices to the revision-petitioner also and he and the other tenants absented themselves for the hearings. The court below heard the counsel for the first respondent herein and care to the conclusion that correct provision was already quoted and his order required review. Even though the Special Deputy Collector has already held in the order, which is under review, that the revision-petitioner has committed default and is liable to pay the amount claimed by the first respondent, yet he has reconsidered the same by discussing the evidence and passed a considered order. Hence there is no illegality in the procedure followed by the Special Deputy Collector. 4. Hence there is no illegality in the procedure followed by the Special Deputy Collector. 4. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioner relied on the decision in Md.Rowther v. Swaminathan A.I.R. 1938 Mad.573, in this regard and the said decision is not helpful as it arises under different circumstances. He also relied on the decision in Subramanya Ayyar v. Govindasami Mopanar wherein it was held: The words of Order 47, Rule 8, namely, may at once re-hear the case or make such order in regard to the re-hearing as it thinks fit' are rather wide. The Court may, in exercise of the powers conferred under that section, not only give directions in regard to procedural matters but also can define the scope of the enquiry. It may, for instance, confine the scope of rehearing to that part of the appeal or suit which was vitiated by the defect found or affected by the new evidence discovered. The discretion is vested in the Court directing re-hearing, as otherwise on the pretext of an error on the face of the record affecting an insignificant part of the decree the entire trial sometimes covering wide field and involving and examination of innumerable witnesses and a security of countless documents will have to be re-heard, though the trial was otherwise free from any defect. It is unnecessary to attribute that intention to the Legislature, unless the clear words compel the conclusion. The aforesaid words have been designedly used by the Legislature conferring - discretionary jurisdiction of a court directing re-hearing of a concluded trial. Of course, if the Court allowing a review petition does not restrict the scope of the enquiry, it may reasonably be held that it intended to re-open the entire case. It has to be mentioned that the decision only supports the case of the first respondent. In the instant case, it is clearly seen from the impugned order of the lower court that review was sought for only in respect of the dismissal of the main petition on the ground that wrong provision was quoted though the court has accepted the case of the first respondent herein on merits. In the instant case, it is clearly seen from the impugned order of the lower court that review was sought for only in respect of the dismissal of the main petition on the ground that wrong provision was quoted though the court has accepted the case of the first respondent herein on merits. The court below, on the review petition accepted the case of the first respondent that correct provision of law has already been quoted and the dismissal of the main petition was wrong and in the circumstances, the court considered that no fresh enquiry is necessary in view of the earlier finding. Further, the revision-petitioner absented himself on the dates of further hearings and hence the court below on the basis of the earlier findings and the materials available reiterated the same and passed the order of eviction. I do not find anything to hold that the said order is contrary to Order 47, Rule 8, Code of Civil Procedure, or illegal in any other respect. Hence, I do not find any merit in the said contention. 5. Next it was submitted by the learned Counsel, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Chinnamar Kathian v. Ayyavoo, that the Special Deputy Collector ought to have granted time for payment instead of passing an order of eviction. In Chinnatnar Kathian v. Ayyavoo, as per majority view of A.D.Koshal and R.B.Misra, JJ., it is observed in para 23 as follows: Now as I read Sub-section (4), it gives the R.D.O., power either to allow the application of the landlord or to dismiss it after he has held a summary enquiry into the matter. If the application is allowed, an order of eviction has to be passed. If it is dismissed the proceedings again come to an end. However, if the ground of eviction is non-payment of rent, the Rule 10, is clothed with power to allow the cultivating tenant to deposit the arrears and costs as directed. The power is discretionary, and while exercising the same, it is not incumbent on the R.D.O., to grant time. If it is dismissed the proceedings again come to an end. However, if the ground of eviction is non-payment of rent, the Rule 10, is clothed with power to allow the cultivating tenant to deposit the arrears and costs as directed. The power is discretionary, and while exercising the same, it is not incumbent on the R.D.O., to grant time. If the Legislature intended to make it obligatory on the part of the R.D.O., to fix a time for deposit of the arrears in all cases covered by Clause (a) or Clause (aa) of Sub-section (2) there is no reason why it should have used the word 'may' in relation to grant of time. Support for this view is available in Clause (b) of Sub-section (3) wherein the Legislature has directed: 'If the court finds that any sum is due it shall allow the cultivating tenant such time as it may consider just and reasonable -- In this situation it must be held that while opportunity of depositing the arrears of rent cannot be denied to a cultivating tenant during the course of proceeding under Sub-section (3), the same is not available as of right under Clause (b) of Sub-section 4. The difference in the language used by the legislature is significant and not without purpose. The intention of the legislature appears to be that normally a defaulting tenant must seek the help of the Court all by himself and that if he does so he must be protected; but that a defaulting tenant who waits for payment of rent till he is sought to be evicted by the landlord is not necessarily entitled to the same protection. Circumstances may exist which may place him at par with a tenant covered by Sub-section (3): but then it may not necessarily be so. That is why it is left to the discretion of the R.D.O., to grant time to the cultivating tenant or to deny him that opportunity. An example of a case in which no time should be allowed would be that of a tenant who although in affluent circumstances at all, at relevant points of time, has failed make payment of rent year after year in spite of repeated demands from or otherwise indigent landlord and whose conduct is, therefore, contumacious calling for no sympathy or concession. The extension to him of the same facility which is afforded to willing tenant under Sub-section (3) would be uncalled for and in fact unjust. In the instant case, the Special Deputy Collector took into consideration of the default committed by the revision-petitioner for faslis 1384 to 1387, which ripened into a decree even on 22-12-1979 and it has become final. Subsequently for the faslis 1389 to 1391 the first respondent filed T.CT.P.No.28 of 1982 before the Special Deputy Collector Tirunelveli who was having the jurisdiction at that time, and the Special Deputy Collector, came to the conclusion that the revision-petitioner was in arrears. Though the said order was passed on 29-7-1982 directing him to pay the arrears of Rs. 7,117 within one month, no amount has been paid. Further, he abstained from attending the court for the hearings and no request was made for granting time for payment. It was urged by the first respondent that the revision-petitioner and the other tenants never pay the rent and they are chronic defaulters and that they drive the first respondent every time to court to realise the arrears of rent. The Special Deputy Collector in the circumstances of the case accepted the said contention of the first respondent and consequently ordered eviction. Hence it cannot be said that the order of eviction passed by the Special Deputy Collector without granting time to pay the arrears is in the circumstances of the case either illegal or contrary to law so as to warrant this Court to interfere with the same. Further, to find out the bona fides of the revision-petitioner, this Court directed the first respondent to file a memo of calculation regarding the arrears and called upon the revision-petitioner to pay the arrears of rent, which according to the calculation memo comes to Rs. 30,179-75. But no amount was forthcoming. On the other hand, the revision-petitioner only insisted this Court to pass an order of merits in this revision. For all these reasons, I am of the view that the impugned order passed by the Special Deputy Collector does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality whatsoever for this Court to interfere. Consequently, the revision fails and stands dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.