Judgment U.P.Singh, J. 1. This application is being disposed of at this stage after hearing both the parties and with their consent as also in accordance with the earlier order dated 24-4-1989. 2. The petitioner has challenged the order passed by the 3rd Additional District Judge, Dhanbad whereby prayer of the accused persons for discharging them from the accusation was refused. 3. This application has been filed by the sole petitioner Raj Narain Singh, against whom the Additional District Judge directed to frame charge under Sec.307 read with Sections 34, 148, 341 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. 4. This incident relates to the Jharia P.S. Case No. 429 of 1982, which was instituted on a Fardbeyan of one Sheo Kumar Roy, which was recorded in the Patliputra Medical College Hospital, Dhanbad at 4.45 p.m. on 13-10-1982. It was alleged that after attending the Court the informant accompanied by six other persons armed with lethal and deadly weapon was going from Dlianbad to Jharia and when he reached near the Bhagatdih B.C.C.L. Office, all on a sudden, there was firing from behind causing damage to the rear glass of the car. The informants car stopped and then two other cars took over from the left side and stopped ahead the informants car. One such car was B.H.W. 25 and yet another car was ahead of it. Thereafter one Sheo Narain Singh and Bachha Singh alighted from the car and started indiscriminate firing with pistol. One A.K. Jha was sitting in that car and was abating. From the car B.H.W. 25 one Rajan Singh (who is accused No. 2 in the first information report) and few other armed with deadly weapons also came out and started indiscriminate firing on the informant party. The petitioner is alleged to be sitting in that car along with another person and alleged to have instigated. The informant sustained injury from the firing caused by one Rajan Singh. These occupants also sustained injuries on account of the firing opened by the informant party. Thus, apparently, it was a fight between the two rival faction on account of long standing enmity between them and each one of them are well Unknown of each other. 5. After investigation charge-sheet was submitted in the year 1985 after three years. The first charge-sheet was submitted on 31-3-1984 and the second charge-sheet on 16-6-1985. Thereafter there was no investigation. 5. After investigation charge-sheet was submitted in the year 1985 after three years. The first charge-sheet was submitted on 31-3-1984 and the second charge-sheet on 16-6-1985. Thereafter there was no investigation. The second charge-sheet which was submitted on 16-6-1985 was placed before the S.D.J.M. on 1-7-1985, which was submitted almost after two years and eight months, The case was thereafter committed to the Court of Sessions and was transferred to the Court of 3rd Additional District Judge, Dhanbad. The major Section under which the charge-sheet was submitted is under Sec.307 of the Indian Penal Code which is triable by the Assistant Sessions Judge. The petitioner and the other accused persons then filed an application for being discharged, which was rejected. 6. In this application, I am not concerned with the case of the other accused persons, since this application has been filed by the sole petitioner Raj Narain Singh who has alone challenged the impugned order rejecting his application for being discharged from the accusation. 7. At the very outset Mr. Dayal, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended that the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge is not a speaking order and, therefore, it cannot be read as to why his prayer for discharge was refused. It was further contended that even prima facie, the allegations made in the First Information Report as also in the two charge-sheet, submitted after long intervals, the very identity of the petitioner is not established and, if, there is suspicion, there is no reason why the petitioner should be harassed for trial on such accusation. On the other hand Mr Sahay, the learned Counsel appearing for the State has contended that the same will be considered at the time of trial and there was no necessity for the Additional Sessions Judge to record any reasons at this stage while refusing to discharge the accused. 8. Considering the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure my attention has been drawn by the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties to several decisions of the Supreme Court but there is no necessity of referring all of them because, on principle, there is no difference of opinion and in the case of State of Karnataka V/s. L. Muniswamy and Ors. -- Justice Chandrachud, as he then was, laid down the proposition in unequivocal terms and rejected the broad proposition raised by the State, who was the appellant in the said case, which is being similarly raised here. 1 he contention raised in the said case was that in any event the High Court could not take upon itself the task of assessing or appreciating the weight of material on the record in order to find whether any charge could be legitimately framed against the respondents. So long as there is some material on the record to connect the accused with the crime, says the learned Counsel, the case must go on and the High Court has no jurisdiction to put a precipitate or premature end to the proceedings on the belief that the prosecution is not likely to succeed. 9. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court did not accept the said proposition as in their opinion, it was too broad a proposition to accept. And after noticing the provisions contained in Sec.227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it was held: It is clear from the provisions that the Sessions Court has the power to discharge an accused if after perusing the record and hearing the parties he comes to the conclusion, for reasons to be recorded, that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The object of the provision which requires the Sessions Judge to record his reasons is to enable the superior Court to examine the correctness of the reasons for which the Sessions Judge has held that there is or is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The High Court therefore is entitled to go into the reasons given by the Sessions Judge in support of his order and to determine for itself whether the order is justified by the facts and circumstances of the case. 10. In this context their Lordships also noticed the provision contained in Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and held: In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Courts inherent powers, both the civil and criminal matters is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon a harassment or prosecution In a criminal case the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction. 11. Referring to the case reported in the case of Vadilal Panchal V/s. D.D Ghadigaonkar -- and Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co V/s. State of Maharashtra -- their Lordships held: It is wrong to say that at the stage of framing charges the court cannot apply its judicial mind to the consideration whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused As observed in the latter case, the order framing a charge affects a persons liberty substantially and therefore it is the duty of the Court to consider judicially whether the material warrants the framing of the charge. It cannot blindly accept the decision of the prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial. ...These decisions show that for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused the Court possesses a comparatively wider discretion in the exercise of which it can determine the question whether the material on the record, if unmerited, is such on the basis of which a conviction can be said reasonably to be possible. 12. 12. Turning to the facts of the present case in order to see whether the proceeding against the petitioner ought to be quashed in order to prevent the abusing of the process of the Court and in order to secure the ends of justice, I asked the learned Counsel appearing on either side to point out the materials on which there could reasonably be any likelihood of the petitioner being prosecuted for the offence in accordance with the allegations made in this case My attention was drawn to the First Information Report, the first charge-sheet, the second charge-sheet and the statement of a few of the material witnesses. 13. At the very threshold, preliminary question raised by the petitioners counsel was the identity of the petitioner. It was pointed out that in the first charge-sheet dated 31-3-1984, there is mention of one Rajan Singh son of Chandi Singh. In the supplementary/second charge-sheet one Raj Narain Singh is mentioned. In both the charge-sheets the name and parentage are different. In the second charge-sheet Raj Narain Singh has been described as alias Rajan. In between the submission of the first charge-sheet in 1984 and the second charge-sheet in June 1985, no investigation has been made and there is no statement of any witness to the effect that Raj Narain Singh has an alias name Rajan. Further, in the First information Report besides other names, two more persons are named in the column as Rajan Singh but without parentage and Raj Narain Singh also without any parentage or alias name and all are said to be residents of Jharia. Also the statements of witnesses from the case diary, relevant on the point raised, was also referred to and none of the witnesses have given either the alias name of parentage of Raj Narain Singh. Besides, these, a few inconsistencies in regard to the presence of the petitioner in a particular car and the weapon held by him has been pointed out The story of accosting or instigation by the petitioner is missing altogether, whatsoever may be, I am conscious that at this stage I am not going to examine the evidence of these witnesses in any meticulous detail. But as held in the aforesaid case (supra) of the Supreme Court a few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution proposed to rely are woefully inadequate for connecting the petitioner for the crime, ho whoever, skillfully one may attempt to weave those bits into a presentable whole. There is no material on the record on which any tribunal could reasonably come to the conclusion that the petitioner is in any manner connected with the assault on the informant. 14. In the facts and circumstances of this case it would, however, be a sheer waste of public time and money to permit the proceeding to continue against the petitioner. The fact of the matter is that there is no material on the record, on the basis of which any tribunal could reasonably come to the conclusion that the petitioner is in any manner connected with the incident leading to the prosecution. The material on which the prosecution proposes to rely against the petitioner is wholly inadequate to sustain the charge that he is in any manner connected with the assault on the informant. 15. In the result, I find that there is no sufficient grounds for proceeding with the prosecution and, therefore, the petitioner is discharged. It is made clear that this order has no relation with the case of other accused persons who are not the petitioner before me The application is, accordingly allowed and the impugned order is quashed only in respect of this petitioner.