JUDGMENT : B.L. Hansaria, J. 1. Late Umesh Deka of Nagaon was travelling in a Matador on 21.8.1980. To his ill luck the vehicle met with an accident at a place called Patarkuchi within the jurisdiction of Gauhati P.S. He was hospitalised in Gauhati Medical College Hospital but could not survive. He met his end on 23.8.1980. A claim petition by his widow and parents was filed on 2.2.1981 claiming a sum of Rs. 6,00,000/- as compensation. The claim petition was on behalf of the children also two of whom were aged about 5 and 3 years at the relevant time and one was born posthumously. 2. The case of the claimants was that the accident was due to rashness and negligence on the part of the driver. The learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT), Guwahati on being satisfied about the negligence on the part of the driver awarded a sum of Rs. 1,40,000/- as compensation together with interest at the rate of 6 per cent calculable from the date of the filing of the petition till realisation. The award was passed jointly and severally against the owner and insurer. A sum of Rs. 500/- was awarded as costs. Feeling aggrieved the owner and insurer have approached this court. Cross-objections have also been filed by the claimants. 3. The first point to be determined is whether the accident was due to rashness or negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle. The case of the owner of vehicle is that the accident had taken place not due to any rashness or negligence on the part of the driver but the same had occurred due to breaking of the drag link. Mechanical defect was thus responsible for the accident, contends the owner of the vehicle. To satisfy the court in this regard the driver-cum-owner examined himself and two DWs were also produced to depose about the checking of the vehicle by them. These witnesses are DW 1 Hazarat Ali and DW 2 Tarun Chandra Bora. The Motor Vehicle Inspector (MVI) was also examined as DW 4. DW 1 deposed that he had checked the vehicle on 14.8.1980 whereas the accident was on 21st. According to him he had cured all the defects of the vehicle. To the same effect is the evidence of DW 2. The driver-cum-owner also testified the same as DW 3. 4. The Motor Vehicle Inspector (MVI) was also examined as DW 4. DW 1 deposed that he had checked the vehicle on 14.8.1980 whereas the accident was on 21st. According to him he had cured all the defects of the vehicle. To the same effect is the evidence of DW 2. The driver-cum-owner also testified the same as DW 3. 4. Despite the above evidence it is contended by Mr. Agarwal that even if the snapping of drag link had taken place at the time of the accident, if the driver would have acted cautiously and carefully the vehicle could have been stopped by applying brakes. In this connection our attention has been invited to the evidence of the MVI who deposed that if any vehicle is driven at a speed of 30/35 kmph (as was the vehicle driven according to DW 3) and the driver applies brakes immediately after the detachment of drag link the vehicle can be stopped. By relying on this evidence it is contended by the learned counsel that the vehicle was not being driven at a speed of 30/35 kmph as deposed by the driver of the vehicle, but was being driven rashly. We accept the submission of Mr. Agarwal and hold that the conclusion arrived at by the learned Tribunal that the vehicle was driven rashly and negligently was correct and we endorse the same. This being the position, the claimants are entitled to just compensation. 5. This takes us to the question of quantum of compensation. In this connection reference to the impugned award shows that the learned Tribunal accepted the figure of Rs. 9,000/- as annual income of the deceased from which a sum of Rs. 2,000/- was deducted as personal expenditure. The yearly loss was thus calculated at Rs. 7,000/-. As the deceased was aged about 40 years at the relevant time and the life span was calculated upto 60, a total figure of Rs. 1,40,000/- was arrived at (Rs. 7,000/- X 20) as loss having been caused to the claimants following the death of Umesh. Of this sum Rs. 1,00,000/- was awarded to the widow and her minor children, Rs. 30,000/- to the mother and the rest of Rs. 10,000/- to the father. 6. Both the sides have challenged this finding of the learned Tribunal. According to Mr. Talukdar, the sum of Rs. Of this sum Rs. 1,00,000/- was awarded to the widow and her minor children, Rs. 30,000/- to the mother and the rest of Rs. 10,000/- to the father. 6. Both the sides have challenged this finding of the learned Tribunal. According to Mr. Talukdar, the sum of Rs. 9,000/- which was accepted as the yearly loss to the family by relying on the evidence of PW 6 who was the Inspector of Income Tax Department, Nagaon was on the high side. From the evidence of this witness it appears that the deceased was an income tax assessee and in 1977-78 the assessed amount was Rs. 10,000/-; in 1978-79 it was Rs. 10,200/- and in 1979-80 it came down to Rs. 8,450/-. It is because of this declining trend that the learned Tribunal fixed the yearly income as Rs. 9,000/-. It is, however, contended by Mr. Talukdar that the aforesaid was not the individual income of the deceased but was the income of the joint family. In this connection our attention has been invited to the evidence of the widow of the deceased who deposed that her husband was running a grocery shop and was engaged in trading of paddy, jute etc. apart from looking after the cultivation of land measuring about 40 bighas. The widow as PW 1 deposed that the shop was being looked after by her brother-in-law, i.e., brother of the deceased. She further admitted that the cultivation and business of jute and paddy are still on. This would show that the family had not lost much in the wake of death of Umesh. 7. As against this, the contention of Mr. Agarwal is that the returned income was the individual income and to this must be added the joint income of the family which they used to derive from the business run from the shop as well as the business of trading related to paddy and jute. In this connection reliance is placed on the evidence of PW 1 who stated that it was her husband who used to run the shop as well as the business of paddy and jute and it was he who used to maintain the family. Reference has also been made to the evidence led by Tilak Deka, father of the deceased, who at the relevant time was 68 years old. According to him the earnings of the deceased were Rs. Reference has also been made to the evidence led by Tilak Deka, father of the deceased, who at the relevant time was 68 years old. According to him the earnings of the deceased were Rs. 1,000/- to Rs. 1,500/- p.m. He admitted in cross-examination that the shop is being run by the younger brother of the deceased and the cultivable land is also being managed by the younger brother of the deceased. 8. We have applied our mind to the evidence on record and according to us the yearly loss to the family was in the neighbourhood of Rs. 10,000/-. The next question is by what multiplier this sum has to be multiplied to find out the total loss caused to the family in the wake of death of Umesh. It is contended by Mr. Agarwal that as the deceased was aged about 40 years at the relevant time, the family must have looked forward to contribution from him atleast upto the age of 70 which was taken to be the life span in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd. and etc. Vs. Smt. Narayanibai and Others, The life span was, however, accepted at 65 years in State of Assam v. Banti Baruah 1978 ACJ 412 (Assam). We have noticed that in a recent decision reported in Rajendra Kumari v. Shanti Trivedi 1989 ACJ 517 (SC), the normal life span was taken to be 60 years. 9. Mr. Agarwal has drawn our attention to certain decisions of the High Courts where a multiplier even upto 16 has been applied in the case of the present nature. He first refers to Asha Rani v. Union of India 1983 ACJ 52 (P&H), in which multiplier of 15 was applied when the deceased was aged about 45 years. In Bihar State Road Transport Corporation v. Chandreshwar Mishra 1983 ACJ 631 (Patna), a Division Bench of Patna High Court opined that the multiplier to be applied in such cases ranges between 16 to 20. In Kamlesh Kumari Nagpal v. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. 1985 ACJ 101 (P&H), in which case the deceased was aged 39 years, a multiplier of 16 was adopted by the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Of course, in State of West Bengal v. Satish Sharma 1985 ACJ 271 (Calcutta), the multiplier to be applied was 15 in the case of deceased aged about 30 years. 10. Ltd. 1985 ACJ 101 (P&H), in which case the deceased was aged 39 years, a multiplier of 16 was adopted by the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Of course, in State of West Bengal v. Satish Sharma 1985 ACJ 271 (Calcutta), the multiplier to be applied was 15 in the case of deceased aged about 30 years. 10. Keeping in view the aforesaid decisions we are of the view that 15 would be the proper multiplier to be applied in the present case. The total loss thus comes to Rs. 1,50,000/-(Rs. 10,000/- X 15). From this quantum of loss we shall deduct 10 per cent on account of lump sum payment. We have done so keeping in view the Full Bench decision of this court in Mra Devi v. Bhaba Kanti Das 1977 ACJ 293 (Assam). The total compensation thus comes to Rs. 1,35,000/-. To this we shall add a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as compensation for loss of consortium which was awarded in Hira Devi's case (supra) as well as in Satish Sharma's case 1985 ACJ 271 (Calcutta). The net awardable sum comes to Rs. 1,45,000/-. 11. The next question is who should pay this amount. Mr Talukdar submits that as the present was a case of comprehensive policy covering risk upto Rs. 1,50,000/- the compensation upto the aforesaid sum should be paid by the insurer. In this connection our attention has been invited to the policy which is on record and which shows, inter alia, that the insurer had charged extra premium for "T.P. risk increase Rs. 1,50,000/-". As to this the submission of Mr. Choudhury appearing for the insurer is that though the present was a case of comprehensive policy it does not mean that the entire amount of Rs. 1,45,000/-has to be paid by the insurer. Our attention has been invited in this context to National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jugal Kishore 1988 ACJ 270 (SC), which has stated that in case of comprehensive policy also the limit of the liability with regard to third party risk does not become unlimited or higher than the statutory liability fixed under Sub-section (2) of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Learned counsel contends that the extra premium charged on account of the aforesaid count was really to cover the damage to the property of third party to the extent of Rs. 1,50,000/-. Learned counsel contends that the extra premium charged on account of the aforesaid count was really to cover the damage to the property of third party to the extent of Rs. 1,50,000/-. This is the instruction given by the insurer to the learned counsel which has been shown to us. Mr. Choudhury has also relied on M.K. Kunhimohammed v. P.A. Ahmedkutty 1987 ACJ 872 (SC), according to which the liability of an insurer in case of an accident of a passenger travelling in a bus is limited. This sum was Rs. 15,000/- when the present accident had taken place. It is therefore submitted by Mr. Choudhury that the liability of the insurer should be confined to a sum of Rs. 15,000/-. 12. This contention of Mr. Choudhury has been challenged both by Mr. Talukdar and Mr. Agarwal. We have already noted the submission of Mr. Talukdar on this aspect of the case. In so far as Mr. Agarwal is concerned, he has brought to our notice certain decisions which have interpreted the words 'third party' as appearing in the Act as well as in the policy. As per the decision in Kishori v. Chairman, Tribal Service Co-operative Society Ltd. 1988 ACJ 636 (MP), 'third party' means all other persons except the insurer and insured--the insurer is the first party, the insured is the second party and others are third parties. This court had also taken the same view in Assam Corporation v. Binu Rani Ao 1974 ACJ 381 (Assam & Nagaland). This aspect of the case has been dealt with in para 30 of the judgment where the meaning of 'third party risk' given in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary was noted and it was opined that the insurer is the one party, the policy holder another party and the claims made by others in respect of negligent use of the car may be described as claims by third party. It may be stated that in the Stroud's Judicial Dictionary reference was made to the Privy Council decision rendered in Digby v. General Accidents Fire & Life Assurance Corporation (1943) AC 121. We have been also referred in this connection to New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kishori 1987 ACJ 892 (MP), where also the meaning given in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary was followed. 13. We have been also referred in this connection to New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kishori 1987 ACJ 892 (MP), where also the meaning given in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary was followed. 13. There is another aspect relating to the limit of the insurer's liability to which our attention has been invited by Mr. Agarwal. That aspect is relatable to the stand taken by the insurer while filing the present appeal. A perusal of the grounds taken in the memo of appeal shows that according to the insurer though its liability was to the extent of Rs. 1,50,000/- in the present case, but as all the claims relating to the accident in question had not been disposed of (it may be pointed out that in the accident another person had also received injury whose claim was pending at the time the appeal was preferred) it should not have been fastened with the liability of Rs. 1,80,000/- as had been done in the present case. Mr. Agarwal submits that in view of this stand taken by the insurer it may not be allowed to take a different stand now. Learned counsel stated that the stand of the insurer should be taken as waiver of his known right and in this connection Mr. Agarwal referred to Bibi Amna Khatun and Others Vs. Zahir Hussain and Another, The argument that the sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- is the total liability is not available after the decision in Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi 1981 ACJ 507 (SC). 14. Mr. Choudhury, however, submits that the insurer may not be made liable to pay the entire amount of Rs. 1,45,000/- if under the law its liability be limited to Rs. 15,000/- only because of what has been stated in the grounds of appeal. Learned counsel states that there is no estoppel against law. From the terms of the comprehensive policy taken out in this case and the definition of the words 'third party' as given in the aforesaid decisions, we are even otherwise satisfied that in the present case the liability of the insurer would be to the extent of Rs. 1,45,000/-. 15. Before concluding a word is required to be said about the interest granted in the present case. 1,45,000/-. 15. Before concluding a word is required to be said about the interest granted in the present case. A perusal of the impugned award shows that the interest awarded is 6 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition whereas in a number of cases the Apex Court has awarded 12 per cent from the date of application. We would accordingly grant interest at the rate of 12 per cent from the date of application (2.2.1981) till realisation. The awarded amount shall be shared by the claimants in the ratio fixed by the learned Tribunal. 16. In the aforesaid view of the matter M.A. (F) 86 of 1985 and the cross-objections are allowed as indicated above, and M.A (F) 13 of 1986 is dismissed. As the insurer has already paid a sum of Rs. 70,000/- the remaining amount would be paid within a period of 2 months from today. Parties shall bear their own costs throughout.