BALAKRISHNA, J. ( 1 ) SMT. T. N. Manjuladevi, learned High court Government Advocate, is directed to take notice for the 1st respondent. ( 2 ) ON 30-7-1984, in Writ Petition No. 27236 of 1982, this Court passed an order allowing the writ petition filed by the same petitioner as in the instant case, directing a fresh disposal in accordance with law after issuing a notice to the petitioner and affording him an opportunity of hearing. The case of the petitioner in the said writ petition was that though he was a necessary and proper party being the purchaser of the land in respect of which an application had been filed under the Karnataka Debt Relief Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') by the wife of late Dandi Boraiah, no opportunity was given to the petitioner to present his case and to convince the 1st respondent that the petitioner was a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration of the very same land under a registered sale deed executed on 20-3-1975. In that case, regarding the subject matter of Writ Petition No. 27236 of 1982, the 2nd respondent herein had filed an application stating that her husband was a debtor within the meaning of the Act and that she had mortgaged the land in question in favour of one Lakshmaiah, who is the 3rd respondent herein and, therefore, had sought redemption under the Act and restoration of the property. ( 3 ) AFTER the order referred to above was passed by this Court on 30-7-1984 in Writ petition No. 27236 of 1982, the 1st respondent issued notices to the petitioner as well as the other parties concerned. It is evident from the records that the 3rd respondent did not appear before the 1st respondent and no mortgage deed was produced before the 1st respondent. But the petitioner appeared before the 1st respondent and produced the registered sale deed dated 20-3-1975 in support of his case. It is no doubt true that the petitioner appeared only on two dates of hearing before the 1st respondent and absented on other dates of hearing. But the petitioner appeared before the 1st respondent and produced the registered sale deed dated 20-3-1975 in support of his case. It is no doubt true that the petitioner appeared only on two dates of hearing before the 1st respondent and absented on other dates of hearing. From the order of the 1st respondent, it is seen that no finding has been given by him and he could not have done so also, on the question whether the husband of Smt. Lakshmamma, namely, Dandi Boraiah was a debtor within the meaning of the Act at the relevant point of time and whether there was any mortgage deed in existence. On the other hand, it is seen that the 1st respondent, having examined the registered sale deed, is carried away by an impression that the sale deed cannot be relied upon because it is executed by the husband of Smt. Lakshmamma in favour of the petitioner and it is the very same husband who is supposed to have executed a mortgage deed in favour of the 3rd respondent. Further, the 1st respondent has observed that as regards the question whether the document produced before him is a sale deed or not, it is a matter for the civil Court to decide. ( 4 ) THE point for consideration is whether the 1st respondent was in error in passing the impugned order and in holding that it is for the Civil Court to decide whether the document before the 1st respondent is a sale deed or not. ( 5 ) IT is significant that there is no material on record either in the application filed by the 2nd respondent or in the impugned order specifying the date on which the alleged mortgage deed came into existence. There is no discussion and finding on the question whether the author of the alleged mortgage deed was a debtor within the meaning of the act. Similarly, the 1st respondent has fought shy of the issue whether the document relied upon by the petitioner stated to be a sale deed executed on 20-3-1975 is, in fact, a sale deed or not. On the other hand, after dabbling with the alleged sale deed, the 1st respondent has virtually abandoned the exercise and concluded by saying that it is for the civil Court to decide whether or not it is a sale deed. On the other hand, after dabbling with the alleged sale deed, the 1st respondent has virtually abandoned the exercise and concluded by saying that it is for the civil Court to decide whether or not it is a sale deed. It may also be pointed out that the very purpose of allowing Writ Petition no. 27236 of 1982 by this Court earlier, was to afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner herein and to dispose of the case afresh. From the contents of the order, i find that though there is a disposal of the case afresh by the 1st respondent, there is no determination of the relevant issue and the relevant issue is whether there was a sale made by the husband of the 2nd respondent in favour of the petitioner and if there was a duly executed registered deed of sale whether the sale was confirmed before the commencement of the Act. Application was made by the 2nd respondent under the provisions of the Karnataka Debt Relief Act, 1976, and not under the Karnataka Debt relief Act, 1980. The Karnataka Debt Relief act, 1976 received the assent of the President on 12-3-1976 and Section 4 which is relevant for this case came into force on 21-10-1975. The registered sale deed came into existence on 20-3-1975 and none of the provisions of the Karnataka Debt Relief Act, 1976, took effect prior to the date of execution of the registered sale deed. ( 6 ) IT is necessary to refer to Section 4 (c) (ii) of the Act which reads thus:-"4. The registered sale deed came into existence on 20-3-1975 and none of the provisions of the Karnataka Debt Relief Act, 1976, took effect prior to the date of execution of the registered sale deed. ( 6 ) IT is necessary to refer to Section 4 (c) (ii) of the Act which reads thus:-"4. Relief from indebtedness:- notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force or in any contract or instrument having force by virtue of any such law and save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, with effect from the date of commencement of this section,- (a) xxx xxx (b) xxx xxx (c) all suits and proceedings (including appeals, revisions, attachments or execution proceedings) pending on the said date against any debtor for the recovery of any such debt shall abate: provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to the sale of - (i) xxx xxx (ii) any immovable property confirmed before such commencement;" ( 7 ) IT is, therefore, clear that nothing in the said clause is applicable to a sale of any immovable property confirmed before the commencement of Section 4 of the Act. ( 8 ) THE rule of law obviously applicable to the facts of this case is that in respect of a sale which has taken place anterior to 21-10-1975, the right to recover any debt under the Act does not abate. ( 9 ) THE petitioner has been fighting for the preservation of the right which he has acquired by virtue of the sale deed dated 20-3-1975. Though the 2nd respondent has denied the existence of any such sale deed, no documentary evidence to negate the effect of registered instrument is adduced before the 1st respondent. The 2nd respondent has done precious little to establish that a mortgage deed was executed by her husband in favour of the 3rd respondent beyond making an application before the 1st respondent invoking the provisions of the Act. There is absolutely no justification for the 1st respondent in raising baseless presumptions that there was a mortgage and that there was no sale by her husband in favour of the petitioner in the absence of the mortgage deed even though a registered sale deed is staring in the face. There is absolutely no justification for the 1st respondent in raising baseless presumptions that there was a mortgage and that there was no sale by her husband in favour of the petitioner in the absence of the mortgage deed even though a registered sale deed is staring in the face. ( 10 ) THE 1st respondent has failed to comprehend the effect and meaning of Section 4 (c) (ii) of the Act and has failed to decide whether the sale took place before the com- mencement of Section 4 of the Act. When a specific statutory provision has mandated that relief from indebtedness is not available where the sale of any immovable property is confirmed before the commencement of Section 4 of the Act, there is absolutely no basis to assume that whether a sale took place prior to the commencement of Section 4 is a question which ought to be decided by a Civil court. The finding of the 1st respondent is totally misconceived. It is one thing to say whether the sale took place prior to the commencement of Section 4 of the Act and another to say whether the sale is benami or that it is a sham transaction. It is the statutory duty of the 1st respondent to determine whether the sale alleged took place prior to the commencement of Section 4 of the Act. Once the registered sale deed is produced before him, there is no other alternative to the 1st respondent. Failure to discharge the statutory obligation, is a failure to exercise proper discretion and, therefore, a denial of justice. Having looked into the records, I am convinced that undoubtedly the registered sale deed came into existence prior to the commencement of Section 4 of the Karnataka Debt Relief Act, 1976. I do not see any justification to send the case back to the 1st respondent for another round of litigation. ( 11 ) IN the result, for the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order of the 1st respondent under annexure-C dated 29-5-1986 is hereby quashed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. ( 12 ) SMT. T. N. Manjuladevi, learned government Advocate, is permitted to file her memo of appearance within two weeks from today. Writ petition allowed. --- *** --- .