JUDGMENT - DR. COUTO G.F., J.:---This revision application directed against the order dated 22nd June, 1988, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Panjim, upholding the objections filed under section 47, Civil Procedure Code, by the judgment debtors/respondents herein, in the proceedings for execution of decree dated 30th April, 1985, gives inter alia, rise to an interesting question of law, viz., whether the expression "dwelling house" as defined in section 2(i) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Mundkars (Protection From Eviction) Act, 1975, for short, "the Act", connotes a separate and independent structure or building, or whether it also brings within its fold a part or a portion of a building where a person who alleges to be a mundkar resides with fixed habitation. 2. Mr. M.S. Usgaokar, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has indeed submitted on the strength of the decision of the Supreme Court in (Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman others)1, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1475, that although undoubtedly the Executing Court is entitled to go behind the decree in case the nullity of such decree is writ large and is apparent on the face of record, the fact remains that in this particular case, such alleged nullity is not apparent. He urged that the petitioner had averred in the suit that he is the owner in possession of a dwelling house bearing the No. 22/A, standing in property known as "ZORICHEM TOLEM" at Batulem, Panji; that on 10th June, 1970, he permitted the first respondent to take shelter in a part of the said house consisting of two rooms, as he had requested the plaintiff to give him temporary shelter, undertaking to vacate it within six months; that in spite of his repeated requests to vacate the said portion of the house, the respondents had neglected and failed to do so and had started to create a nuisance everyday; and that this had given cause for the serving of a notice by the petitioner on the first respondent to vacate the said house. Now, the stand taken by the respondents in their written statement was that the house in question was belonging to them, they having never raised the question of mundkarship. The trial Court negatived this stand and as such, the suit was ultimately decreed. Now, the stand taken by the respondents in their written statement was that the house in question was belonging to them, they having never raised the question of mundkarship. The trial Court negatived this stand and as such, the suit was ultimately decreed. It was only at the stage of the execution proceedings that the respondents filed their objections under section 47, Civil Procedure Code, claiming for the first time that the facts as disclosed in the pleadings unmistakably establish that the respondents are the mundkars of the suit property and that the portion of the house occupied by them is their dwelling house. Therefore, the respondents came out with a case that the decree sought to be executed is a nullity as passed by a Court lacking inherent jurisdiction. But, the learned Counsel contended, what is alleged in the plaint is that the respondents had been allowed to occupy, and are occupying, only two rooms in the suit house. A part of a house does not come within the meaning of "dwelling house" given in section 2(i) of the Act and therefore, naturally, the respondents cannot be held by any stretch of imagination to be mundkars as defined in section 2(p) of the same Act. Reliance was placed in support of the above submission on the decision of the Kerala High Court in (Muhammad v. Imbichibi)2, A.I.R. 1975 Ker. 32. 3. A few facts are necessary to be stated in order to enable the Court to appreciate the above submissions of Mr. Usgaokar. The suit was filed by the petitioner herein on 8th July, 1977, for recovery of possession of a part of the house identified in the plaint. 32. 3. A few facts are necessary to be stated in order to enable the Court to appreciate the above submissions of Mr. Usgaokar. The suit was filed by the petitioner herein on 8th July, 1977, for recovery of possession of a part of the house identified in the plaint. He alleged that he is the owner in possession of a dwelling house bearing the No. 22/A which stands in the property "ZORICHEM TOLEM" situate at Batulem, Panaji; that on or about the 10th June, 1970, the first respondent was given temporary shelter in a part of the said house consisting of two rooms as the same respondent had requested the petitioner to give him temporary shelter since he had no place to stay at that time, having however, undertaken that he would vacate the premises within six months; that inspite of the repeated requests of the petitioner to the first respondent to vacate the said portion of the house occupied by him, the respondents had neglected and failed to do so and influence of liquor; and that the petitioner has therefore, served an Advocate's notice dated 15th April, 1977, on the first respondent calling upon him to vacate the portion of the house in his occupation within one month from the receipt thereof. The respondents resisted this suit on the grounds that the petitioner is not the owner is possession of the suit house. They denied that they had been given temporary shelter in two rooms of the house and that they had undertaken to vacate it within six months. They alleged that somewhere in the year 1970, the petitioner informed the first respondent and his cousin Dattaram Shivram Naik that he was negotiating the purchase of a plot of land situate at Batulem which was part of the property "ZORICHEM TOLEM". He proposed the sale of the said half of the plot of land to the aforesaid Dattaram and the first respondent in equal parts. This proposal was accepted and half of the said plot was acquired for the petitioner and the remaining half, in equal parts, for Dattaram and the first respondent. The petitioner started building his house in the plot which was given to him. The first respondent being short of money, put up only a temporary small house in his plot. This proposal was accepted and half of the said plot was acquired for the petitioner and the remaining half, in equal parts, for Dattaram and the first respondent. The petitioner started building his house in the plot which was given to him. The first respondent being short of money, put up only a temporary small house in his plot. Sometime later, the petitioner alleging to be in financial difficulties, requested the first respondent to be allowed to stay in the said house. 4. Issues were framed on the basis of the pleadings and ultimately, by his judgment dated 30th April, 1985, the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Panaji, decreed the suit ordering the respondents to deliver possession of the part of the suit house occupied by them to the petitioner. It appears that the respondents, being aggrieved, preferred an appeal to the District Court, but were unsuccessful and finally, the decree-holder sought the execution of the aforesaid decree. The respondents filed their objections under section 47 read with section 151, Civil Procedure Code and submitted that the decree sought to be executed was not executable inasmuch as it was a nullity since it was passed by a Court which had no jurisdiction to pass it. It was contended that if clearly flows from the very averments made in the plaint that the suit is for eviction of the judgment debtors from a part of the house which was, admittedly, in their occupation with permission of the decree holder from 10th June, 1970 till atleast 15th April, 1977, i.e. the date on which an Advocate's notice was sent by the petitioner to him to vacate the aforesaid portion of the house. The plaint further discloses, according to the respondents, that no service was rendered by them for such occupation of the house, and that no rent was paid. The suit was filed only on 8th July, 1977 and there is no averment in the plaint that any proceedings had been filed within the period of one year prior to 12th March, 1976, i.e. the date on which the Act came into force for eviction of the judgment debtors alleging they being trespassers or that their occupation was merely as caretakers of the house or for the purposes of maintaining it. Therefore, according to the judgment debtors, it is apparent on the face of the record that they are lawfully residing in the portion of the said house with the consent of the plaintiff/decree holder and that they have fixed habitation therein. As such, they clearly are mundkars of the plaintiff within its meaning in section 2(p) of the Act and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to order eviction from their dwelling house. 5. The petitioner opposed the view taken by the judgment debtors in the aforesaid objection, contending on one hand, that the plea of mundkarship had never been raised by the judgment debtors in the suit and therefore, they were estopped form putting forth such plea in execution proceedings as it requires evidence for determination, and on the other, that it was not within the jurisdiction of the executing Court to go behind the decree as the alleged mundkarship of the judgment-debtors was not apparent on the face of the record. 6. By his impugned Order dated 22nd June, 1988, the learned Executing Judge observed that the point for his determination was whether the application moved by the judgment debtors was maintainable or whether it was liable to be dismissed. He recorded a finding that the decree sought to be executed could not be executed by reason of subsequent legislation. Accordingly, he upheld the aforesaid objections of the judgment-debtors and further ordered the dropping of the execution proceedings. 7. I already mentioned that Mr. Usgaokar, placing reliance on Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi's case (supra), contended that the executing Judge was not entitled to go behind the decree sought to be executed as there was nothing on the record showing that the trial Court had no inherent jurisdiction to pass the aforesaid decree. That was a case where a decree for the eviction of a tenant has been passed. The tenant/judgment debtor contended in the course of the execution proceedings that the Court which had passed the decree had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and therefore, the said decree was a nullity. The executing Court dismissed such objections and the Appellate Court, in turn, also dismissed an appeal filed against the order of the dismissal of the objections. The tenant/judgment debtor contended in the course of the execution proceedings that the Court which had passed the decree had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and therefore, the said decree was a nullity. The executing Court dismissed such objections and the Appellate Court, in turn, also dismissed an appeal filed against the order of the dismissal of the objections. A writ petition was then filed by the judgment debtor under Article 227 of the Constitution and the High Court allowing the said writ petition, ordered the execution proceedings to be dismissed. The decree holders, being aggrieved, moved the Supreme Court in a special leave petition. Dealing with the contentions raised before it, the Supreme Court observed that a Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree between the parties or their representatives. It must take the decree according to its tenor and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts and therefore, until it is set aside by appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree, even if it be erroneous, is still binding between the parties. Then, in para 7, Their Lordship of the Supreme Court observed as under :-- "When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed without bringing the legal representatives on the record of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed an objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for execution. Again when the decree is made by a Court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record : where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the executing Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction." It appears from the above observations of the Supreme Court that although ordinarily an executing Court cannot go behind the decree, the fact remains that when, inter alia, the decree is made by a Court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection to its validity can be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record. However, if such objection does not appear on the face of record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial, or which could have been but had not been raised, the executing Court is barred, for lack of jurisdiction, to entertain an objection to the validity of the decree sought to be executed even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction. 8. The Supreme Court appears however, to have struck a slightly different note in a subsequent judgment, namely, in (Sunder Dass v. Ram Parkash)3, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1201. It was indeed observed in that case as under :-- "Now, the law is well settled that an executing Court cannot go behind the decree nor can it question its legality or correctness. But there is one exception to this general Rule and that is that where the decree sought to be executed is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction in the Court passing it, its invalidity can be set up in an execution proceeding. Where there is lack of inherent jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the competence of the Court to try the case and a decree which is a nullity is void and can be declared to be void by any Court in which it is presented. Where there is lack of inherent jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the competence of the Court to try the case and a decree which is a nullity is void and can be declared to be void by any Court in which it is presented. Its nullity can be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even in collateral proceedings. The executing Court can, therefore, entertain an objection that the decree is a nullity and can refuse to execute the decree. By doing so, the executing Court would not incur the reproach that it is going behind the decree, because the decree being null and void, there would really be no decree at all." It would thus appear that in Sunder Dass' case the Supreme Court dropped the qualification laid down in its earlier decision in Modis' case to the effect that the objection as to the lack of jurisdiction needs to be apparent on the face of record in order to give jurisdiction to the executing Court to go behind the decree. 9. This apparent change of the law is not however, of much relevance in the facts and circumstances of the case, since it is the contention of Mr. Khandeparkar, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, that the lack of jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree sought to be executed is apparent on the face of record as it flows clearly from the averments in the plaint itself. A reference may, however, be made in this connection to the decision of the Supreme Court in (Bhavan Vaja others v. Sokanki Hanuji Khodaji Mansang another)4, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1371, since Their Lordships of the Supreme Court made it clear in the said case that although it is true that an executing Court cannot go behind the decree under execution, that does not mean that it had no duty to find out the true facts of the said decree. The Court indeed observed that for considering a decree, it can not in appropriate cases, it ought to take into consideration the pleadings as well as the proceedings leading up to the decree. 10. The Court indeed observed that for considering a decree, it can not in appropriate cases, it ought to take into consideration the pleadings as well as the proceedings leading up to the decree. 10. Section 2(p) of the Act defines 'mundkar' as meaning a person who with the consent of the Bhatkar or the person acting or purporting to act on behalf of the bhatkar lawfully resides with a fixed habitation in a dwelling house with or without obligation to render any services to the bhatkar and further lays down that includes a member of his family, but does not include the persons mentioned in Clauses (i) to (iv). An Explanation was added to the said definition, stating that a person shall be deemed to be lawfully residing with the consent of the Bhatkar in a dwelling house if such person resides in it for a period exceeding one year prior to the appointed date and the bhatkar has not initiated any proceedings during the said period of one year to evict such person from the dwelling house, through a competent Court of law, on the ground that such person was a trespasser or, having so initiated such proceedings, does not succeed in obtaining a decree for eviction of such person. In turn, section 2(i) defines "dwelling house" as meaning the house in which the mundkar resides with a fixed habitation and further provides that it includes the land on which the dwelling house is standing and the land around and appurtenant to such dwelling house subject to a maximum limit of five metres if the land is within the jurisdiction of a village panchayat and two metres if it is not within such jurisdiction from the outer walls of the dwelling house, as well as a cattle shed, stable, pig-sty, workshop or such other structure connected with the business or profession of the mundkar and also the customary easement, if any, which the residents of the dwelling house have been enjoying for access to a public road or a well or any other place. Now, it is common ground and it is not disputed that the Act came into force on 12th March, 1976 and the suit was filed by the present petitioner for recovery of the portion of the house in possession of the respondents only on 8th July, 1977. Now, it is common ground and it is not disputed that the Act came into force on 12th March, 1976 and the suit was filed by the present petitioner for recovery of the portion of the house in possession of the respondents only on 8th July, 1977. The petitioner specifically averred in the plaint that the respondents were inducted in the said portion of the house on 10th June, 1970, by him as they sought temporary shelter for a period of six months on the ground that they had no place to stay at that time; that in spite of the repeated requests made by the petitioner, the respondents failed to vacate the said portion of the house and the first respondent had been creating nuisance under the influence of liquor everyday; and that an advocate's notice dated 15th April, 1977, was given to the first respondent calling upon him to vacate the portion of the house in his occupation. Nowhere in the plaint, it was alleged that at any time prior to this suit and most particularly, within one year immediately preceding the appointed day (12th March, 1976), proceedings for ejectment of the respondents from the suit premises had been instituted on the ground that he was occupying it as a trespasser. Therefore, in the light of the definition of mundkar given in section 2(p) of the Act, it would appear on the averments made by the petitioner himself, that the respondents may be mundkars. 11. Mr. Usgaokar however, contended that the definition of "dwelling house" given in section 2(i) of the Act Rules out the above view as under the said definition, dwelling house necessarily is an independent and separate structure or building which is utilized by the alleged mundkar as his permanent habitation, excluding from its sweep a part of a house. He urged that this much flows from the very scheme of the Act. The mundkar is indeed entitled to purchase his dwelling house. Now, since dwelling house includes, in terms of Clause (i)(a) of section 2(i) not only the land on which the said house is standing but also the land around and appurtenant to such dwelling house, it is obvious that the dwelling house spoken of in the aforesaid section 2(i) has to be an independent and separate structure. Now, since dwelling house includes, in terms of Clause (i)(a) of section 2(i) not only the land on which the said house is standing but also the land around and appurtenant to such dwelling house, it is obvious that the dwelling house spoken of in the aforesaid section 2(i) has to be an independent and separate structure. This is corroborated by the Explanation II to the said definition which provides that for that purpose, house means an entity in itself because, he contended, if the word "house" occurring in the definition of dwelling house means an entity in itself, it is beyond doubt that it envisages a separate and independent structure, since a part of a house cannot obviously constitute an entity in itself. Support to these submissions was sought in the decision of the Kerala High Court Muhammad v. Imbichibi's case (supra) by submitting that there exists in the State of Kerala an institution that is akin to the institution of mundkar prevailing in this State of Goa and that discussing the meaning of hut and homestead in the Act regulating the said institution (kudikidappukaram), the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court held the view that dwelling house within the meaning of that Act has necessarily to be an independent and separate structure. 12. The definition of "dwelling house" given in section 2(i) of the Act is clearly inclusive. It indeed postulates that dwelling house means the house in which the mundkar resides with a fixed habitation and includes also not only the land mentioned in Clauses (i)(a) and (b) but also the cattle shed, stable, pig-sty, workshop etc. and the customary easement, if any. The accent in the definition is however, on the premises in which the mundkar resides with fixed habitation. It lays down that "dwelling house" means the "house" in which the mundkar resides with fixed habitation, and hence, what is sought to be defined is partly included in the definition itself. This was naturally bound to create ambiguity or obscurity and therefore, the legislature felt it necessary to clarify by introducing an Explanation what is the meaning of the word "house" occurring in the said definition, namely that for the purpose of the aforesaid definition house means an entity in itself. It becomes thus necessary and pertinent to find what is the meaning of an entity. 13. The Act does not define entity. It becomes thus necessary and pertinent to find what is the meaning of an entity. 13. The Act does not define entity. I am therefore, bound, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Khandeparkar, to understand that word as used in common parlance and to give to it the dictionary meaning which is more harmonious with the purpose for which the Act was enacted. "Entity" means, says the Webster's Third New International Dictionary, "being, existence : independent, separate or self contained existence : something that has objective or physical reality and distinctness of being and character : something that has independent or separate existence : something that has a unitary or self contained character". In common parlance also, an entity connotes something that is independent and separate; something that constitutes a thing by itself. This undoubtedly may, at the first glance, appear to give some support to the view taken by Mr. Usgaokar, but on a deeper and more careful consideration, it is manifest that it is not so. The Act was enacted, as stated in its preamble, to provide for better protection to mundkars against eviction from their dwelling house and for granting them the right to purchase the same and to make certain other provisions connected therewith. The Act is therefore, a beneficent piece of legislation. As observed by the Madras High Court in (R.S. Mani v. A. Palanmuthu Pillai and another)5, A.I.R. 1967 Mad. 16 in interpreting the words used in such kind of legislation, one has to adopt the course which leads to the most harmonious interpretation with the context and which promotes in the fullest manner the policy and the objects of the legislation. The Act envisages a better protection to the mundkars against eviction from their dwelling houses. In other words, the Act was enacted to better safeguard the rights of mundkars as regards the premises where they reside with fixed habitation and which constitutes the house where they dwell. Hence, if a mundkar resides in a house or independent structure with fixed habitation, such house or structure will, of course, come within the meaning of dwelling house as defined in section 2(i). Hence, if a mundkar resides in a house or independent structure with fixed habitation, such house or structure will, of course, come within the meaning of dwelling house as defined in section 2(i). Similarly, if he resides in a part of a house with fixed habitation, a harmonious interpretation which will promote the very purpose of the Act requires that such part of house also falls within the same definition which otherwise does not postulate that the house where the mundkar resides with fixed habitation has to be an independent building or structure. It does not exclude a part of a house, the dominant aspect being the "fixed habitation". Therefore, the word "house" used in the definition of dwelling house in section 2(i) merely connotes the idea of "place" or "premises" where the mundkar has his fixed habitation. Residentially, the Supreme Court observed in (S.P. Jain v. Krishna Mohan Gupta and others)6, 1987(1) S.C.C. 191 depends for its sense on the context and purpose of the statute of the project promoted, and quoting from "Corpus Juris Secundum", Vol. 28, pgs. 604-605, and from "Words and Phrases Legally Defined", Vol. 2, 2nd Edn., pg. 127, noted that "dwelling house" means a building used or constructed or adapted to be used wholly or principally for human habitation and includes any part of a house when that part was occupied separately as dwelling house. Thus, there can be no manner of doubt that a part of a house which is used separately for dwelling can be, and is, generally a dwelling house. I have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that the house where the mundkar resides with fixed habitation, as referred to in definition of dwelling house in section 2(i), embraces both an independent building and a part thereof. This interpretation promotes the purpose of the Act and is fully supported by its Explanation II. I may mention that an Explanation to a provision of law, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Khandeparkar, is meant only to clarify some doubts or some gaps which give cause to some obscurity or vagueness made in the enactment. This interpretation promotes the purpose of the Act and is fully supported by its Explanation II. I may mention that an Explanation to a provision of law, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Khandeparkar, is meant only to clarify some doubts or some gaps which give cause to some obscurity or vagueness made in the enactment. Indeed, in (S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman)7, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 582 the Supreme Court observed that it is now well settled that an explanation added to a statutory provision is not a substantive provision in any sense of the terms, but as the plain meaning of the word itself shows, it is merely meant to explain or clarify certain ambiguity which may have crept in the statutory provision. The object of an explanation to a statutory provision is : (a) to explain the meaning and intendment of the Act itself; (b) where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main enactment, to clarify the same so as to make it consistent with the dominant object which it seems to subserve; (c) to provide an additional support to the dominant object of the Act in order to make it meaningful and purposeful; (d) an Explanation cannot in any way interfere with or change the enactment or any part thereof but where some gap is left which is relevant for the purpose of the Explanation, in order to suppress the mischief and advance the object of the Act it can help or assist the Court in interpreting the true purport and intendment of the enactment, and (e) it cannot, however, take away a statutory right with which any person under a statute has been clothed or set at naught the working of an Act by becoming an hindrance in the interpretation of the same. It was seen that in the definition of "dwelling house", the legislature utilized the word "house" and the use of this word was bound to create some ambiguity or obscurity. By the said Explanation II that ambiguity is sought to be removed by clarifying that dwelling house is the premises where the mundkar resides with fixed habitation which by itself constitutes an entity. By the said Explanation II that ambiguity is sought to be removed by clarifying that dwelling house is the premises where the mundkar resides with fixed habitation which by itself constitutes an entity. In other words, the Explanation makes it clear that even a part of a house occupied by a mundkar for his fixed habitation will be a house for the purposes of the definition of "dwelling house", provided such part of the house constitutes an entity in itself. 14. It was already said that in order to strengthen his contrary view, Mr. Usgaokar placed strong reliance on the decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Muhammad's case (above). In my opinion, the aforesaid authority of the Kerala High Court is however, of no assistance. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Khandeparkar, the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court arrived at the finding that a hut and a homestead in the Act which was under its consideration had necessarily to be an independent structure and not part of portion of a larger building in the context of the definition given in the aforesaid Act to hut and homestead. In both definitions, the said Act has established a link between the hut, homestead and the land where that structure stands unlike what happens in the definition of "dwelling house" given by the Act. That apart, it is also pertinent to note that also unlike the definitions of hut and homestead given in the Kerala Act which speaks of a structure built on the land, the definition of "dwelling house" in the Act is inclusive. No doubt, Mr. Usgaokar urged that this inclusive definition, specially Clause (i)(a) to section 2(i) of the Act, clearly indicates that the "dwelling house" defined in the said provision of law must necessarily be an independent structure, since in its proviso it lays down that where a distance between the outer walls of the dwelling house of the mundkar and the house of the bhatkar is less than double of the limits laid down in the clause, the land appurtenant to the dwelling house shall be half of the land lying between the outer walls of the dwelling house of the mundkar and those of the bhatkar. But there is no merit in this submission. But there is no merit in this submission. It was already seen that the definition of "dwelling house" is inclusive and includes land surrounding and appurtenant to the house. The proviso to the aforesaid Clause (i)(a) merely deals with a situation which may occur where appurtenant land as laid down in the said clause is not available, and thus, is of no assistance for the determination of the meaning of the word "house" occurring in the body of section 2(i). I, therefore, find no force whatsoever in the submission of Mr. Usgaokar that "dwelling house" as defined in section 2(i) of the Act connotes necessarily an independent structure. In my view, it does include also a part of a house, provided however, that this part of the house constitutes an entity in itself. 15. It becomes thus clear that on the facts of this case as stated above, namely that admittedly, the respondents had been occupying two rooms of the suit house with the consent of the petitioner from 1970; that they were not paying any rent or compensation for such occupation; that they had been continuously residing in the said rooms with fixed habitation upto 15th April, 1977, at least, i.e. upto the date on which the Advocate's notice was given to them; and that no eviction proceedings had been instituted against them within one year immediately preceding the day on which the Act came into force, the respondents seem to be mundkars of the petitioner and that the rooms in their occupation are their "dwelling house". 16. In the light of these facts which are apparent on the face of the record and on the strength of the aforesaid rulings of the Supreme Court in Modi's, Sunder Dass' and Bhavan Vaja's cases (supra), it was entirely open to the learned executing Judge to go beyond the decree sought to be executed and to examine the question as to whether or not such decree was a nullity and therefore, unsustainable of being executed. But, if this is undoubtedly true, the question arises as to whether it was open to the learned Judge in exercise of the jurisdiction vested in him to straightway drop the execution proceedings, as he did. But, if this is undoubtedly true, the question arises as to whether it was open to the learned Judge in exercise of the jurisdiction vested in him to straightway drop the execution proceedings, as he did. This point becomes material, because by virtue of the provisions of the Act, jurisdiction to declare a person to be mundkar is exclusively vested in the Mamlatdar, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court having therefore been ousted. By dropping the proceedings because on the strength of the averments made in the plaint he arrived at the finding that it was apparent that the respondents are mundkars of the plaintiff, the learned Executing Judge has, by implication, declared them to be mundkars. For this he has no jurisdiction, and in that, the impugned order is vitiated being without jurisdiction. But then what is the fate of the said proceedings? 17. Section 32 of the Act provides that if any suit instituted in any Civil Court involves any issues which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar or the Collector under the Act, the Civil Court shall stay the suit and refer such issues to be Mamlatdar or the Collector, as the case may be, for determination. Mr. Khandeparkar submits that this provision of law has to be read with section 38 of the Act as well as section 141, Civil Procedure Code and the expression "any suit" shall include any appeal or proceedings arising out of the same cause of action. In this connection he placed reliance on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in (Smt. Suman v. Vithal Rama Powar and others)8, A.I.R. 1987 Kant. 92. 18. In my view, the learned Counsel is entirely right in this submission and in my considered opinion, the word "suit" used in section 32 of the Act has undoubtedly to be construed liberally so as to embrace not only a suit proper, but also an appeal or execution proceedings. I am supported in this view by the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in Suman's case, inasmuch as the learned Judge, relying on the observations of Mulla in his commentary on the Civil Procedure Code, observed that the expression "suit" includes execution proceedings. A different view will definitely give cause to some absurd situations. I am supported in this view by the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in Suman's case, inasmuch as the learned Judge, relying on the observations of Mulla in his commentary on the Civil Procedure Code, observed that the expression "suit" includes execution proceedings. A different view will definitely give cause to some absurd situations. This being so, the learned Judge after having found that prima facie the objections raised by the respondents appear to be valid, ought to have framed an issue as to whether or not the respondents are mundkars and ought to have stayed the proceedings for the purposes of a declaration in that respect being obtained from the concerned Mamlatdar. 19. The result, therefore, is that this revision application partly succeeds and consequently, the impugned order is set aside in that the execution proceedings were dropped. The said proceedings are stayed pending the determination of the issue of mundkarship by the competent Mamlatdar. There will be no costs in the circumstances of the case. Revision application partly allowed. -----