B. N. Kirpal, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners were working in the Central Researchinstitute for Yoga (respondent No. 2) and have challenged in this writ petitionthe action of the said Institute in not absorbing them inregular service. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated the facts are that petitioner No. 1 was appointed on 8/04/1981 as an Attendant by respondent No. 2 on daily wages w. e. f. 2/04/1981. Petitioner No. 2 was appointed as a Sweeper vide order dated 29/10/1984 by the said Institute on daily wages. Similarly, petitionerno. 3 was appninted on 19/01/1982 on daily wages as a Peon by thesaid Institute. It is the case of the petitioners, and this is not denied by therespondents, that the petitioners continued to work on daily wages till theirservices were ultimately terminated on 11/12/1987 after the filing ofthe present writ petition. ( 3 ) AT the time when the petition was filed the grievance of. the petitioners was that the respondent-Institute advertised in the newspaper on 1/02/1987 a number of posts, including the posts of Poens and Sweeper. It appears that interview letters were issued, but one of the petitioners was. not even called for interview. The interviews were to be held on 7/12/1987. The case of the petitioners is that the respondent-Institute is a state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, and as the petitionershave put in more than 240 days of work in a year, they are liable to be asborbed in regular service in view of the numerous decisions of the Supreme Court. ( 4 ) ON 8th December, -A 987 this Court issued notice to the respondentsto show cause why the petition be not admitted. Notice was also issued in theinterim application and it was ordered that any appointments that may bemade from outside would be subject to further orders of the Court. Copy ofthe order is stated to have been served on respondent No. 2 on- 11/12/1987. Thereafter, on that very day, i. e. on 11/12/1987 the responddent No. 2 issued three similar office orders to the effect that the services ofthe petitioners were no longer required w. e. f. 11/12/1987. Thereafter another application for stay was filed, and it was directed by this Courtwhile admitting the writ petition, that any appointments which are made fromoutside will be subject to the orders of this Court. Thereafter another application for stay was filed, and it was directed by this Courtwhile admitting the writ petition, that any appointments which are made fromoutside will be subject to the orders of this Court. Counsel for the petitionersinforms me that after the services of the petitioners were terminated fivepersons have been appointed to the posts of Peons and Sweepers. ( 5 ) IN the affidavit. filed in reply it has been, inter alia contendedthat the respondent-Institute is not a State. It has also been submitted thatthe Institute is not an industry and in any case this Court should not exerciseits jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and if it be held that theinstitute is an industry, then the petitioners should be asked to take recourseto the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. ( 6 ) IT is now well settled, and it has not been disputed by the learnedcounsel for the respondents, that a daily wager who works for more than 240days in a year in an industry has to be regarded as having been regularlyappointed. " The services of such an employee is liable to be regularised andin this connection, the following decisions of the Supreme Court may benoticed: J. T. I 987 (4) SC 164-U. P. Income-tax Department Contingent Paidstaff Welfare Association v. Union of India and Others, U. P. Income-taxdepartment Contingent Paid Staff Welfare Association v. Union of India andothers [j. T. 1987 (4) SC. 585]; Delhi Municipal Karamchari Ekta Unionv. Shri P. L. Singh and Others (J. T. 1987 S. C. 617); The General Secretary,bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna v. The Presiding Officer,industrial Tribunal, Patna and Others (J. T. 1988 (1) S. C. 29); and Businesscombine Limited v. M. B. Jagtap and Others (J. T. 1988 (1) S. C. 30 ). In allthese cases it was held by the Supreme Court that when an employeehas served for a number of years without break, the person was entitled tobe regularised and appropriate directions were issued directing the promulgation of the schemes for regularisation of the services of those persons. ( 7 ) IN the present case, the petitioners had worked for over 750 daysprior to their termination of service. It was, however, contended by Mr. D. D. Thakur before me that the respondent-Institute is not an Industry. ( 7 ) IN the present case, the petitioners had worked for over 750 daysprior to their termination of service. It was, however, contended by Mr. D. D. Thakur before me that the respondent-Institute is not an Industry. Inthis connection, reliance was sought to be placed by the learned Counsel onthe observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supplyv. A. Rajappa ( AIR 1978 SC 548 ) where at page 586 Supreme Court hadobserved that institutions like Ashrams where people work tirelessly andvoluntarily and without wages would not be regarded as industry, even thougha few scavengers and servants or part-time auditors or accountants may beemployed for wages It is in that very case that the Supreme Court had heldthat the word "industry" was of a very wide import and where there was asystematic activity, organised by co-operation between the employer and theemployees for the production and distribution of goods and services, calculatedto satisfy human wants and wishes, then, Prima facie, such activity by anenterprise would be regarded as an industry. It was further clarified thatabsence of profit motive or grainful objective was irrelevant. Applying the saidtest the present Institute whose objective is to conduct research in Yoga wouldbe regarded as an industry, especially when most of its employees are personswho are working for wages unlike an Ashram which has been REFERRED TO to bythe Supreme Court in paragraph 132 of its judgment in Bangalore Watersupply case (supra ). The respondent-Institute is carrying out a systematicactivity and its employees do not belong to any holy orders and are certainlynot working voluntarily. I have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to theconclusion that respondent No. 2 is an industry, and the petitioners havingworked more than 240 days in a year are entitled to be treated as regularemployees of the said Institute. ( 8 ) IT was then contended by the learned Counsel for the respondentsthat the said Institute is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of theconstitution. Reliance was sought to beplaced by the learned on the decisionthe Supreme Court in the case of Sabnajit Tewary v. Union of India and Ors. F AIR 1975 SC 1329 ). ( 8 ) IT was then contended by the learned Counsel for the respondentsthat the said Institute is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of theconstitution. Reliance was sought to beplaced by the learned on the decisionthe Supreme Court in the case of Sabnajit Tewary v. Union of India and Ors. F AIR 1975 SC 1329 ). It is no doubt true in Sabhajit Tewary s case it washeld by the Supreme Court that the Counil of Scientific and Industrialresearch was not an instrumentality of the State, but as has been held in thecase of Ajay Ilasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Ors. ( AIR 1981 SC 487 ),while dealing with the case of Sabhajit Tewary that the decision of the Supremecourt in Sabhajit Tewary s case turned on the activities of that Institute. Thesupreme Court clarified in Ajay Hasia s case that it is not because the Centralcouncil of Scientific and Industrial Research was registered under the Societiesregistration Act that it was regarded as not being an instrumentality of thestate, but the said conclusion was arrived at after seeing the duties and functions that were being performed by the said Society. It is, therefore, important to see as to whether the respondent-Institute is functioning as aninstrumentality of the State. ( 9 ) IN the present case, the Memorandum of Association clearly discloses that the respondent-Institute is to be under the general supervision ofthe Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare [clause 2 (ii)]. In the affidavit in reply it has been admitted by the respondents that it is the Centralgovernment which gives entire financial support to the Institute. Inaddition thereto, the Minister of Health to the Government of India is thechairman of the Institute and the Institute is also located in the Governmentpremises though rent is being paid for that. Though the Institute is regardedas an autonomous body, nevertheless, it is clearly under the control anddirection of the Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare,and the entire finances are made available by the Government of India. Clause 4 of the Memorandum of Association further provides that the incomefrom the properties of the Institute shall be applied towards objects as setforth in the Memorandum of Association "subject to such limitations as thegovernment of India may, from time to time, impose". Clause 4 of the Memorandum of Association further provides that the incomefrom the properties of the Institute shall be applied towards objects as setforth in the Memorandum of Association "subject to such limitations as thegovernment of India may, from time to time, impose". It appears, therefore,that the Central Government also has a role to play with regard to financialcontrol in the Institute. The Institute clearly appears to be an agency ofthe State and is, therefore, a "state" within the meaning of Article 12 of theconstitution. ( 10 ) IT may be that the petitioners may be able to approach theindustrial Tribunal or the Labour Court for redress, but the writ petitionhaving been admitted, and as the action of the respondents in not treatingthe petitioners as regular is clearly contrary to law, in my opinion, this is afit case where this Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction underarticle 226 of the Constitution. The respondent-Institute has in fact, in the instant case, acted in a most vindictive and irresponsible manner. On 11/12/1987 the Institute was served with the interim order passed by this Courtto the effect that any appointments which are made by the Institute wouldbe subject to further orders of this Court. The action of the respondent-Institute to terminate the services of the petitioners on that very day, i. e. on 1 1/12/1987 not only shows the arbitrary manner in which it has acted,but also leaves an indelible impression in my mind that the action was vindictive in nature. The Institute seems to have taken it as an affront that thepetitioners had approached this Court and obtained an interim order in theirfavour. One would expect the Institutes sponsored by the Central Government to act with a certain amount of discretion and without at least appearingto be arbitrary. Even though in the writ petition there is no specific prayerfor quashing of the orders dated 11/12/1987, but as the said orderswere passed during the pendency of the writ petition, it would be appropriate to quash the said orders as well. ( 11 ) FROM the aforesaid it will follow that the petitioners are entitledto be regarded as being regular employees of the respondent-Institute. Hadthere been no regular vacancies available, the Institute would have beendirected, as was done by the Supreme Court in aforesaid cases, to put fortha scheme with regard to regularisation of the employees. ( 11 ) FROM the aforesaid it will follow that the petitioners are entitledto be regarded as being regular employees of the respondent-Institute. Hadthere been no regular vacancies available, the Institute would have beendirected, as was done by the Supreme Court in aforesaid cases, to put fortha scheme with regard to regularisation of the employees. In the instant case,however, regular vacancies were available, as is evident from the advertisement of 1/02/1987 issued by the respondent-Institute for filling upa number of posts including those of Peons and Sweepers. The petitionerswere entitled to be regularised in those posts. ( 12 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons the writ petition is allowed and a Writof Mandamus is issued quashing the orders dated 11/12/1987whereby the services of the petitioners were terminated, and a further Writ ofmandamus is issued directing the respondents to regard the petitioners asregular employees of the respondent-Institute and the Institute is furtherdirected to pay to the petitioners full back wages and allowances which theywould have been entitled, if their services had not been illegally terminated. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioners forthwith and shouldthereafter pay the petitioners the arrears of salary, allowances etc. within twomonths from today. The respondent-Institute shall be entitled not to pay thesalary, allowances, etc. for that period after 11/12/1987 for whichthe petitioners may have been gainfully employed elsewhere but such employment elsewhere would not be regarded as a break in service of the petitioners. ( 13 ) THE petitioners shall also be entitled to costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500. 00.