Manisana, J. — In this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged a notice dated 4. 2.77 issued by the Inspector of Excise, Gauhati and notices dated 10. 2. 77, 15. 2. 77 and 19.2.77 issued by the Superintendent of Excise Kamrup on the ground that the Superintendent and the Inspector had no jurisdiction to issue the notices. 2. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner is a partner­ship firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act having its office at Fancy Bazar, Gauhati. The petitioner firm deals in amongst other things, the business of purchasing, storing and selling of molasses (gur) meant for cattle feed. For this purpose the firm imports molasses (gur) from wholesale dealers and commission agents of various places of Uttar Pradesh and stores the same in its godown. On 4. 2. 72 the Inspector of Excise, Gauhati directed the petitioner to furnish a daily return to the Superintendent of Excise, Kamrup, Gauhati showing daily stock position and daily sale of rab gur with effect from 5. 2. 77 along with the names of the customers. Thereafter the Inspector seized the molasses (rab gur) and continued to seize new arrivals at the godown. The petitioner came to know later on that the seizures were affected under the provisions of the Molasses Control Order, 1961. On 10. 2. 77 the Superintendent of Excise, Kamrup issued a notice directing the petitioner firm, inter alia, not to cause sale of molasses and rab gur even after receipt of new consignments. The Superintendent issued another notice dated 15. 2. 77 to the Goods Supervisor N. F. Railway, Gauhati directing therein not to deliver the consignments of molasses to the petitioner and other parties dealing in molasses and rab gur without endorsement of the railway receipts by the Superintendent. The Superintendent further issued another notice dated 19. 2. 77 to the petitioner and others dealing in molasses directing the petitioner and others to get endorsement from the Superintendent on each railway receipt before tak­ing delivery of the consignment of molasses and rab gur. The petitioner thereafter filed Civil Rule No 30/77 in this Court challenging the notification dated 10. 2. 77. 2. 77 to the petitioner and others dealing in molasses directing the petitioner and others to get endorsement from the Superintendent on each railway receipt before tak­ing delivery of the consignment of molasses and rab gur. The petitioner thereafter filed Civil Rule No 30/77 in this Court challenging the notification dated 10. 2. 77. But, on the basis of the statement made by the Government Advocate to the effect that an offence report has already been submitted in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate Gauhati, the counsel for the petitioner did not press the petition and the petition was withdrawn as not pressed. 3. The case of the respondents, in brief, is that the notices are administrative in nature to prevent molasses and rab gur from using for illicit distillation, and the notices did not impose any restriction on the petitioner ; and that the petition is barred by the principles of res judicata, or that the petitioner cannot file a fresh petition after the withdrawal of the earlier writ petition. 4. The question which arises for consideration is whether the present petition is not maintainable as contended by Mr. Agarwal, the learned Government Advocate. 5. In Daryao vs. State of UP, AIR 1961 SC 1457 , the writ petition before the Allahabad High Court was not pressed in view of the decision of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court on the same subject. In consequence the petition was dismissed without considering its merits. Thereafter, a petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court. A question arose whether the petition under Article 32 was barred by the principles analogous to res judicata under section 1-1, CPC. It was held by the Supreme Court that order of dismissal of the writ petition as withdrawn would not constitute a bar of res judicata. But the general rule of res judicata cannot be treated as irrelevant or inadmissible in writ petitions even in dealing with fundamental rights in petitions filed under Article 32. 6. In Hoshnak Singh vs. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 1328 , an earlier petition was dismissed by a non speaking, one word order 'dismissed'. After pursuing the alternative remedy by way of revision, a second petition under Article 226 was filed. Then a question arose whether the second petition was barred by the principles -analogous to res judicata. 6. In Hoshnak Singh vs. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 1328 , an earlier petition was dismissed by a non speaking, one word order 'dismissed'. After pursuing the alternative remedy by way of revision, a second petition under Article 226 was filed. Then a question arose whether the second petition was barred by the principles -analogous to res judicata. The Supreme Court held that such a dismissal without a non-speaking order would not constitute a bar of res judicata to a subsequent petition on the same cause of action, more so, when the facts of the case appeared that the petition was dismissed presumably because the petitioner had an alternative remedy by way of revision petition. 7. In Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Printings vs. Workmen, AIR 1981 SC 960 , the High Court dismissed the petition under Article 226 in limine on the sole ground that the application for special leave on the same facts and grounds have been withdrawn unconditionally. In that case two questions arose for consideration before the Supreme Court. They were : (1) Whether unconditional withdrawal of the leave petition would amount to its dismissal ? (2) If so, what would be the impact on the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has held that the withdrawal of the leave petition cannot be equated with an order of dismissal ; and that the High Court has not exercised a proper and sound discretion in dismissing the writ petition in limine on the sole ground that application for special leave on the same fact and grounds had been withdrawn unconditionally. 8. Keeping in view the above decisions of the Supreme Court, the law may be summarised as follows. The general rules of res judicata cannot be treated as irrelevant or inadmissible in writ petitions, even in dealing with the fundamental right. If a writ petition is dismissed in limine, or the dismissal of a writ petition as withdraw, without a non-speaking order, the principles analogous to res judicata are not applicable. 9. It may be important to note that in the above cases, the Supreme Court has not dealt with the principles analogous to O 23 R 1, CPC. If a writ petition is dismissed in limine, or the dismissal of a writ petition as withdraw, without a non-speaking order, the principles analogous to res judicata are not applicable. 9. It may be important to note that in the above cases, the Supreme Court has not dealt with the principles analogous to O 23 R 1, CPC. In such a situation, the above decisions of the Supreme Court are of no assistance on the question whether a petitioner after withdrawing a writ petition filed by him in the High Court without' permission to institute a fresh petition can file a fresh writ petition in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The relevant observation of the Supreme Court in Daryao's case is at page 1466, and it is as follows : "If the petition is dismissed as withdrawn it cannot be a bar to a subsequent petition under Article 32, because in such a case there has been no decision on the merits by the Court. We wish to make it clear that the conclusions thus reached by us are confined only to the point of res judicata which has been argued as a preliminary issue in these writ petitions and no other." (emphasis supplied) Under O 23 R I, where a plaintiff withdraws from a suit without permission to institute a fresh one, he shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of same subject matter. The general rule of res judicata relates to the jurisdiction i. e. res judicata oust the jurisdiction of the Court. Withdrawal of a suit unconditionally precludes from instituting a second suit. Although there is a distinction between the principles of res judicata and the principles underlying O 23 R 1, as already stated, they are founded on consideration of public policy and the interest of administration of justice. Therefore, the principles underlying O 23 R 1 can be extended in the cases of withdrawal also on the ground of public policy and in the interest of administration of justice, not on the ground of res judicata. 10. .. At this stage it will be helpful to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sarguja Transport Service Vs. 10. .. At this stage it will be helpful to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sarguja Transport Service Vs. S. T. A. Tribunal, AIR 1987 SC 88 , in which the Supreme Court has held : "The point for consideration is whether a petitioner after withdrawing a writ petition filed by him in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India without the permission to institute a fresh petition can file a fresh writ petition in the High Court under that Article. On this point the decision in Daryao's case (supra) is of no assistance. But we are of the view that the principle underlying R. 1 of O. XXIII of the Code should be extended in the interests of administration of justice to cases of withdrawal of writ petition also, not on the ground of res judicata but on the ground of public policy as explained above. It would also discourage the litigant from indulging in bench-hunting tactics. In any event there is no justifiable reason in such a case to permit a petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution once again. While the withdrawal of a petition filed in High Court without permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other remedies like a suit or a petition under Article 32 of the Con­stitution since such withdrawal does not amount to res judicata the remedy under Art. 226 to the Constitution should be deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner in respect of the cause of action relied on in the writ petition when he with­draws it without such permission .................................. ....We, however, make it clear that whatever we have stated in this order may not be considered as being applicable to a writ petition involving the personal liberty of an individual in which the petitioner prays for the issue of writ in the nature of habeas corpus or seeks to enforce the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution since such a case stands on a different footing altogether. We, however, leave this question open." (emphasis supplied) 11. We, however, leave this question open." (emphasis supplied) 11. In view the above discussion, it is held that a petitioner after withdrawing the writ petition filed by him under Article 226 without permission to institute a fresh petition on the same subject matter, cannot file a fresh petition under Article 226 on the same cause of action, except a writ petition involving personal liberty of an individual, or to enforce fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. 12. Coming to the case on hand, in CR No 30 of 1977, the petitioner challenged the notice dated 10. 2. 77 issued by the Super­intendent of Excise. The writ petition was withdrawn unconditionally, as Already stated. It has been settled that the dismissal of a writ petition on withdrawal would not constitute a bar of res judicata to a subsequent petition on the same cause of action. Therefore, the present petition challenging the notice dated 10. 2. 77 will not be barred by the principles analogous to res judicata. But the petitioner is precluded from instituting a fresh petition challenging the notice dated 10. 2. 77, not on the ground of res judicata but on the ground discussed above. 13. As regards the notices dated 4. 2. 77, 15. 2. 77 and 19. 2. 77 each of them was related in some way to others and the notice dated 10. 2 77. There was a common question of law whether the Superintendent and the Inspector could issue their respective notices. Therefore, the notices dated 4. 2. 77, 15. 2. 77 and 19, 2. 77 could have been challenged in the earlier petition. That apart, in view of our conclusion that the petitioner cannot reagitate the validity of the notification dated 10. 2. 77, the petitioner has allowed the notice dated 10.2.77 to become final and, therefore, when the success of the petition may lead to the Court's coming to a decision which will be in conflict with the notice dated 10. 2. 77, which had become final with respect to the same subject matter, the Court should not proceed with the petition. 14. In respect of the notice dated 15.2.77, it may be also added that the petitioner has not filed the original or the copy of notice impugned. Mr. Bhati, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has sub­mitted that he could not obtain the copy of it. 14. In respect of the notice dated 15.2.77, it may be also added that the petitioner has not filed the original or the copy of notice impugned. Mr. Bhati, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has sub­mitted that he could not obtain the copy of it. We are unable to accept his submission for the reason that the notice was issued to the petitioner, and the petitioner has not stated that the notice was lost. In the absence of the notice we are not in a position to ascertain the reasons which might have compelled the Superintendent to issue that notice. In this regard the Supreme Court in Surinder Singh vs. Central Government, AIR 1986 SC 2166 , has held : “The subsequent order of Shri Rajni Kant was challenged by the respondents and the High Court has quashed that order, although that order was not before the High Court as none of the parties filed the same. The respondents who had challenged the order of Shri Rajni Kant should have filed a copy of the order. In the absence of the order under challenge the High Court could not quash the same. Normally whenever an order of Govt. or some authority is impugned before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the copy of the order must be produced before it. In the absence of the impugned order it would not -be possible to-ascertain the reasons which may have impelled the authority to pass the order. It is therefore improper to quash an order which is not produced before the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. The order of the High Court could be set aside for his reason, but we think it necessary to consider the merits also.” (emphasis added) Considering the decision of the Supreme Court above, we are also unable to quash the notice dated 15. 2. 77. 15. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is not maintainable and dismissed accordingly. No costs. A. Raghurir, C. J. — I agree.