JUDGMENT V.K Mehrotra, J.—The question for consideration in these cases is whether the cross-objections, which have been filed by the claimants-respondents in the First Appeals from Order, are within the prescribed period of limitation as provided under Rule 22 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The objection which has been raised by the Registry is that the cross-objections are beyond the prescribed period of one month from the date of service on the respondents of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal. Shri Deepak Gupta, learned Counsel appearing for the Himachal Road Transport Corporation, which is the principal appellant in these F.A. Os. supports this objection. 2. Rule 22 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as it is material, is in the following terms : — "22 Upon hearing respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred separate appeal -(1) Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree but n ay also state that the finding against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour, and may also take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal, provided he has filed such objection in the Appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow. * * * * * * * * * *” 3. What has been contended by Shri Rajiv Sharma, who appears for the claimants-objectors, is that though the notice which was served upon the claimants-objectors mentions that the appeal will be heard on a particular date or on such other date to which it may be subsequently postponed, the date had not been fixed by the "Court" itself but it had been fixed by the Registry of the Court. Consequently, it could not be treated to be a date fixed for hearing of the appeal within the meaning of Rule 22. 4. Consequently, it could not be treated to be a date fixed for hearing of the appeal within the meaning of Rule 22. 4. In essence, the submission of Shri Sharma is that for computing the period of limitation for the purposes of Rule 22 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is the Court which must itself fix the date for hearing of which notice is given to the respondent(s). The mere mention of a date for hearing the appeal, which is not fixed by the Court itself, in any such notice, will be of no consequence and the cross-objection cannot be thrown out as filed beyond the period of limitation on this ground. 5. Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with appeals from original decrees. These provisions are made applicable, as far as may be, to appeals from appellate decrees. This is to be found in Order 42. 6. The Code of Civil Procedure enables the High Court to frame rules, consistent with the provisions of the Code, for regulating its practice and procedure. In exercise of the powers vested under sections 23 and 25 of the State of Himachal Pradesh Act, 1970, read with section 7 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 and section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in exercise of all the powers enabling it in that behalf, this Court has adopted the Punjab High Court Rules and Orders for regulating the practice and procedure in the Himachal Pradesh High Court subject to certain amendments made from time to time. 7. Volume V of the Rules and Orders of the Punjab High Court contains the various rules which, inter alia, govern the practice of the High Court in hearing of cases, including appeals 8. Chapter 3-A of this Volume provides in Rule 2 that the Judges will sit singly or in Benches of two or more in accordance with a roster to be prepared from time to time and that the roster will be prepared by the Deputy Registrar with the approval of Honble the Chief Justice. Rule 5 then says that a register of civil cases will be maintained in the High Court from which cases will be taken up according to the order of institution for incorporation in a weekly list. Rule 5 then says that a register of civil cases will be maintained in the High Court from which cases will be taken up according to the order of institution for incorporation in a weekly list. Cases from this list are to be transferred to the daily list and they shall then be placed before various Benches. Rule 6 provides that cases will be set down in the lists in the order of the date of admission, subject to certain exceptions mentioned in that rule and if admitted, in that order. Amongst the exceptions are cases fixed for actual dates by Judges which will be listed in the daily list next after the part-heard cases. 9. Rule 8 of this Chapter provides that parties and their advocates are required to attend the Court on the day or days for which their cases are set down in the list. The first proviso, as substituted by the amendment made by this Court in the year 1978, contemplates that : — ".........where in a case in which an intimation of actual date (Pacca Date) has been sent to a party as hereinabove and the case appears on the daily cause list ..............no further intimation to such a party other than an entry in the cause list of the date on which it is to be heard shall be necessary and the proceedings against the party failing to appear shall be deemed to be ex-parte..." 10. Part C of Chapter 3 enumerates the powers which have been delegated to the Registrar for the disposal of certain judicial matters. These powers are to be exercised by the Registrar subject to such general or special orders as may be issued by the Chief Justice from time to time. Item (ii) says that the Registrar will have "power to dispose of all matters relating to the service of notices or other processes, including substituted service, except the power to dispense with service on proforma respondents". 11. Rules of a similar nature governing appeals on the Criminal side have also been framed. It is not necessary to refer to them for the purpose of the present controversy. 12. The aforesaid rules clearly indicate that whenever a date for actual hearing is intimated by the Registry to a party in a civil appeal, the power that is exercised by the Registry is that of the Court itself. It is not necessary to refer to them for the purpose of the present controversy. 12. The aforesaid rules clearly indicate that whenever a date for actual hearing is intimated by the Registry to a party in a civil appeal, the power that is exercised by the Registry is that of the Court itself. The power of the Court is left to be exercised by the Registry by the Court itself under the express statutory provisions. 13 Rule 22 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where it talks of filing of the cross-objection "in the Appellate Court within one month from the date of service..... of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal........." envisages that the date for hearing of the appeal should be fixed by the Court or under its authority. It does not envisage that the date of hearing so intimated should be fixed by the Judge presiding in a Court. 14. If the interpretation attempted by Shri Sharma that it is the Presiding Judge in a Court who should himself fix a date for hearing of the appeal before it can be a date "fixed for hearing the appeal" for the purposes of Rule 22 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is accepted, it would make the functioning of the Court difficult. It is well-known that a very large number of appeals are instituted in the High Court and come up for disposal before it. The judicial function of the Court envisaged by Rule 11 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure is, undoubtedly, to be performed by the Presiding Judge in the Court. There can hardly be any doubt about it. But once the Presiding Judge applies his mind to the merits of the case and decides that the appeal does not deserve to be summarily dismissed but requires further hearing, notice of the date of hearing will have to issue to the respondent(s) in the appeal. 15. The Judge may choose to fix a particular date himself. In that event, no difficulty will arise. 15. The Judge may choose to fix a particular date himself. In that event, no difficulty will arise. Where, however, the Presiding Judge admits the appeal or directs that the appeal is to be heard and notice thereof should issue to the respondent(s), the intimation about the date of hearing of the appeal to the respondent(s) by the Registry is in pursuance of the decision of the learned Judge that the appeal deserves to be heard further. 16. Where, as in the case of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, the rules framed by the High Court in exercise of its statutory power envisage that the date of hearing be fixed by the Registry, any date of actual hearing communicated to the respondent(s) by the Registry as the date on which the appeal shall come up for hearing before the Court will have to be treated as the date fixed by the Court for hearing of the appeal. 17. In the present case as well, the notice which was served upon the respondents in the appeal, who have filed cross-objections, mentioned a date for the hearing of the appeal. It was not a date for the mere appearance of the respondents before this Court- There is no dispute between the parties about it. 18. The learned single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Punjab University Chandigarh v. Dr A.K. Kapoor and others, 1981 PLR 203, was examining a slightly different controversy in his decision, upon which reliance has been placed by Shri Rajiv Sharma. A reading of the judgment shows that an appeal, accompanied by an application for permission to file it in forma pauperis, was lodged before the learned District Judge, Rohtak. It was then entrusted to the learned Additional District Judge for disposal. The order that was initially passed by the Additional District Judge was of admitting the appeal and issuing notice to the respondent on payment of process-fee etc. The respondent appeared before the court even before any notice was served upon him. On the request of the learned Counsel for the parties, the matter was adjourned to different dates and ultimately on June 3, 1980, the Court passed an order fixing August 8, 1980 for arguments. The respondent had filed a cross-objection. He also filed an application for condonation of delay in filing the cross-objection. 19. On the request of the learned Counsel for the parties, the matter was adjourned to different dates and ultimately on June 3, 1980, the Court passed an order fixing August 8, 1980 for arguments. The respondent had filed a cross-objection. He also filed an application for condonation of delay in filing the cross-objection. 19. The learned single Judge, after quoting provisions of Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, said that what was to be interpreted by him in the case, were the words "the date fixed for hearing the appeal". In the circumstances of the case before him, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that, inasmuch as, the memorandum of appeal was accompanied by an application for permission to file it in forma pauper-is9 the question of there being a date for hearing of the appeal did not arise at all. To quote the words of the learned Judge : ".........Another strong circumstance which cannot be ignored is that the appeal which was filed by the respondent before the District Judge was in forma pauperis and the question of hearing of this appeal alongwith the appeal of the petitioner could never arise until and unless the matter regarding this pauperism had been decided by the Court." 20. It is obvious that the question whether the date for hearing is to be fixed by the Presiding Judge of the Court himself was not up for consideration before the learned single Judge. 21. There was some discussion before me about the question whether the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in terms apply to an appeal, like the present, against an award made by a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal or not. Some decisions were brought to my notice by the learned Counsel saying that even though the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure may not in terms apply, the principles thereof would be attracted. It is not necessary for me to go into this aspect. The only question which needs consideration is that even on assumption that Rule 22 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies in terms to proceedings like the present, can the date for hearing of the appeal intimated by the Registry be treated to be the date "fixed for hearing the appeal" for the purpose of computing limitation for filing the cross-objection under that rule. 22. 22. In view what has been said above, it must be held that the date intimated by the Registry to the respondents in the appeal as the date on which the appeal will be heard in the notice served upon the respondents shall be the date of the hearing of the appeal for the purpose of Rule 22 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, irrespective of the fact that it was not a date actually fixed by a Presiding Judge of the Court for the hearing of the appeal. 23. The objection of the Registry that the cross-objection has been filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation is to be upheld. However, it is made clear that the objection about limitation in respect of cross-objection filed in F.A.O. (M.V.A.) No. 139 of 1988 to the effect that the cross-objection was beyond the prescribed period of limitation as the claimants-objectors had been served on June 15, 1989 does not appear to be correct. On that date they were served with the notice of the stay application. The cross-objection in this case is held barred by limitation on the ground that it was filed on September 18, 1989, though the notice about the actual hearing sent by the Registry to these objectors had been served upon them on August 2, 1989. 24. As prayed by Shri Rajiv Sharma, the claimants-objectors are permitted to seek condonation of delay in the filing of the cross-objection by making a proper application in that respect. Order accordingly. -