K. J. VAIDYA, R. J. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is at instance of the original accused in Sessions Case No. 71 of 1987 which was on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge Nadiad. ( 2 ) THE case of the prosecution shortly stated was as under: ( 3 ) ACCUSED Nos. 1 and 2 are father and mother respectively of accused Nos. 3 and 4. An incident had taken place at about 5. 15 P. M. on 3-12-1986 at the entrance of Vohravad Dakore. At that time the complainant was after leaving her school going towards the house. She saw that all the accused had assembled at the corner of the pole. The prosecution had alleged that on seeing the complainant accused uttered threatening words to her. Prosecution had alleged that accused No. 2 Ansuyaben was beating the complainant with her hands. In the meanwhile Bhadrasinh the deceased husband of the complainant came on the scene riding a cycle for the purpose of going to his house. As soon as deceased Bhadrasinh came near the scene of offence accused No. 1 started to beat the deceased by inflicting blows with a stick. At that time accused No. 3 the eldest son of accused No. 1 inflicted a blow with an iron pipe on the head portion of the deceased as a result of which there was profuse bleeding from the head portion of the deceased and he fell down on the ground. Prosection had further alleged that accused No. 4 had also inflicted a blow with a stick to the deceased. The case of the prosecution further was that one Shardaben wife of Lalshanker Pandya Sumantbhai Tailor Vikrambhai and Maheshbhai Rami came at the scene of the offence and rescued the complainant and her husband and immediately thereafter the accused ran away from that place. A complaint came to be given in connection with the above offences. Investigation started pursuant to the same and ultimately it resulted in the said Sessions Case. ( 4 ) AFTER the deceased was injured he was shifted to S. S. G. Hospital Baroda but during treatment he expired on 14-12-1986 at about 12-05 hours. ( 5 ) THE learned Additional Sessions Judge Nadiad after framing charge as per Ex. Investigation started pursuant to the same and ultimately it resulted in the said Sessions Case. ( 4 ) AFTER the deceased was injured he was shifted to S. S. G. Hospital Baroda but during treatment he expired on 14-12-1986 at about 12-05 hours. ( 5 ) THE learned Additional Sessions Judge Nadiad after framing charge as per Ex. 3 recorded evidence heard the arguments and passed an order of conviction on 14-3-1988 and an order regarding sentence on 18-3-1988 in the aforesaid Sessions Case. ( 6 ) UNDER the said order of conviction : (A) Accused No. 1 was found guilty of an offence punishable under Sec. 304 Part II read with Secs. 34 323 504 506 of I. P. C. ; (b) Accused No. 2 was found guilty of an offence punishable under Sec. 304 Part II read with Secs. 34 and 504 and 323 of (c) Accused No. 3 was found guilty of an offence punishable under Sec. 304 Part II of I. P. C. ; (d) Accused No. 4 was found guilty of an offence punishable under Sec. 304 Part II read with Sec. 34 and 323 of I. P. C. ; ( 7 ) UNDER the said order of sentence accused No. 1 has been sentenced to undergo R. I. for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 3500 in default to undergo further R. I. for one year for an offence punishable under Sec. 304 Part II read with Sec. 34 of I. P. C. Accused No. 1 has also been sentenced to undergo R. I. for three months for the offence punishable under Sec. 323 I. P. C. and to undergo R. I. for three months for an offence punishable under Sec. 504 of I. P. C. and to undergo R. I. for six months for an offence punishable under Sec. 506 (1) of the I. P. C. All the substantive sentences in the case of accused No. 1 have been ordered to run concurrently. ( 8 ) UNDER the said order of sentence accused No. 3 has been sentenced to undergo R. I. for five years for an offence punishable under Sec. 304 Part II of I. P. C. ( 9 ) UNDER the said order of sentence accused Nos. ( 8 ) UNDER the said order of sentence accused No. 3 has been sentenced to undergo R. I. for five years for an offence punishable under Sec. 304 Part II of I. P. C. ( 9 ) UNDER the said order of sentence accused Nos. 2 and 4 who have been convicted as aforesaid have been directed instead of sentencing them to any punishment that each of them be released on his/her entering into a bond of Rs. 5000. 00 with two solvent sureties to appear and receive sentence when called upon during the period of two years from the date of the order of sentence and in the meantime to keep peace and be of good behaviour. It was further ordered that accused Nos. 2 and 4 should remain under the supervision of the Chief Probation Officer under the Probation of Offenders Act Nadiad for B period of two years from the date of the said order. ( 10 ) THE learned Additional Sessions Judge was further pleased to order that out of the fine of Rs. 3500. 00 if paid by accused No. 1 Rs. 3000. 00 be paid as compensation under Sec. 357 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code to the widow of deceased Bhadrasinh and if the amount of fine was deposited in the Court then payment of compensation to the widow of deceased should be made subject to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 357 of the Criminal Procedure Code. ( 11 ) BEING aggrieved by the said order of conviction and sentence the appellants-orig. accused have come in appeal. ( 12 ) AS stated above accused Nos. 1 2 and 4 are convicted `inter alia of an offence under Sec. 304 Part II read with Sec. 34 of I. P. C. It is necessary to note at this stage that the State has not come in appeal against the order of acquittal of the accused for the offence under Sec. 302 read with Sec. 34 of I. P. C. ( 13 ) SECTION 34 of the I. P. C. provides that when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. The essence of Sec. 34 is simultaneous consensus of the minds of persons participating in the criminal action to bring about a particular result. Such consensus can be developed at the spot and thereby intended by all of them. Furthermore in order to attract Sec. 34 it is not sufficient to prove that each of the participa- ting culprits had the same intention to commit a certain act What is the requisite ingredient of Sec. 34 is that each must share the intention of the other. In a given case it may be that when some persons start with a pre-arranged plan to commit a minor offence they may in the course of their committing the minor offence come to an understanding to commit the major offence as well. Such an understanding may appear from the conduct of the persons sought to be made vicariously liable for the act of the principal culprit or from some other incriminatory evidence but the conduct or other evidence must be such as not to leave any room for doubt in that behalf. When a Court wants to fasten vicarious liability it must satisfy itself as to the prior meeting of the minds of the principal culprit and his companions who are sought to be constructively made liable in respect of every act committed by the former. ( 14 ) IT is therefore necessary to scrutinise the evidence led in the case in the light of the aforesaid principles. At the outset one may notice some facts which emerged from the evidence and which are also not in dispute. All the accused are members of the same family. Accused No. 1 is a teacher by profession. He was aged about 53 years at the time of the incident. There is nothing on the record to show that upto that ap he was involved in any criminal activity. Accused No. 2 is the wife of accused No. 1 and she was aged about 50 years at the time of the incident. Accused Nos. 3 and 4 are the sons of accused Nos. 1 and 2 who were aged about 19 and 17 respectively at the time of the incident. Deceased Bhadrasinh was also a teacher. His wife Shantaben is also a teacher. Both the families therefore were living a normal settled life. ( 15 ) COMPLAINANT Shantaben P. W. 4 Ex. Accused Nos. 3 and 4 are the sons of accused Nos. 1 and 2 who were aged about 19 and 17 respectively at the time of the incident. Deceased Bhadrasinh was also a teacher. His wife Shantaben is also a teacher. Both the families therefore were living a normal settled life. ( 15 ) COMPLAINANT Shantaben P. W. 4 Ex. 37 has stated in her evidence that the deceased was serving as Principal in the School at Jakhed. In the same school accused No. 1 was serving as an Assistant Teacher. The complainant has broadly given out the aforesaid version of the prosecution in her evidence. Complainant has deposed `inter alia that since about a year prior to the date of the incident namely 3 there was ill-feeling between accused No. 1 and her husband and that they had also quarrelled in the school itself. At that time the deceased had asked for police protection. She has also deposed that one day prior to the incident her husband had brought the pay of all the teachers in the said school at home which pay was distributed on 3-12-1986. On a day previous to the incident the deceased had told her that there was a cut of one day in the pay of accused No. 1. In her cross-examination the complainant has deposed that the relations between the two families had become strained because there was a dispute regarding seniority in between the deceased and accused No. 1 ant that despite the said dispute regarding seniority. the deceased and accused No. 1 had continued to work as teachers in the same school. In the cross-examination of the complainant the complainant had denied that her deceased husband had given a out of one day in the pay of accused No. 1 without any justifiable reasons that she did not know that the accused No. 1 had told the deceased that if he would give the said cut then accused No. 1 would observe fast and that it was not true that because accused No. 1 had stated to observe fast as aforesaid the deceased had become excited and had tried to beat accused No. 1. Taking the best view of the aforesaid evidence of the complainant it would seem that there was a somewhat long standing dispute regarding seniority in between the deceased and the accused No. 1. Taking the best view of the aforesaid evidence of the complainant it would seem that there was a somewhat long standing dispute regarding seniority in between the deceased and the accused No. 1. It would seem in the aforesaid circumstances that the proximate cause of the incident was because of cut of one days pay sought to be given by the deceased in the case of accused No. 1. Beyond the aforesaid there is no other evidence regarding motive on the part of the accused. ( 16 ) AT this stages it is necessary to examine the evidence of Dr. Kishore P. Desai P. W. 2 Ex. 22 who has carried out post-mortem examination the dead body of the deceased. He had noticed three external injuries on the person of the deceased one was on a part of the head second was a scratch on the elbow portion of the right hand and the third was also a scratch on the rear portion of the thigh. The internal injuries noted by Dr. Kishore Desai were as under: dr. Desai has opined in his evidence that the aforesaid external injury No. 1 was correlated to all the injuries noticed by him that all the injuries noticed by him were ante-mortem and that the death had resulted because of the aforesaid bead injury as a result of which there had been profuse bleeding. Dr. Desai has further deposed in his evidence that all the aforesaid injuries namely the external injury No. 1 with the internal injuries noted by him. were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Dr. Desai has also deposed that the same were possible by the pipe which was muddamal Article No. 6. In his cross-examination Dr. Desai has disposed that external injuries Nos. 2 and 3 were most simple injuries. It appears that an effort was made in the cross-examination of Dr. Desai to how that death was not the result of the aforesaid head injury but was a result of some negligence or some other cause. Reading the evidence of Dr. Desai as a whole there is no reason to doubt that the death was the result of the aforesaid head injury. One finds nothing in the cross- examination of of. Desai to show that Dr. Reading the evidence of Dr. Desai as a whole there is no reason to doubt that the death was the result of the aforesaid head injury. One finds nothing in the cross- examination of of. Desai to show that Dr. Desai was entertaining any other opinion regarding the head injuries noticed by him as stated above during post-mortem examination. The learned Advocate for the accused also has not emphasised in his submissions that the death was a result in the present case due to some other intervening factors and not a direct result of the aforesaid head injury. ( 17 ) WHEN one has to consider the aspect of common intention on the part of such accused in such an incident then it does not seem that to all the accused had entertained an intention to bring about the death of the deceased and had acted pursuant to the same sharing the common intention. If it was otherwise then many more injuries would have been caused to the deceased than were noticed as aforesaid. It is in evidence that two of the accused. namely accused No. 1 and 4 were with sticks sod accused No. 3 was with an iron pipe. If those sticks and iron pipe were used pursuant to any such common intention to cause death of the deceased. then several other injuries would have been noticed on the dead body of the deceased. The evidence led by the prosecution itself shows that accused No. 1 bad never aimed on a vital part of the body of the deceased and at best. be bad given one blow only with a stick. 50 far as accused No 3 is contended the evidence held by the prosecution itself show that be had wielded the pipe only once. There were no repeated blows either with pipe or stick. There is no evidence worth the name to blow that accused No 4 had wielded his stick so as to cause stick injuries to the deceased. If there of the accused including two accused who were young and energetic bad decided or planned to bring about a murder of the deceased. then in all probability the aforesaid would not have been the only injuries to be noticed on the person of the deceased. If there of the accused including two accused who were young and energetic bad decided or planned to bring about a murder of the deceased. then in all probability the aforesaid would not have been the only injuries to be noticed on the person of the deceased. As stated above according to the complaint herself it was she who was beaten be accused No. 2 and that too with hands. The compliant had not claimed that any of the accused had wielded any stick or pipe on her. The deceased was coming on a cycle and taking the test view of the prosecution evidence he was attacked only in the manner aforesaid. Along with the aforesaid factors the evidence regarding motive which has been referred to hereinabove is certainly no evidence of any strong motive. The dispute regarding seniority and a cut of one days ray. even if it is believed to be true. would not infuriate a person like the accused No. 1 or for that matter persons like accused Nos. 3 and 4 who were just coming up and who were members of a family which was headed by a school teacher to entertain a common intention to bring about the death of the deceased The subsequent conduct of accused Nos. 1 3 and 4 also shows that none of them has given any repeated blows. That certainly would not be the conduct of all or any of the accused who were out to kill the deceased. Apart from the aforesaid from the evidence led in the case it is difficult to cull out as to when that common intention to murder the deceased developed in the present case if at all. The incident as narrated by the complaint bad started only with the besting of the complainant at best and that too with hands by accused No. 2. When the deceased carne on the scene he was at best attacked in the manner aforesaid. There is no evidence that any of accused Nos. 1 3 and 4 had uttered anything at that time to show that their intention was to murder the deceased. There is labor no evidence in the case to show that by any action of accused No. 1 3 and 4 they had disclosed that their intention was to murder the deceased. 1 3 and 4 had uttered anything at that time to show that their intention was to murder the deceased. There is labor no evidence in the case to show that by any action of accused No. 1 3 and 4 they had disclosed that their intention was to murder the deceased. To say the least the evidence regarding common intention in the present case to murder the deceased is very feable even if of takes the most favourable view in favour of the prosecution of the- evidence led in this connection. To impose vicarious liability on the accused with the aid of Sec. 34 I. P. C. is B very serious matter particularly when a person has died. Persons cannot in such a case either convicted lightly or be acquitted likely. The evidence have weighed very closely when constructive liability is to be fastened upon the accused. In the entirety of the evidence we are firmly of the opinion that the evidence in the present case regarding common intention to murder the deceased on the part of the or any of the annual fall short when one considers the requirements of Sec. 14 of the I. P. C in this connection The conclusion therefore in this connection is that there is no evidence regarding common intention for committing an offence under Sec. 302 read with Sec. 34 I. P. C or Sec. 304 Part II read with Sec. 34 I. P. C. on the basis of which one can conclude the the case has been established beyond reasonable doubt in this connection by the prosecution. ( 18 ) THIS brings us to another consideration namely whether there was any common intention even to cause in offence which is lesser than an offence under Sec. 302 of the I. P. C. on the part of accused Nos. 1 3 and 4 or on the part of all the accused. The charge No. 3 is also on the said basis but as stated hereinabove the conviction under Sec. 323 504 and 506 (1) of the I. P. C. in the case of accused No. 1 the conviction under Secs. 1 3 and 4 or on the part of all the accused. The charge No. 3 is also on the said basis but as stated hereinabove the conviction under Sec. 323 504 and 506 (1) of the I. P. C. in the case of accused No. 1 the conviction under Secs. 504 and 323 of the I. P. C. in the case of accused No. 2 and the conviction in the case of focused No. 4 under Sec. 323 of I. P. C. have not been with the aid of Sec. 34 of the I. P. C. The case of the prosecution in this connection Therefore was negatived by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. The state has not come in appeal before this Court in respect of the said negation of the case of the prosecution. It would therefore seem that in an appeal at the instance of the original accused this aspect cannot be gave into be this Court. In that view of the matter this aspect of the matter need not detain us any further ( 19 ) WE shall now proceed to consider the appellants case regarding accused No. 1 for his conviction under Secs. 323 504 and 506 of the I. P. C. As stated hereinabove accused No. 1 has been sentenced to R. I. for three months for an offence under Sec. 323 of the I. P. C. to undergo R. I. for 3 months for an offence under Sec. 504 of the I. P. C. as well as to undergo R. I. for six months for offence under Sec. 506 (1) of the I. P. C. As stated above all the substantive sentences in the case of the accused No. 1 have been ordered to run concurrently. Learned Advocate for the appellants Mt. Shethna has fairly stated before us that in view of the evidence on record it is not possible for him to challenge the convictions of accused No. 1 under the said sections. He however brings it to our notice that accused No. 1 has been in prison on 6-12-1986 that he hat been bailed out upto 14-12-1986 and from 15-12-1986 accused No. 1 is continuously in prison to further brings it to our notice that accused No. 1 was sentenced to undergo R I. for five years and also to pay a file of Rs. 3500. 3500. 00 for an offence punishable under Sec. 304 Part II read with Sec. 34 of the I. P. C. We have already held herein- above that the order of conviction under Sec. 304 Part II read with Sec. 34 I. P. C. cannot be sustained and has to be set aside. That would leave the aforesaid order in the case of accused No 1 regarding minor offences. If the aforesaid conviction regarding major offence under Sec. 304 Part II read with Sec. 34 of I. P. C. in the case of accused No. 1 no longer survives and if the trial Court had come to the same conclusion then certain other considerations would have been in the field before the trial Court itself. If the trial Court had recorded In order of acquittal regarding the aforesaid major offence in the case of accused No. 1 then the trial Court would have proceeded to consider the case of the accused No. 1 from different angles namely whether there was any scope for releasing accused No. 1 on probation. The trial Court also would have considered in those contingencies the personal factors regarding accused No. 1 namely that he was living a settled way of life that he was aged 58 years that his past was without any blemish that he was nearing the retirement age and an order of conviction even regarding the minor offences would have meant for him a total loss of all pensionary benefits. The aforesaid could have been weighty considerations which the trial Court itself would have had to consider if it had not recorded a finding regarding conviction for the aforesaid major offence under Sec. 304 Part II of the I. P. C. When this Court now is of the view that the said order regarding major conviction cannot be sustained in the facts and circum- stances of the case those very considerations are placed before us by the learned Advocate for accused No. 1. In addition learned Advocate for the accused No. 1 has submitted that wheels of time cannot be put in the reverse gear meaning thereby that it is not possible to undo what has been done to accused No. 1 who has languished in jail as stated herein above. That also in our opinion is a weighty aspect of the matter before us. That also in our opinion is a weighty aspect of the matter before us. ( 20 ) TO lend support to the aforesaid considerations Mr. Shethna has invited our attention to the decision in the case of Rajbir v. State of Haryana 1986 GLH 117. In this case before the Supreme Court four persons were convicted under Sec. 304 Part II and Sec. 323 both read with Sec. 34 of the I. P. C. by the Sessions Judge Bhiwani. The accused went in appeal to the High Court and the conviction of all except one under Sec. 304 Part II was set aside but the conviction under Sec. 323 of the I. P. C. along with the sentence was maintained. It has been observed in the said judgment that from the judgment of the High Court it appeared that though the sentence imposed for the offence under Sec. 323 of the I. P. C was six months the appellant and the co-accused had already suffered over one years imprisonment; and that ordinarily in such a situation there would be no need for the Supreme Court to interfere. The Supreme Court however considered that the appellant was in Government service and if the conviction and sentence were maintained he would lose his service. The Supreme Court then considered the facts of the case before them and ultimately reached a conclusion that since there was no material on the record to indicate that the appellant had any previous conviction in absence of such evidence the Supreme Court treated the appellant as a first offender. The Supreme Court in that view of the matter admitted the appellant to the benefits of probation under Sec. 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act 1958 taking into consideration the circumstances of the case the nature of the offence and the character of the appellant. The Supreme Court had specifically observed that they were of the view that in the peculiar facts of the case the conviction should not affect his service. . ( 21 ) THE ratio of the said decision is clearly applicable in the case of accused No. 1. We have already narrated hereinabove the peculiar facts of the present case also and it is not necessary to repeat them. . ( 21 ) THE ratio of the said decision is clearly applicable in the case of accused No. 1. We have already narrated hereinabove the peculiar facts of the present case also and it is not necessary to repeat them. It is however to be highlighted that accused No. 1 is a person who has led a normal life upto the age of 58 years; who has no previous convictions; who felt that his right regarding seniors was adversely affected for no fault of his own and who was a teacher by profession. There is also nothing on the record to show that his service career had any blemish. Unlike the case before the Supreme Court in the present case the conviction for those minor offences are not in conjunction with Sec. 34 of I. P. C. There is also an additional strong circumstances in favour of accused No. 1 that he has already served out the sentence to the extent mentioned above and has lost a precious period of his life languishing in jail. We have therefore no hesitation in reaching a conclusion that accused No. 1 is entitled to the benefit of probation under Sec. 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act 1958 taking into consideration all the aforesaid weighty considerations. ( 22 ) THIS brings us to considering the case regarding accused Nos. 2 and 4. As stated above accused No. 2 was found guilty of an offence punishable under Sec. 304 Part II read with Sec. 34 of the I P. C. For the reasons stated above this conviction cannot be sustained. Accused No. 2 has also been convicted under Secs. 504 and 323 of the I. P. C. for which offence accused No. 2 has been directed instead of imposing any punishment that she be released on her entering into a bond of Rs. 5000. 00 with two sureties to appear and receive sentence when called upon during the period of two years from the date of the order of sentence and in the meantime to keep peace and be of good behaviour. Mr. Shethna representing accused No. 2 has made the submission regarding conviction for the aforesaid minor offences in her case that he cannot with emphasis challenge the said order of conviction in view of the evidence led in the case. Mr. Shethna representing accused No. 2 has made the submission regarding conviction for the aforesaid minor offences in her case that he cannot with emphasis challenge the said order of conviction in view of the evidence led in the case. The most part of the period of two years as fixed under the order of the trial Court is over by now. In the peculiar facts of the case it would be in the interest of justice to reduce the said period to one of one year instead of two years in the case of accused No. 2. ( 23 ) SO far as accused No. 4 is concerned he has also been convicted for the offence under Sec. 304 Part II read with Sec. 34 of I. P. C as also for as offence under Sec. 323 of the I. P. C. In the case of accused No. 4 the conviction under Sec. 304 Part II read with Sec. 34 I. P. C. has to be set aside for the reasons afore mentioned. For the offence under Sec. 323 I. P. C. the case of accused No. 4 is more or less on the same footing as that of accused No. 2 and he has also been given the benefit of probation of the Offenders Act as stated in the judgment of the trial Court The age of accused No. 4 was only 17 years at the time of incident. No useful purpose would be served by sending him to jail. So far as his conviction under Sec. 323 I. P. C. is concerned Mr. Shethna has fairly stated that he is unable to challenge the same in view of the evidence led in the case. In the case of accused No. 4 except to the extent mentioned above regarding the said offence under Sec. 304 Part It read with Sec. 34 I. P. C. we confirm the order of conviction and sentence. ( 24 ) WE now proceed to consider the case regarding accused No. 3 who has been sentenced to undergo R. I. for five years for an offence under Sec. 304 Part II of the I. P. C. There is no reason to doubt the evidence against him regarding his giving a blow to the deceased with an iron pipe. ( 24 ) WE now proceed to consider the case regarding accused No. 3 who has been sentenced to undergo R. I. for five years for an offence under Sec. 304 Part II of the I. P. C. There is no reason to doubt the evidence against him regarding his giving a blow to the deceased with an iron pipe. He has been convicted for his individual act in that connection under Sec. 304 Part II of the I. P. C. and sentenced to undergo R. I. for five years. In view of the evidence on record Mr. Shethna has fairly submitted that he is not in a position to challenge with emphasis the order of conviction in the case of accused No. 3 under Sec. 304 Part II of I. P. C. He however with emphasis has urged before us that accused No. 3 was a young man aged about 19 years at the time of the offence. Accused No. 3 also has been in jail for the same period as in the case of accused No. 1 so far. Mr. Divetia tells mo that accused No. 3 was on parole for about a month and that the probable date of release in the case of accused No. 3 on the basis that he has fully served out the sentence is 14-5-1990. the aforesaid makes it evident that accused No. 3 has undergone a major part of the sentence by now. Mr. Divetia further informs us that the conduct of the accused No. 3 in jail is good and that he has committed no jail offence. It is also to be appreciated that the present is not 8 case which has arisen at the instance of persons who are common criminals or habitual offenders. Of course it is unfortunate that such an incident should have happened but then also the totality of the circumstances existing in a case have always got to be taken into consideration while considering the aspect of sentence in a particular case. The relevant importance of a person being in jail and of a person being out of jail has a great impact on the society and it also has an impact on the individual himself. The relevant importance of a person being in jail and of a person being out of jail has a great impact on the society and it also has an impact on the individual himself. There are persons who cannot be suffered out of jail because of the attending circumstances in their case but those are also persons who should not be in jail for a period which is more than necessary. Taking an overall view of the entire set of circumstances prevailing in the present case no useful purpose would be served by keeping accused No. 3 any longer in jail. On the contrary it might harden his attitude towards life his conduct contact with other criminals may also bring about undesirable results and his rehabilitation h society the longer it is delayed the more it would become difficult. All the same we do not propose to give him any benefit under the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act considering the circumstances of the case but then we consider that the sentence imposed by the trial Court in his case needs to be reduced to the sentence undergone. At the same time considering that it is at the hands of accused No. 3 that a fatal incident has occurred we deem it fit on the one band to reduce the sentence of imprisonment as the sentence having been undergone and on the other to impose a fine of Rs. 3500. 00 on accused No. 3 and out of the said fine Rs. 3000. 00 be paid to the widow of the deceased as compensation under Sec. 357 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. ( 25 ) THE appeal is therefore partly allowed. ( 26 ) THE order of conviction and sentence in the case of accused No. 1 for an offence under Sec. 304 Part II read with Sec. 34 I. P. C. he quashed and set aside and fine if paid be refunded. The convictions under Secs. 323 504 and 506 (1) of the I. P. C. are confirmed but so far as the sentences regarding aforesaid minor offences are concerned he be given benefit of probation under Sec. 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act 1958 and he be released on his entering into J bond of Rs. 5000. The convictions under Secs. 323 504 and 506 (1) of the I. P. C. are confirmed but so far as the sentences regarding aforesaid minor offences are concerned he be given benefit of probation under Sec. 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act 1958 and he be released on his entering into J bond of Rs. 5000. 00 with two solvent sureties to appear and receive sentence when called upon during the period of three months from the date of the present order and in the meantime to keep peace and be of good behaviour. We also made it clear that in the peculiar facts of the present case the order of conviction in the case of accused No. 1 should not affect his service. ( 27 ) THE order of conviction and sentence in the case of accused No. 2 for an offence under Sec. 304 Part II read with Sec. 34 I. P. C. is quashed and set aside. The convictions under Secs. 504 and 323 I. P. C. are confirmed but the period of bond is reduced from two years to one year. ( 28 ) THE order of conviction In the case of the accused No. 3 for the offence under Sec. 304 Part II I. P. C. is confirmed but the sentence is reduced to the one already undergone by him and a fine of Rs. 3500 imposed on him and out of the said amount of fine. Rs. 3000. 00 be paid to the widow of deceased as compensation under Sec. 357 (1) of Criminal Procedure Code. The amount of Rs. 3000. 00 be paid to the widow of the deceased as early as possible as accused No. 3 has stated through his Advocate that the said fine will be deposited in the Court on or before 7-11-1989. ( 29 ) THE order of conviction and sentence in the case of accused No. 4 for an offence under Sec. 304 Part II read with Sec. 34 I. P. C. is quashed and set aside. The order of conviction and sentence for an offence under Sec. 323 I. P. C. as passed by the trial Court is confirmed. (KMV) appeal partly allowed. .