JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner entered the Government service as a Lower Division Clerk in the Rajasthan Canal Project. Thereafter, he was transferred to the Directorate of N.C.C. w.e.f. 19.5.1967. He was transferred from Jaipur to Ajmer vide order dated 4.9.1982. He filed a civil suit in the court of Additional Munsif, Jaipur City (West) Jaipur. Along with the suit, he also filed an application for grant of temporary injunction which was granted to him. 2. A memorandum dated 21.12.1982 was issued by the Deputy Director (Administration), proposing an enquiry under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification. Control and Appeal) Rules. 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules of 1958'). A charge-sheet was given to the petitioner on 9.8.1984. He submitted reply to the charge-sheet on 22.9.1984. After completion of the enquiry, a penalty of compulsory retirement with proportionate pension was inflicted vide order dated 1.10.1985. Against the order dated 1.10.1985, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 1786/1985 Vasudeo K. Hardasani v. State of Rajasthan and others in which following order was passed:- "16.10.85 In this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the order Annexure-17 dated 1.10.85 whereby the penally of compulsory retirement has been imposed on him in departmental proceedings instituted under Rajasthan Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1958. An appeal lies against the aforesaid order under the said rules. In view of the fact that remedy of appeal is available to the petitioner, the writ petition cannot be entertained. The writ petition is dismissed summarily. Sd/- S.C. Agrawal, J." 3. The petitioner preferred an appeal on 2.12.85 (vide Annexure-7) but the same was dismissed vide order dated 27.9.1986 (Annexure-8). The petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging both the orders dated 1.10.85 and 27.9.86. 4. The writ petition was admitted and notices were issued. Reply has been filed on behalf of the respondents. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. We have gone through the statement of allegations on the basis of which charges were framed. They relate to an incident which happened on 12.4.1982, where the petitioner is alleged to have used abusive and derogatory language to Mr. K.S. Shekhawat. LDC and L.R. Malik. Office Assistant and also inflicted a fist blow on the mouth of L.R. Malik, and tried to pick up the steel chair 2-3 times in order to hurt Mr. Malik. They relate to an incident which happened on 12.4.1982, where the petitioner is alleged to have used abusive and derogatory language to Mr. K.S. Shekhawat. LDC and L.R. Malik. Office Assistant and also inflicted a fist blow on the mouth of L.R. Malik, and tried to pick up the steel chair 2-3 times in order to hurt Mr. Malik. He also made a telephone call from the office to call some one to help him. In all four charges were framed against the petitioner. 6. We have gone though the report of the Enquiry Officer (Annexure R-2). The Enquiry Officer, after considering the evidence, has stated that from the above, not much credence can be given except that there was a definite fight between Shri V.K. Hardasani and Shri Lakhiram Malik. The Enquiry Officer has not very categorically and pacifically given any firm finding as to whether the allegations No. 1, 2 and 3 have been proved though it can be inferred that according to the Enquiry Officer, these charges have been proved. As regards Charge No. 4. the Enquiry Officer has categorically stated that it is not sufficiently proved. The Disciplinary Authority in its order dated 1.10.1985 (Annexure-6) has only reproduced the four charges levelled again to the petitioner and mentioned about holding of enquiry but has not discussed any evidence and has merely stated 'on perusal of the findings given by the Enquiry Officer most of the charges have been found established', and thereafter, has mentioned that Charges No. 1, 2 and 3 have been found proved and charge No. 4 partly proved against the petitioner and therefore, the petitioner deserved to be strictly penalised. The Disciplinary Authority has not even referred to the defence or the reply submitted by the petitioner against the charge-sheet. The order dated 27.9.86 passed by the Appellate Authority is laconic and cannot be called a speaking order. At this stage, we shall like to refer to Rule 16 (7), 16(8) and 16(9) of the Rules of 1958, which are reproduced below:- "Rule 16 (7) At the conclusion of the inquiry, the inquiring authority shall prepare a report of the inquiry, recording its findings on each of the charges together with reasons therefore. At this stage, we shall like to refer to Rule 16 (7), 16(8) and 16(9) of the Rules of 1958, which are reproduced below:- "Rule 16 (7) At the conclusion of the inquiry, the inquiring authority shall prepare a report of the inquiry, recording its findings on each of the charges together with reasons therefore. If in the opinion of such authority the proceedings of the inquiry establish charges different from those originally framed it may record findings on such charges provided that findings on such charges shall not be recorded unless the Government Servant has admitted the facts constituting them or has had an opportunity of defending himself against them. Rule 16 (8) The record of the inquiry shall include (i) The charges framed against the Government Servant and the statement of allegations furnished to him under sub-rule (2); (ii) his written statement of defence, if any; (iii) the oral evidence taken in the course of the enquiry; (iv) the documentary evidence considered in the course of the enquiry; (v) the orders, if any, made by the Disciplinary Authority and the Inquiring Authority in regard to the inquiry; and (vi) A report setting out the findings on each charge and the reasons therefor. Rule 16 (9) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it is not the Inquiring Authority, consider the record of the inquiry and record its findings on each charge. The Disciplinary Authority may while considering the report of the Inquiring Authority for just and sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing remand the case for further/de novo enquiry, in case it has reason to believe that the enquiry already conducted has been laconic in some respect or the other". 7. In the present the Disciplinary Authority was different from the Inquiring Authority and therefore it was necessary for the disciplinary authority to consider the record of the enquiry and also to record its own finding on each charge. A perusal of order dated 1.10.85 (Anx. 6) shows that the Disciplinary Authority has only considered the enquiry report and not the whole record of the enquiry and specially the defence of the petitioner and has failed to record its own finding on each charge. Thus, there is a clear violation of Rule 16(9) of the Rules of 1958. 8. A perusal of order dated 1.10.85 (Anx. 6) shows that the Disciplinary Authority has only considered the enquiry report and not the whole record of the enquiry and specially the defence of the petitioner and has failed to record its own finding on each charge. Thus, there is a clear violation of Rule 16(9) of the Rules of 1958. 8. Rule 30(2) of the Rules of 1958 provides that the appellate authority shall consider whether the procedure prescribed in these Rules has been complied with and if not whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any provision of the Constitution or in failure of justice. It further imposes a duty on the appellate authority to ascertain whether the facts on which the order was passed have been established and further whether the facts established afford sufficient justification for making the order and further whether the penalty imposed is excessive, adequate or inadequate. 9. When we look at the order (Annexure-8) passed by the Appellate Authority we find that the appellate authority has not followed the mandate of Rule 30(2), and thus the order of the appellate authority is also vitiated. 10. Supreme Court in Ram Chander v. Union of India & ors. ( AIR 1986 SC 1173 ) has very specifically stated that the Appellate Authority should pass a reasoned order dealing with the contentions raised before it in appeal. A mechanical production of the phraseology of the rule will not be sufficient.The appellate authority should marshal the evidence on record with a view to decide about the sustainability of the finding recorded by the disciplinary authority and the order passed should show that the appellate authority has applied its mind and considered the objections raised in the appeal. This becomes all the more important after the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution. The word 'consider' means an objective consideration by the Appellate Authority after due application of mind which implies giving of reasons for its decision. In view of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it is not necessary for us to elaborate this argument and we find that both the orders of the disciplinary authority as well as that of the appellate authority cannot be upheld and the impugned orders are laconic and cryptic. 11. In view of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it is not necessary for us to elaborate this argument and we find that both the orders of the disciplinary authority as well as that of the appellate authority cannot be upheld and the impugned orders are laconic and cryptic. 11. It may however be noted that the enquiry was field only against the present petitioner, though it was relating to a dispute or quarrel between the petitioner and L.R. Malik. Moreover, the petitioner was not supplied with the copy of the enquiry report as required by Rule 16 (12) of the Rules of 1958. 12. In the result, this writ petition is allowed, the order dated 1.10.1985 (Annexure-6) as also the order dated 27.9.86 (Annexure-8) are hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be deemed to be in continuous service and shall also be entitled to all consequential benefits. 13. No order as to costs.Petition allowed. *******