JUDGMENT - H.H. KANTHARIA, J.:---The petitioner, Sukhdeo Chokha Waghmare, was appointed as a casual Mazdoor on August 26, 1954 by the Bombay Port Trust (hereinafter referred to as 'the first respondent"). The second respondent, Deputy Docks Manager of the Bombay Port Trust, is the administrative head under whom the petitioner was working and the third respondent is the Chairman of the said Port Trust. 2. At the time of his selection to the post of a registered mazdoor in the year 1962, the petitioner was referred to the Medical Officer of the first respondent for ascertaining his age on medical examination. The medical officer issued a certificate specifying the date of birth to the petitioner as July 1, 1926 purely on a medical examination. Accordingly, the date of birth of the petitioner was recorded in the official records of the first respondent as July 1, 1926. 3. Thereafter, on November 17, 1983 when the petitioner was work-king as 'Cart Wagon Unloader' he received a memo from the office of the first respondent informing him that his date of birth as shown in the records of the administration was 1-7-1926 and, therefore, he would retire from the services on 1-7-1984 at the age of 58. The petitioner was also informed that in case he wished to contest the above date of birth, he should do so before December 31, 1983 by producing reliable material such as birth registry extract, school leaving certificate etc. and if he did not do so before December 31, 1983 his claim in that behalf will not be entertained. 4. In reply, the petitioner by a letter dated January 16, 1984 informed the Docks Manager of the first respondent that his correct date of birth was May 3, 1933 and not July 1, 1926 in support of his claim, he sent a school leaving certificate issued to him by the Headmaster of the Zilla Parishad School, Avlai, taluka Atpadi, Dist Sangli. He also pointed out that in the said school leaving certificates his surname was shown as 'Mahar' which was really his caste and his surname was Waghmare. He also assured the first respondent that the school leaving certificate enclosed by him was a genuine and correct document pertaining to him alone and requested that his date of birth be corrected as May 3, 1933. 5. He also assured the first respondent that the school leaving certificate enclosed by him was a genuine and correct document pertaining to him alone and requested that his date of birth be corrected as May 3, 1933. 5. The petitioner received a reply dated February 6, 1984 from the office of the Docks Manager informing him that his request for a change in the date of birth was not accepted as his application in that behalf was received after the stipulated period and hence he would retire from July 1, 1984. 6. The petitioner then appealed to the third respondent by a letter dated April 24, 1984 pointing out that he was trying to get the school leaving certificate for a long time but the Headmaster of the school did not search out the old record and delayed the matter of issuing the school leaving certificate to him and, therefore, there was delay of sixteen days in sending the school leaving certificate to the authorities of the first respondent and requested that the said delay be condoned and the record be rectified in the matter of his correct date of birth. 7. Since the petitioner did not receive any response from the third respondent, he filed Writ Petition No.1339 of 1984 in this Court on June 24, 1984. When the said writ petition came up for admission on June 29, 1984, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent asked for an adjournment to consider the case of the petitioner. His request was granted. The writ petition then came up for admission on July 24, 1984 when it was rejected. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed Appeal No. 749 of 1984 in the month of August, 1984. On August 20, 1984 the Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents asked for two weeks time as the appeal of the petitioner was pending before the third respondent. On September 27, 1984, it was stated on behalf of respondents that the order of the Chairman would be communicated to the petitioner soon and, therefore, the petitioner withdrew his appeal. Then the third respondent rejected the claim of the petitioner for a change in the date of birth by a letter dated November 5, 1984. On September 27, 1984, it was stated on behalf of respondents that the order of the Chairman would be communicated to the petitioner soon and, therefore, the petitioner withdrew his appeal. Then the third respondent rejected the claim of the petitioner for a change in the date of birth by a letter dated November 5, 1984. The petitioner, however, sent another school leaving certificate to the third respondent as the third respondent was of the view that the earlier school leaving certificate was incomplete. The petitioner also sent a certificate issued by the Gram Panchayat showing that his caste was Mahar and that there was no other person in the village by name Sukhdeo Chokha Waghmare except the petitioner. But to the misfortune of the petitioner he received a communication dated February 20, 1985 from the office of the first respondent that the Deputy Chairman of the Bombay Port Trust had considered his submissions and after going through the copy of the fresh school leaving certificate his claim for a change in the date of birth was rejected as there was a discrepancy in the date of birth shown in the school leaving certificate and the one stated in his Advocate's letter dated December 21, 1984. 8. Thus, the petitioner was retired from services with effect from July 1, 1984. Hence he filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on February 26, 1985. At the time of his forced retirement, the monthly emoluments of the petitioner were Rs. 1,541.80. 9. In support of the petition, Miss Sikandar submitted that at the time of the appointment of the petitioner no birth certificate was asked for by the respondents and his date of birth was recorded as 1-7-1926 along with a thousand more in the most arbitrary manner on a medical test. She further submitted that after thirty years of service when the petitioner was called upon to produce proof of his date of birth, the one in the nature of school leaving certificate which the petitioner had produced should have been readily accepted by the respondents instead of rejecting the same on technical grounds. On behalf of the respondents, Mr. She further submitted that after thirty years of service when the petitioner was called upon to produce proof of his date of birth, the one in the nature of school leaving certificate which the petitioner had produced should have been readily accepted by the respondents instead of rejecting the same on technical grounds. On behalf of the respondents, Mr. Dwarkadas urged that the school leaving certificate produced by the petitioner was lacking in material particulars as many columns therein were blank and as there was no supporting evidence in proof of the genuineness of the said certificate, the same was rejected. 10. It is painful to note that unfortunately the public body like the Bombay Port Trust preferred to reject the rightful claim about the correct date of birth of the poor petitioner on the most flimsy and technical grounds. I shudder to think that there could be such heartless and ruthless bureaucrats occupying high positions in the public sector undertakings who refuse to see reasons and inflict economic death sentence on a member of the economically and socially weaker section of the society by depriving him of his very source of livelihood The manner in which it was done is cruel and reprehensible. I am constrained to express my deep feeling of agony and indignance for the reasons to follow hereinafter. 11. Now, it is for the first time after about thirty years of service that the petitioner was called upon by the respondents to contest his date of birth only on 17-11-1983. He was given about one and a half months time to do so. He was asked to produce reliable material such as birth registry extract, school leaving certificate etc. in proof of his correct date of birth on or before 31-12-83. The petitioner produced his school leaving certificate but late by sixteen days on 16-1-1984 and therefore, the same was not acceptable to the Deputy Chairman of the first respondent and not because he doubted the genuineness of the said certificate. According to the Deputy Chairman it was received late (to put in his own words, 'within less than six months period prior to the applicant's date of retirement'). It is not known from where did this six months rule come in the way of the petitioner. No such rule is shown to me by the respondents. According to the Deputy Chairman it was received late (to put in his own words, 'within less than six months period prior to the applicant's date of retirement'). It is not known from where did this six months rule come in the way of the petitioner. No such rule is shown to me by the respondents. Can anyone be so unreasonable, arbitrary and technical minded as the Deputy Chairman of the first respondent ? In my opinion, unless the said officer honestly believed that the school leaving certificate produced by the petitioner was bogus, he should have accepted it in favour of the petitioner. 12. The petitioner then appealed to the third respondent by a letter dated 24-4-1984 pointing out that he was late by sixteen days in submitting the school leaving certificate because of the lapses on the part of his school authorities in not issuing the leaving certificate in time. He entreated the third respondent to be kind enough to ignore the delay of sixteen days and order the Docks Manager to correct his date of birth but in vain. Therefore it appears that the petitioner once again approached the respondents by a letter dated 2-8-1984 to which the Deputy Docks Manager replied on 5-11-1984 that now they would not accept the school leaving certificate because it was not complete as it did not show the place of birth, school previously attended, the standard in which he was studying progress in the school, conduct in the school etc. and the date of leaving the school. It is true that the school leaving certificate in question is silent on these particulars but the same were not available in the original register No. 1 from which the leaving certificate was prepared. In my judgment, except the information about the place of birth, the other particulars were not very much relevant and germane to the point in issue. However, the affidavit of Vinjamuri Rangnath filed on behalf of the respondents shows that an officer of the respondents was deputed to verify the contents of the leaving certificate and he went and met the Headmaster of the school of the petitioner. The said officer found that the school leaving certificate was in accordance with the previous school leaving certificate tendered by the petitioner. The said officer found that the school leaving certificate was in accordance with the previous school leaving certificate tendered by the petitioner. And the date of birth of the petitioner as shown in the original records of the school was not in dispute. That being so, the respondents should have, without the slightest hesitation and murmur, accepted the date of birth of the petitioner as 3-5-1933 and should have corrected the service record accordingly but alas that was not to be. The respondents were adamant in denying the legitimate claim of the petitioner. And that they did in still more crude and unjust manner as under. 13. Thus, an Advocate of the petitioner represented his case to the first respondent by a letter dated 21-12-1984. However, as it is said that when miseries come they do not come singly but in battalion, the learned Advocate made a mistake in quoting the date of birth of the petitioner as 1-6-1940 probably because at column number six of the school leaving certificate the date of entry in the school was mentioned as 1-6-1940. The respondents taking advantage of this mistake committed by the Advocate now rejected the claim of the petitioner by a letter dated 20-2-1985 on the ground that there was a discrepancy in the date of birth as shown in the school leaving certificate and the one stated in the advocate's letter. 14. It is pertinent to note here that the respondents spared no stone unturned in harassing, humiliating and torturing the petitioner even in this Court inasmuch as, as stated earlier in the initial stages of the long spell of this law battle between two unequals, the respondents obtained adjournments to consider the case of the petitioner. They repeated the same exercise even at the final stage of hearing by getting some adjournments before me one the ground that papers were put up before the third respondent for considering the case of the petitioner. The respondents perhaps knew it well that delay was bound to defeat justice. But thanks to the persistent perseverance of the petitioner and the untiring efforts of his lawyer that they proved the respondents wrong. 15. The most distressing and disquieting feature of this matter is that the respondents adopted such an unreasonable attitude despite a couple of judgments passed against them in the past on the same point in similar matters. But thanks to the persistent perseverance of the petitioner and the untiring efforts of his lawyer that they proved the respondents wrong. 15. The most distressing and disquieting feature of this matter is that the respondents adopted such an unreasonable attitude despite a couple of judgments passed against them in the past on the same point in similar matters. They ignored those judgments with impunity. That is really sad and bad. 16. Thus, way back in the year 1981 (to be exact on December 18, 1981) a Division Bench of this Court (Chandurkar and Mehta, JJ) while dealing with a similar matter in Appeal No. 373 of 1981 in case of (Laxman Sakharam Kurade v. Trustees of Bombay Port Trust and another)1, had noticed that the appellant there, along with 300 others, was employed as a mazdoor by the Bombay Port Trust when the dates of birth in respect of those 300 persons were entered in the service records as July 1,1923 on medical tests on the basis of which they were sought to be retired on superannuation from July 1, 1981. The appellant therein was also called upon to produce documents in support of his correct date of birth such as a certificate of birth registry, school leaving certificate etc. before 31-12-1980, failing which his claim would not be entertained. He produced an extract of the entry from the birth register before the authorities of the first respondent but the same was rejected on the ground that he was late in doing so by two and a half months. The Division Bench had then criticized the practice followed by the first respondent and had allowed the appeal with costs directing them to deal with the claim of the appellant with regard to his correct date of birth according to law after giving him necessary opportunity if authorities found that the certificates produced by him was either doubtful or not genuine. The Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal Nos. The Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal Nos. 3484 and 3485 of 1984 in case of (Sanboina Anjan Velly another v. Trustees of the Bombay Port Trust, Bombay and others.)2, by an order dated August 24, 1984 had directed the respondents (Bombay Port Trust) that the date of birth of appellant No. 1 Sanboina Anjan Velly be entered as 26-10-1930 and that of appellant No. 2 Dashrath Khandu Gaikwad as 26-10-1926 and they be allowed to retire in due course on the basis of those dates. The Supreme Court had then sounded a word of advice to the Bombay Port Trust that in such cases it was expected from them to take a lenient view of the matter. Then by a judgment and order dated October 8, 1985 a Single Judge of this Court (Kurdukar, J.) while disposing of Writ Petition No. 1519 of 1982 in case of (Gangaram Tatoo Bansode v. Trustees of Bombay Port Trust and another)3, had struck down the order of the Bombay Port Trust retiring the petitioner therein with effect from 30th June, 1982 with directions that the petitioner would be entitled to all the benefits as permissible in law, had he not been made to retire on 30th June, 1982. The facts were similar as obtaining in the instant case inasmuch as the petitioner there was recruited by the Bombay Port Trust along with 200 more when their dates of birth were entered in the service records as July 1, 1924 on the basis of medical examination. He was also asked to produce documentary evidence such as certificate of birth registry, school leaving certificate etc. on or before 31-12-1981, failing which his claim for alteration in the date of birth would not be entertained. He submitted a birth extract from his village records according to which his date of birth was April 5, 1927. Later, he submitted a school leaving certificate wherein his date of birth was shown as August 1, 1928. His claim for a change in the date of birth was rejected by the Chairman of the Bombay Port Trust as there was a discrepancy regarding the date of birth in the two documents. He was made to retire accordingly on the ground that his correct date of birth was one mentioned in the service records as 1-7-1924 on the medical examination. Mr. He was made to retire accordingly on the ground that his correct date of birth was one mentioned in the service records as 1-7-1924 on the medical examination. Mr. Justice Kurdukar held that the action of the Bombay Port Trust was not accordance with law and that the correct date of birth of the petitioner was 5-4-1927 and not 1-7-1924. 17. It is matter of great regret that the bureaucrats occupying high positions in the office of the Bombay Port Trust refused to be guided by the observations made as above by the Supreme Court and this Court. The instant case is, therefore, a glaring example of bureaucratic woodenness and insensitivity. The impugned order of the respondents retiring the petitioner effective from July 1, 1984, was bad in law and against all cannons of justice, equity and fairplay. It is also important to note here that the concerned officers of the first respondent were obsessed with "1st July". In the three matters which came up before this Court "1st July" was the date of birth entered in the service records of 300, 200 and 1000 employees at a time. This shows total non-application of mind on the part of the concerned Officers of the first respondent in the matter of recruiting mazdoors. And for one I am not able to understand as to how a date of birth of a particular person can be established by means of a medical examination. At the most by such method approximate age, with a margin of error on either side, can be made out. Therefore, the approach of the respondents in fixing the date of birth of the present petitioner and several other mazdoors on medical tests was also irrational. The patently arbitrary act of the respondents in this case of not rectifying the date of birth of petitioner and retiring him wrongly from 1-7-1984 cannot be sustained in law. 18. In this view of the matter, the impugned order of the respondents retiring the petitioner from service with effect from July 1, 1984 is quashed and set aside. The respondents are accordingly directed to correct the date of birth of the petitioner as May 3, 1933 in his service records. 18. In this view of the matter, the impugned order of the respondents retiring the petitioner from service with effect from July 1, 1984 is quashed and set aside. The respondents are accordingly directed to correct the date of birth of the petitioner as May 3, 1933 in his service records. As a necessary consequence the petitioner shall be entitled to continue in the services of the first respondent till he attained the age of 58 on the basis of his correct date of birth as May 3, 1933. The respondents are, therefore, directed to reinstate him forthwith and pay the accumulated wages in the ascending scale as if he had retired on 1-7-1984 The respondents are directed to work out the arrears of wages due to the petitioner in the manner indicated above and disburse the same to him with interest at the rate of 6% per annum on or before August 8, 1989, failing which they shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of 15% per annum effective from August 9, 1989 on the accrued amount. 19. The respondents are also directed to pay to the petitioner the total amount due to him on the aforesaid basis, less such amount as may be considered by them due thereon towards income-tax. However, as the payment to be made to the petitioner is in reality the payment of arrears of back wages and other monetary benefits, the petitioner would be entitled to have the same spread over the entire relevant period of the financial/assessment years for which the said payment relates. The petitioners will be, therefore, at liberty to make an application accordingly to the Income-tax Officer having jurisdiction in the matter for such relief under section 89 of the Income-tax Act. The concerned Income-tax Officer shall grant to the petitioner relief accordingly within thirty days of the receipt of the said application. On such relief being granted, the respondents shall then pay over to the petitioner the amount earlier retained by them towards income-tax. Accordingly, the respondents are directed to pay to the petitioner initially the total amount (less reasonable amount towards income-tax) latest by August 8, 1989 and thereafter the retained amount towards income-tax within two weeks of the petitioner intimating to the third respondent the relief granted to him under section 89 of the Income-Tax Act. 20. Accordingly, the respondents are directed to pay to the petitioner initially the total amount (less reasonable amount towards income-tax) latest by August 8, 1989 and thereafter the retained amount towards income-tax within two weeks of the petitioner intimating to the third respondent the relief granted to him under section 89 of the Income-Tax Act. 20. In view of the fact that the high and mighty concerned officers of the first respondent harassed, humiliated and tortured the petitioner for five years not only by illegally retiring him but also by seeking adjournments form this Court on the ground that they would consider his case, I am inclined to pass an order of heavy cost against the respondents. 21. Rule is made absolute in the terms aforesaid with cost of Rs. 5,000/- by the respondents to the petitioner. 22. Before parting with the matter I may indicate my strong feeling that the manner in which the concerned officers of the first respondent are indulging in the activity of hiring and firing the poor mazdoors, the same requires an in-depth study and investigation by the trustees of the Bombay Port Trust. I hope and trust that they will take such steps as they may deem just and proper and atleast recover the amount of cost awarded to the petitioner personally from the erring officers. The Prothonotary and Senior Master of this Court is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the trustees of the Bombay Port Trust. Rule made absolute. -----