JUDGMENT Nainar Sundaram, J. 1. The second appeal arises out of the present suit O.S. No. 280 of 1981, on the file of the District Munsif, Kallakurichi. The suit is one for declaration of title and injunction. The plaintiff in the present suit was a claimant in respect of an attachment over the suit property in O.S. No. 290 of 1967 on the file of the District Munsif, Kallakurichi, which was a suit filed by one Sadayan Asari against the second defendant in the present suit in respect of a promissory note, executed by her husband Murugesa Asari. The plaintiff in the present suit put forth a claim to the suit property under the cover of the sale deed, dated 24-4-1967 executed by the second-defendant herein. The claim of the plaintiff was dismissed and the plaintiff was obliged to file O.S. No. 656 of 1971 on the file of the District Munsif, Kallakurichi, for setting aside the summary order. That suit was decreed by the first Court There was an appeal A.S.No. 447 of 1973 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore, by Sadayan Asari, the decree-holder in O.S. No. 290 of 1967. In the appeal A.S.No. 447 of 1973, the decree of the first court was set aside and the suit O.S.No. 656 of 1971 was dismissed. There the matter rested for the time being Another litigation cropped up in O.O. No. 113 of 1975 on the file of the District Munsif, Kallakurichi. That was a suit for partition filed by one Vengachi alias Veerammal, who is the fourth defendant in the present suit against the plaintiff and defendants 2, 3 and 5 in the present suit In the suit for partition, the question arose as to whether the sale dated 24-4-1967 in favour of the first defendant in that suit, who was the claimant in the earlier litigation and the plaintiff in the present suit, could be upheld. The decision by the first Court on this question went against the first defendant in that suit, who is the plaintiff in the present suit. The decision on the claim for partition went against the plaintiff in that suit, the fourth-defendant in the present suit. The decision by the first Court on this question went against the first defendant in that suit, who is the plaintiff in the present suit. The decision on the claim for partition went against the plaintiff in that suit, the fourth-defendant in the present suit. It was held, taking note of the decision in A.S. No. 447 of 1973 that the first-defendant in O.S. No. 113 of 1975, the plaintiff in the present suit, could not have title to the suit property. The appeal A.S. No. 46 of 1978 by the plaintiff in O.S. No. 113 of 1975, the fourth-defendant in the present suit, and the memorandum of cross appeal by the first-defendant in that suit, the plaintiff in the present suit, were dismissed. Yet the plaintiff has laid the present suit O.S. No. 280 of 1981 for declaration of title and injunction. The first Court decreed the suit However, on appeal, the lower Appellate Court took a different view and taking note of the decision in the claim suit O.O. No. 656 of 1971, as rendered by the lower Appellate Court in A.S. No. 447 of 1973, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. This has obliged the plaintiff to prefer the present second appeal. 2. When the second appeal was heard, by the learned single Judge, it was urged before him that the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Narasimhachariar v. Raghava Padayachi (1945) 2 M.L.J. 89 (F.B.), 58 L.W. 354, has been approved by the Supreme Court in Mangru v. Taraknathji, and the observations of the Division Bench of this Court in Peda Ramireddi v. Bichalu (1952) I M.L.J. 475 : 65 L.W. 261, do not seem to be in accord with the ruling of the Full Bench in Narasimhachariar v. Raghava Padayachi (1945) 2 M.L.J. 89 F.B., 58 L.W. 354. The learned single Judge felt that though the concerned aspect has not been touched upon by the Supreme Court, yet as to what would be the effect of the observations of the Division Bench in Peda Ramireddi v. Bichalu (1952) I M.L.J. 475, 65 L.W. 261, in the light of the confirmation by the Supreme Court that (he view of the Full Bench has got to be decided by a Full Bench and in that view made the reference and that is how the matter is now before us. The Order of Reference of the learned single Judge reads as follows: Mohan, J. 1. A very important question of law arises in this case, namely, as to what would be the effect of a suit under Order 21, Rule 63, Civil Procedure Code (before amendment), where the claim is allowed or disallowed, and the suit being decreed, whether that judgment in that claim suit would operate as res judicata. The question has become some what difficult because in Narasimhachariar v. Raghava Padayachi (1945) 2 M.L.J. 89 , 58 L.W. 354, it was held at page 92 after overruling the Division Bench ruling to Singariah Chetty v. Chinnabi (1920) 40 M.L.J. 7 : I.L.R. 44. Mad. 268 : (1920) 12 L.W. 725 , as follows: The opinion expressed by Ramesam, J., in Kumara Goundan v. Thevaraya Reddi (1924) 48 M.L.J. 616, that the filing of a suit under Order 21, Rule 63, makes all the difference cannot be accepted without qualification. It is conclusive between the parties to the suit or their representatives so far as the execution of the particular decree is concerned; but where the property is sold in execution proceedings arising out of an entirely different decree, the claimant will not be precluded from setting up his title as against a stranger purchaser. If the attachment has not led to the sale of the property all those concerned, even if there has been a suit under Rule 63 will be left in the same position as they were before the attachment, except that the decree-holder will be at liberty to institute fresh proceedings in execution of the same decree without any right remaining in the claimant to reagitate his claim. Subject to the operation of the doctrine of res judicata in any particular case, we hold that an order on a claim petition filed under Order 21, Rule 58, or a decree in a suit filed under Rule 63 does not extend beyond the execution of the decree which has given rise to those proceedings." "2. Subject to the operation of the doctrine of res judicata in any particular case, we hold that an order on a claim petition filed under Order 21, Rule 58, or a decree in a suit filed under Rule 63 does not extend beyond the execution of the decree which has given rise to those proceedings." "2. In the decision reported in Peda Rami Reddi v. Bichalu 1952 1 MLJ 475 , 65 L.W. 261, the learned Judges of the Division Bench have opined as under : We do not think that the observations in Narasimhachariar v. Raghava Padayachi (1945) 2 M.L.J. 89 : 58 L.W. 354, lend themselves to the interpretation that in no case will the decision given in a suit under Order 21, Rule 63 with reference to title to property would operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit. That this is so is clear from the observations of the learned Judges at page 93 of the same report: Subject to the operation of the doctrine or res judicata in any particular case, we hold that an order on a claim petition filed under Order 21, Rule 58, or a decree in a suit filed under Rule 63 does not extend beyond the execution of the decree which has given rise to those proceedings. It is clear from this statement of law that the learned Judges did not intend to lay down that in no case would the doctrine of res judicata apply to a decision given under Order 21, Rule 63. The earlier observations must be understood in the light of this later statement of law contained in the same judgment and we may take it that the former related to a case where the rule of res judicata would have no application, as for instance, in a suit instituted by the claimant or by the decree-holder, the judgment-debtor was not made a party and the right was only between the claimant and the decree-holder. Viewed in that light, we think there is no conflict between the two statements of law contained in the same judgment. We should not assume that the learned judges laid down a conflicting dicta. Viewed in that light, we think there is no conflict between the two statements of law contained in the same judgment. We should not assume that the learned judges laid down a conflicting dicta. In these circumstances in our judgment the decision in Narasimhachariar v. Raghava Padayachi (1945) 2 M.L.J. 89 , 58 L.W. 354, is not in any way conflicting with the ruling in Munni Bai v. Tirloki Nath (1931) 61 M.L.J. 196 and does not carry the respondent very far. In our opinion, the judgment given in the earlier suit under Order 21, Rule 63 would operate as res judicata as between co-defendants provided the three requisite conditions for the applicability of the rule of res judicata mentioned above are satisfied." The ruling of the Full Bench has come to be approved in Mangru v. Tarakeshwar Math (1931) 61 M.L.J. 196. Prima facie, the observations of the Division Bench in Peda Ramireddy v. Bichalu (1952) 1 M.L.J. 475 : 65 L.W. 261, as extracted above, do not seem to be in accord with the ruling of the Full Bench. Though this particular aspect has not been touched upon by the Supreme Court, as to what would be the effect of these observations in the light of the confirmation by the Supreme Court, of the view of the Full Bench, is an important question to be decided in this case, in order that this question is likely to arise frequently and there being no authoritative ruling in this regard. I direct the papers be placed before My Lord the honorable Chief Justice for reference to a Full Bench as His lordship may desire. 3. Mr. S. Gopalarathnam, the learned Counsel for the respondents submits that in view of the fact that the interim injunction has been made absolute, his clients are put to serious difficulties and therefore, an early hearing of the matter will be in the interest of justice. I make note of this point and it is for the learned Counsel for the respondents to pray for expeditious disposal of the matter. 4. We heard exhaustive submissions by Mr. R. Alagar, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant/the plaintiff in the present suit, as well as by Mr. S. Gopalarathnam, learned Counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 3. I make note of this point and it is for the learned Counsel for the respondents to pray for expeditious disposal of the matter. 4. We heard exhaustive submissions by Mr. R. Alagar, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant/the plaintiff in the present suit, as well as by Mr. S. Gopalarathnam, learned Counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 3. In Mangru v. Taraknathji the claim proceedings under Order 21, Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure, before its amendment by Central Act 104 of 1976, were not prosecuted further after the decision therein went against the claimant and in that context it was observed that an order in the claim proceedings does not operate as res judicata and it is because of Order 21, Rule 63 of that order becomes conclusive and the effect of Order 21, Rule 63 is that unless the suit is brought as provided by that rule, the party against whom the order in the claim proceedings is made or any person claiming through him cannot repaginate in any other suit or proceeding against the order other party or any person claiming through him, the question whether the property was or was not liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree out of which the claim proceedings arose, but the bar of Rule 63 extends no further. While doing so, the Supreme Court referred to with approval the decision of the Full Bench in Narasimhachariar v. Raghava Padayachi (1945) 2 M.L.J. 89 : 58 L.W. 354. 4. In Narasimhachariar v. Raghava Padayachi (1945) 2 M.L.J. 89 : 58 L.W. 354, the question arose as to whether the order passed dismissing an objection preferred to an attachment under Order 21, Rule 58, no suit having been filed under Rule 63(underlining by us to supply emphasis) operates beyond proceedings in execution of the particular decree. In Singariah Chetty v. Chinnabi (1920) 40 M.L J. 7 : I.L.R. 44 Mad. 268, (1920) 12 L.W. 725 . Ayling and Odgers, JJ., held, however, that an order on a claim petition which has not been set aside in a suit by the claimant under Order 21, Rule 63, becomes conclusive not only for the purpose of the execution of the decree in connection with which the claim was preferred, but also of the execution of other decrees between the same parties. This view was over ruled by the Full Bench in the following terms: The decision in Singariah Chetty v. Chinnabai (1920) 40 M.L.J. 7 : (1920) 12 L.W. 725 : I.L.R. 44 Mad. 268, has been criticised by this Court. The criticism is to be found in the judgment of Ramesam, J., sitting with Venkatasubba Rao, J., in Kurnara Goundan v. Thevaraya Reddi (1919)38 M.L.J. 397. Mr. Justice Ramesam was of the opinion that an order passed in a claim inquiry did not continue to be operative after the cessation of the attachment in a case where no suit was filed, but he thought that the filing of a suit under Order 21, Rule 63 made all the difference. We consider that the criticism of Singariah Chetty v. Chinnabi (1919) 38 M.L.J. 397, is well founded. As we have pointed out, Rule 58 of Order 21 only applies to a claim preferred or an objection made to the order of attachment in the particular execution proceedings. The statement in Rule 63 that an order passed on the claim or objection shall, subject to a suit, be conclusive must be read in conjunction with Rule 58 which speaks of 'such attachment' We think that it would be unreasonable to hold that the intention of the Legislature was to make the order conclusive for all purposes inside and outside the particular execution proceedings. Of course, if the dismissal of the claim or objection resulted in the property being sold in execution, the title claimed by the objector would pass to the purchaser at the Court-auction; but we are not considering a case of that nature. The Court is concerned merely with a case where the execution proceedings have not resulted in a sale. If the decision in Singariah Chetty v. Chinnabi (1920) 40 M.L.J. 7 : I.L.R. 44. Mad. 268 : (1920) 12 L.W. 725 , were allowed to stand, it would mean that a person in the position of the plaintiff would not be able to enforce his mortgage, notwithstanding that the decree-holder who instituted the execution proceedings had been satisfied by the judgment-debtor by the payment of the decretal amount and the payment had resulted in the attachment being raised. Thereafter, the Full Bench made the observations extracted in the Order of reference made by the learned single Judge. 5. Thereafter, the Full Bench made the observations extracted in the Order of reference made by the learned single Judge. 5. In Mangru v. Taraknathji (1919) 38 M.L.J. 397, the claimant against whom an adverse order was passed under Order 21, Rule 58 did not file any suit under Order 21, Rule 63 and it was contended before the Supreme Court that since the claimant did not file such a suit, the adverse order passed under Order 21, Rule 58, would operate as res judicata. This contention was rejected in the following terms: We think that this contention should be rejected. In view of the orders passed against Kasinath in the claim proceedings and his failure to institute suits under Order 21, Rule 63, Civil Procedure Code, Kasinath was precluded from claiming that he had the right to attach the suit lands in execution of his money decree, but he was not precluded from claiming that he had the right to sell the lands in execution of his mortgage decree. Rule 58 to 62 of Order 21, Civil Procedure Code provide for a summary investigation of the claims and objections to the attachment of any property attached in execution of a decree. The issue in the proceeding is whether 'such property is liable to such attachment'. If the claim is allowed, the property is released from attachment (R.60). If the claim is disallowed, the attachment continues (R.61). If the property is subject to mortgage or charge in favour of some person not in possession, the attachment may be continued subject to such mortgage or charge (R.62). The party against whom an order is made in the claim proceeding may institute a suit to establish the right which he claims to the property in dispute, but subject to the result of such suit, if any, the order is conclusive (R.63). If no suit is brought under Rule 63 within the prescribed period of limitation, the order in the claim proceeding is conclusive on the question whether the property was or was not liable to attachment and sale in execution of the particular decree. But the order is not conclusive for all purposes. See Kandadai Narasimhachariar v. Raghava Padayachi I.L.R. 1946. Mad. 79 : A.I.R. 1945. Mad. 333. (F.B.). A claim proceeding under Rule 58 is not a suit or a proceeding analogous to a suit. But the order is not conclusive for all purposes. See Kandadai Narasimhachariar v. Raghava Padayachi I.L.R. 1946. Mad. 79 : A.I.R. 1945. Mad. 333. (F.B.). A claim proceeding under Rule 58 is not a suit or a proceeding analogous to a suit. An order in the claim proceeding does not operate as res judicata. It is because of Rule 63 that unless a suit is brought as provided by the Rule, the party against whom the order in the claim proceeding is made or any person claiming through him cannot reagitate in any other suit or proceeding against the other party or any person claiming through him the question whether the property was or was not liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree out of which the claim proceeding arose, but the bar of Rule 63 extends no further. The above passage, in the pronouncement of the Supreme Court, clearly brings out the ratio laid down by it. While laying down the ratio, the Supreme Court approved the view of the Full Bench of this Court that the order in claim proceedings when no suit is brought under Rule 63, is not conclusive for all purposes. 6. The observations in Peda Ramireddi v. Bichalu (1952) I M.L.J. 475 : 65 L.W. 261, extracted by the learned single Judge in this Order of Reference came to be made in a different context and while considering the. question as to whether the judgment given in the earlier suit under Order 21, Rule 63 would operate as res judicata as between the defendants. It was sought to be argued before the Division Bench that the view of the Full Bench in Narasimha Chariar v. Raghava Padayachi (1945) 2 M.L.J. 89 : 58 L.W. 354, is in conflict with the ruling in Munni Bai v. Tirloki Nath (1931) 61 M.L.J. 96. This argument was not countenanced and the view was categorically expressed that the judgment given in the earlier suit under Order 21, Rule 63, will operate as res judicata as between co-defendants, provided the three requisite conditions for the applicability of the rule of res judicata are satisfied. 7. This argument was not countenanced and the view was categorically expressed that the judgment given in the earlier suit under Order 21, Rule 63, will operate as res judicata as between co-defendants, provided the three requisite conditions for the applicability of the rule of res judicata are satisfied. 7. Thus, on an analysis of the pronouncements placed before us, we find that the decision of the Supreme Court in Mangru v. Taraknathji A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1390 was rendered with regard to the implications of an unsuccessful claimant not taking up the matter further as contemplated under Order 21, Rule 63, and the force of Order 21, Rule 63 coming in the way as a bar with regard to further agitation by him on the question as to whether the property was or was not liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree out of which the claim proceedings arose. It was opined that the bar of Rule 63 extends no further. The approval by the Supreme Court of the ratio of the Full Bench could only be understood as confined to the above aspect. As already noted, the decision of the Division Bench in Peda Rami Reddy v. Bichalu (1952) 1 M.L.J. 475 : 65 L.W. 261 was rendered in the different context. In our view ultimately the question as to whether a decision in a suit filed pursuant to Order 21, Rule 63 will operate as res judicata in subsequent litigation will depend upon the scope of the controversy in that suit, and as to whether the matter was directly and substantially in issue in the suit between the same parties or between the parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such an issue has been subsequently raised and has been heard and decided finally by such Court within the meaning of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Certainly, there, are Explanations in Section 11 before the amendments brought in by Central Act 104 of 1976, to provide guidance as to the scope and amplitude of such implications. Apart from making the above statement, we do not find a necessarily to decide the main Second Appeal, which will have to be decided on merits by the learned single Judge, who hears it. Apart from making the above statement, we do not find a necessarily to decide the main Second Appeal, which will have to be decided on merits by the learned single Judge, who hears it. We make the above order in this Reference. We make no order as to costs.