JUDGMENT K.M. Natarajan, J. 1. The unsuccessful wife before the Lower Appellate Court has preferred this second appeal. 2. The facts which are necessary for the disposal of this appeal can be briefly stated as follows: The respondent herein filed the petition H.M.O.P. No. 35 of 1983 Under Section 13(1)(a) of the Hindu-Marriage Act for dissolution of the marriage between him and his wife, the appellant herein. The case of the respondent is that the marriage between him and the appellant took place on 26.3.1980 as per Hindu sastricrites and the custom of the community and thereafter they lived together amicably for about seven months. The appellant went to Coimbatore in May, 1982 for confinement and later she gave birth to a male child. Arunkumar. About seven months after delivery, the respondent went to Coimbatore and requested the appellant to return to Karur along with him. She refused to come and live with the respondent. All efforts taken by the respondent to prevail upon her to return to Karur proved to be of no avail. The appellant had deserted the respondent without any reasonable or probable cause. Subsequently, he gave a notice on29.3.1983 through his counsel. The appellant sent a reply with false, frivolous and defamatory allegations and she had gone to the extent of saying that the respondent is a womaniser, drunkard and gambler and further the respondent is a person who would go to the extent of earning through his wife by hook or by crook thereby describing the respondent as a pimp. The above allegations made in the reply have inflicted mental agony to the respondent and as such she has committed legal cruelty to the respondent. Hence the respondent filed the petition for divorce. 3. The said petition was resisted by the appellant herein and in the counter, she denied the allegations levelled by the respondent and inter alia contended as follows: It is stated that after the customary functions with regard to the birth of the child, the appellant and the child were sent with the respondent to Karur. On 2.12.1982 the respondent himself came with the child and the appellant to the appellant's parents' house at midnight stating that the child was seriously ill and that there was no responsive treatment at Karur. Thereafter the child was admitted in Ramakrishna Hospital. On 2.12.1982 the respondent himself came with the child and the appellant to the appellant's parents' house at midnight stating that the child was seriously ill and that there was no responsive treatment at Karur. Thereafter the child was admitted in Ramakrishna Hospital. Coimbatore with the help of the brother of the appellant, and the respondent left for Karur promising that he would come on the next day with necessary money for medical expenses. But, he did not do so. The alleged mediation and persuasion by the respondent to the appellant to return to Karur are all false. In the reply notice she has clearly expressed her desire to join with the respondent and she only stated therein under what circumstances she led her life with the respondent. It is further stated that she had no intention to attribute qualities to the respondent as he is her own husband. Everything stated in the reply notice is only in the fond hope of the respondent's reformation and not for any other purpose. However, she would aver that the respondent is addicted to liquor and he is in the habit of staying out for days together. He used to appear suddenly on one midnight under the influence of drink and begin to beat the appellant without any reason, It is only the respondent who started beating and scolding the appellant for want of Seer-varisai within three months after marriage. His mother and sister also treated the appellant very cruelly. The respondent is also in bad company/having intimacy with bad character men and women. All efforts taken by her to relieve the respondent from the clutches of bad company proved to be of no avail. It is only the respondent who totally neglected the appellant and the child, and due to the wayward character of the respondent, she had to stay with her family. The appellant was always trying to join the respondent. Hence she prayed for the dismissal of the petition. 4. The trial sub Judge framed four issues with regard to the alleged desertion and cruelty on the pleadings. On the side of the respondent, he examined himself as P.W.1 and another witness P.W.2, and Ex.A.1 notice and Ex.A.2 reply were marked. On the side of the appellant, she examined herself as R.W.1 and Ex. B.1 to B.8 were marked. 4. The trial sub Judge framed four issues with regard to the alleged desertion and cruelty on the pleadings. On the side of the respondent, he examined himself as P.W.1 and another witness P.W.2, and Ex.A.1 notice and Ex.A.2 reply were marked. On the side of the appellant, she examined herself as R.W.1 and Ex. B.1 to B.8 were marked. The Sub Judge for the reasons assigned in his judgment dismissed the petition holding that the respondent has not made out any case for grant of dissolution. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent filed the appeal before the District Judge in C.M.A. No. 9 of 1986. The District Judge on the basis of the allegations stated in the reply notice came to the conclusion that those allegations would amount to legal cruelty and consequently allowed the appeal and granted a decree for divorce. The aggrieved wife has preferred this second appeal and the same was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the lower appellate court is justified in granting a decree for divorce solely relying on Ex.A-2 overlooking that Ex A-2 did not contain any wilful allegation but was written only under provocative circumstances in order to reform the respondent herein? 2. Whether the lower appellate court is justified in reversing the well considered judgment given in respect on both the grounds? 5. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, Mr. K.Sampath, took me through the recorded evidence and the material papers and submitted that ExA.2 was given only by way of reply requesting the advocate for the respondent to advise the respondent suitably so as to make him live with her and she has categorically expressed her willingness to condone his acts of cruelty and join with him even in the said reply notice. According to the learned Counsel, the mere allegations in the circumstances of the case would not constitute mental cruelty in the absence of any evidence to support the same. He would further submit that the lower appellate court failed to consider whether the respondent's conduct was provocative, Unsympathetic and aggressive, and also erred in finding the appellant guilty of cruelty. 6. The learned Counsel for the appellant drew the attention of this Court to certain decisions in support of his contentions. He would further submit that the lower appellate court failed to consider whether the respondent's conduct was provocative, Unsympathetic and aggressive, and also erred in finding the appellant guilty of cruelty. 6. The learned Counsel for the appellant drew the attention of this Court to certain decisions in support of his contentions. Before ever adverting to those decisions, it is worth while to discuss the facts which are necessary for appreciating the above contentions. Under Ex.A-1 the respondent herein sent the notice dated 29.3.1982 through his lawyer to the appellant herein, wherein he has called upon the appellant to come and live with him within three days, failing which he will be constrained to file a petition for restitution of conjugal rights or for divorce, to which the appellant sent a reply notice dated 12.4.1983(Ex.A.2) wherein she has stated in more than three places that her husband is an addict and that he is also a womaniser and a gambler. She has also stated that he wanted her to have illicit connection with his friends for the purpose of earning money. No doubt, she has stated that the has no intention to live away from her husband, but, in view of the above acts, it is not possible for her to live with him unless his counsel interfered and meditated and advised her husband. She also sent a reminder (Ex.B.2) in pursuance of Ex.A.2. The respondent filed the petition for dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act alleging that the appellant herein in her reply has gone to the extent of saying that he is a womanizer, drunkard and a gambler and that she has also averred in her reply that the respondent is a person who will go to the extent of earning through his wife by hook or by crook and that she has also averred in the reply that he is a pimp. He has also stated that even though the respondent was willing at the time of issuing the notice for restitution of conjugal rights and even though the respondent was with the fond hope to have an amicable family life, the allegations stated by the appellant in her reply have inflicted an injury which cannot be healed. The appellant has added insult to the injury by alleging several untenable and defamatory allegations in her reply notice. The appellant has added insult to the injury by alleging several untenable and defamatory allegations in her reply notice. Hence he filed the petition for dissolution of marriage. In the counter filed by the appellant herein, she reiterated the allegations in para 8 by stating that the respondent is an addict to liquor and that he is in the habit of staying out for days together even without informing the family. After an absence of 2 or 3 days, he used to appear suddenly in the dead of midnight and under the influence of drink and start beating her. In para 10 of the counter, she has stated that the respondent is in a bad company having intimacy, with bad charactered men and women. No doubt, she has also stated in the counter that in the reply notice she has clearly expressed her desire to join with the respondent, that she has only stated under what circumstances she led a life with the respondent, that she has no intention to attribute qualities to the respondent as he is her own husband and that everything stated in the reply notice is only in the fond hope of the respondent's reformation and not for any other purpose. It is also noticed that the respondent, who was examined as P.W.1, would state in his chief-examination that in the reply notice his wife, namely, the appellant herein, levelled false accusations and that it is not possible for him to live with her. He has also stated that he was never an addict and he was not a womanizer and that all those allegations contra are all false. In cross-examination the evidence of this witness viz the petitioner/husband in this regard has not been challenged. No suggestion was put that those allegations were made only with a view to reform the respondent or join with him and that those allegations are neither true nor correct. Hence the said evidence of P.W.1 in Chief-examination stands unrebutted. Above all even in court when she was examined as R.W.1, she has reiterated the said allegations. In chief-examination, she has stated that her husband is a drunkard and that he is also a womanizer. Hence the said evidence of P.W.1 in Chief-examination stands unrebutted. Above all even in court when she was examined as R.W.1, she has reiterated the said allegations. In chief-examination, she has stated that her husband is a drunkard and that he is also a womanizer. She has also stated that her husband brought a friend to the Nursing Home where her child was admitted, that they returned without paying money, that her husband found fault with her for not moving with his friend freely as he desired and that hence he returned without paying money. In cross-examination also, she repeatedly said that her husband was having those bad habits even during the stay at Erode and other places. She took the entire responsibility for the allegations made in the reply notice Ex.A.2. When she was questioned as to when her husband asked her to agree for illicit connection with other men. she stated that she did not remember the time or the date or the place-whether it was Karur or Erode. However, she reiterated that it is a fact that her husband asked her to have illicit connection with other men for money, she also stated that her husband used to take liquor and return to the house and that he used to play gambling even in the house. She added that he has got illicit intimacy with other women. When she was questioned as to the particulars of the women, she would state that she cannot specifically state. She has also stated that from the medical check up by doctor she came to know that he was having connection with other womenfolk. Through she has stated that she has given a complaint to the -police against her husband as stated in Ex.A.2, she denied having given such a complaint. She admitted having stated in Ex.A.2 that her father-in-law stood surety for her husband in criminal cases against him. When questioned about this, she has stated that from what she heard from one Kandasami, she has writtenin Ex.A.2. She has stated in more than one place that unless her husband's counsel gave assurance and guarantee, it is not possible for her to go and live with him. She cannot believe the assurance given by her mother-in-law. When questioned about this, she has stated that from what she heard from one Kandasami, she has writtenin Ex.A.2. She has stated in more than one place that unless her husband's counsel gave assurance and guarantee, it is not possible for her to go and live with him. She cannot believe the assurance given by her mother-in-law. She also admitted having made allegations against her husband to the Managing Director of Jeeva Transport where her husband is employed and requested him to transfer her husband to some other place. She fairly conceded that she has not made such allegation in Ex.B.3 to B.5 letters sent by her. Thus it is clear that she has consistently stated in various stages that her husband is an addict to liquor and that he is a womanizer and gambler. According to the appellant, the respondent has gone to the extent of attempting to earn money through his wife acting as a pimp. The question how far those averments constitute mental cruelty is to be decided in the light of the decisions cited on behalf of both the parties. 7. The learned Counsel for the appellant drew the attention of this Court to the decision in Keshao Rao v. Nisha where the meaning of the word 'cruely' as a ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(i-a) had been considered. In that case, it was held: The cruelty contemplated under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act neither attracts the old English doctrine of danger nor the statutory limits embodied in old Section 10(1)(b). The cruelty contemplated is a conduct of such type that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. In Ashwini Kumar Sehgal v. Smt. Swatantar Sehgal 1979 Mat. LR. 26 (Pun. & Har.), it was observed: Cruelty in such cases has to be of the type which should satisfy the conscience of the court to believe that the relations between, parties had deteriorated to such an extent due to the conduct of one of the supouses that it has become impossible for them to live together without mental agony, torture and distress. The cruelty need not be of such a character as to cause danger to life, limb or health or to give rise to and that it has to be of the type contemplated under Section 10(1)(b). The cruelty need not be of such a character as to cause danger to life, limb or health or to give rise to and that it has to be of the type contemplated under Section 10(1)(b). The learned Counsel for the appellant drew the attention of the court to the decision in Bijoli Choudhury v. Sukomal Choudhury wherein it was held: The question of mental cruelty should be answered in the light of the norms of material ties of the particular society to which the parties belong, their social values, status of the parties, environment of the parties etc. On the fact and circumstances of the case it was held that there was no sufficient evidence of any mental or physical cruelty on the part of the wife so as to justify the passing of a decree either for judicial separation or for divorce. The learned Counsel for the appellant relied on para 12 of the said judgment and submitted that in the above quoted case also, reliance was placed on some letters and it was held that they would not amount to legal cruelty. That was a case where it was held that the letters were written by the other spouse only after there was persistent refusal to resume conjugal relations with her and it was held that those letters which were written by her in the desperation must be considered in the background of her own conduct. In those letters she in general terms complained that her husband had forsaken her and was also cruel to her and therefore he should not be permitted to leave India. In two other letters, she has stated that She has been deserted by her husband and she suspected his fidelity. Their Lordships observed: Thus, already the breach between the husband and the wife was complete, we fail to see how the imputations made by Bijoli in her letters which were exhibited in the case would be treated as instances of her cruelty. That decision is not at all helpful to the case of the appellant in view of the fact that she has repeatedly level led allegations against her husband attributing immoral and illegal activities, such as, gambling, drinking, womanizing and acting as pimp. That decision is not at all helpful to the case of the appellant in view of the fact that she has repeatedly level led allegations against her husband attributing immoral and illegal activities, such as, gambling, drinking, womanizing and acting as pimp. The learned Counsel for the appellant relied on the decision in Gangadharan v. T.K. Thankam where a Division Bench observed that a solitary instance of emotional outburst or violent behaviour does not amount to cruelty. That decision is not helpful to the appellant as in the present case it is not a solitary instance that has been alleged. Even in that decision it is held: According to the amended provision, the courts have to interpret and analyse and define what would constitute cruelty depending upon many factors such as social status of parties, their education, physical and mental conditions, customs and traditions and come to its own conclusion that acts proved would amount to cruelty in a given case. It is difficult to lay down a precise definition or to give an exhaustive description of the circumstances which would constitute cruelty. Cruelty should be of such a nature as to satisfy the conscience of the court that the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to such an extent that it would be impossible for them to live together without mental agony, torture or distress to entitle the patty to secure divorce. Physical Violence is not absolutely essential to constitute cruelty and a consistent course of conduct inflicting immeasurable mental agony and torture may well constitute cruelty within the meaning of the Act. Mental cruelty may consist of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy and abusive language leading to constant disturbance of: mental peace of the other party. In Paras Ram v. Kamlesh A.I.R, 1082 P & H 60 it is held: It is a Settled legal position that a false allegation of adultery against a spouse amounts to cruelty in the eye of law. However, it would be a far cry to infer there from that an allegation, of adultery, whether proved or not, would by itself be the mathematical equivalent to legal cruelty. It is not, and cannot possibly be the law that a factually true allegation of adultery whether made otherwise or in defence in a written statement would amount to cruelty. However, it would be a far cry to infer there from that an allegation, of adultery, whether proved or not, would by itself be the mathematical equivalent to legal cruelty. It is not, and cannot possibly be the law that a factually true allegation of adultery whether made otherwise or in defence in a written statement would amount to cruelty. In this field the truth or otherwise of such an allegation is the crux of the matter. To highlight, it is a blatantly false allegation of adultery which would amount to legal cruelty, and not possibly the true allegation of that nature which cannot give any cause of action to the offending spouse. In the above quoted case, it was held: It is only when this has been made a ground of attack that the petitioner can possibly take advantage of such an allegation, if proved false. Unless the truth or falsity of such allegation made in the written statement is put to trial in the manner aforesaid and it is established one way or other, no legal consequence can flow there from for the purpose of Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act. It is, therefore, necessary in such a situation that not only the requisite amendment should be made out a specific and clear issue with regard thereto be framed so that the parties should go to trial thereon with their eyes open. That is not the case here. Here, the very petition is filed by the respondent for divorce on the ground that the allegations levelled against him in her reply notice would constitute mental cruelty and that it is the subject matter of the trial. Further it is not the contention of the appellant before the court that those allegations are true. The first appellate court also came to the conclusion that those allegations would amount to legal cruelty. The learned Counsel for the appellant cited the decision in Suresh Kumar v. Suman A.I.R. 1983 All. 225 where it was held: Every mental tension cannot amount to infliction of mental cruelty. It must however be shown that the injury inflicted through the mind of the petitioner has affected his health, or that the future repetition of that injury is most likely to affect his health. 225 where it was held: Every mental tension cannot amount to infliction of mental cruelty. It must however be shown that the injury inflicted through the mind of the petitioner has affected his health, or that the future repetition of that injury is most likely to affect his health. That decision was rendered by a single learned judge of the Allahabad High Court, and in view of the decision of the supreme court in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi and the decision of the Bombay High Court in Keshao rao v. Nisha (F.B.), already referred to, the said proposition of law cannot be accepted even after the amendment by Act 68 of 1976. 8. The learned Counsel for the respondent drew the attention of this Court to the decision in Aruna v. Ramesh Chand A.I.R. 1988 A11.239 wherein it was held: Wife of an Army Officer in her letter to the husband's superior, copies whereof were sent to president, Prime Minister etc, complaining about husband's entanglement with a woman for three years and asking for husband's transfer to field area and that too on some high altitude as soon as possible - Wife is guilty of cruelty.(Head Note 'C'). The said decision supports the case of the respondent herein. In the instant case also, it is admitted that the appellant has written to the employer of her husband levelling the same allegations and requesting for his transfer. In Kamini Gupta v. Mukesh Kumar A.I.R.1985 Del. 221, a Division Bench held: There are no categories of cruel conduct. Nor compartments. Doctrine of danger to life and limb is no longer in the ascendant. Mental cruelty is how well recognised as ground for divorce. It is settled that physical violence is not a necessary ingredient of cruelty. Unending accusations and imputations can cause more pain and misery than a physical beating. In a petition for divorce the husband alleged that at a meting held in the presence of the parties and relations when negotiations for the re-settlement of the parties ware afoot, wife lost temper and started abusing him and called him womaniser and a drunkard. she also complained that the husband was bringing girls in the matrimonial home. In her written statement, the wife stated that she never falsely accused the character of her husband suggesting thereby that the charges levelled against him were true. she also complained that the husband was bringing girls in the matrimonial home. In her written statement, the wife stated that she never falsely accused the character of her husband suggesting thereby that the charges levelled against him were true. During, the trial, the wife in her evidence repeated these charges times out of number. In her statement she named three girls with whom her husband had extra-marital relations and according to her, they were just few examples of conjugal infidelities of her husband. The wife wanted to examine the father of one of the three girls, who according to her was prepared to give evidence to prove her husband's lecherous character; but although opportunity to produce him was given, he was never produced in the case. The trial judge disbelieved the evidence of the wife and found her a woman of aggressive nature. According to him, the stories about the three girls were invented by the wife in order to malign her husband. He came to the conclusion that the accusation of the wife that the husband was womaniser would necessarily cause mental injury to the husband and it was difficult for any reasonable person to live with a spouse who repeatedly kept taunting the other spouse and levelled such unfounded allegations. Such unfounded allegations amounted to cruelty. Held that the decree of divorce was rightly granted by the trial Court. On the facts of the case it was found that there was sufficient proof of an intention of the wife to disrupt the home and the maintenance of matrimonial relations was nolonger possible. In Dastane v. Dastane the Supreme Court held: The injury to reputations is an important consideration in determining the question of cruelty and that wife's temperament in taking delight in causing injury to the husband and his relations constitutes cruelty. In the instant case also, the appellant-wife has persisted in her accusation against her husband which any reasonable person in the place of the respondent would regard as calculated to bring the matrimonial union to an end. Further any reasonable man with reasonable self-respect and power of endurance would find difficult to live with a taunting wife, when such taunts are in fact insults and indignities. Further any reasonable man with reasonable self-respect and power of endurance would find difficult to live with a taunting wife, when such taunts are in fact insults and indignities. In the circumstances of the case, it is also clear that, in view of the appellant wife's behaviour, there is no possibility of the parties living together in connubial happiness. As contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent, it is not a single outburst; but, on the other hand, it is the course of conduct of the wife persistent right from the reply notice upto her evidence with a view to wound and humilitate the respondent. The decision reported in Kamini Gupta v. Mukesh Kumar A.I.R. 1985 Del.221 supports the case of the respondent in all fours. In Jaishree v. Mohan A.I.R. 1987 Bom. 220 it was held: The mental cruelty resulting from unauthorised and unfounded allegation of adultery in a written statement by husband in a petition seeking divorce on ground of cruelty, is a matter of judicial inference and forms the basis for a decree for divorce. It is also held in that case: Looking at the nature of evidence led by the parties, it is a case where the court must raise an inference of torture and mental agony to the wife by virtue of these wanton and unwarranted allegations. It would have been open for the husband to vindicate these allegations. But he had completely failed to do so. It might be that the wife had not stated in so many words in her pleadings that any mental agony was caused to her by virtue of those allegations. But in these matters, the court has to go by the common experience of the Society and human probabilities. The said decision is an answer to the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the respondent has not stated in so many words that he suffered mental agony on account of the serious allegations affecting his character levelled in the notice, pleadings and the evidence. In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Dastane v. Dastane and Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, the standard of proof required in all these cases is whether the cruelty has been established by preponderance of probabilities and not by proof beyond reasonable doubt as required in criminal case. In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Dastane v. Dastane and Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, the standard of proof required in all these cases is whether the cruelty has been established by preponderance of probabilities and not by proof beyond reasonable doubt as required in criminal case. On a careful analysis of the entire materials, I have no hesitation in holding that the lower appellate court is justified in coming to the conclusion that the appellant is guilty of mental cruelty caused to the respondent-husband and that the respondent is entitled to a decree for dissolution of marriage. There is nothing to hold that the said finding rendered by the first appellate Judge suffers from any infirmity for this Court to interfere. On the other hand, it is supported by acceptable evidence and convincing reasons. Hence substantial questions 1 and 2 are answered in favour of the respondent. 9. In the result, the second appeal fails and stands dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.