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1989 DIGILAW 188 (GAU)

Om Prakash Bharuka v. Sakuntala Bharuka

1989-09-18

MANISANA

body1989
This is an appeal from the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge Dibrugarh in TS (D) 8 of 1988. 2. The respondent Shakuntala Bharuka presented a petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, for short the "Act" for a decree of divorce against the appellant (Om Prakash Bharuka on the ground, inter alia, that after the solemnisation of the marriage, her husband Om Prakash Bharuka treated her with cruelty. The petitioner also has prayed for custody of their minor children and her stridhana described in the petition. A decree was passed exparte against the husband. Hence this appeal by the husband. 3. It may be stated here that at the time of the admission of the appeal, the decree of divocrce has been made absolute as the appellant had no grievance against the decree of divorce, and the appeal has been confined to the observation made by the trial Court concerning the appellant, and guar­dianship/custody of the minor children ; and that pending the hearing of this appeal, this Court directed the Registrar (Judicial) to ascertain from the children as to how they are treated by their mother. Those reports have been placed on record. Parties were given opportunities to have their say after reading them. The reports reveal that the children deisre to remain with mother. 4. As regards the observation made against the appellant, the appellant has contended that all the allegations made in the petition are false, and that the observations have been made against him without any basis. The appellant has further contended that he may be given relief under Section 23 A of the Act. As already stated, it was an exparte decree. The appellant did not present written statement nor adduced evidence. In the absence of the pleadings and/or evidence, the contention of the appellant cannot be considered. That apart, so for as the findings of facts are concerned, those findings, which relate to the decree of divorce, cannot be assailed at this stage, as the decree of divorce has not been challenged and has been made final. However, as regards the observations made against the appellant relating to the custody of children, it will be discussed latter in this judgment. 5. However, as regards the observations made against the appellant relating to the custody of children, it will be discussed latter in this judgment. 5. In respect of the custody of the minor children, the appellant has submitted that the appellant being the father of the children is a natural guardian and, therefore, unless he is disqualified from being a natural guardian his right to the custody of children cannot be deprived of. He has referred to the relevant provisions under the Guardians and Wards Act and the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. 5A. Section 26 of the Act relates to custody of children in any proceeding under the Act. A reading of section 26 makes it clear that orders made under the section 26 may be varied, suspended or revoked from time to time even after the termination of the proceedings by passing a decree as if the proceedings are still pending, and that an order made under section 26 directing the custody of the children to remain with the mother, does not amount to appointing a guardian of the children. Of course, while making any order under section 26, paramount consideration would be the welfare of the minors having due regard to their wishes. 6. At this stage it would be relevant to consider the contention of the appellant that there has been violation of the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 23 of the Act. Sub-section (2) runs in the following terms : "Before proceeding to grant any relief under this Act, it shall be the duty of the court in the first instance in every case where it is possible so to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case, to make every endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties : Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to any proceeding wherein relief is sought on any of the grounds specified in clause (ii), clause (iii), clause (iv) clause (v), clause (vi) or clause (vii) of sub-section (1) of Section 13." (emphasis added) 7. Sub-section (2) must be read with sub-section (1) which provides that, for the purpose of aiding the court in bringing about such reconciliation, the court may, if the parties so desire or if the court thinks it just and proper so to do, adjourn the proceedings for a reasonable period not exceeding fifteen days and refer the matter to any person named by the parties in this behalf or to any person nominated by the court if the parties fail to name any person, with directions to report to the court as to whether reconciliation can be and has been, effected and the court shall in disposing of the procee­ding have due regard to the report. 8. Sub-section (2) cast on the Court a duty in matri­monial cause (other than those cases covered by the proviso) to make every endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties. In other words, the Court owes a duty to repair the broken marriage. This task becomes more necessary when innocent children who strugle in between mother and father who are in dispute are involved. The Family Courts Act, 1984 has been enacted to provide for the establishment of Family Courts with a view to promote conciliation in, and secure speedy settlement of, disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters connected therewith. As the family Court has not been established matter was before the district Court. Therefore, attempt to bring about a reconciliation between the parties is a must where it is possible so to do. 9. The question which, therefore, arises for consideration is at what stage of the case the attempt is to be made. The expression "before proceeding to grant any relief and "in a first instance" have employed in sub-section (2). The expression "before proceeding to grant any relief" means before regular and orderly progress, or procedural steps, to grant any relief under the Act, The use of the expressions "before proceeding to grant any relief" and "in the first instance" in sub-section (2) indicates that attempt to bring about a reconciliation is to be made from the start of the case before directing to file written statement or objection. 10. It appears from the records that there was a failure on the part of the trial Court to make any attempt to bring about a reconciliation although it was possible so to do. 10. It appears from the records that there was a failure on the part of the trial Court to make any attempt to bring about a reconciliation although it was possible so to do. But so far as the decree of divorce is concerned, as the appellant has not challenged the decree, the decree of divorce has been made absolute. In such a situation, it would not affect the jurisdiction of the Court or render decree of divorce invalid. 11. The question then is,-What would be the effect on the decree of custody of children on account of the failure on the part of the trial Court to make attempt to bring about a reconciliation between the parties. As regards the relief of custody of children, the relief is granted under section 26 of the Act, and therefore, it is a relief under the Act. It may be noted here that under section 7(1)(g) of the Family Courts Act the case of any minor falls within the jurisdiction of the Family Court. Since it is a relief under the Act, section 23 is attracted. As already stated there was an omission on the part of the trial Court to make an attempt to bring about a reconciliation between the parties. It has already been concluded that the task of bringing about a reconciliation becomes more necessary when innocent children are involved. Therefore, the omission is a serious one. For the reasons, the decree so far as it relates to the custody of children is liable to be set aside. In view of above conclusion, it is not neces­sary to discuss about the observations made against the appellant so far it relates to the custody of the minors. 12. As regards the custody of the properties, the trial Judge has not given findings whether the properties belongs to the respondent wife or not. Therefore, the decree of custody of properties is also liable to be set aside. 13. The last contention of the appellant is that he may be given a chance to file written statement. As already stated, the decree of divorce has been made confirmed, therefore, the contention of the appellant so far as the divorce matter is concerned it cannot be sustained. 13. The last contention of the appellant is that he may be given a chance to file written statement. As already stated, the decree of divorce has been made confirmed, therefore, the contention of the appellant so far as the divorce matter is concerned it cannot be sustained. As regards the custody of minors and properties, it would be fair and just if the appellant is allowed to file objection considering the circumstances of the case and keeping the above discussion on section 23(2) of the Act in view. 14. For the foregoing reasons, the decree for divorce is confirmed and the decree relating to custody of minors and the properties are set aside. The matter relating to custody of children and the properties are sent back to the District Judge, Dibrugarh for disposal afresh. However, considering the wishes of the children, as indicated in the reports of the Registrar (Judicial), and the facts and circumstances of the case including the absence of the written statement of the appellant, the custody of minor children would be, or would continue to remain, with their mother till any order to the contrary is passed by the trial Court. The trial Court shall make every endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties in the light of the above observation. The appeal is partly allowed with the above observations and directions. No costs.