Dr. B. P. Saraf, J.-These applications under Article 227 of the Con­stitution are directed against common judgment and order dated 30.7. 1983 passed on revision under section 22 of the Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1975, hereinafter ''the Rent Control Act", by the Additional District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala. 2. The facts in brief, are as follows. The respondent, who is the owner of 12 rooms, filed 12 separate petitions before the Rent Control Court under sub-sections (4) & (5) of section 12 of the Tripura Buildings Lease and Rent Control) Act, on the ground that he wanted to construct pucca building on the suit premises. The Rent Control Court, after considering the evidence on record, came to the finding that the landlord (respondent in the present petitions) had good ground to get vacant possession of the suit premises from the tenants .(the petitioners herein) and accordingly decided the issue whether the landlord was entitled to have any relief under section 12(4) (iv) of the Rent Control Act in favour of the landlord and allowed the suit. All the 12 cases were accordingly allowed and the tenants were directed to put the landlord in possession of the suit premises within 4 months and the landlord was directed to give the tenants the first option to take lease at fair rent as contemplated by section 12 (4) (iv) of the Act. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the learned Rent Control Court, the tenants preferred 12 appeals before the Subordinate Judge, Agartala, who is the Rent Control Appellate Authority. The Rent Control Appellate Authority, by its common judgment and order dated 25. 9.82, set aside the order dated 29.2.80 passed by Rent Control Court under section 12 (4) (iv) of the Act. The Appellate Authority was satisfied that the building was in such a condition that it needed reconstruction and there was bonafide requirement of the landlord to reconstruct the same. It, however, held that the Rent Control Court in its order did not make any discussion regarding other two requirements of section I2(4)(vi), namely the ability of the landlord to rebuild and submission of plan and licence. It observed that the evidence regarding ability to rebuild was not sufficient and that the petitioner failed to produce the requisite evidence regarding possession of plan and licence. It observed that the evidence regarding ability to rebuild was not sufficient and that the petitioner failed to produce the requisite evidence regarding possession of plan and licence. On the aforesaid findings, the Appellate Court held that the landlord failed to satisfy the requirements of section 12(4) (iv) of the Rent Control Act. Accordi­ngly, the order of Rent Control Court was set aside by the Appellate Court. 3. Against the said order of the Appellate Authority, revision petitions were filed under section 22 of the Act. As the District Judge assigned the case to the Additional District Judge, the same were heard and decided by him by common order dated 30. 7- 83. The Additional District Judge in his order observed that the landlord sought permission of the Appellate Authority for considering the approved plan and lice ace obtained by him from the municipality which was rejected with suit assigning any reason. He further held that as the appellate authority had the power of making further enquiry directly while deciding an appeal and all the powers of the Rent Control Court, it should have taken into account the appro­ved plan submitted by the landlord for effectively deciding the appeal The learned Additional District Judge, therefore, remanded the appeals to the appellate authority for deciding the same afresh after taking into account the approved plan submitted by the landlord and also after hearing both the parties after giving notice to them. 4. The present petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution have been filed by the petitioners, who are tenants challenging the aforesaid order dated 30 7. 83 passed by the Additional District Judge on revision under section 22 of the Act. As all the petitions are based on identical facts and arise out of a common order, they were taken up together for hearing. Briefly stated, the contentions of the petitioners are as follows:- (1) The power of revision under section 22 of the Rent Control Act has been vested in the District Judge and, as such, the Additional District Judge has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a revision petition under the said section. Briefly stated, the contentions of the petitioners are as follows:- (1) The power of revision under section 22 of the Rent Control Act has been vested in the District Judge and, as such, the Additional District Judge has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a revision petition under the said section. (2) The order passed on revision directing the appellate authority to consider the approved plan submitted by the respondent is illegal and without jurisdiction as no such direction can be given by him in view of the provisions of section 12 (4) (iv) of the Rent Control Act. 5. Heard Sri K. N. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the peti­tioners and Mr. M. C. Deb Roy, learned counsel for the respondent. 6. We shall first take up the contention of the petitioners chall­enging the jurisdiction of the Additional District Judge to hear a revision petition under section 2 of the Act. The answer to his contention will depend upon whether the Additional District Judge is a Judge of the District Court or he forms a Court of his own. Before we discuss this aspect of the matter, it will be appropriate to consider section 22 of the Rent Control Act which deals with the power of revision. It reads :- “22 Revision-(i) In cases where the appellate authority emp­owered under section 20 is a Subordinate Judge the District Judge, and in other cases the High Court, may at any time on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. 2) The costs of, and incident to, all proceedings before the High Court or District Judge under sub-section (1) shall be in its or his discretion." From a reading of the aforesaid section 22, it is clear that "where the appellate authority empowered under section 20 is a Sub­ordinate Judge, revision shall lie to the "District Judge". In the ins-^ant case, the admitted position is that the appellate authority was "Subordinate Judge" and as such revision lies to the "District Judge". The revisions were accordingly filed before the District Judge who assigned the cases to the Additional District Judge. In the ins-^ant case, the admitted position is that the appellate authority was "Subordinate Judge" and as such revision lies to the "District Judge". The revisions were accordingly filed before the District Judge who assigned the cases to the Additional District Judge. The expression "District Judge" however, has not been defined in the Rent Control Act. The point for our consideration, therefore, is whether in the absence of any definition of "District Judge" in the Rent Control Act, "District Judge" mentioned in section 22 of the said Act would include "Additional District Judge". 7. We have given our careful consideration to the aforesaid con­tention of the petitioners. As the expression "District Judge" has not been denned in the Act, we have to refer to other relevant enactments having a bearing in the matter to decide the point. We may first refer to the definition of "District Judge" as given in the General Clauses Act. We are told at the Bar that there is no sep­arate State General Clauses Act for Tripura and in the State of Tripura, tae Centra! General Clauses ct, 1897 applies. Clause (17) of section 3 of the said Act defines the expression "District Judge" to mean 'the Judge of principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction', but not including the High Court. The said definition is quoted below : "(17) "District Judge" shall mean the Judge of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, but shall not include a High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction". 8. The Civil Procedure Code in clauses (4) and (8) of section 2 defines a "District" as meaning the local limits of the jurisdiction of principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction and a "Judge" meaning the presiding officer of civil court. We also find that the law relating to courts in Tripura was consolidated and amended by the Tripura (Courts) Order, 1950, which came into force with effect from; 14. 1. 1950. Section 19 of the Tripura (Courts) Order, 1950 lays down that the court of the District Judge shall be the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in the District. It reads as follows : "19. The District court to be principal court of jurisdiction. The Court of the District Judge shall be the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in the District". It reads as follows : "19. The District court to be principal court of jurisdiction. The Court of the District Judge shall be the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in the District". Clause (ii) of section 2 of the said order defines a "District Court" thus : "ii) "District Court" means the court of the District Judge and includes the Court of the Additional District Judge" Section 17 of the Tripura (Courts) Order deals with the appoi­ntment and functions of the Additional District Judge which reads as follows : “I7. Additional District Judges.- (I) When the business pending before the Court of a District Judge requires the aid of an Additional Judge or Judges for the speedy disposal, the Chief Commissioner, may after consultation with the Judicial Commissioner, appoint such Additional District Judge as may be necessary. (2) An Additional District Judge so appointed shall discharge any of the function of a District Judge which the District Judge may assign to him, and in the discharge of his functions he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge". 9. From a conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and the Tripura (Courts) Order, 1950, it appears that in Tripura the expression ''District Judge" includes "Additional District Judge”. In this connection, it may also be pertinent to refer to section 15 of the Tripura (Courts) Order which specifies that in addition to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner (Now High Court), and the Court of Small Causes and the courts established under any other law for the time being in force, there shall be following three classes of courts : i) The Court of the District Judge ; ii) The Court of a Subordinate Judge ; iii) The Court of a Munsiff. 10. Section 15, thus makes it clear that in Tripura, the Court of Additional District Judge does not constitute a distinct class of civil courts. On the other band, from perusal of the various provisions of the General Clauses Act and Tripura (Courts) Order, 1950, we are of the opinion that in Tripura there is only one court namely, Court of the District Judge and the Court of Additional District Judge is only a Division Court of the said court of District Judge. The Additional District Judge exercise the same judicial powers and is, for judicial purpose, an officer of co-ordinate jurisdiction. The Additional District Judge exercise the same judicial powers and is, for judicial purpose, an officer of co-ordinate jurisdiction. We, therefore, hold that the district Judge mentioned in section 22 of the Rent Control Act includes an Additional District Judge to whom the District Judge may assign his functions under section 22 of the Act. On such assignment, the Additional District Judge exercises the same powers as the District Judge. In the instant case, the fact of assignment of revision petitions by the District Judge to the Additional District Judges is not in dispute As such, we hold that the Additional District Judge had the requisite power and authority to hear and decide the revision petitions in question. In arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, We also find considerable support from a Division Bench decision of this Court in G. C. Bezbarua vs. State of Assam reported in AIR 1954 Assam 161 wherein interpretation of somewhat identical to Assam, cane up for consideration and it was held that '-District Judge" includes “Additional District Judge". 11. Before taking up the next contention of the petitioners, we would like to mention that in course of hearing Mr. K.N. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioner also tried to urge that even if it is held that "District Judge* includes '• Additional District Judge" for the purposes of section 22 of the Rent Control Act, the Additional District Judge cannot exercise the power as there is no specific provision in the said Act to empower the District Judge to assign cases for hearing and disposal to the Additional District Judge. In this connection, he referred to the provision of section 25 of the Rent Control Act which lays down that the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority shall have the powers which are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit in respect of the matters specified therein. According to the learned counsel, as the power to assign a case to Additional District Judge is not include in the items enumerated in the said section, no assignment of cases can be made by the District Judge, and, as such, the Additional District Judge cannot hear any revision under section 22 of the Act. According to the submission of the learned counsel, section 25 is exhaustive and not illustrative. According to the submission of the learned counsel, section 25 is exhaustive and not illustrative. We have given our careful consideration to the aforesaid submission but find it difficult to accept the same on two grounds, firstly, in our opinion, section 25 is not exhaustive. Moreover, it does not deal with the classes of Courts including distribution of functions between different courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction and the procedure of the working of the court. Section 25 only deals with the powers of the court and not the procedure of the administration of the court, part of which is governed by the Tripura (Courts) Order, 1950. As stated earlier, Tripura (Courts) Order makes specific provision in this regard. Absence of such a provision and or non-reiteration of the same in the Rent Control Act is immaterial. In view of what is stated above, the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no force. 12. Now we take up the second contention of the petitioner that the order passed in revision directing the appellate authority to consider the approved plan submitted by the respondent is illegal and without jurisdiction, the same being contrary to the provisions of section 12(4) (iv) of the Rent Control Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the appellate authority had no power to admit the approved plan of the building at the appellate stage which could have been filed only during the trial by the Rent Control Court, and as such, the revisional authority acted illegally and without jurisdiction in issuing directions to the appellate authority to admit the said approved plan and to re-hear the appeals taking into consideration the said approved plan. 13. We have perused the provisions of section 12 (4) (iv) of the Rent Control Act which is quoted below : “12 (4)-A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building - i) ……… ……….. ………… ii) ………… ……….. iii) ……….. …………… …… iv) If the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstr­uction and if the landlord requires bonafide to reconstruct the same and if he satisfies the Rent Control Court that he has plan and licence, If any, required and the ability to re-build and if the proposal is not made as a pretext for eviction. …………… …… iv) If the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstr­uction and if the landlord requires bonafide to reconstruct the same and if he satisfies the Rent Control Court that he has plan and licence, If any, required and the ability to re-build and if the proposal is not made as a pretext for eviction. Provided that the landlord who evicts a tenant and does not reconstruct completely the building within a time which may be fixed or extended by the Rent Control Court, shall on a petition before that Court be liable to a fine of rupees five hundred, if it is proved that he has wilfully neglected to reconstruct completely the building within such time. Provided further that the Rent Control Court shall have power at any time to issue directions regarding the reconstruction of the building and on failure of compliance by the landlord, to give effect to the order in any manner the Rent Control Court deems fit and in appropriate cases to put the tenant back in possession or award to the evicted tenant damages equal to the excess rent he has to pay for another building that he is occupy­ing in consequence of such eviction : Provided also that the tenant who was evicted shall have the first option to have the .reconstructed building allotted to him with liability to pay its fair rent: or'' Under the aforesaid provision, in order to get a direction to the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the budding the landlord is required to satisfy the Rent Control Court, interalia, that he has plan and licence. It is admitted that the petitioner produced some plan or the proposed building before the Rent Control Court, but he did not produce the plan approved by the municipality. The Rent Control Court allowed the petition as it was satisfied that the requirements of section 12(4) (iv) of the Rent Control Act were fulfilled by the landlord. 14. On appeal, it was urged on behalf of the tenants that under section 12(4) (iv) the landlord was required to satisfy the Rent Control Court that he had plan and licence approved by the municipality and as no such approved plan was submitted by the landlord before the Rent Control Court the order of eviction passed under section 12(4) (iv) was bad and liable to be set aside. At the time, of the hearing of the appeal, the landlord sought leave of the appellate Court to file an approved plan and licence which had been subsequently obtained by him from the municipality but the appellate authority did not allow the landlord to file the same on the ground that "it was not considered to be highly essential for the proper decision of the appeal" (emphasis added). On the other hand, the appellate authority also set aside the order 'of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court "for non-submission of plan and licence". 15. In revision under section 22 of the Rent Control Act filed by the landlord, challenging the order of the appellate authority, it was contend d that section 12 4) (iv) does not require that there must be an approved plan from the municipality for getting a direction under that provision. It was further submitted that on facts also the appellate authority ought to have considered that while the tenants were in occupation, it was not possible to get an approved plan from the municipality and submit the same to the Rent Control Court, and as such, the sketch plan was submitted before the Rent Control Court. It was pointed out that after the order of the Rent Control Court under section 12(4) (iv) approval was obtained from the municipality on the basis of the said order and petition was also filed before the appellate authority to admit the said approved plan and to decide the appeal in consideration thereof which was rejected by the appellate authority. On these facts, it was contended before the revisional authority that the appellate authority acted illegally in rejecting the prayer of the landlord to accept and consider the approved plan and in setting aside the order of the Rent Control Court without consideration of the same. The revisional authority examined the order of the appellate authority and found that prayer of the landlord for allowing him to submit the approved plan was rejected by the appellate authority without assigning any reason. It was also pointed out that the appellate authority had very wide powers including the powers of the Rent Control Court while deciding an appeal and, as such, it was not justified in refusing to allow the landlord to submit the approved plan at the appellate stage and passing an order without considering the same. It was also pointed out that the appellate authority had very wide powers including the powers of the Rent Control Court while deciding an appeal and, as such, it was not justified in refusing to allow the landlord to submit the approved plan at the appellate stage and passing an order without considering the same. The revisional authority, therefore, allowed the revision petitions, remanded the appeals to the appellate authority with a direction to decide the same afresh after taking into evidence the approved plan submitted by the landlord and also on hearing both the parties after giving notice to them. 16. The said revisional order dated 30.7.83 is subject matter of challenge in the present petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution. We have, considered the provisions of section 12 (4) (iv), section 20 and section 22 of the Rent Control Act. Section 20 provides for an appeal and sub-sections (3) and (4) thereof deal with the powers of the appellate authority. The said sub-sections are quoted below : " (3) The appellate authority shall call for the records of the case from the Rent Control Court and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, and if necessary, after making such further inquiry as it thinks either directly or through the Rent Control Court, shall decide the appeal. Explanation :- The appellate authority may, while confir­ming the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court, grant an extension of time to the tenant for putting the landlord in possession of the building. (4) The appellate authority shall have all the powers of the Rent Control Court including the fixing of arrears of rent". 17. From a perusal of sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 20 of the Act, it is clear that the power of the appellate authority while disposing of an appeal under this section is very wide. It is not restricted to examining the order passed by the Rent Control Court and the evidence brought on record before it. On the other hand, it has the power to make such further enquiries as it thinks fit, either directly or through the Rent Control Court. The power to make further enquiry under this sub-section includes the power to admit fresh and additional evidence. The power of the appellate authority under this section is co-terminus with that of the Rent Control Court. The power to make further enquiry under this sub-section includes the power to admit fresh and additional evidence. The power of the appellate authority under this section is co-terminus with that of the Rent Control Court. It has been made abundantly clear by incorporation of sub-section (4). In fact, the appellate authority can do all that the Rent Control Court could have done but failed to do if in its opinion, it is necessary to do so for properly deciding the appeal. 18. From the order of the appellate authority, we find that the appellate authority in the instant case took an absolutely wrong approach in the matter and acted on an erroneous view of the scope of its own powers under the Act. It failed to take into account that while hearing an appeal, its powers were not confined to examina­tion of the sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence produced before the Rent Control Court and/or the correctness of the finding of the Rent Control Court on the basis of the material on record. On account of wrong reading of sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 20 and on the erroneous assumption that its powers were very restricted, the appellate authority rejected the prayer of the landlord for subm­ission of the approved plan staling on the one hand, it was not "highly essential for proper decision of the appeal" meaning thereby that it was essential though "not highly essential" and also holding the order of the Rent Control Court as bad on the ground that the landlord failed to satisfy the Rent Control Court that he had the approved plan with him which according to the appellate authority was a condition precedent for an order under section 12 (4) (iv). If that was so, the appellate authority ought to have exercised the power vested in it under sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 20 and admitted the approved plan and decided the appeal on the basis thereof. Further, regarding the ability to rebuild also, if the appellate authority felt that the evidence produced before the Rent Control Court on that score was not sufficient, or that the Rent Control Court did not give a definite finding on that point, it could have made further enquiries itself or get the matter enquired through the Rent Control Court. Further, regarding the ability to rebuild also, if the appellate authority felt that the evidence produced before the Rent Control Court on that score was not sufficient, or that the Rent Control Court did not give a definite finding on that point, it could have made further enquiries itself or get the matter enquired through the Rent Control Court. The appellate authority however, did not exercise any of the powers vested in it and set aside the order of the Rent Control Court. 19. The revisional authority, on perusal of the order of the appe­llate authority found it to be a fit case for exercise of power of revision under section 22 of the Act and accordingly, by order dated 30.7.83 set aside the order of the appellate authority and remanded the appeals to the appellate authority for deciding the same afresh after taking into evidence the approved plan submitted by the petitioner and on hearing both parties after giving notice to them. 20. From a reading of the impugned revisional order and on consideration of the facts and circumstances stated above, we do not find any infirmity in the said order. In fact, the powers of the revisional authority under section 22 of the Act are very wide. In exercise of its power, the revisional authority can even set aside a finding of fact if it is not satisfied about the regularity or propriety of the same. The powers under this section are much wider than the powers of the High Court under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. Keeping in view the scope of the powers of the revisional authority under section 22 of the Act, in the instant case, we do not find that the revisional authority while passing the impugned order dated 30.7.83 acted beyond the scope of its powers to justify interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. 21. In this connection, it may also be mentioned that the powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution are extraordinary powers to be exercised sparingly in appropriate cases. 21. In this connection, it may also be mentioned that the powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution are extraordinary powers to be exercised sparingly in appropriate cases. The scope of the powers of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution in the context of section 22 of the Rent Control Act came up for consideration before a Single Bench of this Court consisting of one of us (Phukan, J) in Ramesh Chandra Sarma vs. Jitendra Kishore Horn Roy reported in (1986) 2 GLR 306 wherein it was held :- "The power of superintendence of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is well-settled. This power is exercised roost sparingly and only in appropriate cases to keep the Subordinate Courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not correcting mere errors". 22. In our opinion, the scope and ambit of the powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution has been aptly summarised in the aforesaid passage and it' is not necessary for us to discuss the same again. In view of the aforesaid legal position, on consideration of the facts of the present cases, we do not find any justification for interfering with the revisional order dated 30.7.1983 passed by the Additional District Judge. In our opinion, the revisional autho­rity was justified in passing the aforesaid order and remanding the appeals back to the appellate authority for deciding afresh after admitting the plan approved by the municipality and rehearing the parties. 23. In course of hearing, the learned the counsel for the petitioners also tried to contend that the appellate authority having come to a finding that the evidence regarding, ability of the landlord to reconstruct was not sufficient, the revisional authority should not have remanded the case. We have considered the aforesaid submission but we do not find any force in it. As we have already observed earlier, the power of the appellate authority is very wide and if it is of the opinion that the evidence adduced before the Rent Control Court on any issue is not sufficient, it may itself make further enquiries to properly decide the issue. The revisional authority, therefore was justified in remanding the appeal of the appellate authority to re-examine the matter afresh. The aforesaid contention also, therefore, fails. 24. The revisional authority, therefore was justified in remanding the appeal of the appellate authority to re-examine the matter afresh. The aforesaid contention also, therefore, fails. 24. Before parting with the case, it may be mentioned that an attempt was made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to submit that these petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution should be treated as a revision petitions as according to him, second revision also lies to the High Court against the order of the District Judge under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. In support of the aforesaid contention, the learned counsel referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shyama Raju Hegde vs. Venkatesha Bhat, AIR 1987 SC 2323 . The learned counsel for the respondents, however, submitted that in view of the provision of section 22 of the Rent Control Act, no second revision will lie under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and in support of his contention, referred the decision of the Supreme Court in Aondal Amal vs. Sadasivan Pillai and others, AIR 1987 SC 203 and decision of this Court in Ramesh Sharma (supra). However, as it was noticed in the case at hand that the applications before this Court were only applicati­on under Article 227 of the Constitution and not under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, the learned counsel for the petitioner fairly submitted that he would not like to press this submission. Accordingly the learned counsel confined his arguments treating the petitions as peti­tions under Article 227 of the Constitution. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary in the present case to go into the question as to whether second revision would lie under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code or not. 25. In view of what is stated above, we hold that the revisional authority was justified in passing the impugned order dated 30.7.198" and remanding the appeal to the Rent Control Appellate Authority. We therefore, do not find any justification for exercise of extraordinary powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. 26. In the result, all the petitions, namely, Civil Revisions Nos. 15 of 1984, 16 of 1984, 17 of 1984, 27 of 198 , 28 of 1984, 29 of 1984, 30 of 1984, and 31 of 198 are dismissed and rules discharged. No order as to cost. S.N.Phukan, J-I agree.