Judgment :- 1. These Civil Revision Petitions arise from a common order passed by the learned District Judge exercising his revisional power under the proviso to S.14 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 2. The only respondent in all these revision petitions is the same person. The revision petitions arise from proceedings taken by a landlady who obtained an order of eviction under S.11(3) and S.11(4)(iv) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. Of course, in C.R.P.No.783 of 1989, which arose from BRC O.P. No.88/79 the landlady did not obtain an order for eviction under S.11(3) but got an order under S.11(4) (iv) of the Act. Hereafter, the revision petitioners will be referred to as 'tenants' and the respondent as 'landlady'. 3. The landlady filed eviction petition against the tenants under two counts, viz. she wants to reconstruct the building (S.11(4) (iv) and after reconstruction she needs the building for her own occupation. As I said earlier, excepting in one case, all the authorities under the Act found that the landlady is entitled to eviction under S.11(3) and S.11(4) (iv) of the Act. 4. S.11(4)(iv) requires the landlord to satisfy certain conditions to obtain an order under that provision. The landlord/ landlady has to satisfy that the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction and that he/she requires bona fide to reconstruct the same. Further, it is stated that the court should satisfy that the landlord/ landlady has the plan and licence if any required and the ability to re-build. It also conditions that the proposal of the landlord/ landlady is not made as a pretext for eviction. There are certain provisos to Clause.11(4)(iv), which I shall advert to later. 5. In this case, the landlady satisfied all the requirements for obtaining an order under S.11 (4)(iv) and also the conditions required under S.11(3) except in one case, C.R.P.No.783/89 BRC O.P.No.88/79. The landlady produced a plan and licence; the Rent Control Court and the authorities under the Act-the appellate authority and the revisional court-relied on the plan and licence produced by the landlady. The landlady produced a plan and licence; the Rent Control Court and the authorities under the Act-the appellate authority and the revisional court-relied on the plan and licence produced by the landlady. The said plan and licence, the landlady obtained under exemption granted by the Government in regard to certain provisions of the building rules, The exemption granted by the Government was challenged by the tenants and this court found that the exemption granted by the Government, exempting the compliance of certain building rules, was without jurisdiction and the order granting exemption was quashed. 6. Now, some dates are relevant. The common order in the proceedings for eviction has become final on 26th July, 1985 when the revisional court passed its final order. Of course, against this final order, the tenants filed revision petitions under S.115 C.P.C. before this court. This court found, following the Supreme Court decision in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai (1987 (1) K.L.T. 53) that the revision petitions are not maintainable and all the revision petitions were dismissed. 7. The order quashing the Government's order granting exemption from certain provisions of the building rules was passed on 7-11-1985 in O.P.No.6851 of 1981. It is significant to note that the order in the Original Petition was passed at a time when the order in eviction proceedings has become final. 8. The said final order was put in execution by the landlady. The tenants raised the objection that the basis of the order, which was sought to be executed, is the plan that has been produced before the Rent Control Court and that plan is no longer available for the landlady, since the construction can be made on the plan only if the exemption granted by the Government also continued in force. As I said earlier, this Court in O.P.No.6851/ 81 quashed the exemption. The tenants contended that this subsequent event is vital and significant and that the court should note this event as one which will make the decree inexecutable. In fact, they contended that the decree was primarily based on a statutory requirement of a plan which in turn makes it possible for the statutory authority to exercise its jurisdiction only on satisfying that condition and so, that condition is very important and by a subsequent event if there is alteration or modification or extinguishment of that condition, the decree is not capable of execution. 9. 9. Of course, whether such a condition is absolutely necessary for passing an order has to be decided on the basis of the statutory provision and only if the court is satisfied that such a statutory condition is existent in a given case, an order can be passed. Certainly, in this case, rightly or wrongly, the authorities under the Act satisfied the existence of such a condition. But that condition vanished when this Court passed an order in O.P.No.6851/81 on 7-11-1985. 10. In what form and under what circumstances, an execution court can examine whether the decree that is sought to be executed is incapable of execution is a matter on which all the courts in India had occasion to render authoritative decisions. 11. In Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash (AIR. 1977 S.C.1201), Bhagwati, J. as he then was, very plainly stated that an executing court cannot go behind the decree nor can it question its legality or correctness. In fact this decision was relied on by the counsel for the tenants. It has to be noted that in the second part of the decision concerning this question, the Supreme Court has said: "Since the proviso was introduced with retrospective effect, it must be deemed to be part of S.3 since the time that the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was enacted. Therefore, by virtue of the said Proviso, the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 were applicable to the tenancy of B for the premises though belonging to the Government, were lawfully let out by A to B and the condition of the proviso was satisfied. Hence, the Civil Court had no inherent jurisdiction to entertain the suit" (emphasis added) 12. So, only when the court which passed the decree lacked the inherent jurisdiction, the execution court can refuse to execute the decree. Here, in fact, there is no case that there is lack of inherent jurisdiction for the authorities under the Act to pass the order sought to be executed. Of course, they have acted on a plan to satisfy one of the statutory requirements for passing an order of eviction and that plan was found to be not a valid one by a subsequent decision in O.P.No.6851/81 on 7-11-1985. Of course, they have acted on a plan to satisfy one of the statutory requirements for passing an order of eviction and that plan was found to be not a valid one by a subsequent decision in O.P.No.6851/81 on 7-11-1985. The question is whether this circumstance is sufficient for the execution court to say that the execution court can refuse to execute the decree on the ground that the decree is non est or one passed by a court which lacked inherent jurisdiction when it passed the decree. I am of the view that the circumstance revealed in the cases will not give the execution court the right to refuse execution. I say so because the mandate given by the decree, here the order, is to evict the tenants. For what reason the trial side has found that the tenants are liable to be evicted, is not a matter for the execution court to investigate. Of course, in the process of execution if the execution court finds that a very vital event has taken place like the amendment of the statute under which the order has been passed as in the case reported in A.I.R. 1977 S.C.1201 and that event has got a real bearing on the order passed by the authorities, under the rent control proceedings, the execution court can consider that aspect of the matter and can hold that the decree is non est or inexecutable depending upon the change effected in the statute. As a subsequent event after the decree the execution court can certainly take note of statutory provisions annulling the decree sought to be executed or statutory provisions which will have the effect of annulling the decree. The effect of such statutory provisions has to be decided by the execution court. 13. Now I shall refer to the decision reported in 1980 K.L.T. 653 (Velayudhan v. Raichal Varghese). This case arose in execution of an order of the Rent Control Court under S.11(4) (iv) of the Act. Khalid, J. as he then was, said: "Under S.11(4)(iv) of the Act, the effective order that the court passes is the order for eviction.It is this order that is put in execution". This case arose in execution of an order of the Rent Control Court under S.11(4) (iv) of the Act. Khalid, J. as he then was, said: "Under S.11(4)(iv) of the Act, the effective order that the court passes is the order for eviction.It is this order that is put in execution". This observation is fully in consonance with what I have said earlier that the mandate given by the authorities passing the order which has got the force of decree to the execution court is to evict the tenants; for what reason and how such a conclusion has been arrived at by the authorities under the act is not a matter for the execution court to investigate. But in the same decision, later it is said: "The conditions which the Rent Control Court lay down in its order are not conditions which the court imposes in its discretion. They are conditions which the statute requires to be incorporated in the order. Even if the order does not contain such conditions, the tenant can claim them as of right, when the building is reconstructed. The petitioner's apprehension will be well-founded only if by the coming into force of the new rule, reconstruction of the building becomes impossible. When such a situation arises, it will not be possible for the execution court to direct eviction, for the statutory conditions become impossible of compliance. Perhaps in such a situation, the execution court will be justified in declining to exercise its power to order delivery and to direct the parties to move the Rent Control Court for appropriate modifications in the order depending upon the facts of each case. There is nothing in the section which makes it obligatory on the landlord to reconstruct the building exactly at the site where the original building stood. Circumstances may arise as in this case where the court will have to take into account subsequent events not contributed by the landlord to make necessary alterations and issue necessary directions for the fulfilment of the object of the section". Khalid, J. as he then was, relied on an unreported decision -C.R.P.No.728 of 1980 -- by Chandrasekhar Menon, J. In that decision, admittedly, the plan which was produced in the trial side was found to be one on which a building cannot be constructed in view of certain statutory objections later introduced in the building rules. Khalid, J. as he then was, relied on an unreported decision -C.R.P.No.728 of 1980 -- by Chandrasekhar Menon, J. In that decision, admittedly, the plan which was produced in the trial side was found to be one on which a building cannot be constructed in view of certain statutory objections later introduced in the building rules. In short, it was impossible to construct a building as per the plan produced by the landlord who obtained the order. Nevertheless, Chandrasekhar Menon, J. said that an alteration in the plan, because of certain subsequent events, will not affect the jurisdiction of the execution court and that the execution court can execute the order in question even if it was not possible to construct a building according to the plan produced on the original side, (emphasis added). Further the court observed that at any rate the tenant in that case was not prejudiced because he can have his right of option because there were sufficient rooms available in the building proposed to be constructed on the basis of the new plan. The court has taken a very practical and pragmatic approach to the question raised by the tenant. Khalid, J, as he then was, also agreed with the approach made by Chandrasekhar Menon, J. and said that even if some changes have to be made. in constructing the building from the original plan.it will not be a reason for the execution court to refuse execution of the order. His Lordship observed: "I hold that the petitioner has not made out any case how his right to get the building allotted after reconstruction according to the new plan, will be lost or how that right would be adversely affected by the reconstruction of the building with the same plinth area nearby". From the above two decisions, it is clear that an absolute and strict adherence to the plan, in the matter of reconstruction, is not the intendment of the provision and that fact also can be taken note of by the execution court. From the above two decisions, it is clear that an absolute and strict adherence to the plan, in the matter of reconstruction, is not the intendment of the provision and that fact also can be taken note of by the execution court. Now I shall quote the provisos to S.11 (4) (iv) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act: "Provided that the landlord who evicts a tenant and does not reconstruct completely the building within a time which may be fixed or extended by the Rent Control Court, shall on a petition before that Court be liable to a fine of rupees five hundred, if it is proved that he has wilfully neglected to reconstruct completely the building within such time: Provided further that the court shall have power at any time to issue directions regarding the reconstruction of the building and on failure of compliance by the landlord, to give effect to the order in any manner the Court deems fit and inappropriate cases to put the tenant back in possession or award to the evicted tenant damages equal to the excess rent he has to pay for another building that he is occupying in consequence of such eviction: Provided further that the tenant who was evicted shall have the first option to Have the reconstructed building allotted to him with liability to pay its fair rent". 14. In this case, perhaps, in view of the decision in 1980 KLT 653 (Velayudhan v. Raichal Varghese), the landlady produced another plan and licence obtained from the municipality and submitted that if a building is constructed in accordance with that plan, there is no difficulty for the tenant in BRC O.P.88/79 to exercise his option. If the tenant in BRC O.P.88/79 is not prejudiced in the matter of his right to exercise his option, I need follow the decision reported in 1980 KLT 653 to reject the objection raised by the tenant. As regards the other tenants, there is no question of option and their rights have not at all been affected even if there is change in the plan. 15. The tenants contended that even in accordance with the new plan, it is not possible for the landlady to construct a building. Certainly this is a question of fact. As regards the other tenants, there is no question of option and their rights have not at all been affected even if there is change in the plan. 15. The tenants contended that even in accordance with the new plan, it is not possible for the landlady to construct a building. Certainly this is a question of fact. Admittedly, the landlady has obtained a plan and licence from the municipality and she has produced it and the revisional court thought of relying on the plan and licence. Of course, the tenants also contended that the plan and licence are not genuine insofar as there is no seal of the municipality or the signature of the authorities for approving the plan, it is also said that the landlady has not signed the plan. Anyhow, the revisional court found that the plan produced by the landlady is acceptable and that if a building is constructed in accordance with that plan, the tenant, who had the right of option, will not be prejudiced and thus applied the decision reported in 1980 KLT. 653. 16. These revision petitions are filed under S.115 C.P.C. Though I have got doubt about the maintainability of these revisions in the light of the decision reported in 1987 (1) KLT 53 (Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai) I do not want to go into that question in view of a direct decision on the point by this Court in Anilatmajan v. Manoharan (1988 (1) K.L.T. 877). But, I have to remember that I am exercising my jurisdiction under S.115 C.P.C. and only if I am satisfied that there is a jurisdictional error which requires to be corrected to avoid a failure of justice I should exercise my jurisdiction under S.115 C.P.C. I say so since the section itself provides that the High Court shall not vary or reverse any order made except, where if that order is allowed to stand, would occasion failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. I do not think that allowing execution and confirming the order of the revisional court, viz. the learned District Judge, it will occasion failure of justice. In this view, these. C.R.Ps. have to be dismissed and I do so. In the circumstances, I do not order costs.