PADMA KHASTGIR, J. ( 1 ) THE present appeal filed by the LT. C. Ltd. arises out of the judgment delivered by Pratibha Bonnerjea, J. (as she then was ). The LT. C. Ltd. filed a suit against the Board of the Trustees for the Port of Calcutta being suit No. 930 of 1967 under the following facts and circumstances:- ( 2 ) ON 9th Sept. , 1966 Reliegh Investment Company Ltd. shipped the cigarette manufacturing machine from the Port of Liverpool for carriage to the Port of Calcutta by M. V. `vishva Kalyan' belonging to the Shipping Corporation of India Limited, the carrier. On 18th Nov. , 1966 the goods landed at the Port of Calcutta as recorded in the tally sheet issued by the Port Trust authorities. ( 3 ) IT was the case of the plaintiff that by various letters dt. 6th Dec. 1966, 8th Dec. 1966 and 16th Dec. 1966 the plaintiff requested not only the Port Trust authorities but also the stevedores to search for the goods as the same were not traceable in the transit stage. Thereafter again on Dec. 16, 1966, and Jan. 3, 1967, the appellant, through various letters, requested the Port Trust authorities as also the stevedores to search for the goods so discharged by the said vessel. Then on 21st Jan. 1967 by a letter the defendant enclosed a wharf rent bill dt. 16th Jan. 1967 in respect of the said goods so landed. This letter was received by the plaintiff on 27th Jan. 1967. Thereafter by another letter dt. 25th Jan. 1967 the Port Turst authorities intimated the plaintiff appellant LT. C. Ltd. that the goods in question were lying in the lock fast of the Port Trust authorities. Inasmuch as the said goods were lying in a broken condition on 27th Jan. 1967 the plaintiff appellant requested for survey of the said goods. On the 4th Feb. 1967 it transpired that the case so received from the lock-fast was in an empty condition i. e. , although the container was there in a broken condition but the machinery contained in such container was found missing. Such fact had been admitted by the respondent authorities by letter dt. 6th Feb. 1967 where it had been recorded that the case in question was pilfered from the shed belonging to the Port Trust authorities. Such fact had been admitted by the respondent authorities by letter dt. 6th Feb. 1967 where it had been recorded that the case in question was pilfered from the shed belonging to the Port Trust authorities. The question which calls for determination in the instant appeal is as to whether the appellant's claim was barred by the law of limitation. While considering the question of limitation, the section which calls for construction of tile Calcutta Port Act are :- S. 113, sub-sec. (1) and sub-sec. (2 ). Sub-sec. (1) of S. 113 provides that the Commissioner shall immediately upon the landing of any goods take charge thereof and store such as are liable to suffer from exposure in any shed or warehouse belonging to the Commissioner. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 113 of the Calcutta Port Act provides, if the owner without any fault on the part of the Commissioner fails to remove any goods (other than those stored in warehouses licenced under S. 16 of the Sea Customs Act, 1973) from the premises of the Commissioner within five clear working days from the time of landing or such goods shall remain on the premises at the sole risk and expenses of the owner. From sub-sec. (1) of S. 113 of the said Act it clearly indicates that as soon as the goods are discharged by a vessel it is the duty of the Commissioner to take charge of the same immediately and the duty and/or responsibility that had been cast on the owner of the goods so delivered by the shipping agency is to remove the said goods from the premises of the Commissioners within five clear working days from the time of the landing of the goods. Thereafter they will remain on the premises of the Port Commissioners at the sole risk and expenses of the owner. By the clear unambiguous language as provided in the section itself it indicates that the liability of the owner to remove the goods within five clear working days from the time of landing could only be applicable in the ordinary circumstances when the goods are landed. But such provision has no application in the facts and circumstances of the case where it is not possible for the owner to remove the goods due to any fault on the part of the Port Commissioner. The language of sub-sec. But such provision has no application in the facts and circumstances of the case where it is not possible for the owner to remove the goods due to any fault on the part of the Port Commissioner. The language of sub-sec. (2) of S. 113 clearly indicates that such liability of the owner to remove the goods within five clear working days would only arise in a case where there is no fault on the part of the Port Commissioners. From the facts as indicated above and from the series of correspondence that have been relied upon both by the appellant and also by respondents it indicated that in various letters and/or correspondence the Port Trust Authorities had clearly admitted that when the goods were landed it had the bearing of the mark `t' indicating that the goods while landed by the shipping agency were not in an intact condition inasmuch as it was in broken condition. It further transpired from the various correspondence as disclosed by the parties that not only it was landed in a broken condition but it also indicated that the said consignment bearing the No. C 279 was untraceable for a considerable period of time and even after when the said case No. C 279 was finally located it was found that the entire goods, that is the machinery so imported, had been pilfered and/or removed from the container. It was only the container which was lying ready for delivery to be taken by the appellant in the instant appeal. ( 4 ) THE learned Judge after discussion of various facts and the law concerned had come to the conclusion that the plaintiff appellants right to take delivery arose immediately on 27th Jan. , 1967 but the defendant could not deliver due to pilferage of the goods from the Port Commissioners shed. The positive finding of the learned Judge was that the cause of action in the instant case arose on and from 27th Jan. , 1967. In spite of such findings it appears that although an appeal had been preferred by the LT. The positive finding of the learned Judge was that the cause of action in the instant case arose on and from 27th Jan. , 1967. In spite of such findings it appears that although an appeal had been preferred by the LT. C. Ltd. being aggrieved by such judgment which went against them on the question of limitation, the Port Trust Authorities had not filed any appeal therefrom nor have they filed any cross-objection disputing such finding of the learned Court below that the plaintiff's right to take delivery arose on and from 27th Jan. , 1967 and not earlier that is the date when the goods were landed at the Calcutta Port in the month of Nov. , 1966. While construing S. (13 (1) and (2) of the Calcutta Port Act it appears that the question of taking delivery of the goods could only arise not only when there was no fault on the part of the Port Trust Authorities but also it is dependent on the fact whether the goods were there in existence for the purpose of taking delivery by the owner. From the facts as indicated above it appeared that the question of taking delivery of the said goods dis not arise. Under these special facts and circumstances inasmuch as on the own admission of the Port Trust Authorities the goods had been pilfered from their custody, as such taking delivery of the same within five clear working days from the date of the landing did not arise. Section 112 (1) of the Port Act provides the responsibility of the Commissioners for loss, destruction or deterioration of animal or goods whether landed for import or received for export for carriage by railway during such time as the same remain in the possession or under the control of the Commissioners and that will be subject to other provisions of that Act. And in case of animals or goods received for carriage by railway subject also to the provisions of the Railways Act of 1890 be that of a bailee under Ss. 151, 152 and 161 of the Contract Act of 1872 omitting the words, "in the absence of any special contract in S. 152 of the last mentioned Act. And in case of animals or goods received for carriage by railway subject also to the provisions of the Railways Act of 1890 be that of a bailee under Ss. 151, 152 and 161 of the Contract Act of 1872 omitting the words, "in the absence of any special contract in S. 152 of the last mentioned Act. " Under the circumstances by virtue of S. 112 (1) the responsibility for loss or destruction or deterioration of the goods landed at the Port Commissioners' premises while the same remained in the possession or under the control of the Commissioners will be upon the Commissioners as that of a bailee under the sections as mentioned in the Contract Act. Section 151 of the Contract Act provides as follows: In all cases of bailment the bailee is bound to take as much care of the goods bailed to him as a man of ordinary prudence would, under similar circumstances, take of his own goods of the same bulk, quality and value as the goods bailed. Similarly S. 152 provides that the bailee, in the absence of any special contract, is not responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the thing bailed, if he has taken the amount of care of it as described in S. 151. In the instant case it is nobody's case that there was any special contract. Under the ordinary circumstances the Port Commissioners, as the bailee of the goods while the goods were still in their possession, were under an obligation to take such care of the bailed goods as a person of ordinary prudence would under similar circumstances have taken. The admitted fact that when the particular machinery so imported from Liverpool had been pilfered while still in the custody of the Port Commissioners does not indicate that they had taken such care as an ordinary man of prudence would take under the similar circumstances. Nor there was any evidence to that effect. Hence, from the facts it appears that the Port Commissioners were under an obligation to make good the loss and/or destruction or deterioration of the goods while the said goods were in their care and custody. ( 5 ) NOW, on the question of limitation, as indicated above, the learned Court below had come to a definite finding after considering the, evidence given at the trial. ( 5 ) NOW, on the question of limitation, as indicated above, the learned Court below had come to a definite finding after considering the, evidence given at the trial. The witness who had been examined on behalf of the appellant plaintiff, Sri Sudhir Kumar Ghose in answer to O. 9 onwards admitted that he had seen the `case' bearing No. C 279 at the Calcutta Port on 18th Nov. , 1966 and he found the same so landed in a broken condition and it was also kept under the Port Commissioners' lock fast. He further gave in his evidence that subsequently it transpired that the case which was landed was an empty case with the machinery missing from inside which was discovered as a result of the survey conducted at the Port Commissioners' premises. He also stated in answer to the question put by the learned Court below that it had the symbol marked as `t' put on it which is usually given in respect of broken cases which had been landed by the shippers. ( 6 ) THE learned lawyer appearing on behalf of the appellant had drawn our attention to the case reported in, 69 Cal WN 881 (Commrs. Port of Calcutta v. Khaitan and Company) and distinguished the finding of the Division Bench of this High Court on the ground that the said decision had to consider the question of the limitation under the old Limitation Act. S. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1908 provided that nothing in that Act shall affect S. 25 of the Contract Act, 1872. Sub-rule (2) of S. 29 provided that where any special or local law prescribed for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of S. 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law. Under S. 19 of the said Limitation Act of 1908 the acknowledgment so made had been specially excluded whereas under the new Limitation Act of 1963 it has been specifically provided under S. 18 the effect of acknowledgment in writing in the manner following: where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was sosigned. This is inclusive of Ss. 4 to 24. Under the circumstances, under the present Act of Limitation the acknowledgment will extend the period of limitation. Apart from that the learned lawyer for the appellant relied on a case reported in, AIR 1979 SC 1144 (Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu International) where the learned Judges of the Supreme Court while considering a claim for refund of the amount of wharfage, demurrage and transit charges claimed by the appellant refused to hear the appeal and adjudicate upon the plea of the appellant, that is, the Madras Port Trust that the claim was barred by the laws of limitation under S. 110 of the Madras Port Trust Act with the following observation. "the plea of limitation based on this section is one which the Court always looks upon with disfavour and it is unfortunate that a public authority like the Port Trust should, in all morality and justice, take up such a plea to defeat a just claim of the citizen. It is high time that governments and public authorities adopt the practice of not relying upon technical pleas for the purpose of defeating legitimate claims of citizens and do what is fair and just to the citizens. " The learned Judges further observed that such plea could be taken and also be considered by Court unless the claim is not well founded and by reason of delay in filing it, the evidence for the purpose of resisting such a claim has become unavailable. In that case the learned Judges were of the view that the claim was a just claim. In that case the learned Judges were of the view that the claim was a just claim. Hence that plea of limitation should not have been availed of by the Madras Port Trust authorities. The learned lawyer further relied upon the case reported in (1976) 1 All ER 129, where the learned Judges of the Court of Appeal were of the view that where a decision is per incuriam where the Court in the previous case having considered a statute in a sense which the words cannot bear the words of the statute being capable of only one meaning there in that case the Court of Appeal was not bound to follow the previous decision even though plainly wrong. Justice Denning at page 137 observed :"where words of an Act are plain and they admit of no doubt no Court is entitled to throw over the plain words of a statute by referring to a previous judicial decision. When there is a conflict between a plain statute and a previous decision, the statute must prevail. "applying the said principle to the facts and circumstances of this case the learned lawyer for the appellant submitted that the learned trial Judge instead of following the case reported in, 69 Cal WN 881, which had no application to the facts and circumstances of this case, should have construed the provisions of the Act which is clear and unambiguous and ought to have followed the provisions as provided in the Act itself. ( 7 ) THE learned lawyer appearing on behalf of the respondent Port Trust authorities however contended that first of all the question of acknowledgment or the pleading thereof of S. 18 of the present Limitation Act being not there in the plaint itself, such plea could not be taken by the appellant/plaintiff. Further he submitted that in view of S. 142 of the Calcutta Port Act not only the remedy but the right of the plaintiff appellant to institute the suit against the Port Trust authorities does not lie inasmuch as S. 142 of the Calcutta Port Act, 1890 provides `that no suit shall be brought against any person for anything done or purporting to or professing to be done in pursuance of this Act after the expiration of three months from the date on which the cause of action in such suit shall have arisen. It is true after the lapse of three months from the date of the cause of action not only the remedy but also the right to institute the suit lapses. Hence, the question which falls for consideration in the instant case under the present facts and circumstances is as to when such cause of action had arisen in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. As indicated earlier there is a definite finding by the learned Court below from which the Port Trust authorities have not preferred any appeal, not had filed any cross-objection. The definite finding of the Court below is that such cause of action or the right of the plaintiff to take delivery arose immediately on 27th Jan. , 1967 and not earlier thereto. If that is the position, then by virtue of the other provisions the obligation and/or duty of the consignee to take delivery of the goods arose within five working days therefrom and not from the date when the goods were discharged by the vessel but the date when the goods were made ready for delivery by the Port Trust authorities will entitle the consignee to take delivery of the goods. In view of such finding of the learned Court below it seems that the cause of action arose against the Port Trust authorities on 27th Jan. , 1967 plus the additional five days that the present appellants were entitled to by virtue of S. 113 sub-sec. (2) of the Calcutta Port Act. By relying upon the case reported in AIR 1974 SC 923 (Trustees, Bombay Port v. Premier Automobiles) the learned lawyer for the respondent submitted that no amount of acknowledgment and/or correspondence would extend the period of limitation as provided in the Act itself. While considering S. 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act, the Learned Judges had to determine and consider the meaning of accrual of the cause of action and the starting point of limitation. Factually, the case is distinguishable from the facts of this case, inasmuch as the various Sections of the Bombay Port Trust Act as quoted in the judgment indicate that there is a clear distinction and difference in the language of the Sections of the Bombay Port Trust Act as also of the Calcutta Port Trust Act, 1890. Factually, the case is distinguishable from the facts of this case, inasmuch as the various Sections of the Bombay Port Trust Act as quoted in the judgment indicate that there is a clear distinction and difference in the language of the Sections of the Bombay Port Trust Act as also of the Calcutta Port Trust Act, 1890. ( 8 ) IN paragraph 58 of the said judgment the learned Judges formulated the conclusions in the manner following :"we thus come to the end of the case and may formulate our conclusions, as clearly as the complex of facts permits. (1) Section 87 of the Act insists on notice of one month. This period may legitimately be tacked on to the six months period mentioned in the Section. (2) The starting point of limitation is the accrual, of the cause of action. Two components of the `cause' are important. The date when the plaintiff came to knew or ought to know with reasonable diligence that the goods had been landed from the vessel into the Port. Two clear, though not conclusive indications of when the consignee ought to know are (i) when the bulk of the goods are delivered, there being short delivery leading to a suit; (ii) 7 days after knowledge of the landing of the goods suggested in S. 61a. Whichever is the later date ordinarily sets off the running of limitation. (3) Letters or assurances that the missing packages are being searched for cannot enlarge limitation, once the goods have landed and the owner has come to know of it. To rely on such an unstable date as the termination of the search by the bailee is apt to make the law uncertain, the limitation liable to manipulation and abuses of other types to seep into the system. (4) Section 87 is attracted not merely when an act is committed but also when an omission occurs in the course of the performance of the official duty. The act-omission complex, if it has a nexus to the official functions of the Board and its officers, attracts limitation under S. 87. " ( 9 ) THE Learned Judges while formulating such conclusions were of the view that the starting point of limitation is the accrual of the cause of action. Two components of the cause are important. The act-omission complex, if it has a nexus to the official functions of the Board and its officers, attracts limitation under S. 87. " ( 9 ) THE Learned Judges while formulating such conclusions were of the view that the starting point of limitation is the accrual of the cause of action. Two components of the cause are important. The date when the plaintiff came to know or ought to come to know with reasonable diligence that the goods had been landed from the vessel into the port. Two clear, though not conclusive indications of when the consignee ought to know are: (i) when the bulk of the goods are delivered, there being short delivery leading to a suit; (ii) 7 days after knowledge of the landing of the goods suggested in S. 61a. Whichever is the later date ordinarily sets off the running of limitation. The very use of the expression `ordinarily' indicates, there could be extraordinary circumstances when the cause of action would deem to have arisen from a later date. In the above case the Learned Judges of the Supreme Court had to consider the case arising out of as hort delivery when the bulk of the consigned goods had already been taken delivery of by the consignee. Under the circumstances, the consignee had a clear knowledge as to the landing of the goods, when the consignee had taken delivery of the major quantity of the goods so landed. Under the circumstances, not only there were differences in the language of both the Port Acts of Bombay and Calcutta but tactually also that the case could be distinguished. It is true, letters of assurances that the missing packages are being searched for cannot enlarge limitation, once the goods have landed and the owner has come to know of it. To rely on such an unstable date as the termination of the search by the bailee is apt to make the law uncertain, the limitation is liable to manipulation and abuses of other types to seep into the system. But in the instant case the question of relying upon the correspondences and/or assurances given by the Port Trust Authorities did not arise. But in the instant case the question of relying upon the correspondences and/or assurances given by the Port Trust Authorities did not arise. To our mind, the very fact of the landing of an empty casket or a case without containing the goods so imported i. e. Cigarette Manufacturing Machine cannot foist the knowledge on the owner of landing of the said goods, admittedly, when there was no dispute as to the pilferage of the goods so imported and the only thing that was made ready for delivery was an empty case and not the contents thereof. ( 10 ) UNDER those circumstances, this Court is of the view that the appellants suit against the respondent-authorities was not barred by the Law of Special Limitation as provided in the Port Act itself. Under those circumstances, the judgment appealed from is set aside. ( 11 ) THE learned lawyer appearing on behalf of the appellant relied upon a decision in the case of Dilbagh Rai Jerry v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1974 SC 130 . The learned Counsel relied on the observations of the learned Judges at page 136 in the manner following:-"the State under our Constitution undertakes economic activities in a vast and widening public sector and inevitably gets involved in disputes with private individuals. But it must be remembered that the State is no ordinary party trying to win a case against one of its own citizens by hook or by crook; for, the State's interest is to meet honest claims, vindicate a substantial defence and never to score a technical point or overreach a weaker party to avoid a just liability or secure an unfair advantage, simply because legal devices provide such an opportunity. "very rightly commented by the learned lawyer on behalf of the respondent-authorities that by no stretch of imagination a multinational company like I. T. C. could be considered a weaker party over which the Port Trust Authorities tried to overreach or take an undue advantage. But the fact remains that the claim admittedly was not an unfair claim or it is not honest. Admittedly, the goods so consigned had been pilfered. ( 12 ) CONSIDERING that it was only a claim for 28, 257. But the fact remains that the claim admittedly was not an unfair claim or it is not honest. Admittedly, the goods so consigned had been pilfered. ( 12 ) CONSIDERING that it was only a claim for 28, 257. 22 this Court feels that although the Court allows the appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment, there should be no order as to costs in favour of the successful appellant. ( 13 ) THE appeal is disposed of accordingly. ( 14 ) AT the instance of the learned lawyer appearing on behalf of the appellant, this Court passes a decree for Rs. 28, 257. 22. This Court passes no order for payment of interim interest but the decretal amount will carry interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. ( 15 ) MOHITOSH MAJUMDAR, J :- I agree. Appeal allowed.