Santosh Duggal, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner No. I, namely, Miss Shakun, a Sales Supervisor in M/s Modern Bazar, shop No. 49, Basant Lok Shopping Centre, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi, and Vishwant Kumar, petitioner No. 2 the proprietor thereof, were prosecuted tor offences under Section 2 (ix) (k) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the act ) on a complaint having been iiled in the court of the Metropolitan Magistrate under the provisions of Sections 7/16 of the Act on the allegation that on 22nd April, 1983 at about 3. 30 p. m. Food Inspector Jit Singh purchased a sample of supari from the said shop, for aaalysis, in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder which was kept stored/exposed in the above premises for the purposes of sale, and this sample was found to be adulterated as well as misbranded on analysis by the Public Analyst in the report dated 19th May, 1983. ( 2 ) THE petitioner in Criminal Revision No. 47/89, Sat Narain Kabra was prosecuted as proprietor of M/s. J. D. and Co , who was alleged to be the supplier of the aforesaid Supari out of which the sample had been purchased and found to be adulterated as well as misbranded. ( 3 ) AFTER recording evidence of the prosecution before charge, and after hearing the prosecution as well as the accused through their respective counsel, the learned Magistrate vide his order dated 11th July, 1988 found it to be a case where it could not be said at that stage that the prosecutionhad not produced such evidence which if unrebutted would not be sufficient to record conviction of the accused. He further held that the deceaces such as of warranty raised by accused No. I and 2, who are now petitioners before this Court in Criminal Revision No. 141/88, or that of accused Sat Narain Kabra, petitioner in Criminal Revision No. 47/88), that he bad not in fact supplied the goods, is such which requires to be proved by defence evidence, and that since prima facie as per report of the Director, Central Food Laboratory, the sample had been declared to be adulterated due to presence of saccharin and also the label declaration had been opined to be faulty and not in conformity with requirements of rule 47 of the rules, framed under the Act; the accused persons were liable to be charged under section 2 (ix) (k) of the Act. He directed by his order dated 11th July, 1988 that charges be framed accordingly against all the accused persons. ( 4 ) BEFORE the charges were actually drawn up, the accused persons came up with the revision petitions before this Court. These two revision petitions being by accused who face a common prosecution, and are aggrieved by a common order of the trial Magistrate, have been taken up together for hearing and disposal, as they are based on identical facts as well as questions of law. The order is being recorded in Criminal Revision No. 141/88. ( 5 ) MR. D. C. Mathur, Advocate appearing for the petitioners in Criminal Revision No. 141/88 and Mrs. Usha Kumari appearing for the petitioner in the other revision petition pressed their challenge to the order of the Magistrate on a point of law to the effect that the Consent in terms of Section 20 of the Act, has been as per prosecution case, accorded by Mr. M. C. Verma, the then Secretary (Medical ). Delhi Administration, Delhi, and that this sanction proved by copy Ex. Public Witness 2/1 revealed that the sanctioning authority had not, at all applied his mind to the facts of the case inasmuch as there is not even a reference to the report of the Public Analyst nor to the provisions of law, for violation or contravention of which, these persons were being prosecuted. Mr. Matbur pointed out that although Mr. Public Witness 2/1 revealed that the sanctioning authority had not, at all applied his mind to the facts of the case inasmuch as there is not even a reference to the report of the Public Analyst nor to the provisions of law, for violation or contravention of which, these persons were being prosecuted. Mr. Matbur pointed out that although Mr. M. C. Verma was produced as a witness by the prosecution in the pre-charge evidence, but his cross-examination had not been concluded, and inspite of the direction of the court that it would be incumbent for the prosecution to produce Mr. M. C. Verma again failing which his evidence would not be read, Mr. M. C. Verma was not put in the witness box again, with the result that the accused persons were deprived of the right of full cross-examination of this witness. The result, according to Mr. Mathur, is that this consent which is a statutory requirement, and without which no prosecution could be launched, has not been duly proved, and that the Magistrate himself recognised this position when by order dated 9th October. 1986, he ordered that the prosecution was directed to produce Mr. M. C. Verma on the next date of hearing, failing which his examination-in-chief shall not be read in evidence. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel argued that the fact remains that Mr. Verma never appeared in the witness box again and that as per this order of the magistrate dated 9th October, 1986, the evidence of Mr. M. C. Verma has to be completely left out, and that as such it becomes a case where the authority who recorded the consent order for prosecution of the accused in this case has to be taken not to have come before the court to vouchsafe for the fact that he had applied his mind to the facts of this case and had recorded his. consent only after being satisfied from the material on record. ( 7 ) ACCORDING to Mr. consent only after being satisfied from the material on record. ( 7 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Maihurthe copy of the consent order, which has been proved as Public Witness 2/a by the Additional Public prosecutor who was authorised to launch this prosecution can at the most be taken to haye been proved, only in the sense that this consent order was received by him, purporting to be signed by Secretary (Medical), Delhi Administration, Delhi along with other papers on the basis of which he proceeded to file the compliant in court. ( 8 ) MR. Mathur then referred to the provisions of Section 20 of the Act, which reads as under : "20. Cognizance and trial of offence. (1) No prosecution for an offence under this Act, not being an offence under Section 14 or Section 14-A, shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of, (the Central Government or the State Government) or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government. . . " ( 9 ) HE laid stress on the fact that the consent in writing is a pre-requisite for launching of the prosecution. That consent must on face of the record indicate that there was full application of mind by the concerned authority and should indicate that he had adverted to all the facts and material of a particular case. Learned counsel pointed out to the signed copy Ex. Public Witness 2/a and argued that a bare look at it, reveals that it has been signed by the Secretary (Medical), Delhi Administration, Delhi, ina mechanical manner inasmuch as it is in the nature of a cyclostyled proforma, where only blanks by way of filling up the names of the accused persons and the particulars of the sample and name of the food inspector and date of lifting of the sample had been inserted. There is no instrinsic evidence in this consent form that the concerned authority had before him the report of the Public Analyst, which is the basis of the prosecution or had gone through the same or was made aware as to what arc the contraventions of law or rules on the part of the accused persons for which they were proposed to be prosecuted and for which be was according his consent. Mr. Mr. Mathur argued that now it is settled proposition that in the absence of any such material apparent on the fact of the document, the sanctioning authority himself had to come in the witness box to supply the missing details or fill up the lacuna. This is lacking in the present case inasmuch as the Secretary (Medical), Delhi Administration, Delhi after being examined partly, was not produced again and the court himself had recorded that his evidence could not be read as part of the record. ( 10 ) THE learned Magistrate no doubt was right in saying that the report stood formally proved by evidence of the Additional Public Prosecutor who had received it along with other papers in the official course of business for launching prosecution but there is a difference between formal proof, in contradiction to the proof as to substance of a document. ( 11 ) A Division Bench of this Court in the case : State (Delhi Administration) v. Shyam Lal, 1987 (11) FACT 198. held that a sanction granted in a cyclostyled form where the name of !he accused had been typed in the body of the form, the feed article as well as the date of lifting of the sample had also been typed, and where there was no reference to the report of the Public Analyst, or the provisions of law with reference to which the accusedwere proposed to be prosecuted, the sanction was not valid. This view was reiterated by this very Division Bench in another case reported as R. N. Gujral and another v. Pritipal Gupta, 1988 (II) FACT 84. This view was reiterated by this very Division Bench in another case reported as R. N. Gujral and another v. Pritipal Gupta, 1988 (II) FACT 84. In both these cases the learned Judges of the Division Bench quoted with approval a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court, reported as; State v. Brij Mohan, 1985 (1) FACT 74 where it was stressed that consent in order to be valid and to furnish requisite sanction for prosecution, had to be complete in all materials details, and where it was found to be in a cyclostyled proforma with names of the accused persons filled up by typing as also the other particulars such as description of the sample, the date of lifting of the sample and name of the food inspector, were all inserted in typing, and there is no reference to the fact that the sanctioning authority bad gone through the report of the Public Analyst, then the consent cannot be said to be a valid sanction in terms of Section 20 of the Act. In that case, the order of the learned Magistrate calling the sanctioning authority in the witness box to prove these facts was upheld. ( 12 ) IN the present case, the prosecution has chosen not to produce the said authority in the witness box inspite of number of adjournments having been given and inspite of the fact that the court had clearly recorded that in the absence of that authority being produced again, his evidence will not be taken into consideration. When that was so, the learned Magistrate fell into wanifest error in rejecting the contention of the accused persons at the time of consideration of charge by observing that since the accused would be getting opportunity to recall prosecution witnesses for crosi-examination after the framing of the charges, the fact that Mr. M. C. Verma, Secretary (Medical), Delhi Administration, Delhi had not been produced again to enable the accused persons to cross-examine him, cannot stand in the way of framing of the charge. M. C. Verma, Secretary (Medical), Delhi Administration, Delhi had not been produced again to enable the accused persons to cross-examine him, cannot stand in the way of framing of the charge. The position that had emerged at the time, the learned Magistrate was considering the question of charge, was that only the consent form was before him, and even if that could be read into evidence prima facie; even then to view of the judgment of this Court, noticed above it was obviously a case where that consent was a document, whereby without any worth, because it does not show on face of the record that the sanctioning authority had applied his mind to the facts of the case. It suffers from all those lacunae which have been indicated earlier, as existing in the cases before the Division Bench in the case of Sham Lal (Supra) and Pritipal Gupta (supra) as well the learned Single Judge in the case; Brij Mohan (Supra ). As such, at the time the Court was considering the question of charge, there was no valid consent before him, and this consent being a pre-requisite for institution of a case in view of the provisions of Section 20 of the Act, there remained nothing further for the accused persons to rebut by evidence, when it was a case where complaint itself was not validity instituted. ( 13 ) INVIEW of the clear authority of our own High Court in three successive judgments with which I respectfully agree, I do not think Mr. Bakshi took up a tenable plea, when appearing for the State, arguing on the basis of a Single Bench judgment of Bombay High Court, reported as; The State of Maharashtra v. Janardan Ramchandra Narwankar, (1978 Criminal Law Journal811), to the effect that under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, a presumption arises that all official acts have been regularly performed, and that since the consent form had been proved by the Additional Public Prosecutor, there was no need for further evidence either of the officer concerned himself or other extraneous evidence to prove that he had applied his mind to the facts of the case. Apart from the fact that I feel bound by the decision of this Court as against judgment of Bombay High Court, otherwise also,it needs hardly to be recorded that even if the consent order is read into evidence, it discloses on face of it, such vital omissions in respect to material particulars that no other inference is possible than the fact that the consent order was signed by the authority concerned mechanically and without proper application of mind. ( 13 ) I, therefore, find it to be a case where the learned trial court clearly fell into error in proceeding further against the accused persons by framing charge. It is, thus, a fit case to allow the revision petition and set aside the order dated 11th July, 1988 whereby charges against all the three accused persons were framed. ( 14 ) IN the result, this petition, as also petition No. 47 of 1989, are allowed, and the order dated 11th July, 1988 is set aside. As a consequence the petitioners in both the revision petitions shall stand discharged. No order as to costs.