Santosh Duggal, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeks issuance of writ of habeas corpus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, as the petitioner is under detention, pursuant to an order passed on 6th July, 1988 invoking the provisions of Section 3 (1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Ordinance (hereinafter referred to as the ordinance ). ( 2 ) THE facts in brief in so far as these are relevant to this case are that on receipt of specific intelligence by Narcotic Control Bureau at New Delhi to the effect that some Dutch nationals were likely to smuggle heroin out of India on 6th April 1987, a surveillance was kept at the IGI Airport, New Delhi. On 6th April, 1987, one person named Ali Bocus Rahmat Ali holding Netherland passport was apprehended and found in possession of 2 kgs. heroin contained in his baggage, and he was placed under arrest. In the meantime, pursuant to the aforesaid intelligence report, the present petitioner along with one 1. Arjun had been intercepted at the Bombay Airport on 5th April, 1987 by officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence before whom the petitioner and his companion made statement. Thereafter they were directed to appear before the Narcotics Control Bureau at Delhi. In response to the summons, the petitioner as well as I Arjun appeared before the officers of the Narcotics Control Bureau on 6th April, 1987. The petitioner gave his statement where he disclosed his involvement in the acquisition of heroin, seized from the possession of Ali Bocus Rehmat Ali. He was, then placed under arrest for offences under the provisions of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act, 1988. ( 3 ) WHILE the petitioner was in judicial custody. The petitioner gave his statement where he disclosed his involvement in the acquisition of heroin, seized from the possession of Ali Bocus Rehmat Ali. He was, then placed under arrest for offences under the provisions of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act, 1988. ( 3 ) WHILE the petitioner was in judicial custody. Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Ordinance was promulgated on 4th July, 1988, and in view of the past activities of the petitioner as disclosed by him in his statements given on 5th April, 1987 and 6th April, 1987 and the seizure of heroin from Ali Bocus Rahmat Ali,a detention order was passed in respect of him by Shri K. L. Verma, Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue on 6th July, 1988, in exercise of powers under Section 3 (1) of the said Ordinance, with the object of preventing him from engaging in purchase of narcotic drugs. This order was served on the petitioner injail on 13th July, 1988 as per record. ( 4 ) IT is the aforesaid detention order, which is under challenge in this writ petition. The ground, inter alia, pleaded is that there was no compelling necessity to place him under preventive detention for the reason that he was already in judicial custody and continued to be so since 6th April, 1987. It is further pleaded that it was within the knowledge of the detaining authority that the petition for bail filed by him earlier bad been rejected by the courts, and that no subsequent petition for bail had been moved, much less pending in any court at the time this order of detention was clamped on him and in face of this situation, it is clear case where the order of detention was passed without proper application of mind, and without there being any material for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to the effect that there was any compelling necessity to preventively detain the petitioner. This plea has been set out in paragraph. This plea has been set out in paragraph. 16 of the writ petition and reiterated in ground VI, where it is specifically urged that the petitioner was already in jail and had not been granted bail by any court of law and assuch there was no urgent reason justifying his detention Reliance is placed in this regard on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Kumar v. Union of India and Ors, AIR 1988 SC 934 . ( 5 ) MR. Malik at the time of hearing, pressed this ground foremost, and argued that it is on record that the petitions for bail filed by the petitioner stood rejected by the courts and that there is no indication in the grounds of detention to the effect that there was likelihood of imminent release from custody of the petitioner, so as to justify the apprehension that the petitioner would be reverting to his prejudicial activities of purchase of narcotic drugs etc. Mr. Malik went on to urge that even if there was any endeavour on the part of the petitioner to secure his release on bail by approaching the court by making application for the purpose, even then proper course for the authorities was to contest the bail petition or resist the passing of the bail order in the manner prescribed by law, and the procedure could not be subverted by resorting to preventive detention. In support of his contention, he ciled Supreme Court judgment reported as Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah and Ors, (1985)4 SCC 232 The learned counsel contended that the Supreme Court has impressed upon the requirement of the detaining authority expressing its satisfaction in the grounds of detention to the effect that there was a compelling necessity to preventively detain a person and that this was so inspite of the fact that such a person was presently in jail. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel went on to argue that on the facts and circumstances of this case, there was no such basis for the detaining authority to even entertain any such apprehension because the petitioner had not moved any court for bail after rejection of the earlier two petitions and he had been in custody for 15 months after his arrest and was facing trial for the offence under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act, 1988. He submitted that there was no reason as to why the ordinary course of law is not allowed to proceed, as there was no imperative necessity to impose preventive detention on the petitioner. Mr. Malik further pointed out that inspite of a clear plea having been taken in the writ petition in this respect, the detaining authority himself has not come forward with any counter to disclose that there was any material before him or any other basis for his satisfaction that inspite of the petitioner being in custody, there was likelihood of his indulging in the prejudicial activities and that there were an such grounds for passing this detention order. He placed reliance on judgments of the Supreme Court in support of his contention that in such situations, the detaining authority should himself come forward with an affidavit vouchsafing for his subjective satisfaction or proper application of mind. (Biru Mahato v. District Magistrate, Dharbad, (1982)3 SCC 322 ; Mohinuddin alias Moin Mastery. District Magistrate, Beed and Ors. , (1987)4 SCC 58 and State of Gujarat v. Sunil Fulchand Shah and another, (1988) l SCC 600 ). ( 7 ) SINCE in the light of the Supreme Court judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it appears that the writ petition can be disposed of on this short point, Mr. Adish Aggarwal appearing tor the respondent was called upon to address himself to the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard. Mr. Aggarwal pleaded that every case has to be determined on its own facts and circumstances, and in the present case the grounds of detention give a clear indication that the detaining authority had recorded its satisfaction that there was necessity to place the petitioner under detention, inspite of the fact that he was in judicial custody. He cited a judgment of the Supreme Court in support of bis contention reported as Smt. K. Aruna Kumari v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. He cited a judgment of the Supreme Court in support of bis contention reported as Smt. K. Aruna Kumari v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. , (1988)1 SCC 296 , to the effect that the sufficiency of the materials available to the detaining authority was not to be examined by the court, inasmuch as while considering the writ petition on behalf of the detenu, the Supreme Court or the High Courts, do not sit in appeal over the detention order and for this reason it was not for the Court to go into and assess the probative value of the evidence available to the detaining authority. In response to the court query, Mr. Aggarwal confirmed from the file that the petitioner had not moved any petition for bail after the order passed on 17th December, 1987 whereby his petition for bail was last rejected. ( 8 ) ON a cumulative study of the exposition of the principles and guidelines as laid down by series of judgments of the Supreme Court, on the necessity of the detaining authority, indicating the factum of compelling necessity in the grounds of detention itself, I think Mr. Aggarwal s plea justifying the detention order on the strength of judgment in Smt. K. ArunaKumart s case (supra), is not tenable. For the question here is not that of sufficiency or adequacy of the material before the detaining authority, but as to that of subjective satisfaction and application of mind. It is considered expedient to reproduce the relevant portion from the grounds of detention. in order to appreciate the contention canvassed on behalf of the petitioner. It says :- "8. In view of the facts mentioned hereinabove, I have no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that you have been engaging in purchase narcotic drugs and in case if you are released on bail you are likely to indulge in the aforesaid activities. Although the criminal proceedings under the NDPS Act, 1985 have been initiated against you, I am satisfied that you should be detailed under the provisions of the Preventive of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Ordinance, 1988 with a view to preventing you from engaging in purchase of narcotic drugs. Although the criminal proceedings under the NDPS Act, 1985 have been initiated against you, I am satisfied that you should be detailed under the provisions of the Preventive of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Ordinance, 1988 with a view to preventing you from engaging in purchase of narcotic drugs. " ( 9 ) A bare reference to the grounds of detention, particularly the extracted portion, makes it abundantly clear that the detaining authority was influenced only by one consideration, and that was that if the petitioner was released on bail, he was likely to indulge in the prejudicial activities such as purchase of narcotic drugs. There are catena of authorities holding that it is not a sufficient ground to establish the compelling necessity, particularly in the absence of an affidavit by the detaining authority himself to vouchsafe for the fact that on the material placed before him he did feel satisfied that inspite of the fact that the petitioner was in judicial custody, it was a fit case where he should be placed under preventive detention. The court is not informed as to why the detaining authority had not come forward with an affidavit because all that we have in this case is an affidavit in reply by Mr. C. Rajan, Under Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Government of India. Such an attempt by another officer particularly a junior officer to try to vouchasafe for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority has been described by the Supreme Court in the case of Gulab Mehra v. State of U. P. and others, (1987) 4 SCC 302 where it was stated in clear terms that the detaining authority himself should come forward with an affidavit stating whether he had taken into consideration the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody and further that because of his past activities he was subjectively satisfied that if the detenu was released on bail, there was likelihood of the detenu indulging in criminal activities again. ( 10 ) IN Biru Mehato s case (supra), the reply affidavit had been filed by the successor-in-office of the District Magistrate, and even then it was held that the officer, namely, the District Magistrate who had passed the detention order ought to have submitted his affidavit in reply in so far as the question of subjectively satisfaction was concerned. ( 10 ) IN Biru Mehato s case (supra), the reply affidavit had been filed by the successor-in-office of the District Magistrate, and even then it was held that the officer, namely, the District Magistrate who had passed the detention order ought to have submitted his affidavit in reply in so far as the question of subjectively satisfaction was concerned. This principle has been recognised in a very recent judgment by the Supreme Court in Sunil Fulchand Shah s case (supra ). In that case, the Home Minister who was the detaining authority, having ceased to be Minister before filing of the affidavit, was not available and the Deputy Secretary (Home) who was fully conversant with the facts of the case did file the affidavit, in that situation the affidavit in reply was taken into consideration but the principle was affirmed in the following words : "it is true that in a case where a point as mentioned above arises the detaining authority should personally affirm off oath the statnd taken on his behalf. . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 11 ) IN this case, there is no such explanation. The lapse of the part of the respondents in not getting an affidavit of the detaining authority placed on record cannot thus be condoned. In the result, we are left only with what is apparent on the record in the grounds of detention. Here we have only a bald assertion that "if you are released on bail, you will indulge in the aforesaid activities", (paragraph 8 ). There is no averment to the effect that the petitioner was trying to get out on ball by moving applications. The factual position is that for about 7 months before the order of detention, the petitioner had not at all moved any petition for bail and his earlier petitions for bail had been successively rejected. There was thus no imminent possibility of his being released from jail He was already facing trial for his alleged involvement in the activity of purchase of heroin that had been seized and for which he had been arrested on 6th April, 1987, and continued to be in custody thereafter. ( 12 ) IT has been held in no uncertain terms in the case Smt. Shashi Aggarwal v. . ( 12 ) IT has been held in no uncertain terms in the case Smt. Shashi Aggarwal v. . State of U. P. and others, (1988)1 SCC 436 , that a bald statement that the person would repeat his criminal activities on release from jail was not enough and that there must be credible information or cogent reasons apparent on the record that the detenu if enlarged on bail would act prejudicially to the interest of public order. The detenu was ordered to be released in that case in the absence of any material apparent on record that he, if released on bail, was likely to commit activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, the detention order in that case being under Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980. Further, it was impressed upon by the Supreme Court that every citizen has a right to move Court for bail when he is arrested under the ordinary law of the land and he cannot be interdicted from moving the Court for bail by clamping an order of detention. ( 13 ) MR. Anish Aggarwal tried to make a distinction between the present case viz-a-viz Smt. Shashi Aggarwal s case by highlighting the facts that the petitioner in the present case was a Pakistani national and not a citizen of India. In view of the fact that the requirements of Article 22 in matters of prevention detention are uniform for citizens as well as non-citizens, there can be no distinction on this score and it is to be observed that the subjective satisfaction for passing order of detention by thedetaining authority is not to be viewed in isolation but in the context of the constitutional requirements of enabling every detenu to make an effective representation as envisaged by Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and that he can do so only if he is clearly told in the grounds of detention as to what material had been considered against him, and in what way the detaining authority had arrived at his subjective satisfaction. ( 14 ) EARLIER, in the case of Ramesh Yadav (supra), the Supreme Court held that merely on the ground that an accused in detention as an undertrial prisoner was likely to get bail, an order of detention under the National Security Act should not ordinarily be passed. ( 14 ) EARLIER, in the case of Ramesh Yadav (supra), the Supreme Court held that merely on the ground that an accused in detention as an undertrial prisoner was likely to get bail, an order of detention under the National Security Act should not ordinarily be passed. If the apprehension of the detaining authority was true, the bail application had to be opposed and in case bail was granted, challenge against that order in the higher forum had to be raised. ( 15 ) A very recent judgment of the Supreme Court has reiterated this position in the case Ahdul Razak Abdal Wahab Sheikh v. Shri S N. Sinha Commissioner of Police Ahmedabad and another, Judgments Today 1989 (1) S. C. 478. where also the grounds of detention disclosed the reason which moved the detaining authority to pass detention order on the ground that the detenu if released on bail was likely to indulge in criminal activities, affecting public order. That being also a case under Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980, the order was struck down by holding that the mere bald statement that the detenu who is in jail custody is likely to be released on bail and there are full possibilities that he may continue the above offensive activities, without reference to any particular case or acts does not show on the face of the order of detention that there lias been subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority in making the order of detention in question. ( 16 ) IN view of the successive judgments of the Supreme Court, emphasising the need of expressing subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in the grounds of detention itself, and making it apparent on record that there was compelling necessity to place particular person under preventive detention, and in face of the authorities referred to above, that in case where the person is already in judicial custody and there was no material made apparent on record, that there was any likelihood of his being released from custody or that even when released he was likely to revert to his criminal activities, the detention order cannot be justified. In view of the above and in view of the facts as noticed earlier. I am of the opinion that the detention order in this case cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. In view of the above and in view of the facts as noticed earlier. I am of the opinion that the detention order in this case cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. ( 17 ) ACCORDINGLY I allow the writ petition and make the rule absolute and direct that the petitioner be released forthwith if not required to be detained in any other case or proceedings. ( 18 ) NO order as to costs.