JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, J :- This second appeal arises out of a judgment and decree dated 12-6-1984 passed by Sri Ranjit Prasad Sinha, 3rd Additional Subordinate Judge, Giridih in Titlie Appeal No.3 of 1982/6 of 1983 whereby and whereunder the said learned court reversed the judgment and decree dated 22-9-1981 passed by Sri G,W. BAA, learned Munsif, Bermo at Tenughat in Title Suit No. 14 of 1975. 2. The facts of the case lie in a very narrow compass. The plaintiff by virtue of a registered deed of sale dated 16-3-1972 (Ext.1) purchased the suit lands which is in several posts appertaining to Khata No. 364 in village Hossir. P. S. Gomia. Dist. Giridih. Admittedly the consideration amount fixed in respect of the aforementioned sale deed was Rs. 1500/-. 3. From a perusal of the said registered deed of sale dated 16-3-1972 (Ext.1) it transpires that the plaintiff paid a slim of Rs. 700/- to defendant No.1 (Vendor) and the balance amout of Rs. 800/- was to be paid on a later date. According to the plaintiff, on or about 17-3-1972 she paid the balance sum of Rs. 800/- therefore the defendant No.1 granted Kabja wasuli receipt which was marked before the learned court below as Ext. 2. The further case of the plaintiff is that some times in May, 1975 she came to learn from the notices issues by the Circle Officer that defendant No. 2 had applied before the said authority for mutation of his name in respect of the aforementioned land, Upon enquiry, she came to learn that the consideration amount was not paid by the plaintiff to defendant No.1, executed a registered deed of cancellation on 20th March, 1972 which was• marked before the learned trial court as Ext. B. It further transpires that on 14-3-1973 defendant No.1 executed a registered deed of sale in respect of l.89½ acres of land out of the suit property in favour of defendant No.2. The said registered deed of sale dated 17-3-1973 was marked as Ext. A/2 before the learned trial court. On 20th March, 1972 defendant No.1 had executed another sale deed in favour of the defendant No.3 who incidently happens to be the son of the plaintiff in respect of l.56½ acres of land out of the suit properties. Defendant No.3, however, denied to have purchased the said land from the defendant No.1. 4. A/2 before the learned trial court. On 20th March, 1972 defendant No.1 had executed another sale deed in favour of the defendant No.3 who incidently happens to be the son of the plaintiff in respect of l.56½ acres of land out of the suit properties. Defendant No.3, however, denied to have purchased the said land from the defendant No.1. 4. The case of defendant No.1 was that in view of the fact that the plaintiff did not pay the entire consideration amount for execution of the aforementioned deed of sale dated 16-3-1972 he had cancelled the said document by executing the said purported deed of cancellation dated 20th March, 1972. The further case of defendant No.1 was that the plaintiff did not come in possession of the suit properties pursuant to the said registered deed of sale dated 16-3-1972 or otherwise, and upon execution of the sale deed dated 20th March, 1972 (in favour of defendant No.3) and the sale deed dated 14-3-1973 (in favour of defendant No.2), the respective purchasers came in possession of their purchased property. On the basis of the aforementioned pleadings, the learned trial court framed the following issues :- (i) Is the suit maintainable? (ii) Is there any cause of action for the suit ? (iii) Is the suit barred by adverse possession and limitation? (iv) Is the suit bad for misjoinder and non-joinder of parties? (v) Is the suit hit under the provisions of specific Relief Act? (vi) Is the suit under-valued ? (vii) Has the plaintiff title over the suit lands, and is also entitled for a decree for confirmation of possession ? (viii) To what other relief or relief is the plaintiff entitled ?" 5. The learned trial Court held that the plaintiff paid the entire amount as consideration of the said deed and as stipulated in the deed of sale dated 16-3-1972 and she came in possession thereon. The learned trial Court also came to the conclusion that the purported deed of cancellation dated 20th March, 1972 (Ext. B) was illegrl and further held that the title and interest of the plaintiff was not affected thereby. The learned lower appellate court, however, in appeal, reversed the said findings. By an order dated 15-1-1985 at the time of admission the following substantial questions of law were formulated for consideration in the second appeal:- "1. B) was illegrl and further held that the title and interest of the plaintiff was not affected thereby. The learned lower appellate court, however, in appeal, reversed the said findings. By an order dated 15-1-1985 at the time of admission the following substantial questions of law were formulated for consideration in the second appeal:- "1. Whether the deed dated 16-3-1972 (Ext.1) conferred title to the plaintiff-appellant after its execution and registration or it was postponed till the payment of the entire consideration money? 2. Whether the learned lower appellate court correctly appreciated the intents and purposes of section 8 of the Transfer of property Act, to ascertain the intention of the parties from the said documents ? 3. Whether the deed of cancellation (Ext. B) dated 20-3-1972 executed by the vendors of Ext. 1 was hit .y the provisions of section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 ? 4. Whether the learned lower appellate court was justified to make investigation of the question of fraud without any pleading and proof to that effect ?" 6. Mr. B.K. Roy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant very fairly conceded that the only point that arise for consideration in this appeal is the substantial question No. 1 formulated in the aforementioned order dated 15-1-1985. 7. Otherwise also, in my opinion the substantial questions Nos. 2 and 3, in the facts and circumstances of this case as indicated herein before, do not arise for consideration in this appeal and have wrongly been formulated. 8. It is now well settled that the question as to whether a title in respect of the property in suit has passed irrespective of the fact as to whether consideration amount has been paid or not depends upon the intention of the parties. Such an intention has primarily to be gathered from the document itself as also from the surrounding circumstances. It is also well settled that even if the vendor has not received the entire consideration amount from the purchaser, if valid title has passed on to the purchaser, his remedy is not to get the same annulled by executing a deed of cancellation but by taking recourse to the suit in terms of section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The vendor, in certain circumstances, may also file a suit for decree for the consideration amount which remained outstanding. The vendor, in certain circumstances, may also file a suit for decree for the consideration amount which remained outstanding. This aspect of the matter has fully been considered by a learned single judge of the Orissa High Court in Michhu Kuanr Vs Raghu Jena Wherein the said-learned judge held that once by the registered sale deed, title had passed to the vendees, non-payment of a part consideration no not nullify the effect of the sale deed. The ratio enuntiated by the Orissa High Court in the aforementioned case has been referred to by a Division Bench of Madras High Court in the of Rajammal Vs Raman Kutty. 9. In terms of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, as also in terms of the provisions contained in section 47 of the Indian Registration Act, title to the property passes to the vendee from the date of execution of the document upon registration there of unless a contrary intention is expressed in the document itself or is ascertainable from the surrounding circumstances. 10. In the event a stipulation is made in the deed of sale itself that either the entire consideration amount has been paid or a part of it has been paid and if no stipulation is made therein, that title in respect of the property in question would not vest in the vendee unless the entire consideration amount is paid, the onus to prove that despite registration of the deed of sale, the title in respect of the property in question did not pass to the vendee, would be upon the vendor. 11. In terms of section 54 of the Transfer of property Act, a deed of sale becomes complete not only when the entire consideration amount is paid but even when a part of it is paid and a part of it - promised to be paid or promise is made for payment of entire consideration amount in future. In the instant case, a specific recital exists in the deed of sale dated 16-3-1972(Ext.1) that a sun of Rs. 700/- has been paid to the vendee by the vendor. True, it is, as has been held by the learned lower appellate court as also as was contended by Mr. C. S. Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 700/- has been paid to the vendee by the vendor. True, it is, as has been held by the learned lower appellate court as also as was contended by Mr. C. S. Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 2 that the aforementioned amount was not paid before the Sub-registrar, but law in this context is absolutely clear which is that the onus to prove in such an event would lie upon the vendor in view of section 8 of the Transfer of property Act, read with section 92 of the Evidence Act. 12. The learned lower appellate court has comitted a serious error of law ill placing the entire onus of proof upon the plaintiff and proceeded to consider the said fact despite the stipulation of the payment so far as the sum of Rs.700/-is concerned by the vendor to the vendee in the sale-deed itself. 13. So far as the rest of Rs. 800/-is concerned, the learned lower appellate court did not discuss the effect and purport of Ext. 2. He in paragraph 18 of the judgment dealt - with the aforementioned document cryptically by saying the following. "To me it appeara that Ext. 2 is at ante dated receipt which would be borne out from Ext. B the cancellation deed executed on the 20th March, 1972. In this deed there is a clear recital regarding non-pay of consideration money and play 6f fraud by the purchaser of the sale deed dated 16-3-1972." This, in my Opinion, is no consideration of the effect of Ext.2 at all. The genuinenss of a document cannot be tested by unilateral and self-serving statement made in the deed of cancellation by a party to the said document. 14. If Ext. 2 otherwise was not a genuine receipt, it was obligatory on the part of the learend lower appellate court to come to the said finding on the basis of the evidences that have been adduced by the parties, but he could not have disbelieved the document merely because there is an unilateral statement of a party to the suit in a subsequent document. Such a statment was bound to be made as in the absence of such a statement the deed of cancellation could not have been executed. Such a statment was bound to be made as in the absence of such a statement the deed of cancellation could not have been executed. Such a consideration at the hands of the learmed lower appellate court in respect of very valuable piece of document in my opinion, amounts to no consideration in the eye of law and that it must be held that in doing so the learned lower appellate court has misdirected himself in law. In this view of the matter, and regard being had to the provisions contained in section 8 of the Transfer of property Act, and also well established principle that the title in respect of the property in suit by reason of the registered deed of sale had passed, to the vendee or not depends on the intention of the parties. It must be held that the judgment of the learned appellate court is not sustainable. From a perusal of the registered deed of sale (Ext.) 1) dated 16-3-1972 as also the of circumstances surrounding thereto, there is no doubt in my mind that the title in respect of the property in question passed on to the plaintiff upon execution of the registered deed of sale: dated 16-3-1972. 15. In this view of the matter the ques-as formulated by this Court must de answered in favour of the appellant and against the respondent. Consequently, this is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the 3rd Additional Subordinate Judge, Giridih dated 12-6-1984 in Title Appeal No.3 of 1982/6 of 1983 is set aside. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.