Gopalan Bhavani v. Raghavan Aravindakshan — 1989 DIGILAW 196 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. One of us referred these two cases for the decision of a Division Bench. One of the questions that requires consideration for a proper decision of these two Civil Revision Petitions is the question whether the Land Tribunal, under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, has got the power to restore an application dismissed for default. 2. Gopalan Nambiyar, J., as he then was, had occasion to consider this matter in Kuttappan v. Thresia (1973 KLT. 521), where His Lordship observed thus: "S.101 confers on the Tribunal certain specifically enumerated powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of certain specified matters. But the power under 0.9, R.9, of setting aside an ex parte decree or order is not one of the specifically conferred or enumerated powers. S.101(1) (e) provides that the Land Tribunal may have the powers of a civil court under the Civil Procedure Code in respect of any other matter which may be "prescribed"; but no such prescription was brought to my notice. In the face of these, the Land Tribunal, being essentially a statutory Tribunal with specifically enumerated powers, cannot have the power to set aside an ex parte decree or order." 3. His Lordship further held that the former part of 0.9, R.9, providing for the bar of a fresh suit on the same cause of action would not be attracted as far as the Land Tribunal is concerned. The court referred to the Full Bench decision of this court in Kalyani Amma Bhargavi Amma v. Ouseph Varkey (1967 KLT. 317) and said that the Full Bench has held with respect to the provisions of Ss.101, 129(2)(e) of the Land Reforms Act and R.99 of the Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules, that the Land Tribunal had power to set aside an ex parte order. It was further held that the requisite power was found under the provisions of R.99 and the Full Bench overruled the contrary view taken in three single bench decisions. The thrust of the decisions in 1973 KLT. It was further held that the requisite power was found under the provisions of R.99 and the Full Bench overruled the contrary view taken in three single bench decisions. The thrust of the decisions in 1973 KLT. 521 can be seen from the following passage: "As the conclusion was rested solely on R.99 of the Rules, and as there is now no such or similar rule, I am unable to hold that there is a power in the Land Tribunal to set aside an ex parte decree." It is pertinent to note that Nambiyar, J., as he then was, referring to the decision in C.R.P.No.270 of 1969 said that the Full Bench decision was considered and the court held that the former part of 0.9, R.9, providing for the bar of a fresh suit on the same cause of action would not be attracted as far as the Land Tribunal is concerned. 4. The Full Bench in 1967 KLT. 317 considered the question of the power of the Land Tribunal to pass orders ex parte to dismiss for default and to set aside ex parte orders and orders of dismissal. The Full Bench, of course, relied on R.99 of the Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules to hold that the Tribunal has got jurisdiction to pass orders ex parte, to dismiss for default and to set aside exparte orders and orders of dismissal for default. But it is significant to note that certain passages in paragraph six of the Full Bench decision spearhead a salient and signal jurisprudential thinking. It reads thus: "If we hold that, there is no jurisdiction for the Land Tribunal to restore, logically it must also be held, that it has no jurisdiction to dismiss for default either, and that such dismissal is void and must be treated as non est." It is a primary jurisprudential and logical look of the situation. 5. Counsel for the respondents submitted before us that if this court on an interpretation of the statutory provisions, holds that the court has no jurisdiction to restore an application dismissed for default, this Court is bound to hold logically that the Tribunal has no power to dismiss an application for default. 5. Counsel for the respondents submitted before us that if this court on an interpretation of the statutory provisions, holds that the court has no jurisdiction to restore an application dismissed for default, this Court is bound to hold logically that the Tribunal has no power to dismiss an application for default. Counsel submitted before us that even for a court this power of dismissal for default is conferred by the C.P.C. under specific provisions and with specific enumeration of circumstances under which such power can be exercised. If a court requires such a specific conferment of power to dismiss an application or a suit for default, necessarily such conferment of power has to be found in the statute which created the Tribunal. Certainly, it would create dissonant, incongruous and paradoxical position. It makes the power of the Tribunal senseless, irrational and unreasonable. In deciding either the general object of the legislature or the meaning or construction of any particular provision, it is plainly clear that the intention which appears to be most in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles should, in all cases of incredible significance, be presumed to be the true one. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". (Artemiou v. Procopiou (1961) 1 QB 878). "Where possible, a construction should be adopted which will facilitate the smooth working of the scheme of legislation established by the Act, which will avoid producing or prolonging artificiality in the law and which will not produce anomalous results" - Maxwel Interpretation of Statutes. 6. The position that emerges from these situations is that the Tribunal, if not conferred with specific power to dismiss an application for default and to restore the application dismissed for default, has no power to dismiss an application for default or to restore an application dismissed for default. Naturally, this would pose another question as to what has to be done with an application, which has not been prosecuted by the applicant. This expediency, in our view, should not force the court to boggle or equivocate its interpretive function. Naturally, this would pose another question as to what has to be done with an application, which has not been prosecuted by the applicant. This expediency, in our view, should not force the court to boggle or equivocate its interpretive function. We feel that it is irrational for a court to hold in the absence of specific provisions in the statutes that the Tribunal has got only the power to dismiss an application for default and has no power to restore an application dismissed for default. 7. Now, we have to interpret the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules. In interpreting any provision of a statute, precedents are replete with meaningful discourses between two rival schools of thought. One school looked at what the Act was intended to do while the other looked at what it said. It is a battle between the literal approach and the purposive approach to statutory interpretation. In Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher (1949) 2 OB 481, Lord Denning suggested not only that judges should interpret legislation according to the mischief which the statute was passed to remedy, but when a defect appears in an Act, should look to the purpose of the legislation and remedy the defect. Whenever a statute comes up for consideration, it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to for see the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity.... A Judge must not alter the material of which it is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.' 8. In (1950) AC 508, Lord Macdermott expressed his dissent against the view taken by Lord Denning in (1949) 2 QB 481, the House of Lords upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v.Asher. Perhaps, encouraged by the fact that the majority of the House of Lords has approved the decision in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher. Lord Denning again said in Mayor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation (1950) 2 Al1.E.R.1226 at p. 1236, thus: "....I have no patience with an ultralegalistic interpretation which would deprive (the appellants) of their rights altogether. I would repeat what I said in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher. Lord Denning again said in Mayor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation (1950) 2 Al1.E.R.1226 at p. 1236, thus: "....I have no patience with an ultralegalistic interpretation which would deprive (the appellants) of their rights altogether. I would repeat what I said in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher. We do not sit here to pull the language of Parliament and of Ministers to pieces and make nonsense of it. That is an easy thing to do, and it is a thing to which lawyers are too often prone. We sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and of Ministers and carry it out, and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the enactment than by opening it up to destructive analysis." (emphasis added). 9. Though this view of Lord Denning which heralds the new approach -- the purposive approach -- to statutory interpretation has been supported by Lord Diplock in Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v.Senith Investments (Torouay) Ltd. (1971) AC 850 and also in R v. National Insurance Commissioners (1972) AC 914, the view expressed in Mayor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation by Lord Denning did not find favour with Lord Simonds in (1952) A.C. 189. Lord Simonds said: "The duty of the courts is to interpret the words that the legislature has used; those words may be ambiguous, but, even if they are, the power and duty of the court to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited. Denning L.J. considers that the court, having discovered the intention of Parliament and of Ministers too, must proceed to fill in the gaps. What the legislature has not written, the court must write. This proposition, which restates in a new form the view expressed by Lord Justice in the earlier case of Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher (to which the Lord Justice himself refers), cannot be supported. It appears to me to be a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation. And it is the less justifiable when it is guesswork with what material the legislature would, if it had discovered the gap, had filled it in. If a gap is disclosed, the remedy lies in an amending Act." 10. It appears to me to be a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation. And it is the less justifiable when it is guesswork with what material the legislature would, if it had discovered the gap, had filled it in. If a gap is disclosed, the remedy lies in an amending Act." 10. In spite of Lord Simonds' warning in (1952) AC 189 in Eddis v. Chichester Constable (1969 2 Ch. 345, Lord Denning again said: "I know that this means that we in this court are filling in a gap left by the legislature -- a course which was frowned on some years ago. But I would rather the courts fill in a gap than wait for Parliament to do it. Goodness knows when they would get down to it. I would apply the principle which I stated in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, a judge should ask himself this question: if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, how would they have straightened it out?" 11. As we said earlier, in recent years, Lord Denning has been able to derive support for his views of statutory interpretation from the judgment of Lord Diplock in the case -Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Investments (Torcuay) Ltd. wherein Lord Diplock outlines a new approach to statutory interpretation, which he describes as the purposive approach. One of the requirements of this approach, according to Lord Diplock, is that the 'judge must impute to Parliament an intention not to impose a prohibition inconsistent with the objects which the statute was designed to achieve, though the draftsman has omitted to incorporate in express words any reference to that intention.' In Carter v. Bradbeer (1975) 3 All ER 158, Lord Diplock observed that'over the last thirty years, the House of Lords has increasingly moved away from the purely literal approach to statutory interpretation towards the purposive approach.' Indeed in the case of Nothman v. Barnet London Borough Council (1978) 1 WLR 220, Lord Denning makes the claim that the literal approach has been superseded by the purposive approach. Lord Denning said: "The literal method is now completely out of date. Lord Denning said: "The literal method is now completely out of date. It has been replaced by the approach which Lord Diplock described as the purposive approach' ....In all cases now the interpretation of statutes we adopt such a construction as will 'promote the general legislative purpose' underlying the provision. It is no longer necessary for the judges to wring their hands and say: 'There is nothing we can do about it'. Whenever the strict interpretation of statute gives rise to an absurd or unjust situation, the judges can and should use their good sense to remedy it --by reading in, if necessary - so as to do what parliament would have done, had they had the situation in mind." The Supreme Court also is now more prone to accept the new approach, viz. the purposive approach in preference to the literal approach -- vide 1(1979) 3 SCC 466 (Authorised Officer v. S. Naganatha Ayyar & others) and 1975 (1) SCC 676 (Union of India & another v. Rajdhani Grains and Jaggery Exchange Ltd. and Others). It is true that in this case, we are not directly involved in a controversy whether we have to accept a purposive approach or a literal one for the purposive of ascertaining whether the Tribunal has got the power to restore an application dismissed for default; but we feel that we are bound to consider that the task before us has intimate connection with the new approach of interpretation advocated by Lord Denning and recently approved by House of Lords. 12. A Division Bench of this court had occasion to deal with an argument based on the proposition of law that if the Land Tribunal has no power to restore an application dismissed for default, it implicits that the Tribunal has no power to dismiss an application for default. In Achutha Menon v. Narayanan (1974 K.L.T. 485), the court observed thus:- "Sri. Shenoi further contended that on the language of S.31 of the Kerala Act 1 of 1964 the Tribunal had no power at all to dismiss an application for fixation of fair rent, for default; but was bound to enquire into it on the merits. In Achutha Menon v. Narayanan (1974 K.L.T. 485), the court observed thus:- "Sri. Shenoi further contended that on the language of S.31 of the Kerala Act 1 of 1964 the Tribunal had no power at all to dismiss an application for fixation of fair rent, for default; but was bound to enquire into it on the merits. S.31 reads thus : we do not think that the obligation placed on the Tribunal under sub-clause (2) above, is so imperative as to make it necessary for it to pay process fee and issue notices to the parties, itself, even in cases where an intransigent applicant refuses to take any further steps after filing the application. To place such a construction on the section would be to place too great a burden on the Tribunal, (leading eventually to its liquidation) by a process of reductio ad absurdum. Mr. Shenoi's inspiration and support for the argument was from the decision of the Full Bench in S. Chenniappa Mudaliar Madurai v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (ALR.1965 Madras 62) confirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1050 of 1968. The decision was concerned with S.33(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as it stood at the relevant time read with S.5 A (8) and R.24 thereof. The wording of S.31 of Act 1 of 1964 is materially different, and the decision cited furnishes no analogy." 13. In LT. Commissioner v. S. Chenniappa (A.I.R. 1969 S.C.1068) considering certain provisions of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules (1946) along with the provisions of Income-tax Act, 1922, the Supreme Court observed thus: "It follows from ail this that the Appellate Tribunal is bound to give a proper decision on questions of fact as well as law which can only be done if the appeal is disposed of on the merits and not dismissed owing to the absence of the appellant." Following the decision in Hukumchand Mills Ltd. v. Commr. of I. T. Central Bombay (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 455), the Supreme Court in AIR. 1969 S.C.1068 said that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is conferred to the subject matter of the appeal and the words "pass such orders as the Tribunal thinks fit" include all the powers (except possibly the power of enhancement) which are conferred upon the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by S.31 of the Income-tax Act. 1969 S.C.1068 said that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is conferred to the subject matter of the appeal and the words "pass such orders as the Tribunal thinks fit" include all the powers (except possibly the power of enhancement) which are conferred upon the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by S.31 of the Income-tax Act. Further it is said that the provisions contained in S.66 about making a reference on questions of law to the High Court will be rendered nugatory if any such power is attributed to the Appellate Tribunal by which it can dismiss, an appeal, which has otherwise been properly filed, for default without making any order thereon in accordance with S.33(4). 14. Counsel submitted before us that the Land Reforms Act allows a land owner to file an application for shifting the kudikidappukaran under S.75(2) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act read with S.77 of the Act. S.77(1) provides that if the kudikidappukaran does not comply with the requisition made under sub-section (2) or sub-section (5) of S.75 by the person in possession of the land to shift to a new site, such person may apply to the Land Tribunal having jurisdiction to entertain an application under S.80B in respect of the kudikidappu to be shifted, to enforce compliance with such requisition. Sub-section (2) of S.77 provides that the Land Tribunal, after such inquiry as it deems fit, and on being satisfied that the applicant has complied with all the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) of sub-section (4) as the case may be, of S.75, may pass an order requiring the kudikidappukaran to shift the kudikidappu before such date as may be specified in the order. S.75(2) gives the right of the land owner to shift the kudikidappukaran under certain conditions. S.75(2) gives the right of the land owner to shift the kudikidappukaran under certain conditions. It reads thus: "(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the person in possession of the land on which there is a homestead or but (hereinafter in this sub-section referred to as the landholder) in the occupation of a kudikidappukaran may, if he bonafide requires the land - (a) for constructing a building for his own residence or for the residence of any member of his family including major sons and daughters; or (b) for purposes in connection with a town planning scheme approved by the competent authority; or (c) for any industrial purpose, require the kudikidappukaran, to shift to a new site belonging to him, subject to the following conditions, namely:- (i) the landholder shall pay to the kudikidappukaran the price of the homestead, if any, erected by the kudikidappukaran; (ii) the new site shall be fit for erecting a homestead and shall be within a distance of one mile from the existing kudikidappu; (iii) the extent of new site shall be the extent of the existing kudikidappu, subject to a minimum of three cents if within the limits of a city or a major municipality, five cents if within the limits of any other municipality and ten cents if in any panchayat area or township; (iv) the landholder shall transfer ownership and possession of the new site to the kudikidappukaran and shall pay to him the reasonable cost of shifting the kudikidappu to the new site. Where the above conditions are complied with, the kudikidappukaran shall be bound to shift to the new site. It Counsel wants to draw a parallel to these provisions with the provisions referred to by the Supreme Court in the Income-tax Act and the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules and submits that if the court is of the view that an application dismissed for default cannot be restored, that should implicit a negation of power to the Tribunal to dismiss an application for default. 15. A different look of the situation is also canvassed by the counsel for the respondents. He submits that the Tribunals are now exercising very great expanded and widened adjudicatory powers on vital matters. 15. A different look of the situation is also canvassed by the counsel for the respondents. He submits that the Tribunals are now exercising very great expanded and widened adjudicatory powers on vital matters. Though their power should stem from the statutes which have created them and the powers conferred on them specifically by the statutes, since the Tribunal is exercising adjudicatory powers of wider amplitude, though it has not got all the trappings of a civil court, in order to regulate its own adjudicatory procedure, at least a limited inherent power is absolutely necessary for the proper conduct and functioning of the Tribunal. In this regard, it is profitable to note certain observations of M.P. Menon, J. in Cheru Ouseph v. Kunhipathumma (1981 K.L.T. 495). 16. M.P. Menon, J. said that the Tribunals are dispensing 'administrative justice' doing exactly the same kind of work, in a specialised field, as ordinary courts of law, with the same degree of freedom from political pressure or official influence. The learned judge further said that in regard to this category, at least the proposition that a tribunal cam exercise only those powers conferred by the statute creating it, has to be understood with caution and its application limited to exercise of substantive powers, as distinct from matters which are purely procedural. His Lordship further observed: "The administration of justice, or at any rate, a substantial part of it is now patterned in a manner different from what it was some half a century ago. The special tribunals which constitute the core of this new pattern are exercising judicial functions inherent in the sovereign state. The powers exercised by them are in many cases indistinguishable in content from those exercised by courts of justice. Exercise of such powers by them is also vital to the citizen despite the supervisory powers of superior courts over such exercise. If this be the true position, the reality which cannot be overlooked from the functional point of view, how are we to proceed in delimiting the powers of these bodies in matters of procedure, at least in areas not directly covered by statutes?" 17. In 1981 K.L.T. 495, the learned judge was considering a question of restoring an application dismissed for default under the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. In 1981 K.L.T. 495, the learned judge was considering a question of restoring an application dismissed for default under the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The court observed: "A litigant may sometimes fail to reach a court in time for reasons beyond his control. The train may be late, the bus may break down, the car may be held up at a railway-crossing. If a Rent Control Court dismisses his application for default in the meanwhile, and if it is held to be powerless to restore it even when proper reasons are shown that will be to allow the past to persist into the present, with all the merits on one side and dry technicality on the other. S.23 of Act 2/65 is not designed to make the tribunal powerless in such matters, but only to supplement its powers with some of the well known trappings of a court. Therefore a Rent Control Court has the power in appropriate cases, to restore an application dismissed for default." Certainly, there was no clear conferment of power in the statute considered by M.P. Menon,J. to restore an application dismissed for default. Nevertheless, in the anxiety to do justice, the court found that it will be wrong to hold that the Tribunal is powerless to restore an application dismissed for default even when proper reasons are shown. 18. In Associated Cement Companies v. Sharma (ALR.1965 S.C.1595), the Supreme Court has held that certain tribunals in India are also exercising the powers exercised by courts, viz. judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign state. Gajendragadkar, C.J. said:- "They are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with and finally determine disputes between parties which are entrusted to their jurisdiction. The procedure followed by the courts is regularly prescribed and in discharging their functions and exercising their powers, the courts have to conform to that procedure. The procedure which the tribunals have to follow may not always be so strictly prescribed, but the approach adopted by both the courts and the tribunals is substantially the same, and there is no essential difference between the functions that they discharge. As in the case of courts, so in the case of Tribunals, it is the State's inherent judicial power which has been transferred and by virtue of the said power it is the State's inherent judicial function which they discharge. As in the case of courts, so in the case of Tribunals, it is the State's inherent judicial power which has been transferred and by virtue of the said power it is the State's inherent judicial function which they discharge. Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State and on considerations of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the courts established by the Constitution; but that does not affect the competence of the State by appropriate measures' to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties. It is really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are common to the tribunals and the courts, and features which are distinct and separate. The basic and the fundamental feature which is common to both the courts and the tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign State." 19. The House of Lords in Aldridge's case (1915 A.C. 120) observed that the adjudication by the Local Government Board was one affecting property and the liberty of a man to do what he chooses with his own. Viscount Haldane C.J. observed thus: "When therefore, Parliament entrusts it with judicial duties, Parliament must be taken, in the absence of any declaration to the contrary, to have intended it to follow the procedure which is its own, and is necessary if it is to be capable of doing its work efficiently". In this background we have to decide the question raised in these cases, that the Tribunal allowed the restoration of application dismissed for default with total lack of jurisdiction and so the whole procedure is wrong and the Civil Revision Petitions have to be allowed. 20. It is in evidence that the applications before the Land Tribunal were once dismissed for default on 28-12-1972. The applications for restoration were filed on the same day. The applications were restored after hearing the parties on 6-1-1973. The original applications were for shifting the kudikidappukars under S.75(2) read with S.77(2) of the K.L.R. Act. The applications for restoration were allowed on payment of costs. Parties received the costs and the applications were restored. The applications for restoration were filed on the same day. The applications were restored after hearing the parties on 6-1-1973. The original applications were for shifting the kudikidappukars under S.75(2) read with S.77(2) of the K.L.R. Act. The applications for restoration were allowed on payment of costs. Parties received the costs and the applications were restored. Thereafter, evidence was taken and the original applications were allowed which were confirmed by the appellate authority, against which the C.R.Ps.are filed. 21. As we said earlier, the main point argued before us, as a question of law, is that the whole procedure before the Land Tribunal was without jurisdiction because the Land Tribunal's order was passed on an application dismissed for default, which was restored by the Tribunal without jurisdiction. Before completing the discussion on the above point, we shall also refer to the decisions, Chandrasekharan v. Jenna (1981 KLT 912) and Gopalan Adiyodi v.State of Kerala (1983 KLT 844). In 1983 KLT 844, Bhaskaran, J., as he then was, observed thus:- "In exercising the power for restoring the application dismissed for default of appearance, the Tribunal was only advancing the cause of justice; and there being no statutory inhibition to the Tribunal exercising, such power, though there is no specific provision conferring power for the exercise of such power, this is not a fit case for interference under Art.226 of the Constitution". In 1981 KLT 912, Balakrishna Menon, J. has held that a power of review to correct a procedural mistake is inherent in every Tribunal. In Dy. Conservator, Forests v. Sarojini (1981 KLT. 179) Chandrasekhara Menon, J. said that inherent jurisdiction is there even with Tribunals of limited jurisdiction. 22. In matters were there was no specific power given to the Tribunal, which could entertain an appeal, to pass an order of stay, it is now well settled that to grant an order of stay is an inherent power of an appellate body. In I.T. Officer v. Mohd. Kunhi (AIR 1969 SC.430), the Supreme Court observed this:- "the Appellate Tribunal must be held to have the power to grant stay as incidental or ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction. This is particularly so when S.220(6) deals expressly with a situation when an appeal is pending before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner but the Act is silent in that behalf when an appeal is pending before the Appellate Tribunal. This is particularly so when S.220(6) deals expressly with a situation when an appeal is pending before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner but the Act is silent in that behalf when an appeal is pending before the Appellate Tribunal. It could well be said that when S.254 confers appellate jurisdiction, it impliedly grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution and that the statutory power carries with it the duty in proper cases to make such orders for staying proceedings as will prevent the appeal if successful from being rendered nugatory." In Poliny v. Gray (1879 -12 Ch.D. 438), which has been referred to by the Supreme Court, Jessel, M.R. observed thus:- "It appears to me on principle that the Court ought to possess that jurisdiction because the principle which underlies all orders for the preservation of property pending litigation is this, that the successful party is to reap the fruits of that litigation, and not obtain merely a barren success. That principle, as it appears to me, applies as much to the Court of first instance before the first trial and to the Court of Appeal before the second trial, as to the Court of last instance before the hearing of the final appeal." In Domat's Civil Law, Cushing's Edition, Volume I, it is stated thus:- "It is the duty of the judges to apply the laws, not only to what appears to be regulated by their express dispositions but to all the cases where a just application of them may be made and which appear to be comprehended either within the consequences that may be gathered from it." 23. It is difficult for us to hold that the Land Tribunal under the K.L.R. Act has jurisdiction to dismiss an application for default; and has no jurisdiction to restore, such an application, which has been dismissed for default. It is difficult for us to hold that the Land Tribunal under the K.L.R. Act has jurisdiction to dismiss an application for default; and has no jurisdiction to restore, such an application, which has been dismissed for default. We say so because the statute does not give the power to dismiss an application or to restore the application dismissed for default, but for the effective implementation of the provisions contained in the statute, both these powers are necessary and the power to dispose of an application under S.75(2) read with S.77(2) grants the ancillary power to dismiss the application for default and also grants the power to restore such an application.Both can be treated as incidental and ancillary to the main power granted to the Tribunal to dispose of the application under S.75(2) read with S.77(2) of the K.L.R. Act. In this view we hold that the Tribunal has got the power to restore an application dismissed for default, if appropriate and valid reasons are stated within reasonable time. 24. Now, we have to consider certain other grounds urged before us by the counsel for the petitioners. For this purpose, we feel we have to state a little more facts of the case. The two Civil Revision, Petitions arise from a common order. Two applications were filed by the land owners (co-owners) for shifting the two kudikidappus from the property. In fact the land owners filed a suit for shifting one of the kudikidappus, which was later transferred.to the files of the Land Tribunal for disposal according to the provisions of the K.L.R. Act. These two kudikidappus are situated in 17 cents in extent. The property belongs to respondents 1 to 6 in C.R.P.No.3458/82. They are co-owners. They wanted the shifting of the kudikidappu for the purpose of putting up a residential building to the third respondent and another respondent. Both the applications were jointly enquired into. The applications happened to be dismissed for default; but the applications were restored. Thereafter, after enquiry a common order was passed allowing the applications. The kudikidappukars filed two appeals before the appellate authority. The appellate authority, after a re-appraisal of the facts and circumstances of the case, dismissed the appeals. Now the kudikidappukars have filed these two Civil Revision Petitions. 25. Thereafter, after enquiry a common order was passed allowing the applications. The kudikidappukars filed two appeals before the appellate authority. The appellate authority, after a re-appraisal of the facts and circumstances of the case, dismissed the appeals. Now the kudikidappukars have filed these two Civil Revision Petitions. 25. Apart from the lack of inherent jurisdiction, in view of the dismissal of the applications for default and the subsequent restoration of the applications, counsel for the revision petitioners contended that the finding of the court below that there was bona fide requirement proved in the case is erroneous and unsustainable. 26. We are considering these Civil Revision Petitions under S.103 of the K.L.R. Act. The power given to this court under S.103 is only to consider whether the Tribunal or the appellate authority, in passing the order, has either decided erroneously or failed to decide any question of law. In Sri. Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy (AIR 1980 S.C.1253), the Supreme Court has held thus:- "A concurrent finding, based on evidence, that the landlord did not bonafide require the premises for his own use and occupation is not a finding which can be touched by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under S.25. In such a case, merely to hold that a question is a mixed question of fact and law is not sufficient to warrant the exercise of revisional power." 27. The question whether the land holder has proved the bonafide requirement is a question of fact or law has been discussed very plainly and clearly in Para.4 of the above decision, which we would like to quote. "Some argument was advanced whether a finding as to the bonafide requirement of a landlord is or not a mixed question of fact and law. Reference was made to Madan Lal v. Sain Dass Berry (1971) 2 SCC535: (AIR. 1973 SC.585) and Kamla Soni v. Rup Lal Mehra (AIR 1969 NSC 186) on the one hand and T.S. Sarvate v. Nemi Chand (1966 MPLJ. 26 (SC) and Mattulal v. Radha Lal (AIR 1974 SC 1596) on the other hand. We do not think it is necessary for the purposes of this case to enter into a discussion of this question. Merely to hold that a question is a mixed question of fact and law is not sufficient to warrant the exercise of revisional power. 26 (SC) and Mattulal v. Radha Lal (AIR 1974 SC 1596) on the other hand. We do not think it is necessary for the purposes of this case to enter into a discussion of this question. Merely to hold that a question is a mixed question of fact and law is not sufficient to warrant the exercise of revisional power. It must, however, be shown that there was a taint of such unreasonableness resulting in a miscarriage of justice. A concurrent finding, based on evidence, that the landlord did not bona fide require the premises for his own use and occupation is not in our view a finding which can be touched by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under S.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The appeal is, therefore, allowed with costs. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the appellate court is restored." 28. The Land Tribunal held after an elaborate consideration of all the aspects of the matter that the requirement of the applicant to construct residential buildings in the sites occupied by the kudikidappukars is reasonable and bona fide. The appellate authority also considered this question independently and came to the conclusion that the land owners have proved the requirement as envisaged by the statutory provision. The findings were recorded by the authorities on a proper appreciation of evidence bearing in mind the norms to be applied in appreciating the evidence to record a finding of fact. As we said earlier, the question considered is a question of fact and we do not think that it is justifiable for us to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower authorities. 29. Counsel for the revision petitioners further argued that the alternate site offered exclusively belonged to one of the co-owners and so it will not satisfy the requirement under S.75(2) of the K.L.R. Act. We cannot agree. Admittedly, the property where the kudikidappus situate belongs to the co-owners and the requirement of shifting was for the construction of residential buildings for two of the co-owners. We cannot agree. Admittedly, the property where the kudikidappus situate belongs to the co-owners and the requirement of shifting was for the construction of residential buildings for two of the co-owners. Counsel Shri S. Parameswaran, argued before us that the new site offered to the kudikidappukars does not belong to all the co-owners, or the co-owners who want to construct residential buildings for them, and so, the provision that the landholder shall transfer 'ownership and possession of the new site' to the kudikidappukaran and shall pay to him the reasonable cost of shifting the kudikidappu to the new site' has not been complied with. Admittedly, the property where the kudikidappus situate belong to the co-owners. It has to be remembered that a co-owner owns every part of the composite property along with others and that he is as much as an owner of the entire property as any other co-owner is. In Shri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath and Others (AIR. 1976 S.C. 2335) it has been held so. Salmond on jurisprudence (13th Edition), Para.46, states thus: "As a general rule a thing is owned by one person only at a time, but duplicate ownership is perfectly possible. Two or more persons may at the same time have ownership of the same thing vested in them. This may happen in several distinct ways, but the simplest and most obvious case is that of co-ownership. Partners, for example, are co-owners of the chattels which constitute their stock-in-trade, of the lease of the premises on which their business is conducted, and of the debts owing to them by their customers. It is not correct to say that property owned by co-owners is divided between them, each of them owning a separate part. It is an undivided unity, which is vested at the same time in more than one person The several ownership of a part is a different thing from the co-ownership of the whole. So soon as each of two co-owners begin to own a part of the thing instead of the whole of it, the co-ownership has been dissolved into sole ownership by the process known as partition. Co-ownership involves the undivided integrity of what is owned." 30. Jurisprudentially, it is plain and clear that a co-owner can claim ownership of every part of the co-ownership property. Co-ownership involves the undivided integrity of what is owned." 30. Jurisprudentially, it is plain and clear that a co-owner can claim ownership of every part of the co-ownership property. Every one of the co-owners has legal ownership over every part of the whole property. Here the 'landholder' in this case is co-owners. The new site admittedly belongs to one of the co-owners, who also has to be considered as the 'landholder' and so, the new site offered by one of the co-owners would satisfy the requirements under S.75(2)(iv) of the K.L.R. Act. We hold so and so, we find no merit in this contention. No other point was argued before us. In the result, the Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we do not order costs.