JUDGMENT B. N. Sinha, J. This application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter called 'the Code') is for quashing the entire criminal proceeding including the order dated l1th of March 1983 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Munger taking cognizance of the case under section 342 and 353 of the Indian Penal Code arising out of Kharagpur P.S. case no. 221 (12) 82 and ordering for issuance of summons against the accused petitioner for his appearance in the case. 2. The facts of the case out of which the present application arises, may be briefly stated. On 13.2.1982, a case was registered against the accused petitioner at Kharagpur Police Station. On the basis of written information filed by Special Officer cum-Registrar Sugar Cane Department, Govt. of Bihar, Patna stating that the petitioner is the proprietor of M/s Shanker lal Giriraj Kishore, a Firm which owns and runs a Sugar-cane Crusher Mill and is also owner of Dal Mill, Rice Mill and Oil Mill all situated within a big compound at Haweli Kharagpur in the district of Munger. On 30.12.1982 at 4.30 P.M., the Special Officer cum-Deputy Registrar, Sugar Cane Department, Govt. of Bihar, Patna (O.P. no. 2) visited the Mill premises of the petitioner for inspection. On failure of the petitioner to produce before the opposite party no. 2 the necessary papers, the opposite party no. 2 ordered to seal the sugarcane crusher of the petitioner. The petitioner prevented the persons accompanying the O.P. no. 2 from sealing the said sugar-cane crusher. Thereupon, the opposite party no. 2 dictated one of those persons named Batram Tiwary for informing the Police. After said Balram Tiwary had gone out of the business premises of the petitioner to inform the Police, he (the accused-petitioner) ordered his men to close the outer gate of the Mill Premises and got it locked. In this way, the opposite party no. 2 and the staff accompanying the opposite party no. 2 were confined in the Mill Premises. After the arrival of the Police, the gate of the Mill Premises was opened and thereafter the sugarcane crusher belonging to the accused petitioner could be sealed. The opposite party no. 2, thereafter lodged a written information with these allegations at the Police Station on the basis of which the present case was initiated against the petitioner. 3. After the arrival of the Police, the gate of the Mill Premises was opened and thereafter the sugarcane crusher belonging to the accused petitioner could be sealed. The opposite party no. 2, thereafter lodged a written information with these allegations at the Police Station on the basis of which the present case was initiated against the petitioner. 3. After usual investigation, the Police submitted charge-sheet against the accused petitioner and on the basis thereof, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Munger took cognizance of the case against this accused-petitioner and ordered for issuance of summons against him by order dated 11.3.19,83 fixing 10.4.1983 for appearance of the petitioner and he transferred the case to another court for trial and disposal. A year thereafter, the present miscellaneous application has been filed. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that on the averments in the written information and the facts stated in the charge-sheet, no offence under sections 353 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code are made out against this accused-petitioner and that the opposite party no. 2 was not empowered under the provisions of the Bihar Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1982 (hereinafter called 'the Act') to inspect the business premises of the petitioner and, therefore, no offence under section 353 of the Indian Penal Code was committed even if the accused petitioner did not allow him to seal the sugarcane crusher. 5. Elaborating his arguments, learned counsel for the accused-petitioner submitted that only a Cane Officer has been empowered to inspect and examine the records, registers and accounts of a Factory under the Act but opposite party no. 2 on the relevant date was not a Cane Officer and, hence, be had no power to inspect the Sugar-cane Mill of the petitioner and to demand for registers as alleged in the written information and to seal the Sugar cane Crusher, on the alleged refusal by the petitioner to produce those registers and even on the allegations in the First Information Report and on the facts mentioned in the charge sheet, no offence under section 353 of the Indian Penal Code is made out against the accused-petitioner. 6. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the opposite patty no. 2 Admittedly on the alleged date of occurrence, the opposite party no. 2 was a Special Officer-cum-Deputy Registrar, Sugarcane Department, Govt. of Bihar, Patna. 6. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the opposite patty no. 2 Admittedly on the alleged date of occurrence, the opposite party no. 2 was a Special Officer-cum-Deputy Registrar, Sugarcane Department, Govt. of Bihar, Patna. Under the Act, the power of inspection of a factory and a Unit of a premises where a sugarcane crusher has been installed, has been given to a Cane Officer alone under section 13 of the Act. Section 13 of the Act also speaks of the appointment of a Cane Officer which provides that the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint such persons as it thinks fit to be Cane Officers for the purposes of this Act within such local limit as may be assigned to them. Sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act provides that the State Government may also, by notification in Official Gazette, appoint such Officer as it thinks fit to be Additional Cane Officers for all or any of the purposes of this Act within such local limits as it may assign to them respectively, Clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act defines a "Cane Officer" and provides that it means the Cane Officer appointed under Section 13 and includes the Additional Cane Officer. 7. A Notification in the Bihar Gazette dated 10th of September 1983 has been annexed as Anncxure-6 to this application by the petitioner to indicate that subsequent to the date of occurrence, the opposite party no. 2 was appointed as Additional Cane Officer and on the basis thereof it has been argued that on 3.12.1982 (the alleged date of occurrence) the opposite party no. 2 was not neither a Cane officer nor an Additional Cane Officer. The opposite party no. 2 on the other hand has annexed a notification dated 25th of September 1972 (Annexure-A) to indicate that opposite party no. 2 was appointed as Cane Officer with effect from 12th of July 1968. But from Annexure-A it only appears that by that notification opposite party no. 2 and one another Officer of the department who had been appointed temporarily as Cane Inspector by notification dated 28th of May 1959 were being appointed as permanent Cane Officer from the date mentioned against their respective names. But this notification does not answer the point taken on behalf of the petitioner that the opposite party no. 2 and one another Officer of the department who had been appointed temporarily as Cane Inspector by notification dated 28th of May 1959 were being appointed as permanent Cane Officer from the date mentioned against their respective names. But this notification does not answer the point taken on behalf of the petitioner that the opposite party no. 2 was not a Cane Officer on the alleged date of occurrence. On the alleged date of occurrence, the opposite party no. 2 was a Special Officer cum-Deputy Registrar, Sugarcane Department., Govt. of Bihar, Patna. No notification has been filed on behalf of opposite party no. 2 to indicate that on the alleged date of occurrence he was either a Cane officer or an Additional Cane Officer. Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act provides that Cane Commissioner, every person appointed under sub-section (2) of Section 12 to assist the Cane Commissioner, every District Magistrate and every Sub-Divisional Magistrate shall be an ex-officio Cane Officer within his jurisdiction. Now sub-section (2) of Section 12 does' not mention a Special Officer cum-Deputy Registrar of the Department amongst the Officers to assist the Cane Commissioner. Hence, there is nothing to indicate that on the alleged date of occurrence, the opposite party no. 2 was a Cane Officer or an Additional Cane Officer. Hence, it cannot be said that by not producing the registers as demanded by the opposite party no. 2 from the petitioner and by not allowing him to seal the sugarcane crusher, the petitioner deterred him from discharging his duty as a public servant. 8. Moreover, on the averments in the first information report and on the facts stated in the charge-sheet, there is no allegation that the petitioner either assaulted or used criminal• force to the opposite party no. 2 in not allowing him to seal the Sugarcane Crusher. Section 353 of the I.P.C. runs as follows: "Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty. 2 in not allowing him to seal the Sugarcane Crusher. Section 353 of the I.P.C. runs as follows: "Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty. - Whoever assaults or uses' criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such pubic servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as such public servant or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine, or with both". 9. On the facts stated above, it is apparent that on the averments in the F.LR. or on the facts stated in the charge-sheet, the ingredients of Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code are not made out. 10. Similarly, on the averments in the F.I.R. and all the facts stated in the counter affidavit, no offence under section 342 or the I.P.C. is made out against the petitioner. Section 342 of the I.P.C. runs as follows: "Punishment for wrongful confinement. - Whoever wrongfully confines any person shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both". Section 340 of the Indian Penal Code defines wrongful confinement which mentions that whoever wrongfully restrains any person in such a manner as to prevent that person from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing limits is said "wrongfully to 'confine" that person. Neither in the F.I.R. nor in the charge-sheet or in the counter-affidavit it is alleged that the opposite party no. 2 was prevented from proceeding from the business premises of the petitioner. On the averments in the F.I.R. it appears that after the opposite party No. 2 had sent one of his staff to the Police Station, the petitioner got the outer gate of his business premises locked which he opened when the Police Officer came there. There is no allegation that the opposite party no. 2 wanted to go out from the business premises of the petitioner but he was not allowed to do so by the petitioner who had got the outer gate locked. There is no allegation that the opposite party no. 2 wanted to go out from the business premises of the petitioner but he was not allowed to do so by the petitioner who had got the outer gate locked. Simply because the petitioner had got the outer gate of his business premises locked, it cannot be inferred that it was done so to restrain the opposite party no. 2 from proceeding beyond limits of the business premises of the petitioner. 11. On the discussions of the -facts stated above, I find that to allow the prosecution of the petitioner to proceed will be a mere abuse of the process of the Court and; hence, it is a fit case in which the prosecution of the petitioner pc quashed under section 482 of the Code. 12. 1, accordingly, allow this application, quash the cognizance of the case and the consequent prosecution proceeding against the petitioner. Application allowed.