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1989 DIGILAW 2 (GAU)

Abdul Walid and Ors. v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax And Another.

1989-01-04

B.L.HANSARIA, W.A.SHISHAK

body1989
B .L. Hansaria, J.:- A question of some importance relating to interpretation of section 35 of the Wealth-Tax Act, 1957, herein after referred to as the Act, has arisen for decision in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners was a wealth-tax assessee and some penalties were imposed on him for the assess­ment years 1966-67 to 1969-70 for the default in not filing the returns in time. In computing the penalties, the Wealth-Tax Officer applied the law in force both before 1. 4. 69 and after 1. 4. 69 treating the default as a continuing offence. The Tribunal confirmed the imposition of penalty by its order passed on 6. 3. 1975. The Tribunal affirming the order of imposition of penalties referred to and relied on its decision in the case of T. K. Roy. The decision in T. K. Roy came to be challenged before this Court wherein the view taken by the Tribunal was not upheld. (See 155 ITR 746). The decision was rendered on 3.4. 78. After this decision the assessee approached the learned Tribunal to reduce the penalties imposed under section 18 (1) (a) of the Act in conformity with the decision of this Court in T. K. Roy (supra). The petitions before the learned Tribunal were filed on 8.8.78 and, as such, were within the period of limitation mentioned in section 35 (7) of the Act. The learned Tribunal, however, refused to exercise powers under section 35 of the Act on two grounds in the main : (1) The assessee had not taken any step to challenge the order of the Tribunal before any forum which had, there­fore become final. In this connection reference was made to M/s Tilokchand Motichand & Ors v. H. B. Munshi, AIR 1970 SC 898 . (2) Even if the Tribunal could be said to have committ­ed a mistake by applying erroneous interpretation of the prov­isions of the Act, the same was not a mistake apparent from the record in which condition only power under section 35 could be exercised. 2. (2) Even if the Tribunal could be said to have committ­ed a mistake by applying erroneous interpretation of the prov­isions of the Act, the same was not a mistake apparent from the record in which condition only power under section 35 could be exercised. 2. Shri Sen has first submitted that the decision in Tilokchand Motichand (supra) cannot stand in the way of the assessee inasmuch as fin that case what had happened was that the petitioners had approached the Supreme Court after a lapse of many years for refund of taxes realised from them pursuant to a provision of law which had subsequently been declared ultra vires by the Supreme Court in a proceeding taken out by a person di­fferent from the assessee. The relief under Article 32 of the Constitution which was invoked in that case was denied on the ground that a stale claim was being set up which the Court refused to entertain. This is what has been observed in para 18 of the judgment. Though it was also stated in para 12 that the petitioners having abandoned their cases years ago could not be allowed to revive the same on the argument that the correct position was not known to the petitioner at the time when they abandoned their litigation. Sri Sen submits that these observations were made while considering the cases of the petitioner under Article 32 of the Constitution and the same would not apply while deciding a case under section 35 of the Act. We are in agreement with the learned counsel. 3. Coming to the second ground given by the learned Tribu­nal, it is urged by Shri Sen that the present was definitely a case of mistake apparent from the record inasmuch as T. K Roy's case was a part of the record which was relied on by the learned counsel and as such any decision rendered by this Court in T. K. Roy has to be taken to be a part of the record of the present case also. In this connection it has been urged that the power of rectification conferred by a provision like section 35 of the Act should not be construed to be analogous to what has been stated in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. In this connection it has been urged that the power of rectification conferred by a provision like section 35 of the Act should not be construed to be analogous to what has been stated in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. To substantiate this submission, our attention has been drawn to Income-Tax Officer vs. Ashok Textiles Ltd., 41 ITR 732(SC) wherein the provision of section 35 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 was examined whose material language is in pari materia with section 35 of the Act. 4. It is then urged by the learned counsel that a subseq­uent event can be taken note of while exercising powers under section 35 of the Act. In this connection, we have been first referred to C. I.T. v. Khemchand Ramdas, 6 ITR 414 (PC), whe­rein the subsequent order passed by the Commissioner relating to the status of the firm was allowed to be taken note of by the Income-Tax Officer to rectify the assessment order. The decision in Khemchand (supra) was approved by the Supreme Court in Venkatachnlam v. Bombay Dyeing and Mfg. Co. Ltd., 34 ITR 143 (SC) wherein an amendment made in the section with retrospective effect was regarded as a good cause to inv­oke the power of rectification. In this decision it was further pointed out that a glaring and obvious mistake of law can be rectified under section 35 as much as a mistake of fact appa­rent from the record. 5. Being satisfied that a subsequent event cm be taken note of and that a glaring and obvious mistake of law can also be rectified under the provisions of section 35 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, whose language is in piri materia with section 35 of the Act, we are satisfiad that pursuant to the decision of this Court in T.K. Roy (supra), which formed the part of the record of the present case also, the assessee had rightly approached the Tribunal to roctify the orders imposing penalties on him in tune with the decision of this Court in T. K. Roy (supra). 6. In the result, the petition is allowed and the learned Tribunal is directed to rectify the orders imposing penalties keeping in view the law laid down by this Court in T.K. Roy.