Hansaria, J. — The facts of this case are rather unusual. The petitioner was once an employee of Banamali Tea Estate as Office Assistance. This was in 1965. His services however came to be terminated in 1973. On an industrial dispute being raised on his behalf by the Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha, hereinafter referred to as the Sangha, a reference was made to the Labour Court at Dibrugarh for adjudica­ting the following issues : (i) Whether the management of Banamali Tea Estate are justified in terminating the services of Shri Chandreswai Bhattacharjee ? (ii) If not, is Shri Bhattacharjee entitled to re-instatement or any other relief in lieu thereof; (iii) Is Shri Chandreswar Bhattacharjee entitled to any scale reconsidered by Wage Board for clerical grade I together with other allowances benefits under statutes and Agreement etc. as a tea garden employee for the period of his employment in Baaamali Tea Estate from the date of his employ­ment or any other subsequent date ? 2. The learned Labour Court held that the termination was unjustified and directed re-instatement of the petitioner with back wages. There was a further direction of the Labour Court that the petitioner would be entitled to the pay scale recommended by the Wage Board. Feeling aggrieved against that award, the management preferred a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before this Court which was the subject matter of Civil Rule 207j78. In that proceeding the petitioner was not made a party by name but was represented by the Sangha. The Civil Rule was withdrawn on the Court being told that the matter had been compromised on the following terms : (1) The management will pay a sum of Rs. 30,000/- to the respondent workman in full and final settlement of the award in Reference No. 6 of 1975. (2) The workman will accept the sum of Rs. 30,000/- from the management in full and final settlement of all his claims and he will have no further claim against the management. 3. This order was passed on 3.8.83. This Court ordered to pay the entire amount as agreed upon within a period of 6 weeks. As the money was not paid within the stipulated time, a petition under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for short the Act, was moved before the learned Labour Court. 3. This order was passed on 3.8.83. This Court ordered to pay the entire amount as agreed upon within a period of 6 weeks. As the money was not paid within the stipulated time, a petition under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for short the Act, was moved before the learned Labour Court. By an order passed on 5.9.84 the Labour Court disposed of the matter directing the management to pay a sum of Rs. 30,000/-with interest @ 121/2 % per annum from 14.9.83 (the period of 6 weeks granted by this Court on 3.8.83 having expired on 13.9.83) till the date of payment. The petitioner's case is that it was only on 28.9.84 that he came to know from a member of the Sangha that a sum of Rs. 33,821.92 had been deposited by the management as per the second award of the Labour Court. The petitioner further knew that the amount had been deposited pursuant to a compromise affected before this Court. He wanted to accept the amount under protest as he had not given consent to the term of the compromise. As this was not allowed to be done, the petitioner accepted the offered amount under "compelling necessity". 4. Utterly dismayed at the compromise affected in the case without the consent of the petitioner, he addressed a petition to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India on 7.10.85 praying to call for the records of the case and to grant adequate relief to the petitioner. It may be stated here that according to the petitioner a sum of Rs. 1,19, 509. 95 had become due to him from the date of his termination (1.9.73) till the date of his superannuation on 31.12.80. As the compromise had however been effected on the management agreeing to pay only a sum of Rs. 30,000/-, the petitioner felt extremely unhappy and it is for this reason that he addressed the aforesaid communication to-the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India. The aforesaid representation led the Assistant Registrar of the Supreme Court (P1L Cell) to write to the petitioner to move this Court through proper petition stating that he had not consented to the terms of the compromise This letter is of March, 1986. The aforesaid representation led the Assistant Registrar of the Supreme Court (P1L Cell) to write to the petitioner to move this Court through proper petition stating that he had not consented to the terms of the compromise This letter is of March, 1986. Subsequently, Assistant Registrar (Judl) of this Court wrote to the petitioner in December, 1986 in reply to the application of the petitioner dated 25.11.86 to move this Court if so advised. The present application under Article 226 of the Constitution was thereafter filed on 22.1.87 seeking a review of the order passed by this Court on 3.8.S3 in Civil Rule 207/78. 5. The entire case of the petitioner is that he did not give any consent to compromise the matter on receiving a sum of Rs. 30,000/-from the management inasmuch as his due as per the award of the Labour Court came to Rs. 1,19,509.95. The petitioner being in extreme penury and at the same time being of completely broken health, legal aid was provided to him by this Court. Shri A. K. Das has accor­dingly appeared on his behalf. The management has been represented by Shri D. N. Choudhury along with his junior Shri U. C. Das. 6. On the above facts, the first point which arises for decision is \yhether the order passed by this Court on 3.8 83 in Civil Rule 207/78 can be reviewed at this stage. It has been strongly and strenuously urged by Shri Choudhury that we may not do anything of this kind at this stage. Shri Das, on the other hand, contends that the pres­ent is eminently a fit case to review the aforesaid order to do complete justice to the petitioner who is presently suffering from lethal disease of cancer and is in extreme financial hardship which could have been taken care of if the petitioner would have received the money as awarded by the Labour Court. 7. Before we examine the question of review ability, it would be nece­ssary to say few words about the compromise effected in Civil Rule 207/78. It is the positive case of the petitioner that he had told the Sangha that he was not agreeable to effect compromise in the case on receipt of Rs. 30,000/-only. This averment has been made in para 14 of the present application. It is the positive case of the petitioner that he had told the Sangha that he was not agreeable to effect compromise in the case on receipt of Rs. 30,000/-only. This averment has been made in para 14 of the present application. Though notice of the case was issued on the Sangha which has been impleaded as respondent No. 3 in the present application, the Sangha has not come forward to say anything in this regard. It is however contended by Shri Choudhury that as the learned counsel appearing for the Sangha in Civil Rule 207/78 had submitted that the matter had been compromised on condition that the management will pay a sum of Rs 30,000/-in full and final settlement of the impugned award, we should accept that the learned counsel appearing for the Sangha had done so on having received instruction from the Sangha. By an order passed on 22. 7. 88 in the present Civil Rule the two counsel who had appeared for the Sangha in the first Civil Rule-they being Shri G. K. Talukdar and Shri B. Choudhury, were asked to tell their views in the matter at hand. Despite service of notice on them to apprise the Court about the matter, none of them has come forward to say anything. Shri Choudhury however contends that as this Court had recorded in its order dated 3. 8. 83 in the first Civil Rule that the counsel for the parties had submitted that the matter had been compromised on the terms mentioned in that order, we should not doubt for a moment that the learned counsel for the Sangha had not made the above submission. In this connection our attention has been drawn by Shri Choudhury to State of Maharastra vs. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayar, AIR 1982 SC 1249 wherein it was stated that we are bound to accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment as to what had transpired in Court. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them that has to be last word on the subject. It was stated that what is recorded in the judgment of the Court is conclusive of the fact so recorded and none can contradict such statement by affidavit or other evidence. 8. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them that has to be last word on the subject. It was stated that what is recorded in the judgment of the Court is conclusive of the fact so recorded and none can contradict such statement by affidavit or other evidence. 8. We are not doubting for a moment, despite silence of the Sangha and their two counsel who had appeared in the first Civil Rule, that a statement was made on behalf of the Sangha in the first Civil Rule that the matter had been compromised in the terms men­tioned in the order of this Court passed on 3.8.83. In this connection Shri Choudhury has also drawn our, attention to the statement made by the petitioner himself before the Labour Court in the proceeding under section 33C (2) that there was a compromise according to the Sangha. But then we have to note that the petitioner had also said in the same breath that there was no compromise according to him. 9. The question, however, is whether the petitioner who is the affected workman was consulted in the matter and whether he had given his consent to forgo all his claim as per the impugned award on receipt of Rs. 30.000/- . On this aspect of the matter, we enter­tain no doubt on the basis of the materials available to us inasmuch as the Sangha has not come forward to say despite specific aver­ment in the petition as noted above that the petitioner had not agreed to affect compromise in the case on receipt of Rs. 30.000/-. May we say that even if the Sangha had instructed its lawyer to compromise without the consent of the petitioner, who is the really affected person, the same cannot be held binding on the petitioner. Shri Choudhury however contends by referring to section 36 of the Act and Rule 40 of the Assam Industrial Dispute Rules, 1958 that the petitioner was bound by the act of the Sangha which had represented the petitioner both in the Labour Court as well as before this Court. It has also been urged in this connection by the learned counsel by referring to Ram Prasad vs. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1961 SC 857 that in an industrial dispute espoused by a Union a workman cannot be heard individually. It has also been urged in this connection by the learned counsel by referring to Ram Prasad vs. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1961 SC 857 that in an industrial dispute espoused by a Union a workman cannot be heard individually. As to this submission we would like to say that in so far as individual hearing of the workman in this case is concerned, the decision in Ram Prasad would not stand in the way for two reasons. First, because in that case dismissal was one of the disputes along with a number of other disputes. Secondly, after insertion of section 2A in the Act even an individual workman can take up his cause of dismissal and the same would give rise to an industrial dispute. In para 9 of Ram Prasad it was stated that in exceptional circumstances the Tribunal may permit representation of the concerned workman by a person different from an officer of a registered trade union. As to the petitioner being bound by the acts of the Sangha which had represented the matter in the first two fights-one before the Labour Court and the other before this Court in Civil Rule 207/78, we would state that a party can be bound only by the legal acts of the representatives, and not by the acts which cannot be regarded having legal force. Now as the petitioner was the affected workman and as it is his clear case which is uncontroverted that he had not given his consent to the Sangha to affect compromise on receipt of Rs. 30.000/- only, we are of the view that it would be unjustified to the petitioner to deny his full due under the impugned award if the same be other wise legal and valid. 10. In this context Shri Choudhury has also drawn our attention to the observation made by this Court in Civil Rule 207/78 that the, terms on which the compromiS3 was affected were "fair and equitable in the facts and circumstances of the case". It is, there­fore, urged that we may not on our own say that the terms were not fair and equitable and review the order passed on 3.8.83. Though we do not know as to why the offer of Rs. It is, there­fore, urged that we may not on our own say that the terms were not fair and equitable and review the order passed on 3.8.83. Though we do not know as to why the offer of Rs. 30.000/- was regarded as "fair and equitable" by this Court, we are inclined to think that this observation must have been made because we find a statement in the impugned award of the Labour Court in its discussion on Issue No. 3 that the expectation of the petitioner relating to the pay scale was a sum of Rs. 400/- p. m. from 1.3.71. Now if this was the expectation, the total dues till the date of superannuation (31.12. 80) i.e. for a period of little less than 10 years come to about Rs. 48.000/-. If the dues be Rs. 48,000/-approximately, an offer of Rs. 30,000/- may be regarded as "fair and equitable". But if the total dues be in the neighbourhood of Rs. 1,20,000/-, as is the case of the petitioner in the present Civil Rule, we do not think if this Court would have observed that the offer of Rs. 30,010/- was "fair and equitable”. 11. The second branch of Shri Choudhury's argument is that the dispute having resulted in compromise, the petitioner is estopped in law to agitate the same. By referring to section 96 3) of the CPC and Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code it is urged by the learned counsel that the matter may be allowed to rest where it is. Though the provisions of the Code are not applicable to a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution as mentioned in the explanation to section 141 of the Code which was inserted in 1976, we would agree with Shri Choudhury that if a matter has really been compromised the same must work as estoppd and the battle may not be allowed to be fought again. This follows from what has been stated in Sailendra Narayan vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1956 SC 346 (para 8); K C, Dora vs. G. Annamanaidu, AIR 1974 SC 1069 (paras 56 to 59) and Venkataswarlu vs. Narasi Reddy, AIR 1971 A. P. 71 (FB). This follows from what has been stated in Sailendra Narayan vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1956 SC 346 (para 8); K C, Dora vs. G. Annamanaidu, AIR 1974 SC 1069 (paras 56 to 59) and Venkataswarlu vs. Narasi Reddy, AIR 1971 A. P. 71 (FB). As Shri Choudhury has referred to the provision of the Code, we may mention that by virtue of the amendment of the Code in 1976 a compromise is required to be reduced in writing and signed by the parties as stated in Order 23 Rule 3. Nothing of this nature however happened in the first fight before this Court in Civil Rule 207/78. 12. In view of all the above, we cannot held that the present petition cannot be entertained by us on the ground that the dispute had ended into a compromise and there is a legal bar in re-opening the same. This, however, is not sufficient to accede to, the prayer of the petitioner to review the order passed by this Court on 3. 8. 83. For this purpose we have to see whether an order passed by this-Court in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution can at all be reviewed and if so under what circumstances. In this context Shri Das referred to Shivdeo Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909 which has held that there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising a power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable error committed by it. Shri Choudhury states that the power of review though available to this Court is not without limits. He refers in this connection to A. T. Sharma vs. A. P. Sharma, AIR 1979 SC 1047 which has stated that there are definite limits to the exercise of power of review even where a matter might have come to this Court under Article 226. Despite this statement of law it was observed in this case that the power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter. Of course this power cannot be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits which would lie within the province of the court of appeal. Despite this statement of law it was observed in this case that the power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter. Of course this power cannot be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits which would lie within the province of the court of appeal. According to us the fact that the petitioner's dues according to him under the impugned award of the Labour Court came to a sum of about Rs. 1,20,000/- is a "new important matter". Shri Choudhury has also referred in this connection to Northern India Caterers vs. Lt. Governor, (1980) 2 SCC 167 which has stated that a, review cannot be sought for merely for the purpose of a re-hearing and a fresh decision of the case. True, but then it was further observed in this case that Court may re-open its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full and effective justice. It has also been pointed out in this decision, which has dealt with power of review of the Supreme Court under Article 137 of the Constitution, that there may be substantial and compe­lling circumstances to review an earlier order. 13. According to us the present wretched condition of the petitioner and the invalid and dying stage in which he presently is are suffi­ciently compelling circumstances to review the order passed on 3. 8. 83. to do full justice in the background of the fact that the total dues of the petitioner under the impugned award according to him came to about Rs. 1,20,000/- (a new and important matter) whereas he got only Rs. 30.000/- by virtue of the purported compromise. Denial of review in such a situation would almost amount to miscarriage of justice and so according to us to do full and effective justice we must review the order passed on 3. 8. 83. 14. For the sake of completeness of the arguments, we had asked Shri Choudhury appearing for the management to satisfy us, in case we felt that review was called for, if the award which was assailed in Civil Rule 207/78 suffered from any infirmity. 8. 83. 14. For the sake of completeness of the arguments, we had asked Shri Choudhury appearing for the management to satisfy us, in case we felt that review was called for, if the award which was assailed in Civil Rule 207/78 suffered from any infirmity. Learned counsel despite being requested have his say on the merits of the earlier Civil Rule refused to address us on this aspect by stating that after the decision of this Court on 3. 8. 83, the award of the learned Labour Court does not survive and as such there was no necessity to satisfy this Court about the untenability of the award. As however we have held that review of the order dated 3. 8. 83 is required for the ends of justice, we are of the view that we have to examine the question relating to infirmity, if any, in the Impugned award and so we heard Shri Das on this aspect of the case. 15. We were taken through the award by Shri Das. A reading of the same shows that before the learned Labour Court one of the points taken was that the petitioner was not an employee of the tea estate but was engaged by the partnership firm named "Banamalie Tea Estate". On this aspect of the case the Presiding Officer stated that the aforesaid firm had come into existence only in 1968 whereas the petitioner was in the employment from 1966. The stand of the management that the workman was an employee of the partnership firm was therefore rejected. 16. The next stand of the management was that as the workman had misappropriated an amount of Rs. 400/-, some police action against him was contemplated. On the request of the workman however the services of the workman was terminated, though he had also offered to resign. 17. It is admitted position that before terminating the services of the workman no enquiry was held. The management however produced some witnesses before the Labour Court to support the aforesaid case. The learned Presiding Officer has gone through the evidence led in the case and has rejected the stand taken by the management. 17. It is admitted position that before terminating the services of the workman no enquiry was held. The management however produced some witnesses before the Labour Court to support the aforesaid case. The learned Presiding Officer has gone through the evidence led in the case and has rejected the stand taken by the management. As the Labour Court has duly applied its mind to the evidence adduced by the management and had given cogent reasons as to why the case of the management relating to the termination of the petitioner's services cannot be accepted, it is not within our domain to go through the evidence all over again as we are seized with the matter in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution wherein the finding of fact arrived at by the subordinate tribunal is not disturbed unless the finding be perverse or unreasonable. A perusal of the impugned award shows that the finding arrived at by the learned Labour Court cannot be said to be perverse or unreasonable inasmuch as it has given reason as to why the evidence adduced by the management through Shri Gurucharan Bhattacharjee and Shri Ajit Chaliha cannot be believed. The case of the management relating to alleged misappropriation of a sum of Rs. 400/-by the workman was also disbelieved because that allegation had been made for the first time in the written statement of the management without charge sheeting the workman on the allegation in question. Though it is permissible to adduce evidence be­fore the adjudicating authority to satisfy it about the action taken, even if the order of termination is passed without holding any enquiry, in the present case the evidence led by the management did not find acceptance of the Labour Court for which due reasons have been given. Apart from the aforesaid two witnesses examined by the management before the Labour Court, the Head Clerk of the garden was also examined who proved the voucher the workman had signed when he had received a sum of Rs. 400/- from the garden authority. This" would clearly show that the present was not a case of misappropriation inasmuch as a voucher was duly signed by the workman and so we would believe the case of the workman that the aforesaid amount, along with another sum of Rs. 2,000/-, was taken by way of advance to be adjusted from the monthly salary. 18. This" would clearly show that the present was not a case of misappropriation inasmuch as a voucher was duly signed by the workman and so we would believe the case of the workman that the aforesaid amount, along with another sum of Rs. 2,000/-, was taken by way of advance to be adjusted from the monthly salary. 18. On the facts as placed before the Labour Court, it came to the conclusion that the termination of the workman was not justified and as such . ordered for his reinstatement with back wages. On the issue relating to entitlement of wage salary recommended by the Wage Board, the Labour Court accepted the case of the workman. Nothing has been canvassed before us to disagree with the Labour Court regarding this finding. 19. In view of all the above, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned award and as such we uphold the same. The rule issued in Civil Rule 84/87 is therefore made absolute. May we state that the earlier proceeding under section 33C(2) of the Act would not stand in the way of the petitioner in realising his dues as per the award. 20. Before parting, we may say that fighting of this battle would not have been necessary if the management would have paid any heed to the stand of the petitioner that if a further sum of Rs. 40,000/-was paid to him he would have felt satisfied in view of the great financial hardship being undergone by him because of which he could not even get himself treated of dreaded . disease of cancer which ultimately rendered him invalid. The management however denied to pay anything further to the workman beyond what was due to him as per the terms of the purported compro­mise. We still hope that the matter would be compromised out of the Court and the management would come forward to offer a reasonable sum of money to the petitioner in his greatly distressed situation in which he is presently placed. S. K. Homchoudhnri, J.— I agree.