Mahesh Chandra, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner in this writ petition has challenged the legal and constitutional validity of acquisition of petitioner s land situated in the revenue estate of village Tughlakabad, Tehsil Mahrauli, Delhi vide notification No. F. 9 (16)/80-L and B dated 5th November, 1980 under Section 4 of the land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) and notification No. F. 9 (2l)/85-Landb/15908 dated 6th June, 1985 under Section 6 of the Act. I he rule nisi was issued vide orders dated 8th October, 1985 by a Division Bench of this court. ( 2 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the file. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner at the very outset that he limit , his challenge to notification No. F. 9 (21) 85-Landb/15908 dated 6th June, 1985 under Section 6 of the Act and not to notification under Section 4 of the Act and I think it rightly so. ( 3 ) AS regards the notification under Section 6 of the Act, it is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the matter in dispute has already been considered by a Division Bench of this court consisting of S. B. Wad and G. C. Jain, JJ, in B. R. Gupta v. Union of India and others, 37 (1989) Delhi Law Times 150 (C. W. P. No. i639 of 1985) and as such this is a covered matter and consequently for the reasons stated in the said judgment by the Division Bench, this petition pertaining to village Tughlakabad is to be allowed just as C. W. P. No. 2567 of 1987 Smt. Sudha Jajodia v. Union of India and others, and C. W. P. No. 2568 of 1987 Shrimahender Kumar Jajodia v. Union of India and others, pertaining to the land in village Said-ul Ajaib were allowed vide judgment dated 9th March, 1989 by S. B. Wad, J. It has been submitted by him that judgmenin B. R. Gupta (Supra) has already quashed the notification under Section 6 of the Act impugned in this petition and it would automatically cover the case of the petitioner and no separate writ petition, is called for by other land owners. It is similarly urged that even if the petitioner had received the compensation from the Government even then acquisition could not survive in as much as the very notification under which the acquisition purports to have been affected stands quashed as awhole and consequently would be of no consequence whatsoever and the respondents have not acquired any, right, title or interest in the property covered by the said notification. ( 4 ) LEARNED cousel for the respondents have conceded before me that certainly Tughlakabad was one of the 13 villages in respect of whom the legality and constitutionality of the acquisition under various notifications under Section 6 of the Act was considered and it was found therein that it was noticed by the Lt. Governor in any of those notifications that the Land Acquisition Collector had not stated how much area was to be notified under Section 6 of the Act. It has similarly been conceded that the Division Bench had found the notifications to be bad for failure of staling any reasons of his satisfaction by the Lt. Governor and for mindless exercise of power under by B. R. Gupta (Supra) for the reasons stated therein It is also conceded that Tughlakabad is one of the villages in respect whereof notifications under Section 6 of the Act, impugded in this writ petition, was specifically quashed. ( 5 ) AFTER going through the judgment of B. R. Gupta (Supra) I find that impugned notification has been quashed for non-application of mind by the conerned authorities. I am, therefore, in agreement with learned counsel for the petitioner that the said judgment covers the present case as well and for the reason stated therein the impugned notification has to be quashed and is hereby quashed. In fact said notification already stands quashed in. B. R. Gupta (Supra) and the petitioner need not have claimed separate order of quashing thereof. Notification as a whole stands quashed and the said judgment would be operative in respect of all lands referred to in the notification. No separate writ need be filed by other land owners so much so that it would be operative irrespective of the fact whether the compensation has been received by the owners or has not been received. Notification as a whole stands quashed and the said judgment would be operative in respect of all lands referred to in the notification. No separate writ need be filed by other land owners so much so that it would be operative irrespective of the fact whether the compensation has been received by the owners or has not been received. The moment notification under Section 6 of the Act is quashed by the Court in one writ petition the entire land covered by that notification would stand de-acquired forthwith. The respondents would stand divested of land subject matter uf such notification and cannot retain any hold thereupon. Their only claim would be for the refund of compensation wherever the compensation has been received by the land owners. In such situation the effect of quashing of notification is that it has never existed in the eyes of law and has never come into operation for any purpose whatsoever. Once thenotification is quashed in one writ petition, it goes as a whole. No action thereunder can survive now. Reference in this behalf may be made with advantage to observations of the full Bench in paras 27 and 30 in Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 Delhi 239. In para 27 thereof it reads as follows: ". . . . . . . . . . . . IF ultimately the single owner succeeds in establishing a vitiating element in the Section 4 notification and in getting it quashed by the Supreme Court, the whole proceeding of acquisition will fail and the Government will have to retrace the steps they may have taken in respect of other lands (see Sheonov v. Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1985 SC 621 and Gauraya v. Thakur, AIR 1986 SC 1440 ). Assuming that where such final order is by a High Court the position is not free from difficulty, the debate as to whether, in law, the quashing of the order enures only to the benefit of the party who filed the writ petition and obtained the order is futile, for the moment the Government seeks to enforce the acquisition against the others, they would come up with similar petitions which cannot but be allowed. In other words, in many of the present day notifications, the acquisition scheme is an integral one and the stay or quashing of any part thereof is a stay or quashing of the whole. This aspect should not be lost sight of. " PARA 30 thereof it reads as follows : "secondly, the nature of proceedings in which stay orders are obtained are also very different from the old pattern of suits confined to parties in their scope and effect. Section 4 notifiications are challenged in writ petitions and it is now settled law that in this type of proceedings, the principle of locus standi stands considerably diluted. Any public spirited person can challenge the validity of proceedings ot acquisition on general grounds and when he does this the litigation is not inter parties simpliciter: It is a public intetest litigation which affects wider interest. The grounds of challenge to the notification may be nothing personal to the particular landholder but are, more often than not grounds common to all or substantial blocks of the land owners. In fact. this group of petitions now listed before us raise practically the same contentions just as the previous batch of writ petitions challenging the notifications under Section 4 raised certain common contentions. To accept the conteetion that the challenges and interim orders in such petitions should be confined to the particular petitioners and their lands would virtually provide persons with common interests with a iccond innings. If the initial challenge succeeds, all of them benefit; and, if for some reason that fails and the second challenge succeeds on a ground like the one presently raised, the first batch of petitioners also get indirectly benefited because of the impossibility of partial implementation of the scheme for which the acquisition is intended. " ( 6 ) IN view of my discussion and findings above, this writ petition is allowed to the extent that Notification No. F. 9 (21)/85-Landb/15908 dated 6th June, 1985 under Section 6 ot the Act in respect of the suit land situatedin village Tughlakabad is quashed as illegal ; null and void and is held to be of no effect whatsoever and the respondents are restrained from interfering with the petitioners s peaceful occupation, possession, user, enjoyment, right and interest of the said land. in the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.