Judgment :- 1. Petitioner is a Process Server attached to the District Court, Quilon. One Sri. Narayana Pillai who was the plaintiff in O.S.No.151 of 1984 filed Ext.P1 complaint on 28-7-1984 alleging that the petitioner demanded an amount of Rs.25/- as illegal gratification for the purpose of serving process on one of the defendants in the suit. That demand was said to have been made on 26-7-1984. The District Judge issued Ext.P2 notice requiring the petitioner to show cause why proceedings may not be taken against him on the basis of Ext.P1. Petitioner submitted Ext.P3 explanation. The District Judge conducted an enquiry into the allegation. He interrogated the complainant and the petitioner. Petitioner had submitted documentary evidence in the nature of Ext.P5 and P6. Thereafter, the District Judge formulated the charges and communicated the memo to the petitioner along with the statement of allegations. Petitioner submitted Ext.P8 explanation. In Ext.P9 enquiry proceedings, the District Judge found the petitioner guilty of the two charges viz. demanding illicit gratification and creating records falsely to the effect that substitute service was effected. Ext.P10 order was issued informing the petitioner of the proposal to impose the punishment of withholding two increments with cumulative effect even though he merited more serious punishment. Petitioner submitted Ext.P11 representation in reply thereto. In Ext.P12 proceedings, the District Judge found that the explanations were unsatisfactory and imposed the punishment as proposed by him. Petitioner filed Ext.P13 appeal before the first respondent under R.23 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. In Ext.P14 order dated 1-3-1985, the appellate authority informed the petitioner that it dismissed the appeal and that "considering the seriousness of the charges proved against the delinquent, High Court is of the opinion that the quantum of the punishment awarded is inadequate." The petitioner was, therefore, required to file his representation, if any, against enhancement of penalty. Petitioner filed Ext.P15 representation. The first " respondent, after consideration of Ext.P15 representation, passed Ext.P16 order enhancing the punishment to that of withholding of four increments with cumulative effect. In Ext.P16 order the power exercised by the first respondent was that available under R.37 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. 2. Petitioner submits that the first respondent erred in law in passing Ext.P6 under R.37 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules (for short "the Rules'). In Ext.P16 order the power exercised by the first respondent was that available under R.37 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. 2. Petitioner submits that the first respondent erred in law in passing Ext.P6 under R.37 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules (for short "the Rules'). He submits further that the penalty order as also Ext.P16 proceeded on wrong assumption in respect of the alleged falsification of records. A third submission of the petitioner is that the finding on the first charge that the petitioner demanded bribe is based entirely on the interested testimony of the complainant, and therefore, the proceedings are unsustainable. Lastly, it is submitted that the relevant documentary evidence which the petitioner had produced was completely ignored and that evidences error of law on the part of the first respondent. 3. Counsel for the petitioner referred me to Rule31(2)(e)(i) of the Rules enabling the appellate authority to enhance the penalty. He referred me also to R.37 of the Rules which does not specifically take in the power of enhancement of penalty. Counsel submitted that the appellate authority applied its mind only to the power under R.37 and not to the power under R.31(2) (e) (i) of the Rules. He, therefore, submits that ExtP16 order is devoid of jurisdiction. In the alternative, he submits that, that order is bad for error of law apparent on the face of the record, because the power which the appellate authority exercised does not enable the authority to enhance the punishment. 4. It is necessary to refer specifically to the provisions of those rules. The relevant portion of R.31 of the Rules is as follows: "31(2) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in R.11(1) the appellate authority shall consider. 4. It is necessary to refer specifically to the provisions of those rules. The relevant portion of R.31 of the Rules is as follows: "31(2) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in R.11(1) the appellate authority shall consider. (a) whether the facts on which the order was based have been established; (b) whether the facts established afford sufficient ground for taking action; (c) whether the procedure prescribed in these rules has been complied with, and if not whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice; (d) whether the findings are justified; and (e) whether the penalty imposed is excessive, adequate or inadequate; and after consultation with the Commissioner, if such consultation is necessary in the case, pass orders,-(i) setting aside, reducing, confirming or enhancing the penalty; or (ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case:" It is evident therefore that the appellate authority, while considering the appeal, has the power to enhance the penalty. 5. R.37 of the rules is in the following terms: "37. Review of orders by appellate authorities.-The authority to which an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in R.11(1) lies may, on its own motion or otherwise, call for the records of the case in a disciplinary proceedings, review any order passed in such a case and, after consultation with the Commissioner where such consultation is necessary, pass such orders as it deems fit, as if the Government servant had preferred an appeal against such order, Provided that no application for review shall be entertained after the expiry of a period of one month from the date of passing the order: Provided further that no action under this rule shall be initiated more than one year after the date of the order to be reviewed." Counsel submits that this rule enables an appellate authority to review a penalty order either on its own motion or on an application by the Government servant and the orders which the appellate authority could pass should necessarily be orders in favour of the employee and not against him. 6. I am not in a position to accept this submission. 6. I am not in a position to accept this submission. The power of review conferred by R.37 provides that the appellate authority may "review any order passed in such a case and pass such orders as it deems fit, as if the Government servant had preferred an appeal against such order." In other words, the order which may be passed under R.37 may be any one of the orders which the appellate authority may pass in an appeal against the penalty order. It is evident from R.31(2)(e)(i) of the Rules which I have referred to, that the appellate authority may pass an order either setting aside or reducing or confirming or enhancing the penalty. It therefore appears to me on a reading of R.37 and 31(2)(e)(i) together that the authority acting under R.37 is competent to pass any order which the appellate authority under R.31(2)(e)(i) of the Rules may pass. One such order is an order enhancing the penalty. I do not, therefore, find any substance in the submission that Ext.P16 order under R.37 of the Rules is devoid of jurisdiction or bad for error of law apparent on the face of the records. 7. It is not disputed before me that the first respondent is the appellate authority entitled to deal with the appeal against the penalty order according to the provisions of R.31. It is not denied that the first respondent in disposing of the appeal could have passed an order enhancing the punishment in view of the provisions contained in R.31(2)(e)(i) of the Rules. If that was possible, even assuming that the petitioner was right in his submission that R.37 did not confer the power to enhance the punishment, the order Ext.P16 would be legal, competent and within jurisdiction. I am of the opinion that R.37 definitely enables the appellate authority while exercising the power of review under R.37 to pass any order including enhancement of penalty as the appellate authority could have passed. 8. The other grounds which the petitioner urges to assail Ext.P16 order are based entirely on the merits of the charges found against him. The submissions which the petitioner urge are either that of incorrect appreciation of evidence or rinding based on insufficient evidence. His case is that neither the disciplinary authority nor the appellate authority should have accepted the interested testimony of the complainant. The submissions which the petitioner urge are either that of incorrect appreciation of evidence or rinding based on insufficient evidence. His case is that neither the disciplinary authority nor the appellate authority should have accepted the interested testimony of the complainant. His next submission is that the authorities erred in evaluating the evidence. The last submission is that relevant evidence was excluded. In whatever form stated, all these amount only to a complaint that the appreciation of evidence was improper or the evidence available before the respondents was insufficient. In either case.it is not for this Court to appreciate or re-evaluate the evidence. The petitioner has no case that there was total absence of any evidence at all in relation to the charges found against him. It is needless to state that in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution particularly in cases where the findings on facts entered by the original authority is confirmed by the appellate authority, it is not for this Court to find fault with such findings for the only reason that the evidence could have been evaluated better. In the result, the Original Petition is devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed. The parties will suffer their respective costs. Issue photo copy of this judgment on usual terms.