Dr. B. P. Saraf. J.-An important question of law has arisen in this case for consideration whether the authorities under the Municipal Act can direct a person, who has been constructing a house, to stop further construction and to demolish the construction already undertaken on the ground of alleged violation of the terms of building permission granted by it, without giving him any notice or opportunity of hearing. The petitioner is a resident of Tura in the State of Meghalaya. H« is in possession of a plot of land measuring 14 Lechas. He wanted to construct an Assam type structure thereon for the purpose of his business. Accordingly, he applied to the Tura Municipal Board for necessary permission to construct the house. The Chairman of the Board by his order dated 20.9 83 accorded permission to the petitioner to construct pucca/Assam type business shop on the aforesaid land. The permission was, however, made subject to clearance given by the Garo Hills District Council for occupation of the said land. The Garo Hills Dist. Council (hereinafter referred to as 'the District Council), by order" dated 3.10.83, settled the aforesaid plot of land with the petitioner and issued a periodic patta in his name in respect thereof. On receipt of the settlement and the periodic patta from the District Council in respect of the land in question, the petitioner in terms of the permission granted by the Tura Municipal Board started construction of the Assam type business shop on the said land. After the petitioner had completed half of the construction of the house he received a notice dated 17.12.83 issued by the Executive Officer of the Tura Municipality directing him to stop construction immediately and to demolish the pucca construction already undertaken by him. The aforesaid notice was purportedly issued on the basis of a finding arrived at on enquiry that the construction was made in contravention of the building permission granted by order dated 20.9.83. The permission granted on 20.9.83 was also revoked by the said notice. Admittedly, no notice to show cause or opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner. The petitioner on receipt of the said notice filed a representation before the Municipal Board on 20.12.83 praying for revocation of the aforesaid order. The permission granted on 20.9.83 was also revoked by the said notice. Admittedly, no notice to show cause or opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner. The petitioner on receipt of the said notice filed a representation before the Municipal Board on 20.12.83 praying for revocation of the aforesaid order. In the said representation it was categorically stated by the petitioner that he had not violated any of the terms of the permission for construction granted by the Municipality on 20.9.83. The petitioner also objected to the aforesaid notice on the ground that the same was issued unilaterally without any enquiry whatsoever made in his presence and without giving him any opportunity of explaining that he did not violate any of the terms of the permission, as alleged. Having received no response from the Municipal Board the petitioner 'filed the instant writ petition. The main contentions of the petitioner are that he had not violated any of the terms of the sanction for construction granted by the Municipality ; the impugned order was arbitrary ; it did not even state the nature of the alleged violation ; no notice was given to the petitioner before the impugned order was passed and that no enquiry whatsoever was made in his presence. According to the petitioner, the impugned action of the Municipality on the face of it was in gross violation of the principles of natural justice and accordingly not sustainable in law. The Municipal Board filed a counter. In the counter it was stated that the petitioner was given permission to construct a pucca/Assam type temporary business shop and that under the cover of the said permission the petitioner started constructing a double storeyed R.C.C. building in violation of the terms of the building permission. It was contended that the District Council had no authority to give settlement of the land to the petitioner as the same was reserved for construction of an artificial lake under the Tura Town Development and Beautification Scheme, the further allegation made in the counter was that the petitioner was required to keep a set back of 25 feet from the middle of the road whereas he had kept only 23 feet. Accordingly, it was stated that the impugned notice was legal and justified. Accordingly, it was stated that the impugned notice was legal and justified. The petitioner filed an affidavit in-reply wherein he replied to all the allegations made by the Municipality and stated that he had neither constructed any R.C.C. building nor left less than 25 feet margin from the middle of the road, as alleged. It was categorically stated that he had constructed an Assam type house in terms of the building permission given by the Municipality keeping well over 25 feet from the middle of the road. Photos of the building taken from different angles were also annexed in support of the aforesaid submission. It was reiterated that the action taken by the Municipal Board was arbitrary and in gross violation of the principles of natural justice and not tenable in law. We have considered the facts of the case. Also heard Mr. A. K. Bhattacharyya, the learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. A. Sarma, the learned counsel for the respondents. On consideration of the facts of the case we find that though according to the Municipal Board the petitioner had violated the terms of the building permission which the petitioner states is not correct, there is no dispute about the fact that no notice whatsoever was given to the petitioner nor was he allowed any opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order revoking the building permission already granted, directing him to stop further construction and to demolish the construction already undertaken. The question for determination, therefore, is whether the Municipal Board can pass such an order exparte without notice or hearing the affected person. The case of the Municipal Board is that action was taken after making an enquiry and no notice or opportunity of hearing was given as there is no provision in the Act to that effect. It was submitted that the action being an administrative action and there being no provision in the statute requiring any notice or opportunity of hearing to be given, it was not obligatory on the part of the Municipal Board to give any notice before taking action in exercise of the power conferred on it under the Meghalaya Municipal Act. In order to properly appreciate the submissions, it will be worthwhile to refer to the relevant provisions of the Municipal Act. In order to properly appreciate the submissions, it will be worthwhile to refer to the relevant provisions of the Municipal Act. The State of Meghalaya adopted the Assam Municipal Act, 1956 by the Meghalaya Adoption of Laws (No 3) of 1973 which came into force from 21.1.72. After the adoption, it was renamed as Meghalaya Municipal Act, 1973. The relevant provision is sub-section (1) of section 177 which reads : "177. Powers of Board in case of disobedience-(1) Should a building be begun, materially altered or erected- (a) without sanction as required by section 171 (1); or (b) without notice as required by section 171 (2), or clause (iii) of section 302 ; or (c) when sanction has been refused : or (d) in contravention of the terms of any sanction granted ; or (e) when the sanction has lapsed ; or (f) in contravention of any bye-laws made under section 302, clause (v); the Board may, by notice to be delivered within a reason­able time, require the building to be altered or demolished as it may deem necessary, within the space of thirty days from the date of the service of such notice. Provided that no such notice shall issue in respect of the contravention of any bye-law the observance of which has been dispensed with under section 173. Provided also that the Board at a meeting may instead of requiring the alterating or demolition of any such build­ing accept by way of composition such sum as it may deem reasonable". Sub-section (2) deals with the penalty leviable on failure to comply with a requisition issued by the Board under the provision of sub­section (I). Sub-section (2) was amended by the Meghalaya Act No. 12 of 1973. Sub-section (2) deals with the penalty leviable on failure to comply with a requisition issued by the Board under the provision of sub­section (I). Sub-section (2) was amended by the Meghalaya Act No. 12 of 1973. The amended sub section (2) reads as follows : "2) Any person who fails to comply with a requisition issued by the Board under the provisions of sub-section (1) shall be liable to a fine not exceeding five hundred rupees and to a further fine not exceeding fifty rupees for every day during which the person continues to make such default after serving on him of such requisition : Provided where such person continues to default or fails to make such alteration or demolition of the building after the imposition of the fine, the Magistrate may, on an application to be made in writing by the Board, order the alteration or demolition of the building within a period of 30 days and on non compliance of such order, may authorise the Board to take all necessary steps to alter or demolish such building and realise the expenses thereby incurred from the owners or occupiers of the building. Accordcling to the Municipal Board the case of the petitioner falls under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and, as such, it had power to issue direction to demolish the construction undertaken in contravention of the terms of the sanction and to revoke the sanction earlier granted. We have carefully considered the rival submissions of the parties in the light of the provisions of section 177 of the Act. We are of the opinion that the stand taken by the Municipal Board in law as in our view, for the reasons stated below, the principle of audi alterem partem applies to a case falling under section 177 of the Act and the Municipal Board is obliged to give a nodes to the affected person and allow him a reasonable opportunity of hearing before taking any action against him thereunder. It is well settled that where rights of a person are adversely and prejudicially affected by an order made by an authority in a proceeding, such person is entitled to pre decisional notice irrespective of whether the proceeding is judicial, quasi judicial or administrative in nature. nj decision should be taken in such a proceeding without first giving the person adversely affected an opportunity of putting forward his case. nj decision should be taken in such a proceeding without first giving the person adversely affected an opportunity of putting forward his case. This principle is applicable even where the statute is silent on the point of pre-decisional notice or hearing, because as stated by Lord Diplock "tae right of a man to be given a lair opportunity of hearing what is alleged against him and of presenting his own case is so fundamental to any civilised legal system that it is to be presumed that Parliament intended that a failure to observe it should render null and void any decision reached in breach of this requirement". (O'Reilly vs. Mackman, (1983) 2 AC 237,276). We are of the firm opinion that even administrative powers which adversely affect the rights of a person must be exercised in accordance with the principles of natural justice. When the legisl­ature confers powers on administrative officers or authorises them to decide matters involving the rights of other persons, there is a presumption that it intended that the officer or authority should act fairly towards those persons who will be adversely affected by their decisions. No specific provision in the statute to that effect is necessary. The right of hearing is a valuable right. It is not an empty formality. In the words of Lord Oenning "If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right in the accused man to know the case which is made against him. He must know what evidence has been given and what statements have been made affecting him : and then he must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict them". (Kanda vs. Govt. of Malaya, (1962) AC 322). The affected person therefore must have fair notice of the accusation against him. It is an essential part of "the fight to notice and hearing''. Notice implies notice of all the relevant facts giving rise to the proposed action. If any enquiry is made, the allegations made, the result of such enquiry and the substance of the information proposed to be utilised must be communicated to him. The authority cannot rely on any evidence or fact in arriving at its conclusion without first pointing out the same to the person concerned and giving him a reasonable opportunity of correcting or contracting anything prejudicial to him. The authority cannot rely on any evidence or fact in arriving at its conclusion without first pointing out the same to the person concerned and giving him a reasonable opportunity of correcting or contracting anything prejudicial to him. It is necessary in order to put the affected person in possession of full particulars of the case he is expected to meet. In the words of Lord Denning "he must know what evidence has been given and what statements have been made affecting him; and then he must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict them". (Kanda vs. Govt. of Malaya (supra). Such person also have a right to inspect the relevant records and documents which are sought to be used against him. In short, the notice and hearing to the aggrieved person must be real and fair. The admitted position in the instant case is that no notice or opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner before the impugned order in exercise of power under section 177 (1) of the Act revoking the building permission earlier granted to the petitioner and directing him to demolish the construction already undertaken by him. On a bare reading of section 177, it is clear that the powers conferred by it on the Municipal Board are very drastic in nature. An order passed in exerise of such power directing a person to alter or demolish a building constructed by him evidently has very serious ramifications. It adversely and prejudicially affects the rights of such person and might cause him irreparable loss and damage. Such an order, therefore, cannot be passed without due notice and real and fair hearing. The Municipal Board has to give the affected person a notice stating clearly and succinctly all allegations against him on the basis of which any action is proposed to be taken and allow him to be heard. Only after such notice and hearing, an order can be passed under section 177 which again must be a ''speaking order”. In the instant case, the aforesaid requirements were not complied with before passing the impugned order. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it was passed in gross violation of the principles of natural justice and therefore it cannot be sustained and has to be quashed which we hereby do. In the instant case, the aforesaid requirements were not complied with before passing the impugned order. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it was passed in gross violation of the principles of natural justice and therefore it cannot be sustained and has to be quashed which we hereby do. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed and the impugned order/ notice 'dated 17.12.83 issued by the Executive Officer of the Tura Municipality is quashed. No. order as to costs. S. K. Homchaudhuri, J.- I agree.