The only question involved in this case is whether the learned Assistant District Judge, Gauhati was correct in holding that it had territorial jurisdiction to try the suit filed by the plaintiff-opposite party. The plaintiff-opposite party, which is a partnership firm, carries on business of motor parts and accessories etc. at Gauhati. The petitioner No.l-defendant is also a partnership firm having its place of business at Pune. It deals in diamond brand taxi and auto-rickshaw fare meters and other accessories. The plaintiff-opposite party being interested in obtaining distributorship of the taxi and auto rickshaw fare meters manufactured by the defendant firm for the State of Assam approached the defendant-petitioners at Pune. A partner of the plaintiff firm, went to Pune for the purpose and wrote a letter on 30th October, 1976 to the defendant firm requesting it to intimate the terms and conditions for the distributorship, delivery scheme and the price structure. He also had discussion with the representative of the defendant firm at Pune in that connection. The defendant firm, in terms of the discussion, appo­inted the plaintiff firm as its distributor for Assam. The appo­intment was communicated by letter dated 30th October, 1976 delivered to the representative of the plaintiff firm in Pune, who in turn, on the very same day placed orders for supply of 200 numbers of diamond taxi meters and some other articles vide letter dated 30th October, 1976. The price of each meter with accessories was fixed at Rs. 1350/-. Along with the order a draft for Rs. 1,80,000/-on the Indian Overseas Bank, Pune by way of advance was also enclosed. The goods were to be sent by air and road transport-as indicated in the said letter. Accordingly, the defendant firm supplied 100 meters on 4. 11.76 by air and further 50 meters each in two instalments by road transport in terms of the order. After about one and a half year the plaintiff firm came to, know that the defendant firm had charged Rs. 1350/- per meter which was higher than the price of such meters prevalent in the market. Accor­ding to the plaintiff, the price of each meter should have been Rs. IIOO/-. There was thus an excess realisation at the rate of Rs. 250/- per meter. 1350/- per meter which was higher than the price of such meters prevalent in the market. Accor­ding to the plaintiff, the price of each meter should have been Rs. IIOO/-. There was thus an excess realisation at the rate of Rs. 250/- per meter. The plaintiff, therefore, demanded from the defendant firm refund of a sum of Rs 40, 29K12 being the excess amount realised on supply of taxi meters with interest and charges etc. The defendant having refused to pay, the plaintiff instituted Money Suit No. 132/78 in the Court of the Assistant District Judge No. 1, Gauhati. The defendants raised a preliminary objection in regard to maintainability of the suit on the ground that the Court at Gauhati had no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit as the contract in question was made at Pune and no cause of action did arise at Gauhati. According to the defendants the case of the plaintiff being that the defendants had charged higher prices for the meters supplied by it to the plaintiff in pursuance of an agreement entered into at Pune by making mis-representation in regard to the price prevailing at the time of the execution of the agreement, it was the place where the alleged wrong complained of was done to the plaintiff which was relevant for determining the territorial jurisdiction of the Court and, therefore, it was only the Court at Pune which had territorial jurisdiction to try the same and not the Court at Gauhati. The learned Assistant District Judge heard the objection as preliminary issue "whether the Court at Gauhati had territorial jurisdiction to try the suit” and by order dated 22.4.81 held that though the actual contract was made at Pune and delivery of goods was also affected at Pune it had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit for return of the excess amount as alleged in the plaint. This finding was arrived at on interpretation of sections 19 and 20 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter 'the Code'). It was held that the Court within whose legal jurisdiction the damage was caused or suffered or sustained would clearly answer the requirement of section 19. Accordingly the issue was decided in favour of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the defendants approached this Court by filing the present revision petition. It was held that the Court within whose legal jurisdiction the damage was caused or suffered or sustained would clearly answer the requirement of section 19. Accordingly the issue was decided in favour of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the defendants approached this Court by filing the present revision petition. I have considered the facts of the case and the impugned order passed by the learned Assistant District Judge. Also heard the learned counsel for both the parties. The material facts are not in dispute. The transaction took place at Pune. The goods were delivered to the carriers in terms of the contract at Pune. It is also the admitted position that the defendants have no place of business at Gauhati within the territorial jurisdiction of the Gauhati Court. The question for determination therefore is whether on such facts and circumstances the Gauhati Court had territorial jurisdiction to try the suit. The decision would depend on interpretation of sections 19 and 20 of the Code and section 39 of the Sale of Goods Act. Section 19 of the Code provides that a suit for compensation for wrong done to the person or to movable property may be tried either where the wrong was committed or where the defendant resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain. It reads: "19. Suit for compensation for wrongs to person or movables.- Where a suit is for compensation for wrong done to the person or to movable property, if the wrong was done within the local limits of the jurisdiction of one Court and the defendant resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, within the local limits of the jurisdiction of another Court, the suit may be instituted at the option of the plaintiff in either of the said Courts". Section 20 of the Code deals with the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts in respect of “other suits". It reads: "20. Section 20 of the Code deals with the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts in respect of “other suits". It reads: "20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises- Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction - (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the Time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain ; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and' voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution ; or (c) the cause of action wholly or in part, arises." From a reading of the aforesaid sections it appears that the scheme of the Code in regard to territorial jurisdiction of the Courts in relation to a suit for compensation for wrong done to a person or to movable property, is that the suit should be instituted at a place where the defendant is able to defend the suit without undue trouble. That is why it is provided in section 19 that a suit can be instituted either at the place where the defendant resides" or "where the wrong is done"; The option to choose the forum is restricted to the aforesaid two . forums only. Similarly, section 20 also restricts the scope of choice" of the forum by the plaintiff to the -place where the defendants, of any one of them, reside or carry on business or the cause of action wholly or in part arises. This scheme appears to have, rationale behind it as otherwise by filing a suit at a place far away from his place of business oral a place with which he has no connection whatsoever many problems might be created for him who might find it difficult to defend the suit. This scheme appears to have, rationale behind it as otherwise by filing a suit at a place far away from his place of business oral a place with which he has no connection whatsoever many problems might be created for him who might find it difficult to defend the suit. The place of suing, therefore, has been specified to be a place where either the defendant resides or carries on business or the wrong is alleged to be done or the cause of action arises. The second forum, namely, the place where the wrong is done in section 19 and where the cause of action arises in section 20 extends the territorial jurisdiction beyond the place of residence or business of the defendant on the basis that if the defendant could do something at such other place thereby committing the wrong or giving rise to the cause of action wholly or in part he should also be able to defend any action bi ought against him at such place arising out of such wrong or cause of action. This view also gets support from sub-section (1) of section 39 of the Sale of Goods Act, 193, which provides that where, in pursuance of a contract of sale, the seller is authorised or required to send the goods to the buyer, delivery of the goods to a carrier, whether named by the buyer or not, for the purpose of transmission to the buyer, is prima facie deemed to be a delivery of the goods to buyer. It reads : "39. Delivery to carrier or wharfinger- (1) Where, in pursuance of a contract of sale, the seller is authorised or required to send the goods to the buyer, delivery of the goods to a carrier, whether named by the buyer or not, for the purpose of transmission to the buyer, or delivery of the goods to a wharfinger for safe custody, is prima facie deemed to be a delivery of the goods to buyer". The aforesaid provision thus makes it clear that the moment the goods are delivered to a carrier it operates as delivery to the purchaser. The aforesaid provision thus makes it clear that the moment the goods are delivered to a carrier it operates as delivery to the purchaser. In the absence of such a provision it could have been possible to contend that the delivery is complete at the destination thereby extending the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts in case of any wrong done to such goods by the supplier to such place of destination. There appears to be some controversy whether section 19 of the Code is in the nature of an exception to section 20 or whether it is really a limitation on the provisions contained in section 20. From a careful reading of section 20, I am of the opinion that section 20 applies to casts other than those to which sections 16 to 19 apply. The heading of section itself is “other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises". This view is reinforced by the opening words of section 20 which make its provisions applicable "subject to the limitations aforesaid" meaning thereby the limitations contained in lections 16 to 19 of the Code. The word 'limitations' used in section 20 cannot be given a literal meaning. It means the cases falling within sections 16 to 19 shall not be governed by the provisions of this section. In fact section 20 contains a residuary provision for determination of territorial jurisdiction of the Courts in cases other than those for which specific provision is made in other sections, namely, sections 16 to 19 From the facts of the instant case, it appears that the provisions of section 19 are applicable and the territorial jurisdiction of the Court has to be decided in accordance with the provisions contained therein. Section 19, as stated above, provides that a suit for compensation for wrong done to a person or movable property should be filed at the place where the wrong is done or at the place where the author of the wrong, namely, the defendant resides or works for gain. These are the only two choices available to a plaintiff and he has to choose one of them. He cannot have a third choice. These are the only two choices available to a plaintiff and he has to choose one of them. He cannot have a third choice. The expression "wrong done" contemplates "wrong done by the defendant” and in most of the cases the place where it is done is not in dispute except in a case like the one where the goods are dispatched from one place to another, of which care is taken by section 39 of the Sale of Goods Act. The expression "wrong done" cannot be screened too far to bring it within its ambit place or places where "the effect of the wrong might be felt by the plaintiff". Such an attempt will go counter to the very object and scheme of section 19 which is to restrict the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts to a place where either the wrong is done or the defendant resides and will whittle down the express provisions contained in section 19 of the Code. It will in fact make the provisions of section 19 otiose. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that section 20 of the Code does not apply to a case covered by section 19. I am also of the opinion that the language of section 19 is very clear and it confers the territorial jurisdiction in case of a suit for compensation for wrong dons to the person or to the movable property on the Courts having jurisdiction over two places only, namely, (1) the place where the wrong was done, and (2) the place where the defendant resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. The expression 'wrong done' is confined to "the wrong act of the defendant" and not to consequential effect thereof on the plaintiff. Consequential effect may be relevant in determining the amount of compensation but not the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. In the instant case, the suit is based on the allegation of wrong done by the defendants at the time of fixation of the price of diamond brand taxi and auto rickshaw fare meters at Pune. The offer and acceptance was at Pune, the agreement was entered into between the parties at Pune. In the instant case, the suit is based on the allegation of wrong done by the defendants at the time of fixation of the price of diamond brand taxi and auto rickshaw fare meters at Pune. The offer and acceptance was at Pune, the agreement was entered into between the parties at Pune. The order for supply of goods was also placed there, and the advance payment was also made there itself ; and in pursuance of the contract of sale the goods were delivered to the carrier at Pune. The claim of the plaintiff is that the price of the meters was fixed at a higher amount because of misrepresentation made by the defendant. That was the alleged wrong done by the defendant and admittedly it was "done" at Pune. The defendants reside at Pune and not at Gauhati. Under such circumstances, in view of the clear provision of section 19 discussed above it is only the Court at Pune which will have territorial jurisdiction to try the suit filed by the plaintiff and not the Court at Gauhati. This position would be the same even if it is held that section 20 is applicable because the contract having been entered into and executed at Pune whole of the "cause of action" arose at Pune only and no part of it arose at Gauhati. I, therefore, hold that the learned Assistant District Judge at Gauhati had no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit. The impugned order dated 24.2.81 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge No. 1, Gauhati in Money Suit No, 132 of 1978 is set aside. The learned Assistant District Judge is directed to return the plaint to the plaintiff-opposite party for presentation to the appropriate Court. Since the plaintiff opposite party persued the claim before the Court at Gauhati under the bonafide belief that it had territorial jurisdiction, the period during which the plaintiff prosecuted the suit at Gauhati should be excluded in computing the period of limitation for filing the suit in appropriate Court. This revision petition is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs.