JUDGMENT Dr. G.F. Couto. J.- This Appeal is directed against the Judgment dated 9th September, 1988, whereby the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Satari, convicted the respondents under Sections 3 and 4, respectively, of the Goa, Daman and Diu Public Gambling Act, 1976, and after sentencing them give the benefit of probation as regards the substantive sentence of imprisonment. 2. The respondents had indeed been charged of having committed the aforesaid offences punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Public Gambling Act. They pleaded not guilty, but ultimately, after the evidence was adduced, the learned Trial Magistrate held that the prosecution has brought home to the respondents the guilt, and accordingly, convicted the first respondent for an offence punishable under Section 3 and the second respondent for an offence under Section 4, both of the aforesaid Act. Thereafter observing that Sections 3 and 4 of the said Act envisage two types of punishment, viz. a fine and an imprisonment, gave the benefit of probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act to both the respondents as regards the sentence of imprisonment. 3. The State, being solely aggrieved by the benefit of probation given to the respondents, has filed this Appeal, which therefore, gives rise to the question as to whether the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act can be given to an offender in cases where a minimum sentence is provided in the transgressed law, and if so, whether such benefit can be given without getting a report of the concerned Probation Officer. 4. Mr. Bhobe, the learned Public Prosecutor, with his habitual fairness, began to state that there is no provision included in the Goa, Daman and Diu Public Gambling Act which excludes the application of the Probation of Offenders Act in respect of the offences committed by a person under it. However, he invited my attention to Section 3 of the same Act and submitted that this provision of the law clearly indicates the legislative intendment to award a minimum sentence of imprisonment and a fine for an offence under the Act. However, he invited my attention to Section 3 of the same Act and submitted that this provision of the law clearly indicates the legislative intendment to award a minimum sentence of imprisonment and a fine for an offence under the Act. It provides for punishment for keeping common gaming houses, and in particular prescribes in the proviso that imprisonment shall not be less than one month in cases of the first offence, not less than three months for the second offence and not less than six months for the third or subsequent offences. In addition, fines of 200 rupees, 300 rupees and 500 rupees are prescribed for the first, second' and third or subsequent offences. The learned public Prosecutor urged that the provision for minimum penalties clearly indicates that the legislature considering the seriousness of the offences, intended to penalise the offender under the Act with a stringent penalty. This, by implication, prima facie indicates that the legislature did not intend to make available to the offenders under Gambling Act, the benefit of the. Probation of Offenders Act. The learned Public Prosecutor, however, conceded in all fairness that it seems that the Supreme Court laid down a different law in Isher Das v. State of Punjab1 according to which, unless a specific provision is included in a particular Act excluding the application of the Probation of Offenders Act, the latter Act would be applicable to all the cases, even to those where a minimum punishment is prescribed. Mr. Bhobe at the same time, urged that the said decision of the Supreme Court appears to be distinguishable, as the view taken in Isher Das's case (supra) was caused by the circumstances that the Probation of Offenders Act was published after to Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 5. In Ishear Das v. State of Punjab (supra) a question as to whether the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act were applicable to the offenders of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, fell for the determination of the Court. Dealing with it. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the Probation of Offenders Act has been enacted in the year 1958 and therefore, much after the enactment and coming into force of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act in the year 1954. Dealing with it. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the Probation of Offenders Act has been enacted in the year 1958 and therefore, much after the enactment and coming into force of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act in the year 1954. Hence, as the Legislature had enacted the Probation of Offenders Act despite the existence on the statute book of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and- has specifically excluded the operation of its provisions in respect of the offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act. the operation of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act could not be whittled down or circumscribed because of the provisions of the earlier enactment, namely of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, as no exclusion of the benefit of the probation was made as regards the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Considering all these circumstances, the Court held the view that the Probation of Offenders Act was also applicable to the offenders under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, although bearing in mind that adulteration of food is a menace to the public health. Their Lordships sounded a note of caution by stating that the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act would not easily be given to persons above 21 years of age found guilty of offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. However, the Court also added that such restriction does riot exist as regards offenders below the age of 21 years. 6. It would, at the first glance, appear from the above observations of the Supreme Court that the reason why the Court held the view that the Probation of Offenders Act was applicable in all cases not specifically excluded, was that the Probation of Offenders Act has been enacted after the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, and inspite of that, unlike what happened with the cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, no exclusion of the cases under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act has been made. But in a deeper and a more careful examination of the case I am of the firm opinion that it is not so and that the view taken by the Supreme Court is that the Probation of Offenders Act is applicable in all cases and to all the offenders except when the application of the said Act is specifically excluded This view is, otherwise, in consonance with the present philosophy behind the penology and also advances the very purpose and object of the Probation of Offenders Act. The philosophy behind the penology has, 'undoubtedly, undergone a sea of change through the centuries. Initially, the philosophy of penology was one of retribution and therefore, the doctrine of an eye, for an eye, or a tooth for a tooth, was evolved. Slowly however, with the advance of the sociology and of the humanitarian approach to the problem, the doctrine of retribution was substituted by the doctrine of repression under which the criminal was to suffer punitive measure. Then, the idea of repression was blended with the theory of correction, i.e. the doctrine that the object of the criminal punishment is not only to repress the crime, but also to correct the offender. Then, the next step in the evolution was that the doctrine that the criminal penalties are meant also to prevent other persons from committing are meant also to prevent other persons from committing the crime came into operation, and therefore, the deterrent aspect of the criminal penalties was accepted Finally, in the present world, it is well settled that the ends and the scope of a criminal penalty is not only punitive, corrective and preventive, but also regenerative, in the sense that it has also the goal of reforming the offender, rehabilitating' him and making him again a good citizen. It is thus clear that in this long evolution of the thinking about the penology, the emphasis which once was on the repressive and preventive aspects has nowadays turned to the reformation and rehabilitation of the citizen. This philosophy is clearly reflected in the enactment of the Probation of Offenders Act. In fact, it can be seen in the statement of objects and reasons wherein, inter alia. This philosophy is clearly reflected in the enactment of the Probation of Offenders Act. In fact, it can be seen in the statement of objects and reasons wherein, inter alia. it is stated that in several States, there are no separate probational laws at all, and even in States where there are probational laws, they are not uniform nor they are adequate to meet the present requirements. There has been an increasing emphasis on the reformation and rehabilitation of the offender as an useful and self-reliant member of the society without subjecting him to the deleterious effects of the jail life. In other words, the Probation of Offenders Act is meant to give an opportunity to an offender to reform himself and become again an useful and self reliant member of the society. This being the case, I am of the firm view that the Probation of Offenders Act is applicable in all cases, including those where a minimum penalty is prescribed for an offence except when there is a specific provisions excluding its application. 7, I already mentioned that the learned Public Prosecutor has fairly conceded that there is no provision at all in the Goa, Daman and Diu Public Gambling Act excluding the persons who had transgreassed against it, from the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act. This being so, it is obvious that the learned Judge has not committed any error while taking the view that the benefit of probation was to be given in the present case to the respondents. However, if this is true, no less true is that the learned Magistrate erred in giving that benefit to the respondents, straightaway. He, indeed, ought to have sought, first, the report of the Probation Officer and only after that and in case the report was favorable, could have granted the benefit of probation. This error, however, does not justify in the facts of this case, the interference of the Court, since the offence is not serious. 8. The result, therefore, is that this Appeal fails and is accordingly, dismissed Appeal dismissed. 1. A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1295.