K. P. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) IN this revision the informant-petitioner has challenged the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Balasore acquitting the accused-opposite parties of offences under Sections 143 and, 379 of the Indian Penal Code. ( 2 ) THE prosecution case shorn of unnecessary details is stated below. The petitioner (P. W. 1) and his two brothers purchased the disputed homestead land measuring Ac. 0. 28 decimals appertaining to M. S. plot Nos. 820, 821 and 822 in Khata No. 301 of mouja Gobindpur by a registered sale deed (Ext. 2) dated 20 -12 - 1976 for consideration from one Pagali Dei. After purchase they enclosed the area which centained bamboo clumps. On 9-6-1980 at about 9 a. m. the opposite parties one of whom named Maguni Das has in the meantime died entered inside the disputed land and despite protests, cut and removed a large number of bamboos from the bamboo clumps. Several witnesses including me Grama Rakhi (p. w. 2) saw the incident. On the next day the petitioner (P. W. 1) gave a written report (Ext. 1) to the A. S. I. of Balimunds. Out - post (P. W. 6) who commenced investigation during which he saized 21 pieces of bamboos from the Ban of deceased Maguni Das and his brother under seizure list (Ext. 9) and further under seizure list Ext. 10 he seized 145 pieces of bamboos from their custody. After close of investigation he submitted charge sheet against the opposite parties for having committed offences under Sections 143, 294, 379 and 447 of the Indian Penal Code. ( 3 ) CHARGES were framed against the opposite parties for having committed offences under Sections 143 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code. They took the plea that they had cut bamboos from their own homestead lands in their khas possession, but the case was started falsely against them. ( 4 ) THE learned Judicial Magistrate who tried the opposite parties and had the opportunity of examining the prosecution witnesses recorded the findings to the effect that the disputed land as well as the bamboo clumps were in possession of P. W. 1. On the date of occurrence the opposite parties committed theft of a large number of bamboos from the dumps although they had no right to do so. On the date of occurrence the opposite parties committed theft of a large number of bamboos from the dumps although they had no right to do so. Therefore, he convicted them for the offences they were charged with and sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. ( 5 ) THE opposite parties preferred appeals before the learned Sessions Judge who on very superficial considerations and without delving deep into the voluminous oral and documentary evidence recorded an order of acquittal on the finding that the prosecution failed to prove its case. ( 6 ) AT the outset it is necessary to quote the legal principle laid down in the oft quoted decision reported in K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and anr. 1 It is true that it is open to the High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties though the State may not have thought fit to appeal but this jurisdiction should be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a main fest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Subsection (4) of Section 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial, when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. it is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. Some cases of this kind however may be indicated, which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. it is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. Some cases of this kind however may be indicated, which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be where the Trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the Trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce, or where the Appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the Trial Court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the Trial Court or by the appeal Court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal and in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it should not do directly in view of the provisions of Section 439 (4 ). To the same effect are all the later decisions of this High Court and also of the Supreme Court including the one reported in Bansi Lal and ors. v. Laxman Singh. 2 ( 7 ) THE conclusions drawn by the learned Sessions Judge are stated below: 1. In the F. I. R (Ext. 1) reference to the disputed land was not made. 2. Although P. W. 5 claimed to be a boundary wintess of the disputed land P. W. 2 did not disclose the name of P. W. 5. Similarly in the spot map (Ext. 12) supported by an index it does not appear that P. W. 5 was a boundary tenant; 3. P. W. 2, the Grama Rakhi is not a resident of the village where the disputed land is situate. Similarly in the spot map (Ext. 12) supported by an index it does not appear that P. W. 5 was a boundary tenant; 3. P. W. 2, the Grama Rakhi is not a resident of the village where the disputed land is situate. So his evidence carried little weight; (4) P. W. 7, the Investigating Officer did not give the location of the bamboo clumps on the disputed land; (5) P. W. 4, contradicted himself by stating that the informant was in possession of the disputed land for the past five years and he did not know who was in possession thereof prior thereto; (6) The seized bamboos were given in zima of a third person and subsequently they were sold without orders of the Court; (7) P. W. 3 had no land near the disputed land; and (8)P. W. 5 was not a disinterested witness. He deposed against the opposite parties in another criminal case which also related to theft of bamboos. That apart he himself purchased apart of the disputed land. ( 8 ) EXPLANATION to the aforesaid conclusions are simple enough and can be found in the evidence itself. They are given serial wise: 1. Although description of the disputed hind in plot numbers and boundaries Was not given in the F. I. R. (Ext. 1) there was clear reference to the sale deed (Ext. 2) in which the disputed land was described in great detail; 2. P. W. 3 stated that P. W. 5 was a boundary witness of the disputed land. The spot map (Ext. 12) was prepared by the Investigating Officer and he was not expected to have personal knowledge of the names of the boundary tenants so as to same P. W. 5 as such; 3. Although P. W. 2, the Grama Rakhi was not a resident of the village where the disputed land was situate, yet there could be no difficulty for him to have personal knowledge of possession thereof. It is well known that persons living at considerable distances may have knowledge of possession of immovable property. On this ground alone his evidence was not liable to be discarded; 4. Because the Investigating Officer did not give the location of the bamboo clumps on the disputed land his evidence cannot be viewed with suspicion. It is well known that persons living at considerable distances may have knowledge of possession of immovable property. On this ground alone his evidence was not liable to be discarded; 4. Because the Investigating Officer did not give the location of the bamboo clumps on the disputed land his evidence cannot be viewed with suspicion. It was at best a simple omission which did not affect the substratum of the prosecution case in view of direct evidence of eye 5. P. W. 4 did not contradict himself at all. He stated that he had knowledge that the informant was in possession of the disputed land for the past five years prior to the occurence but it was possible that he did not know who was in possession thereof prior thereto; 6. If the Investigating Officer gave zima of the seized bamboos to a third person and subsequently sold the same without orders of the court he can at best be blamed. But such action on his part had no relevance to the merits of the prosecution case; 7. Even if P. W. 3 had no land near the disputed land it cannot be said that he was not competent to speak about its possession. His evidence has to be accepted or discarded. on its intrinsic value and 8. P. W. 5 might not be a disinterested witness. The evidence of an interested witness is not necessarily worthless to be rejected forthwith. According to the legal principle, evidence of interested witness is to be considered with caution. If such evidence finds correboration from independent sources there is no reason why it should be discarded In this case the evidence of P. W. 5 has been sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence. Even if his evidence is discarded the prosecution case does not suffer because of other evidence. ( 9 ) THE eye-witnesses to the occurrence are P. Ws. 1,2,3,4 and 5. Each of them stated that the disputed land with bamboo clumps standing thereon was in possession of the informant after purchase. On the date of occurrence the opposite parties cut and removed a large number of bamboos. ( 9 ) THE eye-witnesses to the occurrence are P. Ws. 1,2,3,4 and 5. Each of them stated that the disputed land with bamboo clumps standing thereon was in possession of the informant after purchase. On the date of occurrence the opposite parties cut and removed a large number of bamboos. As a matter of fact, P. W. 6, the Investigating Officer seized about more than 150 pieces of bamboos from the Ban of deceased opposite party Maguni Das who was obviously at the halm of the crime If the disputed land with bamboo clumps belonged to the opposite parties or some of them there was hardly any need to cut down such a large number on a single day. The intrinsic value of the evidence of these prosecution witnesses was not at all examined by the learned Sessions Judge. He did not make a graphic reference to them. He picked up statements here and there and without reference to the context demolished the prosecution case as untrue. ( 10 ) ON behalf of the prosecution a large number of documents were admitted into evidence. Ext. 6 is a Khatian in which the vender of P. W. 1 was recorded as Stitiban tenant in respect of the disputed land. Ext. 5 is the rent roll standing in her name. The registered sale deed executed by the vendor of P. W. 1 is Ext. 2. Ext. 3 is the Parcha standing in her name and Exts. 4 series are rent receipts obtained by P. W. 1 Ext. 7 dated 1-5-1977 is the order by the Revenue Officer, Basudevpur in case No. 1086 of 1976. The case was initiated by deceased opposite party Maguni Das for settlement of the disputed land in his favour under Section 36-A of. the O. L. R. Act. It was found by the Revenue Officer that he was not in possession of the disputed land. On the other hand one of the purchasers under Ext. 2 namely, Gopinath Das had constructed a small hut in one comer of disputed plot No. 820. The learned Sessions Judge, however, referred to Ext. A an earlier order dated 16-1-1977 and observed that deceased opposite party Maguni Das was in physical possession of the disputed land as found by the Revenue Officer. 2 namely, Gopinath Das had constructed a small hut in one comer of disputed plot No. 820. The learned Sessions Judge, however, referred to Ext. A an earlier order dated 16-1-1977 and observed that deceased opposite party Maguni Das was in physical possession of the disputed land as found by the Revenue Officer. Above all, the learned Sessions Judge did not make reference to all the documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution and came to abrupt conclusions on the basis of a document which subsequently stood corrected by the same Revenue Officer. ( 11 ) ON an analysis of the evidence both oral and documentary it cannot but be noticed that the appreciation thereof by the learned Sessions Judge was singularly superficial, unreasonable and suffers from error of record here and there. Such a judgment which occasioned miscarriage of justice cannot be supported according to the settled principle of law referred to earlier. ( 12 ) I would accordingly allowed the criminal revision set aside the impugned order of the learned Sessions Judge, Balasore and direct rehearing and disposal of the appeal according to law without in any way being influenced by any of the observations made in this judgment. The lower court records maybe sent back forthwith. .